Multiple vulnerabilities including an incorrect permission assignment for critical resource [CWE-732] vulnerability and a time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition [CWE-367] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiClientWindows before 7.0.7 allows attackers on the same file sharing network to execute commands via writing data into a windows pipe.

**Outbreak Alerts**

What you need to know about the latest cybersecurity attacks - VM2 Sandbox Escape Vulnerability

**Threat Signal Report**

Patch Released for Critical vm2 Sandbox Escape Vulnerability (CVE-2023-29017 and CVE-2023-29199) - Apr 12, 2023

**Research Center**

\[Insomni'hack 2023\] Hacking your Jump Rope or your Coffee Machine - Mar 24, 2023

CVE-2022-43946: Fortiguard

An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command vulnerability [CWE-78] in FortiADC 5.x all versions, 6.0 all versions, 6.1 all versions, 6.2.0 through 6.2.4, 7.0.0 through 7.0.3, 7.1.0; FortiDDoS 4.x all versions, 5.0 all versions, 5.1 all versions, 5.2 all versions, 5.3 all versions, 5.4 all versions, 5.5 all versions, 5.6 all versions and FortiDDoS-F 6.4.0, 6.3.0 through 6.3.3, 6.2.0 through 6.2.2, 6.1.0 through 6.1.4 may allow an authenticated attacker to execute unauthorized commands via specifically crafted arguments to existing commands.

CVE-2022-40679: Fortiguard

Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-10-3 - macOS Big Sur 11.7.6 addresses code execution and out of bounds write vulnerabilities.

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Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-10-3

Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-10-2 - macOS Monterey 12.6.5 addresses code execution and out of bounds write vulnerabilities.

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Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-10-2

Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-07-3 - Safari 16.4.1 addresses code execution and use-after-free vulnerabilities.

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Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-07-3

Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-07-2 - macOS Ventura 13.3.1 addresses code execution, out of bounds write, and use-after-free vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-04-07-2 macOS Ventura 13.3.1

macOS Ventura 13.3.1 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/HT213721.

IOSurfaceAccelerator  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been  
actively exploited.  
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved  
input validation.  
CVE-2023-28206: Clément Lecigne of Google's Threat Analysis Group and  
Donncha Ó Cearbhaill of Amnesty International’s Security Lab

WebKit  
Available for: macOS Ventura  
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to  
arbitrary code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue  
may have been actively exploited.  
Description: A use after free issue was addressed with improved  
memory management.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 254797  
CVE-2023-28205: Clément Lecigne of Google's Threat Analysis Group and  
Donncha Ó Cearbhaill of Amnesty International’s Security Lab

macOS Ventura 13.3.1 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or  
Apple's Software Downloads web site:  
https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates  
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 2023-04-07-2

The gap between permissions granted and permissions used exposes organizations to increased risk. (Part two of a two-part series.)

Did you know that 86% of businesses plan to increase their investment in hybrid or multicloud technology? And yet 73% of those same companies find it challenging to manage multicloud environments.

In part, this is because managing identities and their related access permissions is more complicated when you're dealing with a multicloud environment. Digital sprawl has led to an explosion in permissions across multicloud environments, and we lack a consistent oversight solution.

To date, as many as 99% of current cloud permissions are going unused. This gap between permissions granted and permissions used represents a significant concern for enterprise businesses, as it opens them up to an increased risk of both accidental and malicious insider threats. Read on to learn how you can evolve your identity and permissions management by implementing cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM) solutions into your own operations.

**How Does CIEM Work?**

One issue with overpermissioned multicloud environments is that they're very difficult for security teams to monitor. Various cloud platforms don't always interact well with one another, and that can make it challenging for security teams to have full visibility across the entire multicloud environment. Identities have also expanded beyond employees and customers to encompass developers, third-party contractors, and even workload identities like web apps, virtual machines, containers, scripts, serverless functions, and more.

Attackers can exploit the misconfigured permissions of these identities to access critical cloud infrastructure. The permissions gap can be reduced by implementing least privilege access and working toward a zero-trust security model, but it's very difficult to do manually and at a cloud scale. That's where CIEM comes in.

As we learned in Part 1 of this series, CIEM was first coined by Gartner as a way to address the identity and permissions challenges posed by cloud technology. CIEM acts as a cloud-native, scalable, and extensible way to automate the continuous management of permissions in the cloud because it is built on a continuous, activity-based model. This allows organizations to keep pace with rapid cloud growth while also scaling their security infrastructure.

CIEM is made up of seven core pillars: account and entitlements discovery, cross-cloud entitlements correlation, entitlements visualization, entitlements optimization, entitlements protection, entitlements detection, and entitlements remediation. Essentially, it works by allowing organizations to understand what permissions currently exist within their environments and how various identities are using those permissions.

CIEM can even help organizations understand how they should change their current identity management to follow the principles of least privilege access and how to best protect their environments moving forward.

**How To Implement CIEM In Your Own Organization**

Cloud technology has become table stakes for many organizations, and the move to shift workloads into the cloud isn't likely to slow down anytime soon. This means that cloud providers will continue to add new capabilities and services, generating tens of thousands of permissions and growing the number of identities — both human and workload — in the process.

That's why we recommend taking a life cycle approach to CIEM. This empowers organizations to continuously discover, remediate, and monitor the activity of every unique user and workload identity that's operating in their cloud environment. It also has the benefit of alerting security and infrastructure teams to unexpected or excessive risks in cloud environments so they can respond accordingly.

The first step is the discovery phase. This involves creating individual usage profiles for each human or workload identity to understand how they typically operate in your environment and assess whether permissions granted in the past are still needed today.

Next is the remediation phase. A core attribute of CIEM is that it enables companies to look at usage data to see which permissions each identity is actually using. Based on this insight, security teams can then revoke permissions that aren't being used or that aren't necessary for that person or workload's function.

Finally, we have the monitoring phase. Thousands of identities can be active across cloud environments at any given time. So it's critical for CIEM solutions to provide robust monitoring and alerting capabilities. This monitoring should be customizable by both identity and activity, and your CIEM solution should be able to send automated alerts to the appropriate security team.

Strong cloud security ultimately hinges on an organization's ability to control the level of access that human and workload identities have to their infrastructure. Something like CIEM can help secure these identities at scale.

How CIEM Can Improve Identity, Permissions Management for Multicloud Deployments

A "by-design flaw" uncovered in Microsoft Azure could be exploited by attackers to gain access to storage accounts, move laterally in the environment, and even execute remote code.
"It is possible to abuse and leverage Microsoft Storage Accounts by manipulating Azure Functions to steal access-tokens of higher privilege identities, move laterally, potentially access critical business assets, and

Cloud Security / Data Security

A "by-design flaw" uncovered in Microsoft Azure could be exploited by attackers to gain access to storage accounts, move laterally in the environment, and even execute remote code.

"It is possible to abuse and leverage Microsoft Storage Accounts by manipulating Azure Functions to steal access-tokens of higher privilege identities, move laterally, potentially access critical business assets, and execute remote code (RCE)," Orca said in a new report shared with The Hacker News.

The exploitation path that underpins this attack is a mechanism called Shared Key authorization, which is enabled by default on storage accounts.

According to Microsoft, Azure generates two 512-bit storage account access keys when creating a storage account. These keys can be used to authorize access to data via Shared Key authorization, or via SAS tokens that are signed with the shared key.

"Storage account access keys provide full access to the configuration of a storage account, as well as the data," Microsoft notes in its documentation. "Access to the shared key grants a user full access to a storage account's configuration and its data."

The cloud security firm said these access tokens can be stolen by manipulating Azure Functions, potentially enabling a threat actor with access to an account with Storage Account Contributor role to escalate privileges and take over systems.

Specifically, should a managed identity be used to invoke the Function app, it could be abused to execute any command. This, in turn, is made possible owing to the fact that a dedicated storage account is created when deploying an Azure Function app.

"Once an attacker locates the storage account of a Function app that is assigned with a strong managed identity, it can run code on its behalf and as a result acquire a subscription privilege escalation (PE)," Orca researcher Roi Nisimi said.

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In other words, by exfiltrating the access-token of the Azure Function app's assigned managed identity to a remote server, a threat actor can elevate privileges, move laterally, access new resources, and execute a reverse shell on virtual machines.

"By overriding function files in storage accounts, an attacker can steal and exfiltrate a higher-privileged identity and use it to move laterally, exploit and compromise victims' most valuable crown jewels," Nisimi explained.

As mitigations, it's recommended that organizations consider disabling Azure Shared Key authorization and using Azure Active Directory authentication instead. In a coordinated disclosure, Microsoft said it "plans to update how Functions client tools work with storage accounts."

"This includes changes to better support scenarios using identity. After identity-based connections for AzureWebJobsStorage are generally available and the new experiences are validated, identity will become the default mode for AzureWebJobsStorage, which is intended to move away from shared key authorization," the tech giant further added.

The findings arrive weeks after Microsoft patched a misconfiguration issue impacting Azure Active Directory that made it possible to tamper with Bing search results and a reflected XSS vulnerability in Azure Service Fabric Explorer (SFX) that could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Newly Discovered "By-Design" Flaw in Microsoft Azure Could Expose Storage Accounts to Hackers

Your iPhone, iPad, and Mac now have a built-in password feature, complete with two-factor authentication.

Most people don't use a password manager or two-factor authentication—even people who know it's a good idea—because installing and managing _yet another app_ just sounds exhausting. Well, if you're an Apple user, you don't need another app anymore: Your device can manage your passwords and generate two-factor authentication codes for you, and you can even sync them with a Windows computer.

Password managers are important. Why? To quickly summarize, using the same password for every website and app is an open invitation for hackers to access all of your accounts. That's because passwords regularly leak, and a leaked password on one site can give hackers access to all your other accounts if you use the same password everywhere. It's best, then, to use a totally different password on every site, but no human being can remember that many passwords.

Password managers are the best solution we have at the moment, because they can generate, and then store, secure passwords for all of your services. Most people don't use one, though, because such apps can be complicated to learn, and the best ones aren't free.

So it's great that Apple offers such functionality. But there's a downside: It's a little buried, if not outright hidden. Still, if you're a Safari user with multiple Apple devices, this feature means you can quickly generate and save secure passwords for all of your accounts. Here's how. Note that you'll need a (free) iCloud account for this service to sync passwords between devices, though if you're an Apple user you almost certainly already have one.

Create Passwords

To get started, you may need to enable the feature, which you can find in System Settings on your device under **Passwords**. Make sure **iCloud Keychain** is turned on. Windows users should also install iCloud for Windows, which can sync your passwords with Chrome or Microsoft Edge.

The simplest way to add passwords to Apple's hidden password manager is to just start using your devices and saving passwords as you go. When you sign into any online account in Safari, or in any app on your iPhone or iPad, there's generally a pop-up asking if you want to save the password in your **iCloud Keychain for AutoFill.** This is the simplest way to add accounts: Just hit the **Save Password** button and your username and password will be saved.

Alternatively, if you're signing up for a new account, you will generally be offered an automatically generated strong password—if not, you can tap the key icon at the top of the keyboard on mobile or in the right side of the password field on desktop. Either way you should see the **Add New Password** option, which can automatically create a strong password for you.

From now on, when you log in to the site, your device will offer to fill out the username and password for you. It will generally use TouchID, FaceID, or your system password to confirm you identity, after which the username and password field will be filled in. This saves you from having to remember the passwords, and even the usernames, you use to log in to websites.

Browse and Edit Your Passwords

You might be wondering _where_, exactly, all of these passwords are saved. Let's head back to **Passwords** in System Settings. Here you will find a list of all the passwords you've saved.

Apple via Justin Pot

At the top of the list is a **Security Recommendations** function, which will cross-reference your saved passwords with known lists of leaked accounts. This is a useful way to know if any of your passwords absolutely need to be changed.

Below that is a search bar, which you can use to quickly find any account. Open an account to see the username, password, and URLs associated with the account. You can also add a note to any account, if you want.

Two-Factor Authentication

We've talked about how two-factor authentication keeps you more secure, but basically it means that a hacker who gets your password won't be able to log in unless they _also_ have physical access to your device. Generally two-factor authentication requires installing _yet another_ app, for generating codes, but Apple devices have this feature built in, and they can even fill in the field for you.

Head back to your list of passwords in the System Settings app. Open any account and you'll see a **Set Up Verification Code** field.

Apple via Justin Pot

Tap this and you can set up two-factor authentication for the application. How to do this depends on the specific service you're setting it up for, but it's generally in the settings of the specific app or website. You'll have a QR code to sign or, alternatively, a long code to copy.

Apple via Justin Pot

After setting this up, your Apple device will automatically offer verification codes for you every time you log in to the service on any of your devices. It's really slick, and it's a lot faster than applications like Authy or Google Authenticator.

Importing and Exporting Passwords

Note that if you have an existing password manager, you can import your passwords to Apple's system. Head back to **Passwords** in the settings app and hit the three-dot button on the right above your list of passwords. Here you will see the option to **Import passwords**.

Apple via Justin Pot

You will need to export your passwords to a CSV file before you can use this functionality. Here are instructions for the leading password managers:

*   1Password
*   LastPass
*   Bitwarden
*   Dashlane
*   Google Chrome

You can also **Export** your Apple passwords to a CSV file from here, allowing you to import them into one of these password managers. We've outlined  the best password managers for you; my personal recommendations are Bitwarden, which is free and open source, and 1Password, which is powerful and free to use.

There's not a lot of reason for the Apple faithful to do this, though. As we've outlined, Apple's password system does most of what these applications can do. The main problem is that they're hidden. 

Recently the blogger Cabel Sasser argued that Apple Passwords needs an app, which is part of why I wrote this guide. I'm not sure if I agree with his premise—I suspect most people would simply ignore any “Passwords” app, the way they ignore most applications that come bundled with their devices. Still, it is true that all of this functionality is pretty buried. I hope this article helps you find it.

How to Use Apple’s New All-In-One Password Manager

In three separate incidents, engineers at the Korean electronics giant reportedly shared sensitive corporate data with the AI-powered chatbot.

Recent reports about engineers at Samsung Electronics inadvertently leaking sensitive company information via ChatGPT in three separate incidents highlight why policies governing employee use of AI services in the workplace are quickly becoming a must for enterprise organizations.

The Economist Korea, one of the first to report on the data leaks, described the first incident as involving an engineer who pasted buggy source code from a semiconductor database into ChatGPT, with a prompt to the chatbot to fix the errors. In the second instance, an employee wanting to optimize code for identifying defects in certain Samsung equipment pasted that code into ChatGPT. The third leak resulted when an employee asked ChatGPT to generate the minutes of an internal meeting at Samsung.

The incidents played out exactly the same way that researchers have been warning that they could, since OpenAI made ChatGPT publicly available in November. Security analysts have noted how, in all instances where users share data with ChatGPT, the information ends up as training data for the machine learning/large language model (ML/LLM). They have noted how someone could later retrieve the data using the right prompts. 

ChatGPT creator, OpenAI, itself has warned users on the risk: "We are not able to delete specific prompts from your history. Please don't share any sensitive information in your conversations," OpenAI's user guide notes.

**Samsung Enacts Emergency Anti-ChatGPT Measures**

The situation has apparently prompted a rethink of ChatGPT use at Samsung after the third incident, just barely three weeks after the South Korean electronics giant allowed employees access to the generative AI tool. The company had initially banned the technology over security and privacy concerns before relenting.

The Economist reported Samsung's emergency measures to limit ChatGPT use internally as including restricting employees from asking questions of ChatGPT that were larger than 1,024 bytes and considering disciplinary action against employees who share corporate data with LLMs such as ChatGPT.

Samsung did not respond to a Dark Reading request seeking clarification on the three incidents and the company's response to them. Security researchers, however, have been warning that such leaks could become common as employees begin leveraging ChatGPT for various use cases within the enterprise.

A study that Cyberhaven conducted earlier this year found many workers at client companies pasting source code, client data, regulated information, and other confidential data into ChatGPT. Examples included an executive who pasted his company's 2023 strategy document into the chatbot so it could generate a PowerPoint slide presentation, and a doctor who entered a patient's name and medical diagnosis so ChatGPT could generate a letter to the patient's insurance company.

**AI: A Risk vs. Benefit Gamble for Enterprises**

"From an employee's perspective, ChatGPT-like tools offer the potential to be exponentially more productive, making them hard to ignore," says Krishna Vishnubhotla, vice president of product strategy at Zimperium. However, it's important to consider the risks vs. rewards equation, which will vary depending on specific roles and responsibilities, he notes. For instance, employees working with intellectual property would require more guidance and precautions on how to use tools like ChatGPT he says: "It is crucial for organizations to understand how productivity will look and where it will come from before they embrace this opportunity."

Michael Rinehart, vice president of artificial intelligence at Securiti, says it's important to remember that advanced Generative AI tools such as ChatGPT cannot distinguish between what they should and should not memorize during training. So, organizations that want to harness them for different use cases should consider using tools for classifying, masking, or tokenizing personal and other sensitive data.

Or "a second approach is the use of differential privacy. Differential privacy offers provable protection of individuals in structured data," Rinehart says.

**Differential Privacy**

Rinehart describes differential privacy as a technique for protecting data in a dataset. "It involves adding noise — or error — to real data," he says. The synthetic data will have many of the important characteristics of real-world data without exposing the individuals in the dataset. "If used properly, even if the synthetic dataset were leaked, privacy would still be protected. Enterprise-grade synthetic data generators with differential privacy are now available," he says.

Rinehart perceives attempts by organizations to ban ChatGPT use in the workplace as ill conceived and unlikely to work. "A consistent story in the field of security is that it may be better to offer a secure path to using a tool than to block it," he says. "If a tool offers incredibly high benefits, people may attempt to circumvent blocks to take advantage of it."

Melissa Bischoping, director of endpoint security at Tanium, says the issue with sharing data to ChatGPT lies in the fact that the creators can see the data and use it to understand how the model continues to train and grow. Once a user shares information with ChatGPT, that information becomes part of the next model. 

"As organizations want to enable use of powerful tools like ChatGPT, they should explore options that allow them to leverage a privately trained model so their valuable data is only used by their model and not leveraged by iterations on training for the next publicly available model."

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