Tag
#nginx
### Summary Nginx-UI is a web interface to manage Nginx configurations. It is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution by abusing the configuration settings. ### Details The `Home > Preference` page exposes a list of system settings such as `Run Mode`, `Jwt Secret`, `Node Secret` and `Terminal Start Command`. The latter is used to specify the command to be executed when a user opens a terminal from the web interface. While the UI doesn't allow users to modify the `Terminal Start Command` setting, it is possible to do so by sending a request to the [API](https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/api/system/router.go#L13). ```go func InitPrivateRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) { r.GET("settings", GetSettings) r.POST("settings", SaveSettings) ... } ``` The [`SaveSettings`](https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/api/system/settings.go#L18) function is used to save the settings. It is protected by t...
### Summary The `Home > Preference` page exposes a small list of nginx settings such as `Nginx Access Log Path` and `Nginx Error Log Path`. However, the API also exposes `test_config_cmd`, `reload_cmd` and `restart_cmd`. While the UI doesn't allow users to modify any of these settings, it is possible to do so by sending a request to the [API](https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/api/system/router.go#L13). ```go func InitPrivateRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) { r.GET("settings", GetSettings) r.POST("settings", SaveSettings) ... } ``` The [`SaveSettings`](https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/api/system/settings.go#L18) function is used to save the settings. It is protected by the [`authRequired`](https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/router/middleware.go#L45) middleware, which requires a valid JWT token or a `X-Node-Secret` which must equal the `Nod...
### Summary The [`OrderAndPaginate`](https://github.com/0xjacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/model/model.go#L99C4) function is used to order and paginate data. It is defined as follows: ```go func OrderAndPaginate(c *gin.Context) func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB { return func(db *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB { sort := c.DefaultQuery("order", "desc") order := fmt.Sprintf("`%s` %s", DefaultQuery(c, "sort_by", "id"), sort) db = db.Order(order) ... } } ``` By using [`DefaultQuery`](https://github.com/0xjacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/model/model.go#L278-L287), the `"desc"` and `"id"` values are used as default values if the query parameters are not set. Thus, the `order` and `sort_by` query parameter are user-controlled and are being appended to the `order` variable without any sanitization. The same happens with [`SortOrder`](https://github.com/0xjacky/nginx-ui/blob/04bf8ec487f06ab17a9fb7f34a28766e5f53885e/model/model.go#L91), but it doesn...
This Metasploit module exploits a command injection vulnerability in Vinchin Backup & Recovery v5.0.*, v6.0.*, v6.7.*, and v7.0.*. Due to insufficient input validation in the checkIpExists API endpoint, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands as the web server user.
The next parameter in the /accounts/login endpoint of Seafile 9.0.6 allows attackers to redirect users to arbitrary sites.
### Summary When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates the RFC because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. ### Details For example, we have this Nginx configuration: ``` location /admin { deny all; return 403; } ``` This can be bypassed when the attacker is requesting to /#/../admin This won’t be vulnerable if the backend server follows the RFC and ignores any characters after the fragment. However, if Nginx is chained with another reverse proxy which automatically URL encode the character # (Traefik) the URL will become /%23/../admin And allow the attacker to completely bypass the Access Restriction from the Nginx Front-End proxy. Here is a diagram to summarize the attack: ![i...
Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates RFC 7230 because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. This vulnerability has been addressed in versions 2.10.6 and 3.0.0-beta5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
kkFileView v4.3.0 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control.
nexkey is a microblogging platform. Insufficient validation of ActivityPub requests received in inbox could allow any user to impersonate another user in certain circumstances. This issue has been patched in version 12.122.2.
HAProxy before 2.8.2 accepts # as part of the URI component, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information or have unspecified other impact upon misinterpretation of a path_end rule, such as routing index.html#.png to a static server.