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### Impact XWiki's database search allows remote code execution through the search text. This allows remote code execution for any visitor of a public wiki or user of a closed wiki as the database search is by default accessible for all users. This impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce on an instance, without being logged in, go to `<hostname>/xwiki/bin/get/Main/DatabaseSearch?outputSyntax=plain&text=%7D%7D%7D%7B%7Basync%20async%3Dfalse%7D%7D%7B%7Bgroovy%7D%7Dprintln%28%22Hello%20from%22%20%2B%20%22%20search%20text%3A%22%20%2B%20%2823%20%2B%2019%29%29%7B%7B%2Fgroovy%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fasync%7D%7D%20`. If the title of the RSS channel contains `Hello from search text:42`, the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10RC1. ### Workarounds It is possible to manually apply [this patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/95bdd6cc6298acdf7f8f21298d40eeb839...

### Impact Remote code execution is possible via PDF export templates. To reproduce on an installation, register a new user account with username `PDFClass` if `XWiki.PDFClass` does not exist. On `XWiki.PDFClass`, use the class editor to add a "style" property of type "TextArea" and content type "Plain Text". Then, add an object of class `PDFClass` and set the "style" attribute to `$services.logging.getLogger('PDFClass').error("I got programming: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming')")`. Finally, go to `<host>/xwiki/bin/export/Main/WebHome?format=pdf&pdftemplate=XWiki.PDFClass`. If the logs contain "ERROR PDFClass - I got programming: true", the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10-rc-1. ### Workarounds If PDF templates are not typically used on the instance, an administrator can create the document `XWiki.PDFClass` and block its edition, after making sure that it does not contain a `style` att...

### Impact Any user with edit right on any page can execute any code on the server by adding an object of type `XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceClass` to their user profile or any other page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce on an instance, as a user without script nor programming rights, add an object of type `XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceClass` to your profile page. On this object, set every possible property to `}}}{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}` (i.e., name, engine, service, query, limit and icon). Save and display the page, then append `?sheet=XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceSheet` to the URL. If any property displays as `Hello from Groovy!}}}`, then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10 RC1. ### Workarounds [This patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/6a7f19f6424036fce3d703413137adde950ae809#...

### Impact It is possible to access the hash of a password by using the diff feature of the history whenever the object storing the password is deleted. Using that vulnerability it's possible for an attacker to have access to the hash password of a user if they have rights to edit the users' page. Now with the default right scheme in XWiki this vulnerability is normally prevented on user profiles, except by users with Admin rights. Note that this vulnerability also impacts any extensions that might use passwords stored in xobjects: for those usecases it depends on the right of those pages. There is currently no way to be 100% sure that this vulnerability has been exploited, as an attacker with enough privilege could have deleted the revision where the xobject was deleted after rolling-back the deletion. But again, this operation requires high privileges on the target page (Admin right). A page with a user password xobject which have in its history a revision where the object has be...

### Summary The [patch that addressed CVE-2023-40581](https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/commit/de015e930747165dbb8fcd360f8775fd973b7d6e) attempted to prevent RCE when using `--exec` with `%q` by replacing double quotes with two double quotes. However, this escaping is not sufficient, and still allows expansion of environment variables. Support for output template expansion in `--exec`, along with this vulnerable behavior, was added to `yt-dlp` in version [2021.04.11](https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/tag/2021.04.11). ```cmd > yt-dlp "https://youtu.be/42xO6rVqf2E" --ignore-config -f 18 --exec "echo %(title)q" [youtube] Extracting URL: https://youtu.be/42xO6rVqf2E [youtube] 42xO6rVqf2E: Downloading webpage [youtube] 42xO6rVqf2E: Downloading ios player API JSON [youtube] 42xO6rVqf2E: Downloading android player API JSON [youtube] 42xO6rVqf2E: Downloading m3u8 information [info] 42xO6rVqf2E: Downloading 1 format(s): 18 [download] Destination: %CMDCMDLINE：~-1%&echo pwned&calc.exe [4...

By cybernewswire Dubai, UAE, April 10th, 2024, CyberNewsWire Match Systems, a leading authority in crypto crimes investigations and crypto AML… This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Match Systems publishes report on the consequences of CBDC implementation, led by CEO Andrei Kutin

By Cyber Newswire Match Systems, a leading authority in crypto crimes investigations and crypto AML solutions provider, has published a comprehensive… This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Match Systems report on consequences of CBDC implementation, led by CEO Andrei Kutin

In a cyberattack more reminiscent of the 2010s, a seemingly lone hacker fleeced a major corporation for millions of open customer records.

Versions of the package mysql2 before 3.9.3 are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation through the `keyFromFields` function, resulting in cache poisoning. An attacker can inject a colon `:` character within a value of the attacker-crafted key.

Versions of the package mysql2 before 3.9.4 are vulnerable to Prototype Poisoning due to insecure results object creation and improper user input sanitization passed through `parserFn` in `text_parser.js` and `binary_parser.js`.