ghsa

We have identified a cross-site websocket hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability within the control.ashx endpoint of MeshCentral. This component is the primary mechanism used within MeshCentral to perform administrative actions on the server. To demonstrate the impact of the vulnerability we developed a proof-of-concept which leveraged the cross-site websocket hijacking vulnerability to read the server configuration file to leak the sessionKey variable, generating login tokens, and generating an authentication cookie. The vulnerability is exploitable when an attacker is able to convince a victim end-user to click on a malicious link to a page hosting an attacker-controlled site. The attacker can then originate a cross-site websocket connection using client-side JavaScript code to connect to “control.ashx” as the victim user within MeshCentral. There are some caveats to exploiting this issue however as MeshCentral configures `SameSite=Lax` security setting on cookies which introduces some add...

### Summary Ever since https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/pull/204 (or specifically https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/commit/387755eacf0be35591a478d3c67fe10618a6d542) was merged, I can create a reproducible crash when running the snippet under PoC on a current Debian bullseye aarm64 on a Raspberry Pi 3 (I was **not** able to reproduce this on my x86_64 Laptop with Python 3.11; I suspect because there is enough memory to allocate still) ## Details ### PoC ```py import json import concurrent.futures import cbor2 def test(): obj = "x" * 131128 cbor_enc = cbor2.dumps(obj) return cbor2.loads(cbor_enc) with concurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutor() as executor: future = executor.submit(test) print(future.result()) ``` ``` malloc(): unsorted double linked list corrupted Traceback (most recent call last): File "test.py", line 14, in <module> print(future.result()) File "/usr/lib/python3.9/concurrent/futures/_base.py", line 440, in result return self.__get_...

### Impact Path disclosure in JavaScript variable ### Patches Patch in PrestaShop 8.1.4 ### References https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Full_Path_Disclosure Thanks to https://github.com/hugo-fasone

The `rquickjs` crate used by SurrealDB implements Rust bindings to the QuickJS C library and is used to execute SurrealDB scripting functions. The `rquickjs` function `Exception::throw_type` takes a string and returns an error object. Prior to version `0.4.2` of the crate, this string would be fed directly into `printf`, which will receive the error string as a format string with no additional arguments, leading to undefined behavior. This issue triggers when a SurrealDB scripting function returns an error and its input contains a format string such as `%s` or `%d`. This vulnerability can only affect SurrealDB servers explicitly enabling the scripting capability with `--allow-scripting` or `--allow-all` and equivalent environment variables `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_SCRIPT=true` and `SURREAL_CAPS_ALLOW_ALL=true`. ### Impact An attacker with privileges to execute scripting functions with arbitrary inputs may be able to exploit this format string vulnerability in order read arbitrary memory...

The query executor would panic when executing a query containing a call to a built-in SurrealDB function that did not exist. This could occur accidentally in situations where the version of the SurrealDB client was newer than the SurrealDB server or when a pre-parsed query was provided to the server via a newer version of the SurrealDB SDK. ### Impact A client that is authorized to run queries in a SurrealDB server is able to craft and execute a pre-parsed query invoking a nonexistent built-in function, which will cause a panic. This will crash the server, leading to denial of service. ### Patches - Version 1.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Concerned users unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted users to run arbitrary SurrealQL queries in the affected versions of SurrealDB. To limit the impact of the denial of service, SurrealDB administrators may also want to ensure that the SurrealDB process is running so that it can be automati...

The span rendering would panic when handling failed parsing of queries where the error occurred on a line terminator character. ### Impact A client that is authorized to run queries in a SurrealDB server is able to execute a malformed query which will fail to parse on a line terminator character and cause a panic in the span rendering code. This will crash the server, leading to denial of service. ### Patches - Version 1.2.1 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Concerned users unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted users to run arbitrary SurrealQL queries in the affected versions of SurrealDB. To limit the impact of the denial of service, SurrealDB administrators may also want to ensure that the SurrealDB process is running so that it can be automatically re-started after a crash. ### References - #3527 - https://github.com/StarlaneStudios/Surrealist/issues/177

### Impact For Cilium users who have enabled [an external kvstore](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/installation/k8s-install-external-etcd/#when-do-i-need-to-use-a-kvstore) and [Wireguard transparent encryption](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/network/encryption-wireguard/#encryption-wg), traffic between pods in the affected cluster is not encrypted. ### Patches This issue affects Cilium v1.14 before v1.14.7. This issue has been patched in Cilium v1.14.7. ### Workarounds There is no workaround to this issue - affected users are encouraged to upgrade. ### Acknowledgements The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @giorio94 and @gandro for their work on triaging and remediating this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/community/community/#slack). If you think you found a related vu...

### Impact For Cilium users who are using CRDs to store Cilium state (the default configuration) and [Wireguard transparent encryption](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/network/encryption-wireguard/#encryption-wg), responses from pods to the Ingress and health endpoints are not encrypted. Traffic from the Ingress and health endpoints to pods is not affected by this issue. The health endpoint is only used for Cilium's internal health checks. ### Patches This issue affects Cilium v1.14 before v1.14.7. This issue has been patched in Cilium v1.14.7. ### Workarounds There is no workaround to this issue - affected users are encouraged to upgrade. ### Acknowledgements The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @gandro for their work on triaging and remediating this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.i...

## Overview A potential security vulnerability discovered in `pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle` version up to v1.3.3 . The vulnerability involves a Host Header Injection in the `invitationLinkAction` function of the UserController, specifically in the way `$loginUrl` trusts user input. ## Details The host header from incoming HTTP requests is used unsafely when generating URLs. An attacker can manipulate the HTTP host header in requests to the /admin/user/invitationlink endpoint, resulting in the generation of URLs with the attacker's domain. In fact, if a host header is injected in the POST request, the $loginURL parameter is constructed with this unvalidated host header. It is then used to send an invitation email to the provided user. Here is an excerpt from the affected section of UserController.php file: ``` // /src/Controller/Admin/UserController.php public function invitationLinkAction(Request $request, TranslatorInterface $translator): JsonResponse { ...

### Impact Knowing a user's email address and username, an unauthenticated attacker can hijack the user's account by poisoning the link in the password reset notification message. ### Patches https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/7055731d09ff12b2781410a372f790172e279744 ### Workarounds Define `$g_path` as appropriate in config_inc.php. ### References https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=19381 ### Credits Thanks to the following security researchers for responsibly reporting and helping resolve this vulnerability. - Pier-Luc Maltais (https://twitter.com/plmaltais) - Hlib Yavorskyi (https://github.com/Kerkroups) - Jingshao Chen (https://github.com/shaozi) - Brandon Roldan - nhchoudhary