Generative AI is seeping into the core of your phone, but what does that mean for privacy? Here’s how Apple’s unique AI architecture compares to the “hybrid” approach adopted by Samsung and Google.

Yet Google and its hardware partners argue privacy and security are a major focus of the Android AI approach. VP Justin Choi, head of the security team, mobile eXperience business at Samsung Electronics, says its hybrid AI offers users “control over their data and uncompromising privacy.”

Choi describes how features processed in the cloud are protected by servers governed by strict policies. “Our on-device AI features provide another element of security by performing tasks locally on the device with no reliance on cloud servers, neither storing data on the device nor uploading it to the cloud,” Choi says.

Google says its data centers are designed with robust security measures, including physical security, access controls, and data encryption. When processing AI requests in the cloud, the company says, data stays within secure Google data center architecture and the firm is not sending your information to third parties.

Meanwhile, Galaxy’s AI engines are not trained with user data from on-device features, says Choi. Samsung “clearly indicates” which AI functions run on the device with its Galaxy AI symbol, and the smartphone maker adds a watermark to show when content has used generative AI.

The firm has also introduced a new security and privacy option called Advanced Intelligence settings to give users the choice to disable cloud-based AI capabilities.

Google says it “has a long history of protecting user data privacy,” adding that this applies to its AI features powered on-device and in the cloud. “We utilize on-device models, where data never leaves the phone, for sensitive cases such as screening phone calls,” Suzanne Frey, vice president of product trust at Google, tells WIRED.

Frey describes how Google products rely on its cloud-based models, which she says ensures “consumer's information, like sensitive information that you want to summarize, is never sent to a third party for processing.”

“We’ve remained committed to building AI-powered features that people can trust because they are secure by default and private by design, and most importantly, follow Google’s responsible AI principles that were first to be championed in the industry,” Frey says.

**Apple Changes the Conversation**

Rather than simply matching the “hybrid” approach to data processing, experts say Apple’s AI strategy has changed the nature of the conversation. “Everyone expected this on-device, privacy-first push, but what Apple actually did was say, it doesn’t matter what you do in AI—or where—it’s how you do it,” Doffman says. He thinks this “will likely define best practice across the smartphone AI space.”

Even so, Apple hasn’t won the AI privacy battle just yet: The deal with OpenAI—which sees Apple uncharacteristically opening up its iOS ecosystem to an outside vendor—could put a dent in its privacy claims.

Apple refutes Musk’s claims that the OpenAI partnership compromises iPhone security, with “privacy protections built in for users who access ChatGPT.” The company says you will be asked permission before your query is shared with ChatGPT, while IP addresses are obscured and OpenAI will not store requests—but ChatGPT’s data use policies still apply.

Partnering with another company is a “strange move” for Apple, but the decision “would not have been taken lightly,” says Jake Moore, global cybersecurity adviser at security firm ESET. While the exact privacy implications are not yet clear, he concedes that “some personal data may be collected on both sides and potentially analyzed by OpenAI.”

How Apple Intelligence’s Privacy Stacks Up Against Android’s ‘Hybrid AI’

Multiple threat actors, including cyber espionage groups, are employing an open-source Android remote administration tool called Rafel RAT to meet their operational objectives by masquerading it as Instagram, WhatsApp, and various e-commerce and antivirus apps.
"It provides malicious actors with a powerful toolkit for remote administration and control, enabling a range of malicious activities

Mobile Security / Threat Intelligence

Multiple threat actors, including cyber espionage groups, are employing an open-source Android remote administration tool called **Rafel RAT** to meet their operational objectives by masquerading it as Instagram, WhatsApp, and various e-commerce and antivirus apps.

"It provides malicious actors with a powerful toolkit for remote administration and control, enabling a range of malicious activities from data theft to device manipulation," Check Point said in an analysis published last week.

It boasts a wide range of features, such as the ability to wipe SD cards, delete call logs, siphon notifications, and even act as ransomware.

The use of Rafel RAT by DoNot Team (aka APT-C-35, Brainworm, and Origami Elephant) was previously highlighted by the Israeli cybersecurity company in cyber attacks that leveraged a design flaw in Foxit PDF Reader to trick users into downloading malicious payloads.

The campaign, which took place in April 2024, is said to have utilized military-themed PDF lures to deliver the malware.

Check Point said it identified around 120 different malicious campaigns, some targeting high-profile entities, that span various countries like Australia, China, Czechia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, and the U.S.

"The majority of victims had Samsung phones, with Xiaomi, Vivo, and Huawei users comprising the second-largest group among the targeted victims," it noted, adding no less than 87.5% of the infected devices are running out-of-date Android versions that no longer receive security fixes.

Typical attack chains involve the use of social engineering to manipulate victims into granting the malware-laced apps intrusive permissions in order to hoover sensitive data like contact information, SMS messages (e.g., 2FA codes), location, call logs, and the list of installed applications, among others.

Rafel RAT primarily makes use of HTTP(S) for command-and-control (C2) communications, but it can also utilize Discord APIs to contact the threat actors. It also comes with an accompanying PHP-based C2 panel that registered users can leverage to issue commands to compromised devices.

The tool's effectiveness across various threat actors is corroborated by its deployment in a ransomware operation carried out by an attacker likely originating from Iran, who sent a ransom note written in Arabic through an SMS that urged a victim in Pakistan to contact them on Telegram.

"Rafel RAT is a potent example of the evolving landscape of Android malware, characterized by its open-source nature, extensive feature set, and widespread utilization across various illicit activities," Check Point said.

"The prevalence of Rafel RAT highlights the need for continual vigilance and proactive security measures to safeguard Android devices against malicious exploitation."

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Multiple Threat Actors Deploying Open-Source Rafel RAT to Target Android Devices

The new remote access trojan (RAT) dubbed SpiceRAT was used by the threat actor SneakyChef in a recent campaign targeting government agencies in EMEA and Asia.

*   Cisco Talos discovered a new remote access trojan (RAT) dubbed SpiceRAT, used by the threat actor SneakyChef in a recent campaign targeting government agencies in EMEA and Asia. 
*   We observed that SneakyChef launched a phishing campaign, sending emails delivering SugarGh0st and SpiceRAT with the same email address. 
*   We identified two infection chains used to deliver SpiceRAT utilizing LNK and HTA files as the initial attack vectors. 

_Cisco Talos would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation._ 

**SneakyChef delivered SpiceRAT to target Angola government with lures from Turkmenistan news agency **

Talos recently revealed SneakyChef’s continuing campaign targeting government agencies across several countries in EMEA and Asia, delivering the SugarGh0st malware (read the corresponding research here). However, we found a new malware we dubbed “SpiceRAT” was also delivered in this campaign.  

SneakyChef is using a name "ala de Emissão do Edifício B Mutamba" and the email address “dtti.edb@\[redated\]” to send several phishing emails with at least 28 different RAR file attachments to deliver either SugarGh0st or SpiceRAT. 

One of the decoy PDFs that we analysed in this campaign was dropped by a RAR archive, delivered as an attachment in the emails likely targeted Angolan government agencies. The decoy PDF contained lures from the Turkmenistan state-owned news media “ТУРКМЕНСКАЯ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСКАЯ СЛУЖБА” (Neytralnyy Turkmenistan), indicating that the actor has likely downloaded the PDF from their official website. We also found that a similar decoy PDF from the same news agency was dropped by the RAR archive that delivered the SugarGh0st malware in this campaign, highlighting that SneakyChef has SugarGh0st RAT and SpiceRAT payloads in their arsenal.   

__Decoy PDF samples of SugarGh0st and SpiceRAT attacks.__

**Two infection chains **

Talos discovered two infection chains employed by SneakyChef to deploy SpiceRAT. Both infection chains involved multiple stages launched by an HTA or LNK file.  

**LNK-based infection chain  **

The LNK-based infection chain begins with a malicious RAR file that contains a Windows shortcut file (LNK) and a hidden folder. This folder contains multiple components, including a malicious executable launcher, a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL loader, an encrypted SpiceRAT masquerading as a legitimate help file (.HLP) and a decoy PDF. The table below shows an example of the components of this attack chain and the description. 

File Name 

Description 

2024-01-17.pdf.lnk 

Malicious shortcut file  

LaunchWlnApp.exe 

Windows EXE to open decoy PDF and run a legitimate EXE 

dxcap.exe 

Benign executable to side-load the malicious DLL 

ssMUIDLL.dll 

Malicious DLL loader 

CGMIMP32.HLP 

Encrypted SpiceRAT

Microsoftpdf.pdf 

Decoy PDF  

When the victim extracts the RAR file, it drops the LNK and a hidden folder on their machine. After a victim opens the shortcut file, which masqueraded as a PDF document, it executes an embedded command to run the malicious launcher executable from the dropped hidden folder.  

__Sample LNK file that starts the malicious launcher EXE.__

This malicious launcher executable is a 32-bit binary compiled on Jan. 2, 2024. When launched by the shortcut file, it reads the victim machine’s environment variable, the execution path of the legitimate executable and the path of the decoy PDF document and runs them using the API ShellExecuteW.  

__Sample function that starts the legitimate EXE and opens the decoy document.__

The legitimate file is one of the components of SpiceRAT infection, which will sideload the malicious DLL loader to decrypt and launch the SpiceRAT payload.  

**HTA-based infection chain **

The HTA-based infection chain also begins with a RAR archive delivered with the email. The RAR file contains a malicious HTA file. When the victim runs the malicious HTA file, the embedded malicious Visual Basic script executes and drops the embedded base64-encoded downloader binary into the victim’s user profile temporary folder, disguised as a text file named “Microsoft.txt.” 

After dropping the malicious downloader executable, the HTA file executes another function, which drops and executes a Windows batch file in the victim’s user profile temporary folder, named “Microsoft.bat.”  

The malicious batch file performs the following operations on the victim’s machine: 

*   The certutil command decodes the base64-encoded binary data from “Microsoft.txt” and saves it as “Microsoft.exe” in the victim’s user profile temporary folder.  

certutil -decode %temp%\\\\Microsoft.txt %temp%\\\\Microsoft.exe

*   It creates a Windows scheduled task that runs the malicious downloader every five minutes, supressing any warnings that it triggers when the same task name existed.  

schtasks /create /tn MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineClSAN /tr %temp%\\\\Microsoft.exe /sc minute -mo 5 /F 

*   The batch script creates another Windows task named “MicrosoftDeviceSync” to run a downloaded legitimate executable “ChromeDriver.exe” every 10 minutes.  

schtasks /create /tn MicrosoftDeviceSync /tr C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\Chrome\\\\ChromeDirver.exe /sc minute -mo 10 /F 

*   After establishing persistence with the Windows scheduled task, the batch script runs three other commands to erase the infection markers. This includes deleting the Windows task named MicrosoftDefenderUpdateTaskMachineClSAN and removing the encoded downloader “Microsoft.txt,” the malicious HTA file, and any other contents unpacked from the RAR file attachment.  

schtasks /delete /f /tn MicrosoftDefenderUpdateTaskMachineClSAN 

del /f /q %temp%\\\\Microsoft.txt %temp%\\\\Microsoft.hta 

del %0 

The malicious downloader is a 32-bit executable compiled on March 5, 2024. After running on the victim’s machine through the Windows task MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineClSAN, it downloads a malicious archive file “chromeupdate.zip” from an attacker-controlled server through a hardcoded URL and unpacks its contents into the folder at “C:\\ProgramData\\Chrome”. The unpacked files are the components of SpiceRAT.  

__A sample function of the malicious downloader.__

**Analysis of SpiceRAT **

Both infection chains eventually drop the SpiceRAT files into victim machines. The SpiceRAT files include four main components: a legitimate executable file, a malicious DLL loader, an encrypted payload and the downloaded plugins.  

**The loader components of SpiceRAT ****Legitimate executable **

The threat actor is using a legitimate executable (named “RunHelp.exe”) as a launcher to sideload the malicious DLL loader file (ssMUIDLL.dll). This legitimate executable is a Samsung RunHelp application signed with the certificate of "Samsung Electronics CO., LTD.” In some instances, it has been observed masquerading as “dxcap.exe,” a DirectX diagnostic included with Visual Studio, and “ChromeDriver.exe,” an executable that Selenium WebDriver uses to control the Google Chrome web browser. 

__File properties and digital signature details of the legitimate executable.__

The legitimate Samsung helper application typically loads a DLL called “ssMUIDLL.dll.” In this attack, the threat actor abuses the application by sideloading a malicious DLL loader that is masquerading as the legitimate DLL and executes its exported function GetFulllangFileNamew2. 

__Sample function that side-loads the malicious DLL.__

**Malicious DLL loader **

The malicious loader is a 32-bit DLL compiled on Jan. 2, 2024. When its exported function GetFullLangFileNameW2() is run, it copies the downloaded legitimate executable into the folder "C:\\Users\\<user>\\AppData\\Local\\data\\” as “dxcap.exe” along with the malicious DLL “ssMUIDLL.dll” and the encrypted SpiceRAT payload “CGMIMP32.HLP.”  

__A sample function copies the SpiceRAT components.__

It executes the schtasks command to create a Windows task named “Microsoft Update,” configured to run “dxcap.exe” every two minutes. This technique establishes persistence at multiple locations on the victim's machine to maintain resilience.    

schtasks  -CreAte -sC minute -mo 2 -tn "Microsoft Update" -tr "C:\\Users\\<User>\\AppData\\Local\\data\\dxcap.exe" 

__A sample function that creates Windows task.__

Then the loader DLL takes the snapshot of the running processes in the victim machine and checks if the legitimate executable that sideloads this malicious DLL is being debugged by querying its process information using “NtQueryInformationProcess.” 

The loader DLL executes another function that loads the encrypted file “CGMIMP32.HLP,” which is masquerading as a legitimate Windows help file into memory and decrypts it using the RC4 encryption algorithm. In one of the samples, we found that the DLL used a key phrase “{11AADC32-A303-41DC-BF82-A28332F36A2E}” for decrypting SpiceRAT in memory. After decryption, the loader DLL injects and runs the SpiceRAT from memory to its parent process “dxcap.exe.”  

__A sample function that decrypts the SpiceRAT in memory.__

**The SpiceRAT payloads **

Talos discovered that SneakyChef has employed SpiceRAT and its plugin as the payloads in this campaign. With the capability to download and run executable binaries and arbitrary commands, SpiceRAT significantly increases the attack surface on the victim’s network, paving the way for further attacks.  

SpiceRAT is a 32-bit Windows executable with three malicious export functions GetFullLangFileNameW2, WinHttpPostShare and WinHttpFreeShareFree. Initially, it executes the GetFullLangFileNameW2 function, creating a mutex as an infection marker on the victim machine. The mutex name is hardcoded in the RAT binary. We spotted two different mutex names among the SpiceRAT samples that we analyzed: 

*   {00866F68-6C46-4ABD-A8D6-2246FE482F99}  
*   {00861111-3333-4ABD-GGGG-2246FE482F99} 

After the Mutex is created, the RAT collects reconnaissance data from the victim’s machine, including the operating system’s version number, hostname, username, IP address and the system’s network card hardware address (MAC address). The reconnaissance data is then encrypted and stored in the machine’s memory. 

__A sample function that encrypts the reconnaissance data in memory.__

During runtime, the RAT loads the WININET.dll file and imports the addresses of its functions to prepare for C2 communication.  

__A sample function that loads the APIs of WININET.dll.__

Once the function addresses of WININET.dll are imported, the RAT executes the WinHttpPostShare function to communicate with the C2. It connects to the C2 server with a hardcoded URL in the binary and through the HTTP POST method.  

 

 

Then, it attempts to read and send the encrypted stream of reconnaissance data and user credentials from memory to the C2 server. The C2 server responds with an encrypted message enclosed with HTML tags in the format “<HTML><encrypted Response> </HTML>”. The RAT decrypts the response and writes them into the memory stream.  

We discovered that the C2 server sends an encrypted stream of binary to the RAT. The RAT decrypts the binary stream into a DLL file in the memory and executes its exported functions. The decrypted DLL functions as a plugin to the SpiceRAT.  

 __Sample function of SpiceRAT executing the export functions of plugin.__ 

**SpiceRAT plugin enables further attacks  **

SpiceRAT plugin is a 32-bit dynamic link library compiled on March 28, 2023. The plugin has an original filename “Moudle.dll” and has two export functions: Download and RunPE. 

The Download function of the plugin appears to access decrypted response data from the C2 server stored in the victim’s memory and writes them into a file on disk, likely as commanded by the C2.  

__The downloader function of SpiceRAT plugin.__

The RunPE function appears to execute arbitrary commands or binaries that were likely sent from C2 using the WinExec API.  

__A sample function to run a PE file.__ 

**C2 communications **

SneakyChef’s infrastructure includes the malware’s download and command and control (C2) servers. In one attack, the threat actor hosted a malicious ZIP archive on the server 45\[.\]144\[.\]31\[.\]57 and hardcoded the following URL in a malicious downloader executable.  

http://45[.]144[.]31[.]57:80/S1VRB0HpMXR79eStog35igWKVTsdbx/chromeupdate.zipservers

We observed that the threat actor used IP addresses and domain names to connect to the C2 servers in different samples of SpiceRAT in this campaign. Our research uncovered various C2 URLs hardcoded in SpiceRAT samples.  

*   hxxp\[://\]94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4/homepage/index.aspx 
*   hxxp\[://\]stock\[.\]adobe-service\[.\]net/homepage/index.aspx 
*   hxxp\[://\]app\[.\]turkmensk\[.\]org\[/\]homepage\[/\]index.aspx 

One of the C2 servers, 94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4, was found to be running Windows Server 2016 and hosted on the M247 network, which is frequently abused by APT groups. Passive DNS resolution data indicate that the IP address 94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4 resolved to the domain app\[.\]turkmensk\[.\]org and we found another SpiceRAT sample in the wild that communicated with this domain.  

Further analysis of the C2 server 94\[.\]198\[.\]40\[.\]4 uncovered a unique C2 communication pattern of SpiceRAT. The SpiceRAT initially sends the encrypted reconnaissance data to the C2 URL through the HTTP POST method. The C2 server then responds with an encrypted message embedded in the HTML tags.   

We observed that the SpiceRAT and its C2 servers use a three-byte prefix for their first three requests and responses, as shown in the table below. 

C2 server response prefix 

Our analysis suggests that the second request that SpiceRAT sends likely contains the encrypted stream of the victim’s machine user credentials. We found that for the third request that SpiceRAT sends from the victim machine, the C2 server responds with an encrypted stream of the SpiceRAT’s plugin binary. SpiceRAT then decrypts and injects the plugin DLL reflectively.  

Once the plugin is downloaded and implanted on the victim’s machine, SpiceRAT sends another request with the prefix “wG.” The C2 server responds with an unencrypted message “<HTML>D\_OK<HTML>”, likely to get a confirmation of successful payload download.  

**TTPs overlap with other malware campaigns  **

Talos assesses with medium confidence that the actor SneakyChef, using SpiceRAT and SugarGh0st RAT is a Chinese-speaking actor based of the language observed in the artifacts and overlapping TTPs with other malware campaigns.  

In this campaign, we saw that SpiceRAT leverages the sideloading technique, utilizing a legitimate loader alongside a malicious loader and the encrypted payload. Although sideloading is a widely adopted tactic, technique and procedure (TTP), the choice to use the Samsung helper application to sideload the malicious DLL masquerading “ssMUIDLL.dll” file is particularly notable. This method has been previously observed in the PlugX and SPIVY RAT campaigns. 

**Coverage **

 Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. 

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. 

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. 

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SID for this threat is 63538. 

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRAT-10031450-0 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRATPlugin-10031560-0 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRATLauncher-10031652-0 

Win.Trojan.SpiceRATLauncherEXE-10032013-0 

**Indicators of Compromise **

Indicators of Compromise associated with this threat can be found here.

Unveiling SpiceRAT: SneakyChef's latest tool targeting EMEA and Asia

The messaging standard promises better security and cooler features than plain old SMS. Android has had it for years, but now iPhones are getting it too.

If you've been keeping up with all the news out of WWDC 2024 this week, you'll know that Apple is bringing the RCS (Rich Communication Services) messaging standard to iPhones later this year with iOS 18. That's a win for Google, which has long backed RCS on Android. But what actually is RCS? And why does supporting it matter?

The short version: It's an upgrade on the standard SMS/MMS texting standards that smartphones have been using from the start. It brings better support for all the cool features we're used to in our messaging apps, like read receipts and images, and it adds some extra security layers too.

Yes, it's a lot like using iMessage from Apple, or using WhatsApp—though it's not quite that simple. There's no RCS app you can install, but you can find apps that support the RCS standard, as we'll explain.

RCS is coming to iOS this year.

Courtesy of Apple

So the long version: Rich Communication Services is a fundamental standard rather than an app like WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram. It requires carrier support to work, which is why adoption was slow in the beginning, though RCS now works across most countries and is supported by AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile.

SMS (Short Message Service) and MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service) weren't really built for the modern way that we communicate through our phones, and RCS tries to fix that. It adds or improves support for sharing large-resolution images and video, group chatting, read receipts, video calls, and messages that actually go beyond 160 characters.

When RCS is supported in your phone's default texting app, you can add reactions to messages, see when someone else is typing, and drop extra elements like GIFs, stickers, and your current location into conversations—all features you may well be used to and accept as standard in other apps.

There are changes and upgrades behind the scenes as well. Whereas SMS/MMS requires a data connection to your cellular network, RCS works over cell networks as well as Wi-Fi. If you don't have a cell signal for whatever reason but you can find a wireless network, your message can still go through.

RCS settings on a Pixel phone.

Courtesy of David Nield

The standard also brings end-to-end encryption with it. It means that no one else—not even Google or your carrier—can see the conversation that's taking place, because only the devices involved in the conversation have the keys necessary to decrypt it. End-to-end encryption is a security feature you should look for in any app that handles sensitive information, including communications.

It's a clear upgrade, which is why Google Messages and Samsung Messages now support it—the messaging apps you'll find on Pixel phones and Galaxy phones, respectively. In November 2023, Apple finally relented and agreed to support RCS on the iPhone in 2024, though this course correction perhaps had more to do with concerns about antitrust procedures than any newfound sense of camaraderie with Google.

Now we know that iPhone RCS support is going to arrive in September with iOS 18. This means all of those features we've mentioned—from read receipts to message reactions—will work inside the iOS Messages app. However, Android users are still going to show up as green bubbles, as the RCS standard isn't going to be fully integrated with the iMessage platform that Apple operates.

When you're texting someone with RCS enabled, you'll see "Text Message RCS" inside the text input box in Messages on iOS, indicating that the recipient can take advantage of all the modern messaging features that we're now used to. There's no need to turn RCS on or off—it's automatically enabled if you're chatting with a contact who has a device that supports RCS.

How RCS messages will look on an iPhone.

Courtesy of Apple

With iOS 18 still in its development stage, there might be changes to come for how RCS is handled on iPhones before the software is rolled out to all compatible devices later in the year. This version of iOS will work on any iPhone models launched in 2018 or later, so most Apple handsets currently in use will get the software and RCS.

It's the same with Samsung Messages: RCS is simply enabled when available. It's Google Messages for Android that gives you most control over RCS settings, and you can get to them from inside the app by tapping your profile picture (top right), then selecting **Messages settings**. Choose **RCS chats** and you're able to turn features such as read receipts and typing indicators on or off.

With RCS soon to appear on iPhones and now extensively supported on Android devices, it's going to become less and less likely that your phone will need to revert back to SMS—though it will do this if RCS isn't available for whatever reason. Otherwise, the standard that has powered our text messages since 1992 will finally be able to enjoy a well-earned retirement.

A Guide to RCS, Why Apple’s Adopting It, and How It Makes Texting Better

The company focused heavily on data and system security in the announcement of its generative AI platform, Apple Intelligence, but experts worry that companies will have little visibility into data security.

Source: Cosmo Condina via Alamy Stock Photo

Apple's long-awaited announcement of its generative AI (GenAI) capabilities came with an in-depth discussion of the company's security considerations for the platform. But the tech industry's past focus on harvesting user data from nearly every product and service have left many concerned over the data security and privacy implications of Apple's move. Fortunately, there are some proactive ways that companies can address potential risks.

Apple's approach to integrating GenAI — dubbed Apple Intelligence — includes context-sensitive searches, editing emails for tone, and the easy creation of graphics, with Apple promising that the powerful features require only local processing on mobile devices to protect user and business data. The company detailed a five-step approach to strengthen privacy and security for the platform, with much of the processing done on a user's device using Apple Silicon. More complex queries, however, will be sent to the company's private cloud and use the services of OpenAI and its large language model (LLM).

While companies will have to wait to see how Apple's commitment to security plays out, the company has put a lot of consideration into how GenAI services will be handled on devices and how the information will be protected, says Joseph Thacker, principal AI engineer and security researcher at AppOmni, a cloud-security firm.

"Apple's focus on privacy and security in the design is definitely a good sign," he says. "Features like not allowing privileged runtime access and preventing user targeting show they are thinking about potential abuse cases."

Apple spent significant time during its announcement reinforcing the idea that the company takes security seriously, and published a paper online that describes the company's five requirements for its Private Cloud Compute service, such as no privileged runtime access and hardening the system to prevent targeting specific users.

Still, large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, and other forms of GenAI are new enough that the threats remain poorly understood, and some will slip through Apple's efforts, says Steve Wilson, chief privacy officer at cloud security and compliance provider Exabeam, and lead on the Open Web Application Security Project's Top 10 Security Risks for LLMs.

"I really worry that LLMs are a very, very different beast, and traditional security engineers, they just don't have experience with these AI techniques yet," he says. "There are very few people who do."

**Apple Makes Security a Centerpiece**

Apple seems to be aware of the security risks that concern its customers, especially businesses. The implementation of Apple Intelligence across a user's devices, dubbed the Personal Intelligence System, will connect data from applications in a way that has, perhaps, only been implemented through the company's health-data services. Conceivably, every message and email sent from a device could be reviewed by AI and context added through on-device semantic indexes.

Yet, the company pledged that, in most cases, the data never leaves the device, and the information is anonymized as well.

"It is aware of your personal data, without collecting your personal data," Craig Federighi, senior vice president of software engineering at Apple, stated in a four-minute video on Apple Intelligence and privacy during the company's June 10 launch, adding: "You are in control of your data, where it is stored and who can access it."

When it does leave the device, data will be processed in the company's Private Cloud Compute service, so Apple can take advantage of more powerful server-based generative-AI models, while still protecting privacy. The company says that it never stores or makes accessible any data to Apple. In addition, Apple will make every production build of its Private Cloud Compute platform available to security researchers for vulnerability research in conjunction with a bug-bounty program.

Such steps seemingly go beyond what other companies have promised and should assuage the fears of enterprise security teams, AppOmni's Thacker says.

"This type of transparency and collaboration with the security research community is important for finding and fixing vulnerabilities before they can be exploited in the wild," he says. "It allows Apple to leverage the diverse skills and perspectives of researchers to really put the system through the wringer from a security testing perspective. While it's not a guarantee of security, it will help a lot."

**There's an App for (Leaking) That**

However, the interactions between apps and data on mobile devices and the behavior of LLMs may be too complex to fully understand at this point, says Exabeam's Wilson. The attack surface area of LLMs continues to surprise the large companies behind the major AI models. Following its release of its latest Gemini model, for example, Google had to contend with inadvertent data poisoning that arose from training its model with untrusted data.

"Those search components are falling victim to these kind of indirect injection data-poisoning incidents, where they're off telling people to eat glue and rocks," Wilson says. "So it's one thing to say, 'Oh, this is a super-sophisticated organization, they'll get this right,' but Google's been proving over and over and over again that they won't."

Apple's announcement comes as companies are quickly experimenting with ways to integrate GenAI into the workplace to improve productivity and automate traditionally tough-to-automate processes. Bringing the features to mobile devices has happened slowly, but now, Samsung has released its Galaxy AI, Google has announced the Gemini mobile app, and Microsoft has announced Copilot for Windows.

While Copilot for Windows is integrated with many applications, Apple Intelligence appears to go beyond even Microsoft's approach.

**Think Different (About Threats)**

Overall, companies need to first gain visibility into their employees' use of LLMs and other GenAI. While they do not need to go to the extent of billionaire tech innovator Elon Musk, a former investor in OpenAI, who raised concerns that Apple — or OpenAI — would abuse users' data or fail to secure business information and pledged to ban iPhones at his companies, chief information security officers (CISOs) certainly should have a discussion with their mobile device management (MDM) providers, Exabeam's Wilson says.

Right now, controls to regulate data going into and out of Apple Intelligence do not appear to exist and, in the future, may not be accessible to MDM platforms, he says.

"Apple has not historically provided a lot of device management, because they are leaned in on personal use," Wilson says. "So it's been up to third parties for the last 10-plus years to try and build these third-party frameworks that allow you to install controls on the phone, but it's unclear whether they're going to have the hooks into \[Apple Intelligence\] to help control it."

Until more controls come online, enterprises need to set a policy, and to find ways to integrate their existing security controls, authentication systems, and data loss prevention tools with AI, says AppOmni's Thacker.

"Companies should also have clear policies around what types of data and conversations are appropriate to share with AI assistants," he says. "So while Apple's efforts help, enterprises still have work to do to fully integrate these tools securely."

**About the Author(s)**

Veteran technology journalist of more than 20 years. Former research engineer. Written for more than two dozen publications, including CNET News.com, Dark Reading, MIT's Technology Review, Popular Science, and Wired News. Five awards for journalism, including Best Deadline Journalism (Online) in 2003 for coverage of the Blaster worm. Crunches numbers on various trends using Python and R. Recent reports include analyses of the shortage in cybersecurity workers and annual vulnerability trends.

Apple Intelligence Could Introduce Device Security Risks

When a drug kingpin named Microsoft tried to seize control of an encrypted phone company for criminals, he was playing right into its real owners’ hands.

Inside the Biggest FBI Sting Operation in History

Plus, SS7 vulnerabilities are being exploited and BreachForums is taken down again.

Thursday, May 23, 2024 14:00

Since the advent of products like the Tile and Apple AirTag, both used to keep track of easily lost items like wallets, keys and purses, bad actors and criminals have found ways to abuse them. 

These adversaries can range from criminals just looking to do something illegal for a range of reasons, but maybe just looking to steal a physical object, to just a jealous or suspicious spouse or partner who wants to keep tags on their significant other. 

Apple and other manufacturers who make these devices have since taken several steps to curb the abuse of these devices and make them more secure. Most recently, Google and Apple announced new alerts that would hit Android and iOS devices and alert users that their devices’ location is being connected to any location-tracking device.  

“With this new capability, users will now get an ‘\[Item\] Found Moving With You’ alert on their device if an unknown Bluetooth tracking device is seen moving with them over time, regardless of the platform the device is paired with,” Apple stated in its announcement. 

Companies Motorola, Jio and Eufy also announced that they would be adhering to these new standards and should release compliant products soon.  

Certainly, products like the AirTag and Samsung trackers that these companies have direct control over will now be more secure, and hopefully less ripe for abuse by a bad actor, but it’s far from a total solution to the problem that these types of products pose. 

As I’ve pointed out in the past with security cameras and any other range of internet-connected devices, online stores are filled with these types of products, promising to track users’ personal items with an app so they don’t lose common household items like their phones, wallets and keys.  

Amazon has countless listings under “location tag” for a range of AirTag-like products made by unknown manufacturers. Some of these products are slim enough to fit right into the credit card pocket of a wallet or purse,  and others are smaller than the average AirTag and even advertise that they can remain hidden inside a car.  

I admittedly haven’t been able to dive into these individual devices, but some of them come with their own third-party apps, which come with their own set of security caveats and completely take it out of platform developers’ hands.  

There are also other “find my device”-type services that pose additional security concerns outside of just buying a small tag. Android’s new, enhanced “Find My Device” network is a crowdsourced solution to help users potentially find their lost devices, similar to iOS’ Find My network.  

The Find My Device network works by using other Android devices to silently relay the registered device’s approximate location, even if the device being searched for is offline or turned off. In the wrong hands, there are a range of ways that can be abused on its own.  

So, rather than relying on developers and manufacturers to make these services more secure, I have a few tips for how to use AirTag-like devices safely, if you really can’t come up with a better solution for not losing your keys. 

*   Check for suspicious tracking devices. On iOS, this means opening the “Find My” app and navigating to Items > Items Detected Near You. Any unfamiliar AirTags will be listed here. On Android, you can do the same thing by going to Settings > Safety & Emergency > Unknown Tracker Alerts > Scan Now. 
*   Remove yourself from any “Sharing Groups” unless it’s a trusted contact in your phone using the Find My app on iOS. 
*   If location tracking is your primary concern (especially for parents and their children) using the Find My app on iOS and Android is generally a more secure option than trusting a third-party app downloaded from the app store or relying on a Bluetooth connection.  
*   Manage individual apps’ settings to ensure only the services that \*really\* need to track your device’s physical location are using it. (Ex., you probably don’t need Facebook tracking that information.) 
*   Since AirTags are connected to your Apple ID, ensure that login is secured with multi-factor authentication (MFA) or using a passkey.  

**The one big thing **

Cisco recently developed and released a new feature to detect brand impersonation in emails when adversaries pretend to be a legitimate corporation. Threat actors employ a variety of techniques to embed brand logos within emails. One simple method involves inserting words associated with the brand into the HTML source of the email. New data from Talos found that popular brands like PayPal, Microsoft, NortonLifeLock and McAfee are among some of the most-impersonated brands in these types of phishing emails.  

**Why do I care? **

Brand impersonation could happen on many online platforms, including social media, websites, emails and mobile applications. This type of threat exploits the familiarity and legitimacy of popular brand logos to solicit sensitive information from victims. In the context of email security, brand impersonation is commonly observed in phishing emails. Threat actors want to deceive their victims into giving up their credentials or other sensitive information by abusing the popularity of well-known brands. 

**So now what? **

Well-known brands can protect themselves from this type of threat through asset protection as well. Domain names can be registered with various extensions to thwart threat actors attempting to use similar domains for malicious purposes. The other crucial step brands can take is to conceal their information from WHOIS records via privacy protection. And users who want to learn more about Cisco Secure Email Threat Defense's new brand impersonation detection tools can visit this site. 

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Adversaries have been quietly exploiting the backbone of cellular communications to track Americans’ location for years,** according to a U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The official broke ranks with their agency and reportedly shared this information with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The official said that attackers have used vulnerabilities in the SS7 protocol to steal location data, monitor voice and text messages, and deliver spyware. Other targets have received text messages containing fake news or disinformation. SS7 is the protocol used across the globe that routes text messages and calls to different devices but has often been a target for attackers. In the past, other vulnerabilities in SS7 have been used to gain access to telecommunications providers’ networks. In their written comments to the FCC, the official said that these vulnerabilities are the “tip of the proverbial iceberg” of SS7-related exploits used against U.S. citizens. (404 Media, The Economist) 

**The FBI once again seized the main site belonging to BreachForums,** a popular platform for buying and selling stolen personal information. Last year, international law enforcement agencies took down a previous version of the cybercrime site and arrested its administrator, but the new pages quickly emerged, using three different domains since the last disruption. American law enforcement agencies also took control of the forum’s official Telegram account, and a channel belonging to the newest BreachForums administrator, “Baphomet.” However, the FBI has yet to publicly state anything about the takedown or any potential arrests. BreachForums isn’t expected to be gone for long, as another admin named “ShinyHunters” claims the site will be back with a new Onion domain soon. ShinyHunters claims they’ve retried access to the seized clearnet domain for BreachForums, though they did not provide specific methods. BreachForums is infamous for being a site where attackers can buy and sell stolen data, offer their hacking services or share recent TTPs. (TechCruch, HackRead) 

**The U.S. Department of Justice charged three North Koreans with crimes related to impersonating others to obtain remote employment in the U.S., which in turn generated funding for North Korea’s military.** The three men, and another U.S. citizen, were charged with what the DOJ called “staggering fraud” in which they secured illicit work with several U.S. companies and government agencies using fraudulent identities from 60 real Americans. The U.S. citizen was allegedly placed laptops belonging to U.S. companies at various residences so the North Koreans could hide their true location. North Korean state-sponsored actors have used these types of tactics for years, often relying on social media networks like LinkedIn to fake their personal information and obtain jobs or steal sensitive information from companies. More than 300 companies may have been affected, with the perpetrators earning more than $6.8 million, most of which was used to “raise revenue for the North Korean government and its illicit nuclear program,” according to the DOJ. (ABC News, Bloomberg) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Proactive Threat Hunting in Duo Data 
*   Talos Takes Ep. #184: Recapping RSA  
*   You have to look out for these hacks in 2024! 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**ISC2 SECURE Europe** **(May 29)** 

_Amsterdam, Netherlands_ 

> _Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will participate in a panel on “Using ECSF to Reduce the Cybersecurity Workforce and Skills Gap in the EU.” Karadzhova-Dangela participated in the creation of the EU cybersecurity framework, and will discuss how Cisco has used it for several of its internal initiatives as a way to recruit and hire new talent._  

**Cisco Live** **(June 2 - 6)** 

_Las Vegas, Nevada_ 

> _B_ill Largent from Talos' Strategic Communications team will be giving our annual "State of Cybersecurity" talk at Cisco Live on Tuesday, June 4 at 11 a.m. Pacific time. Jaeson Schultz from Talos Outreach will have a talk of his own on Thursday, June 6 at 8:30 a.m. Pacific, and there will be several Talos IR-specific lightning talks at the Cisco Secure booth throughout the conference.

**_AREA41_** **_(June 6 – 7)_** 

_Zurich, Switzerland_ 

> _Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela from Cisco Talos Incident Response will highlight the primordial importance of actionable incident response documentation for the overall response readiness of an organization. During this talk, she will share commonly observed mistakes when writing IR documentation and ways to avoid them. She will draw on her experiences as a responder who works with customers during proactive activities and actual cybersecurity breaches._ 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** 9be2103d3418d266de57143c2164b31c27dfa73c22e42137f3fe63a21f793202   
**MD5:** e4acf0e303e9f1371f029e013f902262   
**Typical Filename:** FileZilla\_3.67.0\_win64\_sponsored2-setup.exe   
**Claimed Product:** FileZilla   
**Detection Name:** W32.Application.27hg.1201 

**SHA 256:** a024a18e27707738adcd7b5a740c5a93534b4b8c9d3b947f6d85740af19d17d0   
**MD5:** b4440eea7367c3fb04a89225df4022a6   
**Typical Filename:** Pdfixers.exe   
**Claimed Product:** Pdfixers   
**Detection Name:** W32.Superfluss:PUPgenPUP.27gq.1201 

**SHA 256:** 1fa0222e5ae2b891fa9c2dad1f63a9b26901d825dc6d6b9dcc6258a985f4f9ab   
**MD5:** 4c648967aeac81b18b53a3cb357120f4   
**Typical Filename:** yypnexwqivdpvdeakbmmd.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::1201 

**SHA 256:** d529b406724e4db3defbaf15fcd216e66b9c999831e0b1f0c82899f7f8ef6ee1   
**MD5:** fb9e0617489f517dc47452e204572b4e   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent 

**SHA 256:** abaa1b89dca9655410f61d64de25990972db95d28738fc93bb7a8a69b347a6a6   
**MD5:** 22ae85259273bc4ea419584293eda886   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto++ x64.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto++   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent

Apple and Google are taking steps to curb the abuse of location-tracking devices — but what about others?

Plus: Google holds off on killing cookies, Samourai Wallet founders get arrested, and GM stops driver surveillance program.

Controversial gunshot-detection company ShotSpotter has deployed more than 25,000 microphones across 170 cities worldwide. This week, WIRED and _South Side Weekly_ revealed the company may continue to provide gunshot data to police in cities even after contracts have ended. Internal emails seen by the publications suggest ShotSpotter sensors may have stayed online despite law enforcement deals having expired, raising questions about what will happen to 2,500 microphones in Chicago when its contract runs out at the end of the year.

Elsewhere, Change Healthcare finally admitted to paying a ransom to the AlphV hackers, also known as BlackCat, that extorted the medical company. Weeks ago, WIRED revealed the attackers were paid $22 million, one of the largest ransomware payments ever. However, in a statement this week the company admitted for the first time that it paid the ransom as part of its effort “to do all it could to protect patient data from disclosure.” Some of that data still found its way onto the dark web.

In another successful grift, researchers have found animators in North Korea creating artwork for major Hollywood studios. A misconfigured North Korea cloud server, discovered at the end of last year, contained thousands of animation files, notes, and working documents for productions of shows that stream on Amazon Prime Video and Max. The companies likely didn’t know workers from the Hermit Kingdom were creating the artwork, but it’s another example of how North Korea is using skilled workers to circumvent sanctions and make the regime money.

Meanwhile, Cisco revealed this week that some of its devices, called Adaptive Security Appliances, have been targeted by state-sponsored hackers who exploited two zero-day vulnerabilities in the systems. The attack, dubbed ArcaneDoor, is believed to have had an espionage focus and sources suspect China’s state-backed hackers may be the culprits.

The November presidential elections may still be months away, but the next US president will have increased surveillance capabilities. This week Joe Biden signed a controversial bill extending and enhancing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FISA allows spy agencies to collect Americans’ calls, emails, and more when pursuing foreign intelligence. Critics say the changes are “a gift to any president who may wish to spy on political enemies.”

That’s not all. Each week, we round up the security and privacy news we didn’t cover in depth ourselves. Click the headlines to read the full stories. And stay safe out there.

**School Principal Framed Using AI Voice Deepfake**

In January, an Instagram account in Baltimore, Maryland, posted an alleged audio recording of local school principal Eric Eiswert making racist and antisemitic comments. Baltimore County Public Schools quickly opened an investigation into the incident. However, this week, a former athletic director at Pikesville High School was arrested after police said he used artificial intelligence software to create the fake audio clip of Eiswert. The audio included comments about “ungrateful Black kids” and disparaging remarks about the Jewish community.

Dazhon Darien, the former staff member, was arrested after being stopped in possession of a gun at an airport when officials saw there was an outstanding arrest warrant, the _Baltimore Banner_ reported. The media organization reports that Darien was charged with disrupting school activities and stalking. The fake clip was allegedly made in retaliation for the principal investigating Darien over irregular payments to his roommate.

Police reports, the _Banner_ says, indicate that the audio clip had a “profound” impact on the school principal. “It not only led to Eiswert’s temporary removal from the school but also triggered a wave of hate-filled messages on social media and numerous calls to the school,” police reports said.

Voice-cloning technology, which can fall under the broader banner of deepfake technology, has rapidly improved within the last year. Cloning tools can recreate someone’s voice to a relatively realistic level using just a few seconds of real audio. The systems have increasingly been used to impersonate politicians and scam people over the phone.

**General Motors Stops Driving Surveillance, Following Privacy Complaints**

Your car knows a lot about you—from where and how you drive, to your weight and how you sit. This week, following a series of revelations from _New York Times_ reporter Kashmir Hill, General Motors announced it will end its “Smart Driver” program and unenroll all customers. Until the reports from the _Times_, GM was sharing data with data brokers LexisNexis and Verisk, which shared it with insurers and led to high payments for some people. The OnStar Smart Driver program had been designed to promote safer driving, GM said. However, many people were not aware they had been enrolled in the system. Ten lawsuits have been filed so far about the Smart Driver program and how it shared data.

**Google Delays Killing Cookies—Again**

In January 2020, Google said it would remove third-party cookies from Chrome within two years—following Safari, Brave, Firefox, and other browsers in eradicating the tracking technology. It’s now April 2024 and the company has delayed the change for a third time, saying it’ll happen in 2025. Google’s proposed cookie replacement has faced scrutiny from competition and privacy regulators in the UK, with critics saying cookies are just being replaced by another form of tracking and suggesting the changes could further benefit Google’s ad business.

**Samourai Wallet Founders Arrested Over $2 Billion Unlawful Transactions**

Keonne Rodriguez and William Lonergan Hill, the founders of crypto-mixing service Samourai Wallet, were charged by US prosecutors this week for running an unlicensed money transfer business and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The company processed $2 billion in “unlawful transactions” and “facilitated more than $100 million in money laundering,” according to Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and other investigators. The charges can carry a maximum of 20 years each. The move comes as US prosecutors try to clampdown on crypto mixing services that may be used to hide funds or allow illicit behavior. Mixers Bitcoin Fog, Helix, and Tornado Cash have all faced action in recent years.

**Chinese Keyboard Vulnerabilities Could Reveal Typing**

New research from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab this week revealed vulnerabilities in eight Chinese keyboard apps that, if exploited, could allow everything typed to be intercepted. Up to a billion people may be impacted, the researchers say. They tested apps from major technology companies and phone makers, including Baidu, Honor, Huawei, Samsung and Tencent. “Most of the vulnerable apps can be exploited by an entirely passive network eavesdropper,” they researchers write, adding that most of the impacted companies fixed the vulnerabilities when they were reported.

School Employee Allegedly Framed a Principal With Racist Deepfake Rant

Eight out of nine apps that people use to input Chinese characters into mobile devices have weakness that allow a passive eavesdropper to collect keystroke data.

Source: badboydt7 via Shutterstock

Nearly all keyboard apps that allow users to enter Chinese characters into their Android, iOS, or other mobile devices are vulnerable to attacks that allow an adversary to capture the entirety of their keystrokes.

This includes data such as login credentials, financial information, and messages that would otherwise be end-to-end encrypted, a new study by Toronto University's Citizen Lab has uncovered.

**Ubiquitous Problem**

For the study, researchers at the lab considered cloud-based Pinyin apps (which render Chinese characters into words spelled with roman letters) from nine vendors selling to users in China: Baidu, Samsung, Huawei, Tencent, Xiaomi, Vivo, OPPO, iFlytek, and Honor. Their investigation showed all but the app from Huawei to be transmitting keystroke data to the cloud in a manner that enabled a passive eavesdropper to read the contents in clear text and with little difficulty. Citizen Lab researchers, who have earned a reputation over the years for exposing multiple cyber espionage, surveillance, and other threats targeted at mobile users and civil society, said each of them contain at least one exploitable vulnerability in how they handle transmissions of user keystrokes to the cloud.

The scope of vulnerabilities should not be underestimated, Citizen Lab researchers Jeffrey Knockel, Mona Wang and Zoe Reichert wrote in a report summarizing their findings this week: The researchers from Citizen Lab found that 76% of keyboard app users in mainland China, in fact, use a Pinyin keyboard to input Chinese characters.

"All of the vulnerabilities that we covered in this report can be exploited entirely passively without sending any additional network traffic," the researchers said. And to boot, the vulnerabilities were easy to discover and do not require any technological sophistication to exploit, they noted.  "As such, we might wonder, are these vulnerabilities actively under mass exploitation?"

Each of the vulnerable Pinyin keyboard apps that Citizen Lab examined had both a local, on-device component and a cloud-based prediction service for handling long strings of syllables and particularly complex characters. Of the nine apps they looked at, three were from mobile software developers — Tencent, Baidu, and iFlytek. The remaining five were apps that Samsung, Xiaomi, OPPO, Vivo, and Honor — all mobile device manufacturers — had either developed on their own or had integrated into their devices from a third-party developer.

**Exploitable via Active & Passive Methods**

Methods of exploitation differ for each app. Tencent's QQ Pinyin app for Android and Windows for instance had a vulnerability that allowed the researchers to create a working exploit for decrypting keystrokes via active eavesdropping methods. Baidu's IME for Windows contained a similar vulnerability, for which Citizen Lab created a working exploit for decrypting keystroke data via both active and passive eavesdropping methods.

The researchers found other encrypted related privacy and security weaknesses in the Baidu's iOS and Android versions but did not develop exploits for them. iFlytek's app for Android had a vulnerability that allowed a passive eavesdropper to recover in plaintext keyboard transmissions because of insufficient mobile encryption.

On the hardware vendor side, Samsung's homegrown keyboard app offered no encryption at all and instead sent keystroke transmissions in the clear. Samsung also offers users the option of either using Tencent's Sogou app or an app from Baidu on their devices. Of the two apps, Citizen Lab identified Baidu's keyboard app as being vulnerable to attack.

The researchers were unable to identify any issue with Vivo's internally developed Pinyin keyboard app but had a working exploit for a vulnerability they discovered in a Tencent app that is also available on Vivo's devices.

The third-party Pinyin apps (from Baidu, Tencent, and iFlytek) that are available with devices from the other mobile device makers all had exploitable vulnerabilities as well.

These are not uncommon issues, it turns out. Last year, Citizen Labs had conducted a separate investigation in Tencent's Sogou — used by some 450 million people in China — and found vulnerabilities that exposed keystrokes to eavesdropping attacks.

"Combining the vulnerabilities discovered in this and our previous report analyzing Sogou's keyboard apps, we estimate that up to one billion users are affected by these vulnerabilities," Citizen Lab said.

The vulnerabilities could enable mass surveillance of Chinese mobile device users — including by signals intelligence services belonging to the so-called Five Eyes nations — US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand — Citizen Lab said; the vulnerabilities in the keyboard apps that Citizen Lab discovered in its new research are very similar to vulnerabilities in the China-developed UC browser that intelligence agencies from these countries exploited for surveillance purposes, the report noted.

**About the Author(s)**

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year career at Computerworld, Jai also covered a variety of other technology topics, including big data, Hadoop, Internet of Things, e-voting, and data analytics. Prior to Computerworld, Jai covered technology issues for The Economic Times in Bangalore, India. Jai has a Master's degree in Statistics and lives in Naperville, Ill.

Chinese Keyboard Apps Open 1B People to Eavesdropping

By Waqas
Popular keyboard apps leak user data! Citizen Lab reports 8 out of 9 Android IMEs expose keystrokes. Change yours & protect passwords!
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Popular Keyboard Apps Leak User Data: Billion Potentially Exposed

Citizen Lab investigated the security of cloud-based pinyin keyboard apps and found that eight out of nine vendors transmitted user keystrokes in an insecure manner. This means keystrokes could be intercepted by eavesdroppers on the network.

A new report by Citizen Lab has uncovered critical security vulnerabilities in popular keyboard apps, potentially exposing the keystrokes of nearly a billion users to eavesdroppers.

The report, titled “The not-so-silent type: Vulnerabilities across keyboard apps reveal keystrokes to network eavesdroppers,” investigates cloud-based pinyin input method editors (IMEs) used on a vast majority of Android devices in China.

Researchers analyzed keyboard apps from nine major vendors: Baidu, Honor, Huawei, iFlytek, OPPO, Samsung, Tencent, Vivo, and Xiaomi. Alarmingly, they found vulnerabilities in eight of these apps that could allow attackers to steal users’ keystrokes as they type.

The report details various weaknesses in how these apps transmit data. Some apps, like Samsung Keyboard, send keystrokes completely unencrypted, making them easy for anyone snooping on the network to intercept. Others rely on flawed encryption methods that can be cracked.

The ease of eavesdropping varies depending on the app. In some cases, a malicious actor on the same Wi-Fi network could steal your data. Even more concerning, some vulnerabilities are exploitable by entirely passive eavesdroppers, who can intercept data without needing any interaction from the user.

The report highlights Huawei as the only vendor whose keyboard app did not exhibit these vulnerabilities. This offers some peace of mind for Huawei users but leaves a significant number of users potentially exposed.

Citizen Lab estimates that the combined market share of Baidu, Sogou (mentioned in a previous report by Citizen Lab), and iFlytek represents over 95% of the third-party IME market in China, translating to roughly one billion users at risk.

This security lapse has serious consequences. Keystrokes can contain sensitive information like passwords, credit card details, and private messages. If intercepted, this data could be used for identity theft, financial fraud, and other malicious activities.

Nevertheless, the report shows the importance of using secure keyboard apps. Users should prioritize apps with a strong reputation for security and that encrypt user data properly. Additionally, it’s recommended to avoid using sensitive information on public Wi-Fi networks.

Researchers urge app developers to address these vulnerabilities immediately by implementing strong encryption methods and secure data transmission protocols.

1.  AI Model Listens to Typing, Compromising Sensitive Data
2.  Keyboard app collecting users data after 31M records leaked online
3.  Intel removes remote Android keyboard app rather than fixing its flaws
4.  Chinese Keyboard Developer Spies on User Through Built-in Keylogger
5.  Android Emoji keyboard app makes millions with unauthorized purchases

Tag

#samsung