#js

Another day, another supply chain attack!

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from an unauthenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. Input passed to the GET parameter 'redirect' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.

An issue was discovered in Django 5.1 before 5.1.4, 5.0 before 5.0.10, and 4.2 before 4.2.17. Direct usage of the django.db.models.fields.json.HasKey lookup, when an Oracle database is used, is subject to SQL injection if untrusted data is used as an lhs value. (Applications that use the jsonfield.has_key lookup via __ are unaffected.)

### Impact The regular expression that is vulnerable to backtracking can be generated in the 0.1.x release of `path-to-regexp`, originally reported here: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9wv6-86v2-598j ### Patches Upgrade to 0.1.12. ### Workarounds Avoid using two parameters within a single path segment, when the separator is not `.` (e.g. no `/:a-:b`). Alternatively, you can define the regex used for both parameters and ensure they do not overlap to allow backtracking. ### References - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9wv6-86v2-598j - https://blakeembrey.com/posts/2024-09-web-redos/

### Summary The Comment feature has implemented a filter to prevent users from adding restricted characters, such as HTML tags. However, this filter operates on the client-side, which can be bypassed, making the application vulnerable to HTML Injection. ### Details The Comment feature implements a character filter on the client-side, this can be bypassed by directly sending a request to the endpoint. Example Request: ``` PATCH /activity/comment/3 HTTP/2 Host: directus.local { "comment": "<h1>TEST <p style=\"color:red\">HTML INJECTION</p> <a href=\"//evil.com\">Test Link</a></h1>" } ``` Example Response: ```json { "data": { "id": 3, "action": "comment", "user": "288fdccc-399a-40a1-ac63-811bf62e6a18", "timestamp": "2023-09-06T02:23:40.740Z", "ip": "10.42.0.1", "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36", "collection": "directus_files", "item": "7247dda1-c386-4e7a-...

### Summary sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a bundle provides a invalid signature for a checkpoint. ### Impact This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify() Currently checkpoints are only used to ensure the root hash of an inclusion proof was provided by the log in question. Failing to validate that means a bundle may provide an inclusion proof that doesn't actually correspond to the log in question. This may eventually lead a monitor/witness being unable to detect when a compromised logs are providing different views of themselves to different clients. There are other mechanisms right now that mitigate this, such as the signed entry timestamp. Sigstore-java currently requires a valid signed entry timestamp. By correctly verifying the signed entry timestamp we can make certain assertions about the log signing the log entry (like the log was aware of the artifact signing event and signed it). Therefore the impact on clients...

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Affected versions use deno_core releases that expose `Deno.core.ops.op_panic` to the JS runtime in the base core This function when called triggers a manual panic in the thread containing the runtime. It can be fixed by stubbing out the exposed op: ```javascript Deno.core.ops.op_panic = (msg) => { throw new Error(msg) }; ```

Affected versions use deno_core releases that expose `Deno.core.ops.op_panic` to the JS runtime in the base core This function when called triggers a manual panic in the thread containing the runtime, breaking sandboxing It can be fixed by stubbing out the exposed op: ```javascript Deno.core.ops.op_panic = (msg) => { throw new Error(msg) }; ```

Earlier today, a publish-access account was compromised for `@solana/web3.js`, a JavaScript library that is commonly used by Solana dapps. This allowed an attacker to publish unauthorized and malicious packages that were modified, allowing them to steal private key material and drain funds from dapps, like bots, that handle private keys directly. This issue should not affect non-custodial wallets, as they generally do not expose private keys during transactions. This is not an issue with the Solana protocol itself, but with a specific JavaScript client library and only appears to affect projects that directly handle private keys and that updated within the window of 3:20pm UTC and 8:25pm UTC on Tuesday, December 3, 2024. These two unauthorized versions (1.95.6 and 1.95.7) were caught within hours and have since been unpublished. We are asking all Solana app developers to upgrade to version 1.95.8. Developers pinned to `latest` should also upgrade to 1.95.8. Developers that suspect t...