By Deeba Ahmed
Hidden Code, Hidden Profits - Tracked Before You Click - SDBN Takes Adobe to Court Over Alleged Illegal Tracking of Dutch Cizitens.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Dutch Watchdog Sues Adobe Over Mass Collection of Citizen Data

Dutch privacy watchdog SDBN alleges that Adobe is spying on and collecting data from ‘virtually every Dutch internet user’ through the illegal placement of tracking cookies.

Dutch privacy watchdog Stichting Data Bescherming Nederland (**SDBN**) is suing Adobe for illegally tracking and sharing the personal data of millions of Dutch citizens.

For your information, SDBN is a Netherlands-based non-profit foundation striving to safeguard users’ privacy and data protection. Apart from Adobe, the organization is also actively pursuing lawsuits against Amazon and X (formerly Twitter).

Adobe, a United States-based design software company known for its creativity and multimedia software products, is accused of secretly collecting vast amounts of data from users visiting prominent websites and apps, including Dutch telecommunications company KPN, Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP (National Civil Pension Fund), and the Dutch Tax Authority.

According to SDBN, the collected data is then shared with multiple third parties without obtaining user consent. Moreover, the company allegedly used tactics like hidden tracking cookies and app SDKs to collect data.

In a press release that the organization shared with Hackread.com, users are kept in the dark about their digital footprints, and sometimes Adobe plants cookies before they can say no. These profiles are shared with other companies for targeted advertising.

This practice violates the General Data Protection Regulation (**GDPR**), putting users at risk of data exposure, identity fraud, and other privacy concerns. SDBN claims that Adobe is snooping on nearly every Dutch citizen, even those who have never used Adobe products.

> _“Via websites and apps, Adobe itself illegally collects an enormous amount of data on virtually every Dutch internet user, irrespective of whether they have ever used an Adobe product”._
> 
> SDBN

It warns that this data trade is not risk-free and could expose sensitive information and identity. They are taking Adobe to court, demanding an end to the covert tracking and compensation for millions of affected Dutch citizens.

Adobe profited financially from this unlawful data collection. Hence, SDBN filed a class action lawsuit demanding Adobe to cease illegal data collection, destroy all the illegally collected data, and disclose all parties with whom data has been shared. The lawsuit aims to stop tracking cookies on popular websites and hidden code in apps like Marktplaats and Buienradar. 

SDBN also demands justice for an estimated seven million Dutch citizens whose data was shared, demanding Adobe to remove every illegally collected data and give impacted users compensation for the privacy invasion. 

Dutch internet users can join the fight by signing up for a free mass claim on SDBN’s website. If a Dutch internet user has visited the aforementioned websites or used the listed apps, they may be eligible to join the lawsuit and claim compensation.

SDBN’s chairperson Anouk Ruhaak, stated that the design software vendor’s involvement in mass data collection and trading is surprising.

“While Adobe is primarily recognized as a design software supplier, what’s surprising is its simultaneous involvement in the digital personal data market – tracking your online activities. Have you made online Christmas purchases? Well, Adobe likely has a detailed record of what you browsed and where you bought your Christmas stockings or perfume.”

SDBN also shared a list of websites and apps which it claims are used by Adobe to track users. These included the following sites:

*   Abp.nl
*   Albelli.nl
*   Bruna.nl
*   Douglas.nl
*   Expedia.nl
*   Gamma.nl
*   Karwei.nl
*   ketnet.be
*   Kijk.nl
*   Kpn.com
*   Kwf.nl
*   Tui.nl
*   Unibet.nl
*   Unive.nl
*   Wsj.com
*   Footlocker.nl
*   Hallmark.com
*   Beterhoren.nl
*   Belastingdienst.nl

****Examples of mobile apps (iOS and Android) that allegedly contain Adobe tracking software include:****

*   Asos
*   RTL XL
*   MijnKPN
*   Ziggo GO
*   Buienradar
*   Marktplaats
*   PlayStation
*   TomTom Go Navigation
*   Essent Verbruiksmanager

****_RELATED ARTICLES_****

1.  **Canada Bans WeChat and Kaspersky Due to Spying Concerns**
2.  **Google Facing Lawsuit Over Tracking Users in Incognito Mode**
3.  **$4 billion lawsuit claims Google tracked iPhone users’ activities**
4.  **Amazon Files Lawsuits Against Fraudsters Peddling Fake Reviews**
5.  **Authors Sue OpenAI: ChatGPT’s Training Methods Challenged in Lawsuit**

Dutch Watchdog Sues Adobe Over Mass Collection of Citizen Data

Threat actors are increasingly placing malicious ads for Zoom within Google searches.

During the past month, we have observed an increase in the number of malicious ads on Google searches for “Zoom”, the popular piece of video conferencing software. Threat actors have been alternating between different keywords for software downloads such as “Advanced IP Scanner” or “WinSCP” normally geared towards IT administrators.

While Zoom is used by millions of people around the world, these campaigns are likely targeting victims who are into cryptocurrencies as well as corporate users, in order to gain access to company networks.

In this blog post, we chose to highlight two cases:

*   Case #1 is about a new loader which we have not seen mentioned publicly before called **_HiroshimaNukes_**. It drops an additional payload designed to steal user data.
*   Case #2 is a campaign dropping FakeBat loader where the threat actor tracked victims via a panel that was new to us, called **_Hunting panel 1.40_**. FakeBat is often used by threat actors as the initial entry point for hands on keyboard operations.

We have reported the malicious ads to Google.

**Advertiser profiles**

The threat actors are using a number of fake identities to create multiple advertiser accounts. We noticed that different ads had different advertiser IDs but the backend infrastructure was the same.

Fake advertiser profiles

They are also using what looks like existing advertising accounts (one of the accounts had over 30K ads) which may have been compromised:

Advertising account possibly hacked to insert malicious Zoom ad

While we don’t know how many people may have fallen for these Zoom malvertising campaigns, we can say that the number of ads and their positioning was prominent enough to generate a substantial amount of traffic.

**Cloaking via new services**

The threat actors are using tracking templates to cloak the redirection mechanism to either the legitimate Zoom website or a site or their choosing. They are abusing a service called AppsFlyer (onelink.me) and HYROS (l.hyros.com) for their redirects. We observed the following links for the Zoom campaigns:

*   aksdquwrqr\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   ntcrgfmmc3\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   169-zoona32\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   zoromonm\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   notetrest\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   putin-777\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   zoomus\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   mmozl\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   arnold\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   desktop-client\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   slovo-pacana\[.\]onelink\[.\]me
*   l\[.\]hyros\[.\]com/c8KqPHYKdt

Ad and redirection mechanism

**Case #1: HiroshimaNukes**

HiroshimaNukes is a name given by its author to a piece of malware that was new to us. It uses several techniques to bypass detection from DLL side-loading to very large payloads. Its goal is to drop additional malware, typically a stealer followed by data exfiltration.

HiroshimaNukes loader installation flow

**Distribution**

The threat actor is targeting users via Google ads related to a search for zoom:

Malicious ad for Zoom via Google search

Clicking on the ad redirects to a domain at _zoommaster\[.\]life_ that checks the IP address of the visitor and performs a redirect to _zoom.us_ (legitimate) site or _zoom-us\[.\]tech_ (malicious site) based on certain conditions. Intended targets will see a web page that looks similar to the real Zoom’s website:

Fake Zoom web page with malicious download

Users are tricked into downloading a file called _ZoomInstaller.zip_ which once extracted contains one main executable and several DLL files:

Content of the Zoom download archive

The _\_Zoom.exe_ file is a legitimate binary signed by Zoom Video Communications, Inc:

Main executable is legitimate

**DLL side-loading**

DLL side-loading is a technique used by threat actors to bypass detection. It consists of replacing a legitimate library file (DLL) used by a program (EXE) with a malicious one, using the same name and location.

When the main program is launched, it will automatically load the corresponding DLL without necessarily validating it. In this instance, _\_Zoom.exe_ side-loads _librcrypto-3-zm.dll_:

The malicious DLL that is loaded when the main executable runs

While DLL side-loading is commonly used by malware authors, it is also a unique TTP that we don’t see in all malvertising campaigns. We were able to search for previous similar attacks from the same threat actor. This time, the malicious DLL was side-loaded as if it was the FFmpeg library (_ffmpeg.dll_). As you can see from the screenshot below, the lure varied over time with for example brands such as TradingView, Notion or Obsidian.

Other examples of DLL side-loading

All the malicious DLLs we found were likely compiled by the same threat actor, who was either sloppy or wanted to leave the malware name in plain sight:

D:\\Projects\\General\\HiroshimaNukesDropper\\V2\\Dll\\x64\\Release\\Dll.pdb

This “HiroshimaNukes” dropper will spawn a new executable (_zoom\_crypted.exe_) that also attempts to evade detection due to its size:

Dropped file over 774 MB

The file has been inflated with junk code:

UnpacMe service’s analysis of the binary

Looking at its strings we can see that it is a stealer focusing on cryptocurrency wallets:

0x40284e: Cookies
0x40290a: Network\\Cookies
0x4029c2: DHistoryDDDDDDDsWeb Datassssssss
0x42c43b: TDiscord PTB\\Local Storage\\leveldbTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTC
0x42c51f: wDiscord Canary\\leveldbwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww-
0x42e1fd: Jkey3.dbJJJJJJJ
0x42e67c: Nformhistory.sqlite
0x42e798: Nformhistory.sqlite
0x433d69: WIMAP PasswordWWWWWWWWWWWWW
0x43515c:
0x44241d: oArmoryoooooo6
0x4426f4: 2bytecoin22222222
0x4427ba: ZJaxxClassicZZZZZZZZZZZ
0x4431f2: %Jaxx\\Local Storage\\leveldb%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
0x44347e: jEthereumjjjjjjjj2
0x443544: oEthereum\\keystoreooooooooooooooooo>
0x443621: #Electrum
0x443751: }Electrum\\wallets}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
0x443825: Electrum-LTC
0x4438ff: Electrum-LTC\\wallets
0x443a3c: Electrum-BCH
0x443b76: WElectrum-BCH\\walletsWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
0x443c5e: 2Atomic222222&
0x443d64: atomic\\Local Storage\\leveldb
0x443e5a: +Guarda
0x443f66: 9lGuarda\\Local Storage\\leveldb
0x4440ab: tWasabitttttt
0x444194: 7^WalletWasabi\\Client\\Wallets
0x444335: ,Daedalus,,,,,,,,f
0x444441: Daedalus Mainnet\\wallets
0x444523: Ledger Live
0x4445fc: )Ledger Live)))))))))))
0x444d50: /Litecoin////////

**Case #2: FakeBat and Hunting panel**

In this second case we look at a FakeBat loader payload which has an interesting addition to it. The threat actors are tracking victims from their campaigns using a control panel called Hunting panel 1.40 which was new to us.

FakeBat installation flow

**Distribution**

Unsuspecting users doing a Google search for “zoom” are deceived by a Sponsored result that looks authentic from the outside. While the ad display URL is **zoom.us** (which is the official website for Zoom), clicking on the menu beside the ad reveals an advertiser identified as “CHANDLER BONNY M”:

Malicious ad for Zoom via Google search

Web traffic following click on ad

On this landing page, users are tricked into downloading a malicious version of the Zoom installer:

Fake Zoom web page and malicious installer

The download process is initiated via a JavaScript event linking to the _ms-appinstaller_ URL where the MSIX file is hosted:

Source code processing the download of the MSIX installer

**Malware payload**

The malicious installer contains several files but the malicious components reside in the PowerShell scripts. This technique has been used by the threat actor for months already, probably because they get higher infection rates than with a traditional malware binary.

Contents of the MSIX file

The Base64-encoded PowerShell reveals the malware’s command and control server as well as a number of other commands such as reporting telemetry back about the machine and any security software installed, and more importantly a GPG encrypted payload decoded on the fly.

View of the malicious PowerShell script

**Panel and API**

Inspecting web traffic, we noticed that a new WebSocket was created to send data to a remote domain at api\[.\]huntingpanel\[.\]link. Some of this data includes a fileID, a project name and the domain that was used for the landing page.

Connection to WebSocket

This server is hosting a login page to “Hunting panel 1.40”, a control panel we had not heard of before. We surmise this is a way for the threat actor to track their malvertising and payload delivery campaigns. The panel’s background image is from the Firewatch video game.

Hunting panel 1.40 control panel

**Protection**

Malvertising continues to be a privileged malware delivery vector where threat actors are able to bypass ad verification checks, and often times security solutions as well.

We are actively tracking and reporting each new malvertising campaign we come across. As we can’t always control when third parties will take action on malicious ads, our top priority is to ensure our customers remain protected by blocking new malware domains and samples.

Both our consumer and enterprise users are protected agains these threats.

**Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank Sergei Frankoff, malware researcher and a co-founder of Open Analysis, for his help with the HiroshimaNukes dropper.

**Indicators of Compromise**

**Case #1 IOCs**

**_Description_**

**_Indicator_**

Fake Zoom site

zoom-us\[.\]tech

Download URL

zoom-us\[.\]tech/ZoomInstaller.zip

Fake Zoom archive (ZoomInstaller.zip)

fd524641d2be705d76feb0453374c5b2ad9582ced4f00bb3722b735401da2762

Malicious DLL (libcrypto-3-zm.dll)

30fda67726f77706955f6b52b202452e91d5ff132783854eec63e809061a4b5c

Stealer payload

5b917d04d416cafaf13ed51c40b58dc8b4413483ea3f5406b8348038125cad0b

Stealer C2

94.131.110\[.\]127

**Case #2 IOCs**

**_Description_**

**_Indicator_**

Fake Zoom site

z00nn.one-platform-to-connect\[.\]group

Fake Zoom site

info-zoomapp\[.\]com

Fake Zoom site

zoomnewsonly\[.\]site

Fake Zoom site

zoonn\[.\]virtual-meetings\[.\]cn\[.\]com

Fake Zoom site

promoapp-zoom\[.\]com

Download URL

youstorys\[.\]com/fonts/Zoom-x64.msix

Download URL

windows-rars\[.\]shop/bootstrap/Zoom-x64.msix

Download URL

scheta\[.\]site/apps.store/ZoomInstaller.msix

Installer (Zoom-x64.msix)

dcb80bd21bd6900fe87423d3fb0c49d8f140d5cf5d81b662cd74c22fca622893

Installer (Zoom-x64.msix)

44cac5bf0bab56b0840bd1c7b95f9c7f5078ff417705eeaaf5ea5a2167a81dd5

Installer (ZoomInstaller.msix)

462df2e4a633e57de0d5148060543576d7c1165bf90e6aec4183f430d8925a1c

Encrypted payload URL

winkos\[.\]net/ld/zm.tar.gpg

FakeBat C2

2311foreign\[.\]xyz

 Malvertisers zoom in on cryptocurrencies and initial access 

One Identity Password Manager versions prior to 5.13.1 suffer from a kiosk escape privilege escalation vulnerability.

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20231206-0 >  
=======================================================================  
               title: Kiosk Escape Privilege Escalation  
             product: One Identity Password Manager Secure Password Extension  
  vulnerable version: <5.13.1  
       fixed version: 5.13.1  
          CVE number: CVE-2023-48654  
              impact: critical  
            homepage: https://www.oneidentity.com/products/password-manager/  
               found: 2023-10-09  
                  by: Stefan Schweighofer (Office Vienna)  
                      Constantin Schieber-Knöbl (Office Vienna)  
                      Armin Weihbold (Office Linz)  
                      SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                      An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
                      Europe | Asia

                      https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

Vendor description:  
-------------------  
"One Identity delivers solutions that help customers strengthen operational  
efficiency, reduce risk surface, control costs and enhance their  
cybersecurity. Our Unified Identity Platform brings together best-in-class  
software to enable organizations to shift from a fragmented identity strategy  
to a holistic approach."

Source: https://www.oneidentity.com/company/

Business recommendation:  
------------------------  
The vendor provides a patch version 5.13.1 which should be installed immediately.

SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the  
product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential  
further security issues.

Vulnerability overview/description:  
-----------------------------------  
The Password Manager Application by One Identity enables users to reset  
their Active Directory passwords on the login screen of a Windows client, with  
the Secure Password Extension. The Secure Password Manager Extension launches a  
Chromium based browser in Kiosk mode to provide the reset functionality.

Due to application-specific functionalities the Password Manager Extension  
suffers from two exploitable Kiosk Escape vulnerabilities which allow a local,  
pre-authenticated attacker to escalate the privileges to SYSTEM.

1) Password Manager Kiosk Escape with Google ReCAPTCHA (CVE-2023-48654)  
The Password Manager Extension uses Google ReCAPTCHA, which enables an  
attacker to escape the Kiosk Mode of the browser and gain  
"nt authority\system" permissions on the login screen of the targeted machine.  
This is possible due to the fact that Google ReCAPTCHA links to external  
websites, which open in a new browser window and enable an attacker to  
navigate to other external websites.

2) Password Manager Kiosk Escape after Session Timeout  
The Password Manager application provides a link to a help page of  
One Identity. This link references an external site and is therefore hidden  
in the Kiosk Mode browser of the Password Manager Extension. If the Password  
Manager Extension website is loaded after an active session expires the  
link to the external One Identity websites gets shown. This enables an  
attacker to escape the Kiosk Mode of the browser and gain  
"nt authority\system" permissions on the login screen of the targeted machine.

Proof of concept:  
-----------------  
1) Password Manager Kiosk Escape with Google ReCAPTCHA (CVE-2023-48654)  
An attacker requires access to a locked machine, where the Password Manger  
Extension is installed, either via physical (pre-auth) or remote (RDP) access.  
 From the login screen the Password Manger Extension Kiosk mode browser can  
be launched.

Since Google ReCAPTCHA is used on the Password Manger website the Google  
ReCAPTCHA icon is also shown on the website and provides a link to an  
external website via the "Privacy" button of the Google ReCAPTCHA field.

2) Password Manager Kiosk Escape after Session Timeout  
An attacker requires access to a username to login to either the Password Manager  
website or a logged in user, which leaves the session open until the session  
expires. Since the Password Manager uses Active Directory credentials, the  
username from the Windows login screen can be used to log into the website.  
For this attack the session of a logged-in user has to expire.

After the session expiration the Password Manager website gets reloaded and displays  
a help icon that is usually hidden. The help icon links to the external  
One Identity website., from witch it is possible to navigate to the Google Search  
website using the Sign In option of the One Identity website. The Sign In page  
has the option to login with a Facebook account and information about cookies  
is displayed on this page, which links to a Google Chrome website.

For both vulnerability 1 and 2, an attacker can use the Google Search website and  
trigger the "search by image" feature. This "search by image" feature can be used  
to trigger an upload, which then opens a file explorer window for file selection.

The file explorer window makes it possible to input "cmd" in the path field  
of the file explorer to open a command prompt. The created command prompt  
is executed with highest "nt authority\system" permissions.

Vulnerable / tested versions:  
-----------------------------  
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available  
at the time of the test:  
* 5.13

It is assumed that all previous versions are affected as well.

Vendor contact timeline:  
------------------------  
2023-11-06: Contacting vendor through vendor security contact form  
             https://support.oneidentity.com/de-de/essentials/reporting-security-vulnerability  
2023-11-07: Vendor is able to reproduce both escapes, internal discussion with  
             product team needed.  
2023-11-14: Vendor notifies us that the product team fixed the vulnerabilities  
             and will release an update soon. Asking for CVE numbers.  
2023-11-15: Vendor will not assign CVE numbers, we are going to request them.  
             Patch release scheduled for 17th or the week after.  
2023-11-17: Receiving one CVE number from MITRE, asking about the second one;  
             No response.  
2023-11-20: Asking for status update as no patch was released on 17th.  
2023-11-21: Patch was postponed to 1st December, setting our release date to  
             6th December.  
2023-12-01: Vendor releases fixed version v5.13.1.  
2023-12-06: Coordinated release of security advisory.

Solution:  
---------  
The vendor provides a patch which can be downloaded from  
https://support.oneidentity.com/password-manager/5.13.1

The release notes of the vendor can be found here:  
https://support.oneidentity.com/technical-documents/password-manager/5.13.1/release-notes/

Workaround:  
-----------  
None

Advisory URL:  
-------------  
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
Europe | Asia

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an  
Eviden business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the  
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The  
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and  
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.  
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities  
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com  
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com  
Blog: https://blog.sec-consult.com  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF S. Schweighofer, C. Schieber-Knöbl, A. Weihbold / @2023

One Identity Password Manager Kiosk Escape Privilege Escalation

Apple Security Advisory 12-11-2023-6 - macOS Monterey 12.7.2 addresses code execution and out of bounds read vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-12-11-2023-6 macOS Monterey 12.7.2

macOS Monterey 12.7.2 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214037.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at  
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent  
software updates with security advisories.

Accounts  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data  
Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data  
redaction for log entries.  
CVE-2023-42919: Kirin (@Pwnrin)

AppleEvents  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to access information about a user's contacts  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42894: Noah Roskin-Frazee and Prof. J. (ZeroClicks.ai Lab)

CoreServices  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: A user may be able to cause unexpected app termination or  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds  
checking.  
CVE-2023-42886: Koh M. Nakagawa (@tsunek0h)

Find My  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42922: Wojciech Regula of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog)

ImageIO  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: Processing an image may lead to arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-42899: Meysam Firouzi @R00tkitSMM and Junsung Lee

IOKit  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to monitor keystrokes without user permission  
Description: An authentication issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-42891: an anonymous researcher

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to break out of its sandbox  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-42914: Eloi Benoist-Vanderbeken (@elvanderb) of Synacktiv  
(@Synacktiv)

ncurses  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: A remote user may be able to cause unexpected app termination or  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2020-19185  
CVE-2020-19186  
CVE-2020-19187  
CVE-2020-19188  
CVE-2020-19189  
CVE-2020-19190

TCC  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to access protected user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-42932: Zhongquan Li (@Guluisacat)

Vim  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected  
application termination or arbitrary code execution  
Description: This issue was addressed by updating to Vim version  
9.0.1969.  
CVE-2023-5344

macOS Monterey 12.7.2 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or  
Apple's Software Downloads web site:  
https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates  
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 12-11-2023-6

Apple Security Advisory 12-11-2023-5 - macOS Ventura 13.6.3 addresses code execution and out of bounds read vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-12-11-2023-5 macOS Ventura 13.6.3

macOS Ventura 13.6.3 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214038.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at  
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent  
software updates with security advisories.

Accounts  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data  
Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data  
redaction for log entries.  
CVE-2023-42919: Kirin (@Pwnrin)

AppleEvents  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access information about a user's contacts  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42894: Noah Roskin-Frazee and Prof. J. (ZeroClicks.ai Lab)

Archive Utility  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-42924: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

AVEVideoEncoder  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to disclose kernel memory  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42884: an anonymous researcher

CoreServices  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: A user may be able to cause unexpected app termination or  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds  
checking.  
CVE-2023-42886: Koh M. Nakagawa (@tsunek0h)

Find My  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42922: Wojciech Regula of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog)

ImageIO  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Processing an image may lead to arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-42899: Meysam Firouzi @R00tkitSMM and Junsung Lee

IOKit  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to monitor keystrokes without user permission  
Description: An authentication issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-42891: an anonymous researcher

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to break out of its sandbox  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-42914: Eloi Benoist-Vanderbeken (@elvanderb) of Synacktiv  
(@Synacktiv)

ncurses  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: A remote user may be able to cause unexpected app termination or  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2020-19185  
CVE-2020-19186  
CVE-2020-19187  
CVE-2020-19188  
CVE-2020-19189  
CVE-2020-19190

TCC  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to access protected user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-42932: Zhongquan Li (@Guluisacat)

Vim  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected  
application termination or arbitrary code execution  
Description: This issue was addressed by updating to Vim version  
9.0.1969.  
CVE-2023-5344

macOS Ventura 13.6.3 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or  
Apple's Software Downloads web site:  
https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates  
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 12-11-2023-5

Apple Security Advisory 12-11-2023-4 - macOS Sonoma 14.2 addresses code execution, out of bounds read, and spoofing vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-12-11-2023-4 macOS Sonoma 14.2

macOS Sonoma 14.2 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214036.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at  
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent  
software updates with security advisories.

Accessibility  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: Secure text fields may be displayed via the Accessibility  
Keyboard when using a physical keyboard  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved state management.  
CVE-2023-42874: Don Clarke

Accounts  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data  
Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data  
redaction for log entries.  
CVE-2023-42919: Kirin (@Pwnrin)

AppleEvents  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to access information about a user's contacts  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42894: Noah Roskin-Frazee and Prof. J. (ZeroClicks.ai Lab)

AppleGraphicsControl  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app  
termination or arbitrary code execution  
Description: Multiple memory corruption issues were addressed with  
improved input validation.  
CVE-2023-42901: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42902: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero, and Michael  
DePlante (@izobashi) of Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative  
CVE-2023-42912: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42903: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42904: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42905: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42906: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42907: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42908: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42909: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42910: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42911: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero  
CVE-2023-42926: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero

AppleVA  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: Processing an image may lead to arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-42882: Ivan Fratric of Google Project Zero

Archive Utility  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-42924: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

AVEVideoEncoder  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to disclose kernel memory  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42884: an anonymous researcher

Bluetooth  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An attacker in a privileged network position may be able to  
inject keystrokes by spoofing a keyboard  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-45866: Marc Newlin of SkySafe

CoreMedia Playback  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-42900: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

CoreServices  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: A user may be able to cause unexpected app termination or  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds  
checking.  
CVE-2023-42886: Koh M. Nakagawa (@tsunek0h)

ExtensionKit  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data  
Description: A privacy issue was addressed with improved private data  
redaction for log entries.  
CVE-2023-42927: Noah Roskin-Frazee and Prof. J. (ZeroClicks.ai Lab)

Find My  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2023-42922: Wojciech Regula of SecuRing (wojciechregula.blog)

ImageIO  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: Processing an image may lead to arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-42898: Junsung Lee  
CVE-2023-42899: Meysam Firouzi @R00tkitSMM and Junsung Lee

IOKit  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to monitor keystrokes without user permission  
Description: An authentication issue was addressed with improved state  
management.  
CVE-2023-42891: an anonymous researcher

Kernel  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to break out of its sandbox  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2023-42914: Eloi Benoist-Vanderbeken (@elvanderb) of Synacktiv  
(@Synacktiv)

ncurses  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: A remote user may be able to cause unexpected app termination or  
arbitrary code execution  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2020-19185  
CVE-2020-19186  
CVE-2020-19187  
CVE-2020-19188  
CVE-2020-19189  
CVE-2020-19190

SharedFileList  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-42842: an anonymous researcher

TCC  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: An app may be able to access protected user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2023-42932: Zhongquan Li (@Guluisacat)

Vim  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected  
application termination or arbitrary code execution  
Description: This issue was addressed by updating to Vim version  
9.0.1969.  
CVE-2023-5344

WebKit  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: Processing web content may lead to arbitrary code execution  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 259830  
CVE-2023-42890: Pwn2car

WebKit  
Available for: macOS Sonoma  
Impact: Processing an image may lead to a denial-of-service  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 263349  
CVE-2023-42883: Zoom Offensive Security Team

Additional recognition

Memoji  
We would like to acknowledge Jerry Tenenbaum for their assistance.

Wi-Fi  
We would like to acknowledge Noah Roskin-Frazee and Prof. J.  
(ZeroClicks.ai Lab) for their assistance.

macOS Sonoma 14.2 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or Apple's  
Software Downloads web site: https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates  
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 12-11-2023-4

Atos Unify OpenScape Session Border Controller (SBC) versions before V10 R3.4.0, Branch versions before V10 R3.4.0, and BCF versions before V10 R10.12.00 and V10 R11.05.02 suffer from an argument injection vulnerability that can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution and authentication bypass.

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20231205-0 >  
=======================================================================  
               title: Argument injection leading to unauthenticated RCE and  
                      authentication bypass  
             product: Atos Unify OpenScape Session Border Controller (SBC)  
                      Atos Unify OpenScape Branch  
                      Atos Unify OpenScape BCF  
  vulnerable version: OpenScape SBC before V10 R3.4.0  
                      OpenScape Branch before V10 R3.4.0  
                      OpenScape BCF V10 before V10 R10.12.00 and V10 R11.05.02  
       fixed version: OpenScape SBC V10 R3.4.0 or higher  
                      OpenScape Branch V10 R3.4.0 or higher  
                      OpenScape BCF V10 R10.12.00 or higher, V10 R11.05.02  
          CVE number: CVE-2023-6269  
              impact: Critical  
            homepage: https://unify.com/  
               found: 2023-09-01  
                  by: Armin Weihbold (Office Linz)  
                      SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                      An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
                      Europe | Asia

                      https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

Vendor description:  
-------------------  
"Unify is is the Atos brand for communication and collaboration solutions  
Unify is the newest member of the Atos family, combining Atos’ knowledge and  
reputation in the IT services market with Unify’s expertise in unified  
communications and collaboration to provide customers with seamless services  
solutions for their entire digital portfolio. Within Atos, Unify continues to  
deliver a unique integrated proposition for unified communications and real  
time capabilities."

Source: https://unify.com/en/expert/unify

Business recommendation:  
------------------------  
SEC Consult recommends users of this solution to immediately install the latest  
patch from the vendor.

Furthermore, an in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals  
is highly advised, as the software may be affected from other security issues.

Vulnerability overview/description:  
-----------------------------------  
1) Argument injection leading to unauthenticated RCE and authentication bypass (CVE-2023-6269)  
The administrative web interface insufficiently escapes supplied login  
credentials before passing them to a user management application, leading to  
an unauthenticated attacker being able to gain root access to the appliance  
via SSH.

Another possibility to exploit this vulnerability is to append a special  
argument during logon to completely bypass the authentication of the web interface.  
A previously unauthenticated attacker can logon as administrator without any  
known credentials.

Proof of concept:  
-----------------  
1) Argument injection leading to unauthenticated RCE and authentication bypass (CVE-2023-6269)  
Example 1) Gaining unauthenticated SSH root access

The file receiving data from the login page is `auth.php`, here the  
user-provided credentials are passed on to the function  
`PasswordMgr::authPassword` after some checks on the supplied username.

```php  
// /srv/www/htdocs/auth.php  
// [...]  
     $ret=false;  
     $real_user='';  
     $error = '';  
     $local_user=strip_tags($_POST['username']);  
// [...]  
     if( !sessionLimitReached() )  
     {  
         // Authenticate user/password...  
         $privilege = PasswordMgr::getUserPrivilege($local_user);  
         if (($local_user == 'assistant') || ($local_user == 'cdr') || (!PasswordMgr::isUserEnabled($local_user))){  
             $ret = false;  
         }  
         else {  
             switch ($privilege) {  
                 case 'admin':  
                     $ret = PasswordMgr::authPassword($_POST["username"], $_POST["password"], $error, $real_user, $local_user, FALSE);  
                     break;  
                 // [...]  
             }  
         }  
         // [...]  
     }  
// [...]

```

The function `PasswordMgr::authPassword` in `core/PasswordMgr.php` is just a  
wrapper around `call_osbpasswd` in the same file.

```php  
// /srv/www/htdocs/core/PasswordMgr.php

public static function authPassword($username, $password, &$error, &$real_user, &$local_user, $local = FALSE)  
{  
     $error='';  
     if ( PasswordMgr::call_osbpasswd("auth", $username, $password, $error, $real_user, $local_user, $local ) )  
     {  
         $error='Current Password does not match user';  
         return false;  
     }  
     return true;  
}  
```

The function `call_osbpasswd` is responsible for anything related to user  
management, it does this by constructing shell arguments and supplying them to  
the executable `/osb/bin/osbpasswd` which is executed with root privileges via  
`cfgUtilExecSudo`. This executable handles the actual authentication, creation  
of users, and other tasks.  
In the case of authentication the arguments are written to a temporary file  
and read from there.  
Before that the supplied password is escaped using `escapeshellcmd` instead of  
`escapeshellarg`. This means that space characters (hex 0x20) in the password  
are left intact allowing for argument injection.

```php  
// /srv/www/htdocs/core/PasswordMgr.php

public static function call_osbpasswd( $method, $username, $password, &$output, &$real_user, &$local_user, $local, $extraArg = '' )  
{  
     // [...]  
     $curruser = 'GUI';  
     // [...]

     $params = "$method";  
     if ($local)          $params .= ' --local';  
     if ($username != '') $params .= " --user $username";  
     if ($curruser != '') $params .= " --curruser $curruser";  
     if ($extraArg != '') $params .= "$extraArg";

     $file = '';  
     // [...]  
     else {  
         $params .= " --password ";  
         $fakePar = $params."xxxxxx";  
         $params .= escapeshellcmd($password);  
         $params .= "\n";  
         $file = tempnam('/osb/var/tmp','osbpasswd.'.md5($params).'.');  
         /*E.g.: /opt/openbranch/var/tmp/osbpasswd.f9e2a9fcf29c6275830257316d560e27.CG4IcQ */  
         cfgUtilEcho( $params, $file );  
         $command = "/osb/bin/osbpasswd ".$fakePar." --file ".$file;  
     }

     $outArray = array();  
     $ret = cfgUtilExecSudo($command, $outArray, FALSE, TRUE);  
     // [...]  
     return $ret;  
}  
```

The function that is responsible for parsing command line arguments  
in the called application `/osb/bin/osbpasswd` iterates over arguments and  
sets global variables based on them. This is done in a loop and no check is  
done if that argument was already set. This means an attacker can override all  
parameters by specifying them again.

```C  
int parse_arguments(int argc, char **argv, int n)  
{  
   // [...]  
   while ( n < argc && argv[n] ) {  
     // [...]  
     else if ( !strcmp("--user", argv[n]) ) {  
         if ( ++n < argc )  
            arg_user = argv[n];  
     }  
     else if ( !strcmp("--shell", argv[n]) ) {  
         if ( ++n < argc )  
             arg_shell = argv[n];  
     }  
     // [...]  
     else if ( !strcmp("auth", argv[n]) ) {  
         arg_command_name = argv[n];  
         arg_command_number = 1;  
     }  
     else if ( !strcmp("add", argv[n]) ) {  
         arg_command_name = argv[n];  
         arg_command_number = 6;  
     }  
     // [...]  
     ++n;  
   }  
   return 0LL;  
}  
```

The combination of faulty escaping of the supplied password and overly  
permissive parsing of arguments in the called binary leads to an attacker being  
able to request arbitrary operations from the `/osb/bin/osbpasswd` binary with  
arbitrary arguments. An attacker could for example create a new user with SSH  
access and change the password of the root user leading to a complete  
compromise of the system.

To demonstrate the vulnerability, it is sufficient to [...]

[ Proof of concept removed ]

- this creates a new user with SSH access, the second one [...]

[ Proof of concept removed ]

which changes the password of the root user. The attacker can then login [...]  
to gain root access.

Example 2) Bypassing the web interface logon as administrator  
As described in example 1, the same vulnerability can also be exploited to  
bypass the logon for the web interface and immediately gain access as  
administrator because the arguments for the command-line tool are passed and  
evaluated.

By supplying the [...] following [...] string [...], it is possible to logon  
without known credentials:

[ Proof of concept removed ]

[...]  
Afterwards the attacker is logged on as administrator (or any other supplied  
user account).

Vulnerable / tested versions:  
-----------------------------  
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available  
at the time of the test:

* Atos Unify OpenScape Session Border Controler (SBC) Firmware Version V10 R3.3.0

According to vendor, versions before V10 R3.3.0 are affected as well.

The vendor confirmed that the following products are vulnerable:  
* Atos Unify OpenScape SBC V10 before V10 R3.4.0  
* Atos Unify OpenScape Branch V10 before V10 R3.4.0  
* Atos Unify OpenScape BCF V10 before V10R10.12.00 and V10R11.05.02

Vendor contact timeline:  
------------------------  
2023-09-13: Contacting vendor through email obso@atos.net; sending  
             encrypted advisory (S/MIME)  
2023-09-25: Call with vendor, patch has already been developed, available  
             internally for testing & QA since 22nd.  
2023-09-26: Preliminary vendor security advisory available, giving feedback  
             regarding recommendations. Vendor informs customers in advance  
             (TLP:AMBER), patch planned for 2023-09-27.  
2023-10-04: Vendor security advisory public release (TLP:WHITE).  
2023-10-06: Asking regarding next steps for affected product Atos Unify  
             OpenScape BCF.  
2023-10-10: Vendor confirms that OpenScape BCF is affected as well and added  
             it to their advisory.  
2023-11-27: Reserving CVE-2023-6269 and sending it to vendor, defining  
             release date of 5th December.  
2023-12-05: Coordinated release of security advisory.

Solution:  
---------  
The vendor provides a patch for the affected products:  
* Atos Unify OpenScape Session Border Controller Firmware Version V10 >=R3.4.0  
* Atos Unify OpenScape Branch version V10 >=R3.4.0  
* Atos Unify OpenScape BCF version V10 >=V10R10.12.00 and V10R11.05.02

The patches can be obtained for registered customers through the vendor's  
download server:  
https://sws.unify.com/SWSIntranet/SWSIntra.aspx or via  
https://unify.com/en/partner/partnerportal  
https://unify.com/en/support/kunden-support-portal

Furthermore, the vendor has also released a security advisory which is  
available here:  
https://networks.unify.com/security/advisories/OBSO-2310-01.pdf

Workaround:  
-----------  
In addition to deploying the patch, limit access to the administrative  
web application and SSH ports to authorized personnel on the network level.

Advisory URL:  
-------------  
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
Europe | Asia

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an  
Eviden business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the  
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The  
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and  
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.  
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities  
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com  
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com  
Blog: https://blog.sec-consult.com  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF A. Weihbold / @2023

Atos Unify OpenScape Authentication Bypass / Remote Code Execution

The "userModify" feature of Silverpeas Core 6.3.1 is vulnerable to Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) leading to privilege escalation. If an administrator goes to a malicious URL while being authenticated to the Silverpeas application, the CSRF with execute making the attacker an administrator user in the application.

**Cross Site Request Forgery in Silverpeas**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Dec 13, 2023 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Dec 13, 2023

GHSA-g27c-w2v7-88xp: Cross Site Request Forgery in Silverpeas

The "Create a Space" feature in Silverpeas Core 6.3.1 is reserved for use by administrators. This function suffers from broken access control, allowing any authenticated user to create a space by navigating to the correct URL.

**Broken access control in Silverpeas**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Dec 13, 2023 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Dec 13, 2023

GHSA-vpp3-hpcm-v944: Broken access control in Silverpeas

Anveo Mobile application version 10.0.0.359 and server version 11.0.0.5 suffer from missing certificate validation and user enumeration vulnerabilities.

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20231128-0 >  
=======================================================================  
               title: Missing Certificate Validation & User Enumeration  
             product: Anveo Mobile App and Server  
  vulnerable version: Mobile App: 10.0.0.359 / 2016-07-13; Server: 11.0.0.5  
       fixed version: -  
          CVE number: -  
              impact: Medium  
            homepage: https://www.anveogroup.com/en/mobile-apps-for-dynamics/  
               found: 2023-05-28  
                  by: Daniel Hirschberger (Office Bochum)  
                      SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                      An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
                      Europe | Asia

                      https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

Vendor description:  
-------------------  
"Create your own individual Mobile App with Anveo. Our base, out of the box  
solutions offer many useful functions, and can be flexibly adapted to your  
requirements: the Anveo Service App, Anveo Sales App, and Anveo Delivery App.  
You are looking for a mobile App for a different scenario? Not a problem with  
the Anveo Mobile App Builder! Thanks to the toolkit character of the solution,  
configuration of a completely new, custom App is simple."

Source: https://www.anveogroup.com/en/mobile-apps-for-dynamics/

Business recommendation:  
------------------------  
The vendor was unresponsive and did not reply to our communication attempts and even  
deleted our comment to request a contact on LinkedIn, see the timeline section further  
below.

There is no solution known to us for this security issue. In case you are a customer  
of Anveo, request an update from them about the issue.

Furthermore, an in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is  
highly advised, as the software may be affected from other security issues.

Vulnerability overview/description:  
-----------------------------------  
1) Missing Certificate Validation  
The Windows application was tested which does not perform certificate validation  
and is therefore vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks which might allow an  
attacker to gain access to sensitive data.

2) User Enumeration  
The login is vulnerable to user enumeration because the error message for a  
non-existent user differs from the error message when a user exists. This allows  
an attacker to perform targeted brute-force attacks and potentially take over  
other user accounts.

Proof of concept:  
-----------------  
1) Missing Certificate Validation  
The application does not validate the server certificate. To verify this,  
a new self-signed certificate was created with the openssl commandline tool.

Afterwards, an openssl server was spawned with netcat:

[ POC removed]

When adding a new account in the application with the IP and port of this server,  
a connection is attempted. Now a special string has to be sent from the netcat  
listener to the client.

As a response, the client tries to authenticate against the server with the  
username and password:

<img certificate_validation.png>

The part between <EOS> and <EOSC> can be base64-decoded and decompressed with  
zlib which yields the following output:

[ POC removed ]

The "PW" Parameter contains the base64-encoded password, in this case "unknown".

2) User Enumeration  
When a non-existent user tries to login, the error message shows "Cannot find  
user":

<img user_nonexistent.png>

When a valid username but a wrong password is submitted, the server responds  
with "Username or password is not correct":

<img user_exists.png>

Vulnerable / tested versions:  
-----------------------------  
The following version has been tested:  
* Application version 10.0.0.359 / 2016-07-13 (the Windows version was tested)

The vendor did not respond to our communication attempts, hence it is unknown whether  
further versions are affected as well.

Vendor contact timeline:  
------------------------  
2023-06-12: Contacting vendor through email info@AnveoGroup.com  
             Asking for security contact, no response  
2023-06-26: Contacting vendor through same email again, no response.  
2023-07-24: Contacting vendor through technical support email support@AnveoGroup.com  
             Asking for security contact again, no response.  
2023-09-15: Contacting vendor again through info@AnveoGroup.com, support@AnveoGroup.com  
             and datenschutz@AnveoGroup.com. Ticket got automatically created, but no  
             response.  
2023-09-19: Posted a message/comment on LinkedIn at Anveo Group to contact us. Besides a  
             few profile views from employees (Team Lead Anveo Mobile App, Social Media  
             Marketing, CEO) no response.  
             Our comment then got deleted by Anveo Group.  
             Comment:  
             "Hi Anveo Group, we have been trying to reach your company since June through  
             our responsible disclosure process as we have identified some security  
             issues in your products. We never received any response via multiple email  
             addresses (found on your website). Could you please get in touch with us and  
             provide us with a person responsible for security? Thank you!"  
2023-09-20: Contacting third party whether they received a patch; no response.  
2023-10-09: Contacting again; no response.  
2023-10-23: Contacting again; no response.  
2023-11-17: Final attempt, asked third party for info again, tried to contact  
             "support@anveogroup.com" through ticket again. No response from vendor, but  
             third party replied, that they also did not receive any response from Anveo.  
2023-11-28: Public release of security advisory.

Solution:  
---------  
The vendor was unresponsive and did not reply to our communication attempts and even  
deleted our comment to request a contact on LinkedIn, see the timeline section.

There is no solution known to us for this security issue. In case you are a customer  
of Anveo, request an update from them about the issue.

Furthermore, an in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is  
highly advised, as the software may be affected from other security issues.

Workaround:  
-----------  
None

Advisory URL:  
-------------  
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
Europe | Asia

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an  
Eviden business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the  
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The  
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and  
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.  
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities  
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com  
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com  
Blog: https://blog.sec-consult.com  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF Daniel Hirschberger / @2023

Tag

#auth