#php

The `Zend\Http\PhpEnvironment\RemoteAddress` class provides features around detecting the internet protocol (IP) address for an incoming proxied request via the X-Forwarded-For header, taking into account a provided list of trusted proxy server IPs. Prior to 2.2.5, the class was not taking into account whether or not the IP address contained in PHP's `$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']` was in the trusted proxy server list. The IETF draft specification indicates that if `$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']` is not a trusted proxy, it must be considered the originating IP address, and the value of X-Forwarded-For must be disregarded.

Online Media Asset Handling (*`.youtube` and *`.vimeo` files) in the TYPO3 backend is vulnerable to denial of service. Putting large files with according file extensions results in high consumption of system resources. This can lead to exceeding limits of the current PHP process which results in a dysfunctional backend component. A valid backend user account or write access on the server system (e.g. SFTP) is needed in order to exploit this vulnerability.

Due to missing file extensions in $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['BE'][‘fileDenyPattern’], backend users are allowed to upload *.phar, *.shtml, *.pl or *.cgi files which can be executed in certain web server setups. A valid backend user account is needed in order to exploit this vulnerability. Derivatives of Debian GNU Linux are handling *.phar files as PHP applications since PHP 7.1 (for unofficial packages) and PHP 7.2 (for official packages). The file extension *.shtml is bound to server side includes which are not enabled per default in most common Linux based distributions. File extension *.pl and *.cgi require additional handlers to be configured which is also not the case in most common distributions (except for /cgi-bin/ location).

When using the TYPO3 backend in order to create new backend user accounts, database records containing insecure or empty credentials might be persisted. When the type of user account is changed - which might be entity type or the admin flag for backend users - the backend form is reloaded in order to reflect changed configuration possibilities. However, this leads to persisting the current state as well, which can result into some of the following: - account contains empty login credentials (username and/or password) - account is incomplete and contains weak credentials (username and/or password) Albeit the functionality provided by the TYPO3 core cannot be used either with empty usernames or empty passwords, it still can be a severe vulnerability to custom authentication service implementations. This weakness cannot be directly exploited and requires interaction on purpose by some backend user having according privileges.

It has been discovered that request handling in Extbase can be vulnerable to insecure deserialization. User submitted payload has to be signed with a corresponding HMAC-SHA1 using the sensitive TYPO3 encryptionKey as secret - invalid or unsigned payload is not deserialized. However, since sensitive information could have been leaked by accident (e.g. in repositories or in commonly known and unprotected backup files), there is the possibility that attackers know the private encryptionKey and are able to calculate the required HMAC-SHA1 to allow a malicious payload to be deserialized. Requirements for successfully exploiting this vulnerability (all of the following): - rendering at least one Extbase plugin in the frontend - encryptionKey has been leaked (from LocalConfiguration.php or corresponding .env file)

Online Pizza Ordering System version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

Boelter Blue System Management version 1.3 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

Due to a missing signature (HMAC) for a request argument, an attacker could unserialize arbitrary objects within FLOW3. To our knowledge it is neither possible to inject code through this vulnerability, nor are there exploitable objects within the FLOW3 Base Distribution. However, there might be exploitable objects within user applications.

Due to reports it has been validated that internal workspaces in Neos are accessible without authentication. Some users assumed this is a planned feature but it is not. A workspace preview should be an additional feature with respective security measures in place. Note that this only allows reading of internal workspaces not writing. And for clarification, an internal workspace is a workspace that is non public and doesn't have an owner. Given that an internal workspace exists in your installation, it is possible to view a page in context of that workspace by opening a link in this format: https://domain/path/to/page.html@workspace-name The issue is quite problematic when exploited but at the same time slightly less impactful than it sounds. First of all there is no default internal workspace, so the issue affects only workspaces created by users. That also means the workspace-name, which will also always include a hash is individual to a project and an exploiter must get hold of t...

It has been discovered that Flow 3.0.0 allows arbitrary file uploads, inlcuding server-side scripts, posing the risk of attacks. If those scripts are executed by the server when accessed through their public URL, anything not blocked through other means is possible (information disclosure, placement of backdoors, data removal, …). Note: The upload of files is only possible if the application built on Flow provides means to do so, and whether or not the upload of files poses a risk is dependent on the system setup. If uploaded script files are not executed by the server, there is no risk. In versions prior to 3.0.0 the upload of files with the extension php was blocked. In Flow 2.3.0 to 2.3.6 a potential XML External Entity processing vulnerability has been discovered in the MediaTypeConverter.