Tag
#auth
Summary Cybersecurity researchers have identified a large-scale hacking operation linked to notorious ShinyHunters and Nemesis hacking groups. In…
It’s easy to tick the checkboxes on a compliance checklist with the mindset that your system is protected and not exposed to risk. If it is this simple, why do we continue to invest billions of dollars in developing security controls and software development lifecycle (SDL) practices that help harden software and minimize risk? What is the value in configuring services, tuning firewalls, and enforcing access policies only to accept a risk rating for a vulnerability directly mapped to a base score that seemingly ignores all the work done?This contradictory model of focusing on security featur
### Summary If a `server.ca` file is present in `LXD_DIR` at LXD start up, LXD is in "PKI mode". In this mode, only TLS clients that have a CA-signed certificate should be able to authenticate with LXD. We have discovered that if a client that sends a non-CA signed certificate during the TLS handshake, that client is able to authenticate with LXD if their certificate is present in the trust store. - The LXD Go client (and by extension `lxc`) does not send non-CA signed certificates during the handshake. - A manual client (e.g. `cURL`) might send a non-CA signed certificate during the handshake. #### Versions affected LXD 4.0 and above. ### Details When PKI mode was added to LXD it was intended that all client and server certificates *must* be signed by the certificate authority (see https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/2070/commits/84d917bdcca6fe1e3191ce47f1597c7d094e1909). In PKI mode, the TLS listener configuration is altered to add the CA certificate but the `ClientAut...
### Summary If a `server.ca` file is present in `LXD_DIR` at LXD start up, LXD is in "PKI mode". In this mode, all clients must have certificates that have been signed by the CA. The LXD configuration option `core.trust_ca_certificates` defaults to `false`. This means that although the client certificate has been signed by the CA, LXD will additionally add the certificate to the trust store and verify it via mTLS. When a restricted certificate is added to the trust store in this mode, it's restrictions are not honoured, and the client has full access to LXD. ### Details When authorization was refactored to allow for generalisation (at the time for TLS, RBAC, and OpenFGA, see https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/12313), PKI mode did not account for the `core.trust_ca_certificates` configuration option. When this option is enabled, all CA-signed client certificates are given full access to LXD. [This cherry-pick from Incus](https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/12513/commits/5cdc9a3...
The second zero-day vulnerability found in Windows NTLM in the past two months paves the way for relay attacks and credential theft. Microsoft has no patch, but released updated NTLM cyberattack mitigation advice.
Protect your systems with automated patching and server hardening strategies to defend against vulnerabilities like the NTLM zero-day.…
A vulnerability was found in OIDC-Client. When using the RH SSO OIDC adapter with EAP 7.x or when using the elytron-oidc-client subsystem with EAP 8.x, authorization code injection attacks can occur, allowing an attacker to inject a stolen authorization code into the attacker's own session with the client with a victim's identity. This is usually done with a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) or phishing attack.
unstructured v.0.14.2 and before is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) via the XMLParser.
due to a weakness in the encryption method used in cookie-encrypter an attack can use the world visible IV to edit encrypted cookies without decrypting the cookie itself. This is known as an AES CBC bit flipping attack.
Scammers set up call centers in luxury rentals to run bank help-desk fraud, as well as large-scale phishing campaigns, across at least 10 European countries, according to law enforcement.