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The Duplicate Post Page Menu & Custom Post Type plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized page and post duplication due to a missing capability check on the duplicate_ppmc_post_as_draft function in versions up to, and including, 2.3.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with subscriber access or higher to duplicate posts and pages.

Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. A Content-Security-Policy that disables eval, specifically setting a `script-src` directive and _not_ providing `unsafe-eval` in that directive, is not respected in renderers that have sandbox disabled. i.e. `sandbox: false` in the `webPreferences` object. This allows usage of methods like `eval()` and `new Function` unexpectedly which can result in an expanded attack surface. This issue only ever affected the 22 and 23 major versions of Electron and has been fixed in the latest versions of those release lines. Specifically, these versions contain the fixes: 22.0.1 and 23.0.0-alpha.2 We recommend all apps upgrade to the latest stable version of Electron. If upgrading isn't possible, this issue can be addressed without upgrading by enabling `sandbox: true` on all renderers.

Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. This issue is only exploitable if an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a javascript object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported. This issue has been fixed in versions `25.0.0-alpha.2`, `24.0.1`, `23.2.3`, and `22.3.6`.

Electron is a framework which lets you write cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Electron apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met: 1. The app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory and 2. The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory. This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude Physically Local Attacks but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. This issue has been fixed in versions:`26.0.0-beta.13`, `25.4.1`, `24.7.1`, `23.3.13`, and `22.3.19`. There are no app side workarounds, users must update to a patched version of Electron.

### Impact Apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. E.g. if your app exposes itself in the path as `myapp --help` Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met: * Your app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory * The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude [Physically Local Attacks](https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-7x97-j373-85x5#:~:text=Physically%20Local%20Attacks) but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. Please bear this in mind when reporting similar issues in the future. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `26.0.0-beta.13` * `25...

### Impact Apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. ### Workarounds This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions: * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge ...

go-ethereum (geth) is a golang execution layer implementation of the Ethereum protocol. A vulnerable node, can be made to consume unbounded amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node. The fix is included in geth version `1.12.1-stable`, i.e, `1.12.2-unstable` and onwards. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

### Impact A Content-Security-Policy that disables eval, specifically setting a `script-src` directive and _not_ providing `unsafe-eval` in that directive, is not respected in renderers that have sandbox and contextIsolation disabled. i.e. `sandbox: false` and `contextIsolation: false` in the `webPreferences` object. This resulted in incorrectly allowing usage of methods like `eval()` and `new Function`, which can result in an expanded attack surface. ### Patches This issue only ever affected the 22 and 23 major versions of Electron and has been fixed in the latest versions of those release lines. Specifically, these versions contain the fixes: - 22.0.1 - 23.0.0-alpha.2 We recommend all apps upgrade to the latest stable version of Electron, especially if they use `sandbox: false` or `contextIsolation: false`. ### Workarounds If upgrading isn't possible, this issue can be addressed without upgrading by enabling at least one of `sandbox: true` or `contextIsolation: true` on all ren...

Tenda N300 Wireless N VDSL2 Modem Router allows unauthenticated access to pages that in turn should be accessible to authenticated users only

Red Hat Security Advisory 2023-4986-01 - The Red Hat OpenShift Distributed Tracing 2.9 container images have been released. Users of Red Hat OpenShift Distributed Tracing 2.8 container images are advised to upgrade to these updated images, which contain backported patches to correct security issues, fix bugs, and include further enhancements. You can find images updated by this advisory in Red Hat Container Catalog. Issues addressed include a denial of service vulnerability.