#git

By Waqas If you are an Airbnb user, you need to be vigilant against cybercriminals who are targeting your device, personal, and financial information. This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Crooks Using Stealers and Stolen Cookies to Hack Airbnb Accounts

GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. In order to resolve some git references, GitPython reads files from the `.git` directory, in some places the name of the file being read is provided by the user, GitPython doesn't check if this file is located outside the `.git` directory. This allows an attacker to make GitPython read any file from the system. This vulnerability is present in https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/refs/symbolic.py#L174-L175. That code joins the base directory with a user given string without checking if the final path is located outside the base directory. This vulnerability cannot be used to read the contents of files but could in theory be used to trigger a denial of service for the program. This issue has not yet been addressed.

An unhandled edge case in the component _sanitizedPath of ZipArchive v2.5.4 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted zip file.

Chitor-CMS before v1.1.2 was discovered to contain multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities.

An issue in Archive v3.3.7 allows attackers to execute a path traversal via extracting a crafted zip file.

### Impact Python's "format" functionality allows someone controlling the format string to "read" all objects accessible through recursive attribute lookup and subscription from objects he can access. This can lead to critical information disclosure. With `RestrictedPython`, the format functionality is available via the `format` and `format_map` methods of `str` (and `unicode`) (accessed either via the class or its instances) and via `string.Formatter`. All known versions of `RestrictedPython` are vulnerable. ### Patches The issue will be fixed in 5.4 and 6.2. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds to fix the issue without upgrading. ### References * https://docs.python.org/3/library/stdtypes.html#str.format_map * http://lucumr.pocoo.org/2016/12/29/careful-with-str-format/ * https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51580 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the [RestrictedPython issue tracker](https://github.com/zope...

The `pytorch/pytorch` `filter-test-configs` workflow is vulnerable to an expression injection in Actions, allowing an attacker to potentially leak secrets and alter the repository using the workflow. ### Details The [`filter-test-configs`](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/ec26947c586dd323d741da80008403664c533f65/.github/actions/filter-test-configs/action.yml) workflow is using the raw `github.event.workflow_run.head_branch` value inside the `filter` step: ```yaml - name: Select all requested test configurations shell: bash env: GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github-token }} JOB_NAME: ${{ steps.get-job-name.outputs.job-name }} id: filter run: | ... python3 "${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/../../scripts/filter_test_configs.py" \ ... --branch "${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}" ``` In the event of a repository using `filter-test-configs` in a `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow, an attacker could use a malicious branch name to gain command ex...

### Summary In order to resolve some git references, GitPython reads files from the `.git` directory, in some places the name of the file being read is provided by the user, GitPython doesn't check if this file is located outside the `.git` directory. This allows an attacker to make GitPython read any file from the system. ### Details This vulnerability is present in https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/refs/symbolic.py#L174-L175 That code joins the base directory with a user given string without checking if the final path is located outside the base directory. I was able to exploit it from three places, but there may be more code paths that lead to it: https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/repo/base.py#L605 https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/1c8310d7cae144f74a671cbe17e51f63a830adbf/git/repo/base.py#L620 https://github.com/gitpython-d...

### Impact A flaw in the cryptographic authentication scheme in borgbackup allowed an attacker to fake archives and potentially indirectly cause backup data loss in the repository. The attack requires an attacker to be able to 1. insert files (with no additional headers) into backups 2. gain write access to the repository This vulnerability does not disclose plaintext to the attacker, nor does it affect the authenticity of existing archives. Creating plausible fake archives may be feasible for empty or small archives, but is unlikely for large archives. Affected are all borgbackup releases prior to 1.2.5. Note: CVSS scoring model seemed to badly fit for this case, thus I manually set score to "moderate". ### Patches The issue has been fixed in borgbackup 1.2.5. Additionally to installing the fixed code, users must follow the upgrade procedure as documented in the change log. ### Workarounds Data loss after being attacked can be avoided by reviewing the archives (timestamp and ...

Older versions of the package are vulnerable to Command Injection as an attacker controlled parameter. As a result, attackers may run malicious commands. For example: ``` const find = require("find-exec"); find("mplayer; touch hacked") ``` This creates a file named "hacked" on the filesystem. You should never allow users to control commands to find, since this package attempts to run every command provided. Thanks to @miguelafmonteiro for reporting.