#c++

In radare2 before 3.7.0, a command injection vulnerability exists in bin_symbols() in libr/core/cbin.c. By using a crafted executable file, it's possible to execute arbitrary shell commands with the permissions of the victim. This vulnerability is due to improper handling of symbol names embedded in executables.

An exploitable code execution vulnerability exists in the PCX image-rendering functionality of SDL2_image 2.0.4. A specially crafted PCX image can cause a heap overflow, resulting in code execution. An attacker can display a specially crafted image to trigger this vulnerability.

In MatrixSSL 3.8.3 Open through 4.2.1 Open, the DTLS server mishandles incoming network messages leading to a heap-based buffer overflow of up to 256 bytes and possible Remote Code Execution in parseSSLHandshake in sslDecode.c. During processing of a crafted packet, the server mishandles the fragment length value provided in the DTLS message.

In Exiv2 0.27.99.0, there is an out-of-bounds read in Exiv2::MrwImage::readMetadata() in mrwimage.cpp. It could result in denial of service.

Exiv2::PngImage::readMetadata() in pngimage.cpp in Exiv2 0.27.99.0 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted image file.

In this series, we have explored the need for proactive measures to eliminate a class of vulnerabilities and walked through some examples of memory safety issues we’ve found in Microsoft code that could have been avoided with a different language. Now we’ll peek at why we think that Rust represents the best alternative to C and C++ currently available.

In this series, we have explored the need for proactive measures to eliminate a class of vulnerabilities and walked through some examples of memory safety issues we’ve found in Microsoft code that could have been avoided with a different language. Now we’ll peek at why we think that Rust represents the best alternative to C and C++ currently available.

In our first post in this series, we discussed the need for proactively addressing memory safety issues. Tools and guidance are demonstrably not preventing this class of vulnerabilities; memory safety issues have represented almost the same proportion of vulnerabilities assigned a CVE for over a decade. We feel that using memory-safe languages will mitigate this in ways that tools and training have not been able to.

What if we could eliminate an entire class of vulnerabilities before they ever happened? Since 2004, the Microsoft Security Response Centre (MSRC) has triaged every reported Microsoft security vulnerability. From all that triage one astonishing fact sticks out: as Matt Miller discussed in his 2019 presentation at BlueHat IL, the majority of vulnerabilities fixed and with a CVE assigned are caused by developers inadvertently inserting memory corruption bugs into their C and C++ code.

What if we could eliminate an entire class of vulnerabilities before they ever happened? Since 2004, the Microsoft Security Response Centre (MSRC) has triaged every reported Microsoft security vulnerability. From all that triage one astonishing fact sticks out: as Matt Miller discussed in his 2019 presentation at BlueHat IL, the majority of vulnerabilities fixed and with a CVE assigned are caused by developers inadvertently inserting memory corruption bugs into their C and C++ code.