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### Summary A path traversal vulnerability via the plugin repository name allows an authenticated attacker to delete files on the server leading to unavailability and potentially data loss. ### Details Uptime Kuma allows authenticated users to install plugins from an official list of plugins. This feature is currently disabled in the web interface, but the corresponding API endpoints are still available after login. Before a plugin is downloaded, the plugin installation directory is checked for existence. If it exists, it's removed before the plugin installation. Because the plugin is not validated against the official list of plugins or sanitized, the check for existence and the removal of the plugin installation directory are prone to path traversal. ### Impact This vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to delete files from the server Uptime Kuma is running on. Depending on which files are deleted, Uptime Kuma or the whole system may become unavailable due to data loss.

### Impact It was discovered that due to improper handling and escaping of user-provided query parameters, a maliciously crafted Nautobot URL could potentially be used to execute a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (Reflected XSS) attack against users. All filterable object-list views in Nautobot are vulnerable, including: - /dcim/location-types/ - /dcim/locations/ - /dcim/racks/ - /dcim/rack-groups/ - /dcim/rack-reservations/ - /dcim/rack-elevations/ - /tenancy/tenants/ - /tenancy/tenant-groups/ - /extras/tags/ - /extras/statuses/ - /extras/roles/ - /extras/dynamic-groups/ - /dcim/devices/ - /dcim/platforms/ - /dcim/virtual-chassis/ - /dcim/device-redundancy-groups/ - /dcim/interface-redundancy-groups/ - /dcim/device-types/ - /dcim/manufacturers/ - /dcim/cables/ - /dcim/console-connections/ - /dcim/power-connections/ - /dcim/interface-connections/ - /dcim/interfaces/ - /dcim/front-ports/ - /dcim/rear-ports/ - /dcim/console-ports/ - /dcim/console-server-ports/ - /dcim/power-ports/ - /dc...

MOVEit drove a big chunk of the increase, but human vulnerability to social engineering and failure to patch known bugs led to a doubling of breaches since 2023, said Verizon Business.

As Kubernetes becomes increasingly integral to production environments, cyber adversaries are likewise becoming more skilled in cloud-native exploitation. According to the CrowdStrike 2024 Global Threat Report, cases involving exploitation of cloud services increased by 110% in 2023, far outpacing non-cloud cases, which grew only 60% year-over-year.CrowdStrike helps organizations stay ahead of these evolving adversaries by providing breach prevention solutions that span endpoints, Kubernetes, clouds, data and identity in the consolidated CrowdStrike Falcon® platform.This article talks about t

As the social media giant celebrates its two-decade anniversary, privacy experts reflect on how it changed the way the world shares information.

The purported metadata for each these containers had embedded links to malicious files.

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-2m57-hf25-phgg. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description Passing a heavily nested list to sqlparse.parse() leads to a Denial of Service due to RecursionError.

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### Impact On CRI-O, an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation: ``` --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection annotations: # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too, # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string. org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'" spec: containers: - name: hello image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello) ``` This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system. Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube. Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536 CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systend.property." See also: - https://github.com...