#git

A SSRF vulnerability using the Aegis DataBinding in versions of Apache CXF before 4.0.4, 3.6.3 and 3.5.8 allows an attacker to perform SSRF style attacks on webservices that take at least one parameter of any type. Users of other data bindings (including the default databinding) are not impacted.

Chinese users looking for legitimate software such as Notepad++ and VNote on search engines like Baidu are being targeted with malicious ads and bogus links to distribute trojanized versions of the software and ultimately deploy Geacon, a Golang-based implementation of Cobalt Strike. “The malicious site found in the notepad++ search is distributed through an advertisement block,” Kaspersky

### Impact Vela pipelines can use variable substitution combined with insensitive fields like `parameters`, `image` and `entrypoint` to inject secrets into a plugin/image and — by using common substitution string manipulation — can bypass log masking and expose secrets without the use of the commands block. This unexpected behavior primarily impacts secrets restricted by the "no commands" option. This can lead to unintended use of the secret value, and increased risk of exposing the secret during image execution bypassing log masking. Given by the following substitution examples: using `parameters` ```yaml steps: - name: example image: <some plugin> secrets: [ example_secret ] parameters: example: $${EXAMPLE_SECRET} ``` using `image` tag ```yaml steps: - name: example image: <some plugin>:latest${EXAMPLE_SECRET} secrets: [ example_secret ] ``` using `entrypoint` as a shim for `commands` ```yaml steps: - name: example image: <some plugin> secre...

The data privacy company Onerep.com bills itself as a Virginia-based service for helping people remove their personal information from almost 200 people-search websites. However, an investigation into the history of onerep.com finds this company is operating out of Belarus and Cyprus, and that its founder has launched dozens of people-search services over the years.

discordrb is an implementation of the Discord API using Ruby. In discordrb before commit `91e13043ffa` the `encoder.rb` file unsafely constructs a shell string using the file parameter, which can potentially leave clients of discordrb vulnerable to command injection. The library is not directly exploitable: the exploit requires that some client of the library calls the vulnerable method with user input. However, if unsafe input reaches the library method, then an attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands on the host machine. Full impact will depend on the permissions of the process running the `discordrb` library and will likely not be total system access. This issue has been addressed in code, but a new release of the `discordrb` gem has not been uploaded to rubygems. This issue is also tracked as `GHSL-2022-094`.

Whoogle Search is a self-hosted metasearch engine. In versions 0.8.3 and prior, the `element` method in `app/routes.py` does not validate the user-controlled `src_type` and `element_url` variables and passes them to the `send` method which sends a `GET` request on lines 339-343 in `requests.py`. The returned contents of the URL are then passed to and reflected back to the user in the `send_file` function on line 484, together with the user-controlled `src_type`, which allows the attacker to control the HTTP response content type leading to a cross-site scripting vulnerability. An attacker could craft a special URL to point to a malicious website and send the link to a victim. The fact that the link would contain a trusted domain (e.g. from one of public Whoogle instances) could be used to trick the user into clicking the link.The malicious website could, for example, be a copy of a real website, meant to steal a person’s credentials to the website, or trick that person in another way. ...

Whoogle Search is a self-hosted metasearch engine. Versions 0.8.3 and prior have a limited file write vulnerability when the configuration options in Whoogle are enabled. The `config` function in `app/routes.py` does not validate the user-controlled `name` variable on line 447 and `config_data` variable on line 437. The `name` variable is insecurely concatenated in `os.path.join`, leading to path manipulation. The POST data from the `config_data` variable is saved with `pickle.dump` which leads to a limited file write. However, the data that is saved is earlier transformed into a dictionary and the `url` key value pair is added before the file is saved on the system. All in all, the issue allows us to save and overwrite files on the system that the application has permissions to, with a dictionary containing arbitrary data and the `url` key value, which is a limited file write. Version 0.8.4 contains a patch for this issue.

Whoogle Search is a self-hosted metasearch engine. In versions 0.8.3 and prior, the `window` endpoint does not sanitize user-supplied input from the `location` variable and passes it to the `send` method which sends a `GET` request on lines 339-343 in `request.py,` which leads to a server-side request forgery. This issue allows for crafting GET requests to internal and external resources on behalf of the server. For example, this issue would allow for accessing resources on the internal network that the server has access to, even though these resources may not be accessible on the internet. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.4.

Whoogle Search is a self-hosted metasearch engine. In versions prior to 0.8.4, the `element` method in `app/routes.py` does not validate the user-controlled `src_type` and `element_url` variables and passes them to the `send` method which sends a GET request on lines 339-343 in `request.py`, which leads to a server-side request forgery. This issue allows for crafting GET requests to internal and external resources on behalf of the server. For example, this issue would allow for accessing resources on the internal network that the server has access to, even though these resources may not be accessible on the internet. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.4.

There are a few reasons why we’re so ready to jump to the “it’s a cyber attack!”