Tenda AX9 V22.03.01.46 has been discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the 'list' parameter at /goform/SetNetControlList.

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CVE-2023-49436: vuln/iot/AX9/SetNetControlList-2.md at master · ef4tless/vuln

DedeCMS v5.7.111 was discovered to contain a reflective cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the v parameter at selectimages.php.

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CVE-2023-49493: DedeCMS-V5.7.111 Reflective XSS vulnerability · Issue #2 · Hebing123/cve

Tenda AX12 V22.03.01.46 has been discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the 'mac' parameter at /goform/SetOnlineDevName.

CVE-2023-49428: vuln/iot/AX12/SetOnlineDevName.md at master · ef4tless/vuln

Tenda AX12 V22.03.01.46 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the list parameter at /goform/SetStaticRouteCfg.

CVE-2023-49426: vuln/iot/AX12/SetStaticRouteCfg.md at master · ef4tless/vuln

Tenda AX12 V22.03.01.46 has been discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the 'list' parameter at /goform/SetNetControlList.

CVE-2023-49437: vuln/iot/AX12/SetNetControlList-3.md at master · ef4tless/vuln

The affected devices use publicly available default credentials with administrative privileges.

**Full Disclosure mailing list archives**

_From_: Phos4Me via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure () seclists org>  
_Date_: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 07:12:31 +0000  

> > Advisory ID: Ph0s-2023-004
> > Product: EnBw - SENEC legacy storage box: V1-V3
> > Manufacturer: SENEC - a part of EnBw
> > Affected Version(s): Firmware: all (as of 2023-06-19)
> > Tested Version(s): current
> > Vulnerability Type: CWE-1392: Use of Default Credentials

> > Risk Level:
> > CVSS v3.1 Vector:
> > AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)

> > Manufacturer Risk Level Rating:
> > AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L/E:H/RL:U/RC:C
> > Overall CVSS Score: 8.6

> > Solution Status: Fixed
> > Manufacturer Notification: 2023-06-05
> > Public Disclosure: 2023-11-01
> > CVE Reference: CVE-2023-39170
> > Author of Advisory: Ph0s\[4\], R0ckE7

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Overview:
> > Foreword:
> > This vulnerability was reported to the enbw-cert. we would like to
> > thank enbw-cert for taking care of the vulns and patch the systems.
> > we decided to publish when most of the reported vulns are patched
> > to make sure nobody is harmed when 3rdparys exploit the mentioned vulns.

> > About Senec:
> > We are SENEC

> > We have been the EnBW energy independence experts since 2018 – but we have
> > put our heart and soul into guiding customers on the route to independence
> > since SENEC was founded in 2009. Our passion lies in actively promoting the
> > energy transition with innovative ideas and pioneering products. And,
> > because we don’t do things by halves, our unwavering ambition is to create
> > integrated solutions that enable you to enjoy the highest possible degree
> > of independence and sustainability through self-generation of solar
> > electricity.

> > About SENEC Home:

> > SENEC.Home: The smart electricity storage device for your home

> > SENEC.Home is the heart of the your sustainable, affordable supply of solar
> > electricity. The smart battery storage device stores excess electricity
> > generated by your PV system so that you can use it when you need it – such as
> > when your household’s energy consumption rises in the evening, or on rainy days
> > when your PV system generates less power.

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Vulnerability Details:

> > The credentials for the senec inverters are known in public.

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Proof of Concept (PoC):

> > The attack consists of the following steps:

> > 1\. use google to optain them, eg:
> > https://www.photovoltaikforum.com/thread/206930-senec-v3-hybrid-zugangsdaten/

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Solution:
> > Patched by Manufacturer
> > (Rolled out until September 11, 2023)

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Disclosure Timeline:

> > 2022-06-01: Vulnerability discovered
> > 2023-06-05: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
> > 2023-09-11: Patch rollout by manufacturer to affected devices
> > 2023-11-01: Public disclosure of vulnerability

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Researcher:
> > Ph0s\[4\], R0ckE7

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Disclaimer:

> > The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
> > and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
> > be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible.

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Copyright:

> > Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0
> > URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
> > \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
> > Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
> > https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
> > Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

**Attachment: publickey - Phos4Me@proton.me - 0x3F4F673D.asc**  
_Description:_

**Attachment: signature.asc**  
_Description:_ OpenPGP digital signature

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

**Current thread:**

*   **Senec Inverters Home V1, V2, V3 Home & Hybrid Publicly Accessible Default Credentials- CVE-2023-39170** _Phos4Me via Fulldisclosure (Nov 12)_

CVE-2023-39169: Senec Inverters Home V1, V2, V3 Home & Hybrid Publicly Accessible Default Credentials- CVE-2023-39170

SENEC Storage Box V1,V2 and V3 accidentially expose a management UI accessible with publicly known admin credentials.

**Full Disclosure mailing list archives**

_From_: Phos4Me via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure () seclists org>  
_Date_: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 07:11:03 +0000  

> > Advisory ID: Ph0s-2023-005
> > Product: EnBw - SENEC legacy storage box: V1-V3
> > Manufacturer: SENEC - a part of EnBw
> > Affected Version(s): Firmware: all (as of 2023-06-19)
> > Tested Version(s): current
> > Vulnerability Type: CWE-923: Improper Restriction of Communication
> > Channel to Intended Endpoints

> > Risk Level:
> > CVSS v3.1 Vector:
> > AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L (7.4 High)

> > Manufacturer Risk Level Rating:
> > AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L/E:H/RL:T/RC:C
> > Overall CVSS Score: 7.2

> > Solution Status: Fixed
> > Manufacturer Notification: 2023-06-05
> > Public Disclosure: 2023-11-01
> > CVE Reference: CCVE-2023-39171
> > Author of Advisory: Ph0s\[4\], R0ckE7

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Overview:
> > Foreword:
> > This vulnerability was reported to the enbw-cert. we would like to
> > thank enbw-cert for taking care of the vulns and patch the systems.
> > we decided to publish when most of the reported vulns are patched
> > to make sure nobody is harmed when 3rdparys exploit the mentioned vulns.

> > About Senec:
> > We are SENEC

> > We have been the EnBW energy independence experts since 2018 – but we have
> > put our heart and soul into guiding customers on the route to independence
> > since SENEC was founded in 2009. Our passion lies in actively promoting the
> > energy transition with innovative ideas and pioneering products. And,
> > because we don’t do things by halves, our unwavering ambition is to create
> > integrated solutions that enable you to enjoy the highest possible degree
> > of independence and sustainability through self-generation of solar
> > electricity.

> > About SENEC Home:

> > SENEC.Home: The smart electricity storage device for your home

> > SENEC.Home is the heart of the your sustainable, affordable supply of solar
> > electricity. The smart battery storage device stores excess electricity
> > generated by your PV system so that you can use it when you need it – such as
> > when your household’s energy consumption rises in the evening, or on rainy days
> > when your PV system generates less power.

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Vulnerability Details:

> > The management interface of the SENEC.Inverter is publicly accessible via the
> > Internet. This circumstance is recommended by the manufacturer and customers are
> > advised to open the necessary ports to enable remote maintenance.
> > As a result, anyone who manages to detect and successfully exploit security
> > vulnerabilities in SENEC.Inverter, for instance the authors of this report, can
> > access and compromise all devices available on the internet without
> > restrictions. To achieve this,it is possible to use an IoT search engine such as
> > Shodan to automatically obtain an up-to-date list of IP addresses of all devices
> > in just a few seconds.

> > Besides Shodan, there are other IoT search engines such as Censys or ZoomEye to
> > complement the list even further.
> > Consequently, it is very easy for an attacker to develop an exploit script for
> > the automated compromise of all SENEC.Inverter devices, e.g. to simul-
> > taneously shut down all appliances or to damage them through a targeted
> > overload. For this purpose, only the hard-coded credentials previously
> > identified in findings CVE-2023-39168 and CVE-2023-39169 need to be used in
> > conjunction with SENEC.Inverter’s built-in API.

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Proof of Concept (PoC):

> > The attack consists of the following steps:

> > 1\. use the shodan dork to obtain management-interfaces.
> > (no longer valid, patched by manufacturer)

> > https://www.shodan.io/search?query=http.html%3A<title>SENEC<%2Ftitle%
> > 3E

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Solution:
> > Patched by Manufacturer
> > (Rolled out until September 11, 2023)

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Disclosure Timeline:

> > 2022-06-01: Vulnerability discovered
> > 2023-06-05: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
> > 2023-09-11: Patch rollout by manufacturer to affected devices
> > 2023-11-01: Public disclosure of vulnerability

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Researcher:
> > Ph0s\[4\], R0ckE7

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Disclaimer:

> > The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
> > and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
> > be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible.

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Copyright:

> > Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0
> > URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
> > \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
> > Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
> > https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
> > Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

**Attachment: publickey - Phos4Me@proton.me - 0x3F4F673D.asc**  
_Description:_

**Attachment: signature.asc**  
_Description:_ OpenPGP digital signature

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

**Current thread:**

*   **Senec Inverters Home V1, V2, V3 Home & Hybrid Publicly Accessible Management Interface “Local GUI”- CVE-2023-39171** _Phos4Me via Fulldisclosure (Nov 12)_

CVE-2023-39171: Senec Inverters Home V1, V2, V3 Home & Hybrid Publicly Accessible Management Interface “Local GUI”- CVE-2023-39171

Tenda AX12 V22.03.01.46 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the deviceList parameter at /goform/setMacFilterCfg .

CVE-2023-49425: vuln/iot/AX12/setMacFilterCfg.md at master · ef4tless/vuln

WinterCMS version 1.2.3 suffers from a persistent cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Stored XSS in WinterCMS 1.2.3 Plugin Components# Date: 12/7/2023# Exploit Author: tmrswrr# Vendor Homepage: https://wintercms.com/# Software Link: https://github.com/wintercms/winter# Version: 1.2.3# Tested on: debian 9PoC   1. Access the WinterCMS backend at http://localhost/backend/cms.   2. Navigate to the Plugin Components section.   3. In the Markup Code input field, insert the following payload:   "<sVg/onLy=1 onLoaD=confirm(1)//".   4. Save the input and click on the "Preview" button.   5. The injected script executes, demonstrating the XSS vulnerability.

WinterCMS 1.2.3 Cross Site Scripting

The affected devices transmit sensitive information unencrypted allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to capture and modify network traffic.

**Full Disclosure mailing list archives**

_From_: Phos4Me via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure () seclists org>  
_Date_: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 07:13:23 +0000  

> > Advisory ID: Ph0s-2023-004
> > Product: EnBw - SENEC legacy storage box: V1-V3
> > Manufacturer: SENEC - a part of EnBw
> > Affected Version(s): Firmware: all (as of 2023-06-19)
> > Tested Version(s): current
> > Vulnerability Type: CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

> > Risk Level:
> > CVSS v3.1 Vector:
> > AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (8.1 High)

> > Manufacturer Risk Level Rating:
> > AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L/E:F/RL:U/RC:C
> > Overall CVSS Score: 7.4

> > Solution Status: Fixed
> > Manufacturer Notification: 2023-06-05
> > Public Disclosure: 2023-11-01
> > CVE Reference: CVE-2023-39172
> > Author of Advisory: Ph0s\[4\], R0ckE7

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Overview:
> > Foreword:
> > This vulnerability was reported to the enbw-cert. we would like to
> > thank enbw-cert for taking care of the vulns and patch the systems.
> > we decided to publish when most of the reported vulns are patched
> > to make sure nobody is harmed when 3rdparys exploit the mentioned vulns.

> > About Senec:
> > We are SENEC

> > We have been the EnBW energy independence experts since 2018 – but we have
> > put our heart and soul into guiding customers on the route to independence
> > since SENEC was founded in 2009. Our passion lies in actively promoting the
> > energy transition with innovative ideas and pioneering products. And,
> > because we don’t do things by halves, our unwavering ambition is to create
> > integrated solutions that enable you to enjoy the highest possible degree
> > of independence and sustainability through self-generation of solar
> > electricity.

> > About SENEC Home:

> > SENEC.Home: The smart electricity storage device for your home

> > SENEC.Home is the heart of the your sustainable, affordable supply of solar
> > electricity. The smart battery storage device stores excess electricity
> > generated by your PV system so that you can use it when you need it – such as
> > when your household’s energy consumption rises in the evening, or on rainy days
> > when your PV system generates less power.

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Vulnerability Details:

> > The management interface of the SENEC.Inverter transmits security-critical data
> > (authentication credentials) in cleartext in a communication channel that can be
> > sniffed by unauthorized actors. For example, in networking, packets can traverse
> > many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the
> > internet or an internal network. Some actors might have privileged access to a
> > network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router. As a result,
> > network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data.
> > Incidentally, this refers not only to remote maintenance of the photovoltaic
> > system, but also to on-site configuration by a technician at the customer’s
> > premises. Due to the lack of transport encryption, a technically skilled
> > customer is therefore also able to gather authentication credentials by
> > intercepting network traffic, e.g. at the central network gateway.

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Proof of Concept (PoC):

> > n/a, simply sniff the network

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Solution:
> > Patched by Manufacturer
> > (Rolled out until September 11, 2023)

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Disclosure Timeline:

> > 2022-06-01: Vulnerability discovered
> > 2023-06-05: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
> > 2023-09-11: Patch rollout by manufacturer to affected devices
> > 2023-11-01: Public disclosure of vulnerability

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Researcher:
> > Ph0s\[4\], R0ckE7

> > \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

> > Disclaimer:

> > The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
> > and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
> > be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible.

> > \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

> > Copyright:

> > Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0
> > URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en
> > \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
> > Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
> > https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
> > Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

**Attachment: publickey - Phos4Me@proton.me - 0x3F4F673D.asc**  
_Description:_

**Attachment: signature.asc**  
_Description:_ OpenPGP digital signature

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

**Current thread:**

*   **Senec Inverters Home V1, V2, V3 Home & Hybrid Cleartext Transmission of Authentication Credentials - CVE-2023-39172** _Phos4Me via Fulldisclosure (Nov 12)_

Tag

#git