Headline
CVE-2021-40398: TALOS-2021-1411 || Cisco Talos Intelligence Group
An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the parse_raster_data functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 19.10. A specially-crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
Summary
An out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the parse_raster_data functionality of Accusoft ImageGear 19.10. A specially-crafted malformed file can lead to memory corruption. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
Tested Versions
Accusoft ImageGear 19.10
Product URLs
ImageGear - https://www.accusoft.com/products/imagegear-collection/
CVSSv3 Score
8.1 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-119 - Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
Details
The ImageGear library is a document-imaging developer toolkit that offers image conversion, creation, editing, annotation and more. It supports more than 100 formats such as DICOM, PDF, Microsoft Office and others.
There is a vulnerability in the parse_raster_data function, due to a buffer overflow caused by a missing buffer size check.
A specially-crafted PICT file can lead to an out-of-bounds write, which can result in memory corruption.
Trying to load a malformed PICT v1 file, we end up in the following situation:
0:000> g
(248c.1394): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
eax=0c4fb013 ebx=0cd21000 ecx=00000001 edx=00000001 esi=0c4fb012 edi=0cd21000
eip=6731dd22 esp=0019f634 ebp=0019f64c iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe cy
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010217
MSVCR110!memcpy+0x2a:
6731dd22 f3a4 rep movs byte ptr es:[edi],byte ptr [esi]
When we look at the edi memory allocation we can see the buffer allocated is very small, only 1 byte:
0:000> !ext.heap -p -a edi
address 0cd21000 found in
_DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 3db1000
in busy allocation ( DPH_HEAP_BLOCK: UserAddr UserSize - VirtAddr VirtSize)
cb63034: cd20ff8 1 - cd20000 2000
695ba8b0 verifier!AVrfDebugPageHeapAllocate+0x00000240
7752f10e ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x00000039
774970f0 ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x000000f0
77496e3c ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeapInternal+0x0000104c
77495dde ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x0000003e
6731daff MSVCR110!malloc+0x00000049
674e64de igCore19d!AF_memm_alloc+0x0000001e
675c82aa igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000dc27a
675c7751 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000db721
674c13d9 igCore19d!IG_image_savelist_get+0x00000b29
675008d7 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x000148a7
67500239 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x00014209
67495757 igCore19d!IG_load_file+0x00000047
00402219 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000019
00402524 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x00000324
0040668d Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x0000448d
760ffa29 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x00000019
774b7a9e ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000002f
774b7a6e ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x0000001b
The call stack will indicate where the memcpy is happening:
0:000> kb
# ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child
00 0019f638 6748f9a6 0cd21000 0c4fb012 00000001 MSVCR110!memcpy+0x2a
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
01 0019f64c 675c9b43 0cd21000 0c4fb012 00000001 igCore19d+0xf9a6
02 0019f66c 675c856f 0cd20ff8 0cd228f8 0c4fb103 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xddb13
03 0019f734 675c7751 0019fc3c 1000001e 0e44eff8 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdc53f
04 0019fbb4 674c13d9 0019fc3c 0e44eff8 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdb721
05 0019fbec 675008d7 00000000 0e44eff8 0019fc3c igCore19d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
06 0019fe68 67500239 00000000 0524dfd0 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x148a7
07 0019fe88 67495757 00000000 0524dfd0 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14209
08 0019fea8 00402219 0524dfd0 0019febc 00000001 igCore19d!IG_load_file+0x47
09 0019fec0 00402524 0524dfd0 0019fef8 051aff48 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
0a 0019ff28 0040668d 00000005 051a8f68 051aff48 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x324
0b 0019ff70 760ffa29 003fe000 760ffa10 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x448d
0c 0019ff80 774b7a9e 003fe000 721cdcd8 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
0d 0019ffdc 774b7a6e ffffffff 774d8a44 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
0e 0019ffec 00000000 00406715 003fe000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
The igCore19d+0xf9a6 is just a wrapper of memcpy, so the interesting callback is igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xddb13, which corresponds to the function write_into_dest_buffer with the following pseudo code. The memcpy is performed at LINE54 as edi contains the dest_buffer pointer.
LINE1 int __stdcall write_into_dest_buffer(void *_dest_buffer, void *source, int size_source, int size_dest)
LINE2 {
[...]
LINE13
LINE14 dest_buffer = _dest_buffer;
LINE15 _source_buffer = (int)source;
LINE16 max_source_addr = (char *)source + size_source;
LINE17 max_dest_addr = (char *)_dest_buffer + size_dest;
LINE18 one_byte = (char *)source + size_source - 1;
LINE19 size_sourcea = (char *)source + size_source;
LINE20 if ( source >= one_byte )
LINE21 return 0;
LINE22 // loop counter is size_source parameter
LINE23 do
LINE24 {
LINE25 if ( dest_buffer >= max_dest_addr )
LINE26 break;
LINE27 byte_value_from_source = *(_BYTE *)_source_buffer;
LINE28 if ( *(_BYTE *)_source_buffer >= 0x80u )
LINE29 {
LINE30 if ( *(_BYTE *)_source_buffer <= 0x80u )
LINE31 {
LINE32 ++_source_buffer;
LINE33 }
LINE34 else
LINE35 {
LINE36 size_1 = 257 - byte_value_from_source;
LINE37 if ( (char *)dest_buffer + size_1 > max_dest_addr )
LINE38 size_1 = max_dest_addr - (_BYTE *)dest_buffer;
LINE39 OS_memset(dest_buffer, *(_BYTE *)(_source_buffer + 1), size_1);
LINE40 max_dest_addr = (char *)_dest_buffer + size_dest;
LINE41 max_source_addr = size_sourcea;
LINE42 dest_buffer = (char *)dest_buffer + size_1;
LINE43 _source_buffer += 2;
LINE44 }
LINE45 }
LINE46 else
LINE47 {
LINE48 memcpy_size = byte_value_from_source + 1; // read from source buffer
LINE49 if ( (char *)dest_buffer + memcpy_size > max_dest_addr ) // check if destination has enough room
LINE50 memcpy_size = max_dest_addr - (_BYTE *)dest_buffer;
LINE51 if ( memcpy_size + _source_buffer + 1 > (unsigned int)max_source_addr ) // check if source buffer has enough room
LINE52 memcpy_size = (size_t)&max_source_addr[-_source_buffer - 1];
LINE53 source_buffer = (void *)(_source_buffer + 1);
LINE54 OS_memcpy(dest_buffer, source_buffer, memcpy_size);
LINE55 max_dest_addr = (char *)_dest_buffer + size_dest;
LINE56 max_source_addr = size_sourcea;
LINE57 dest_buffer = (char *)dest_buffer + memcpy_size;
LINE58 _source_buffer = (int)source_buffer + memcpy_size;
LINE59 }
LINE60 }
LINE61 while ( _source_buffer < (unsigned int)(max_source_addr - 1) );
LINE62 return 0;
LINE63 }
The bound checking for the value of the memcpy size (memcpy_size) is controlled by dest_buffer and max_dest_addr at LINE49 and LINE50.
This is to ensure that memcpy_size, which is derived from byte_value_from_source at LINE48 and coming from the source buffer at LINE27, matches the dest_buffer.
The same logic applies to _source_buffer at LINE51 and LINE52. The max_dest_addr is derived, at LINE17, from the argument size_dest passed to the function.
We need to go earlier in the call stack to see where these parameters are coming from. The source of our interesting call to write_into_dest_buffer is happening at LINE321 in the function parse_raster_data.
LINE64 int __stdcall parse_raster_data(
LINE65 mys_table_function *mys_table_func,
LINE66 uint kind_of_heap,
LINE67 undefined4 param_3,
LINE68 pict_header *pict_header,
LINE69 HIGDIBINFO hDib)
LINE70 {
[...]
LINE136
LINE137 _kind_of_heap = (void *)kind_of_heap;
LINE138 _pict_header = pict_header;
LINE139 buffer2_28 = 0;
LINE140 io_buffer.buffer_size = 0;
LINE141 DIB_width_get(hDib);
LINE142 height = DIB_height_get(hDib);
LINE143 _raster_size = IO_raster_size_get(hDib);
LINE144 table_of_pic_raster_data = pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE145 __raster_size = _raster_size;
LINE146 pixel_size = table_of_pic_raster_data->pixel_size;
LINE147 num_planes = table_of_pic_raster_data->num_planes;
LINE148 size__destination_buffer = table_of_pic_raster_data->bounding_rectangle.lower_right_corner_y
LINE149 - table_of_pic_raster_data->bounding_rectangle.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE150 _pixel_size = pixel_size;
LINE151 _err_count = IO_DIB_create_ex(mys_table_func, hDib);
LINE152 if ( _err_count )
LINE153 return AF_err_record_set((LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 759, -2464, 0, 0, 0, 0);
LINE154 rgb_dest = (char *)AF_memm_alloc(
LINE155 (int)_kind_of_heap,
LINE156 __raster_size,
LINE157 (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE158 761);
LINE159 __destination_buffer = AF_memm_alloc(
LINE160 (int)_kind_of_heap,
LINE161 5 * size__destination_buffer,
LINE162 (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE163 762);
LINE164 buffer3 = (char *)AF_memm_alloc(
LINE165 (int)_kind_of_heap,
LINE166 height * __raster_size,
LINE167 (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE168 764);
LINE169 buffer4 = AF_memm_alloc(
LINE170 (int)_kind_of_heap,
LINE171 height * __raster_size,
LINE172 (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE173 766);
LINE174 if ( rgb_dest && __destination_buffer && buffer3 )
LINE175 {
LINE176 if ( pixel_size == 32 && num_planes == 4 )
LINE177 buffer2_28 = 1;
LINE178 }
LINE179 else
LINE180 {
LINE181 _err_count = AF_err_record_set((LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 769, -1000, 0, 0, 0, 0);
LINE182 }
LINE183 _buffer3 = buffer3;
LINE184 OS_memset(buffer3, 0, height * __raster_size);
LINE185 _kind_of_heap_1 = _kind_of_heap;
LINE186 _err_count_iobinit = IOb_init(mys_table_func, (int)_kind_of_heap, &io_buffer, 0x5000u, 1);
LINE187 _err_count += _err_count_iobinit;
LINE188 if ( !_err_count )
LINE189 {
LINE190 _pict_header_1 = _pict_header;
LINE191 IO_attribute_set(mys_table_func, 4u, &_pict_header->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch);
LINE192 v14 = 0;
LINE193 offset_mem = 0;
LINE194 v52 = 0;
LINE195 index_raster_data = 0;
LINE196 do
LINE197 {
LINE198 if ( v14 >= _pict_header_1->num_of_pic_raster_data )
LINE199 break;
LINE200 v16 = (pic_raster_data *)((char *)_pict_header_1->table_of_pic_raster_data + offset_mem);
LINE201 _num_planes = v16->num_planes;
LINE202 if ( (unsigned int)_num_planes >= 3 )
LINE203 _num_planes = 3;
LINE204 for ( i = 0; i < _num_planes; ++i )
LINE205 three_bytes[i] = v16->component_size;
LINE206 x_diff = v16->four_short_1.lower_right_corner_x - v16->four_short_1.top_left_corner_x;
LINE207 y_diff = v16->four_short_1.lower_right_corner_y - v16->four_short_1.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE208 _ydiff = y_diff;
LINE209 v50 = x_diff;
LINE210 IO_raster_size_calc(y_diff, _num_planes, three_bytes);
LINE211 if ( pixel_size == 1 )
LINE212 _raster_size_1 = DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_calc(_ydiff);
LINE213 else
LINE214 _raster_size_1 = DIBStd_raster_size_calc_simple(
LINE215 _ydiff,
LINE216 _num_planes,
LINE217 _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[index_raster_data / 0x440].component_size);
LINE218 dest_size = _raster_size_1;
LINE219 raster_data = &_pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[index_raster_data / 0x440];
LINE220 _new_offset = raster_data->some_distance_to_move_into;
LINE221 some_length = raster_data->bounding_rectangle.lower_right_corner_y
LINE222 - raster_data->bounding_rectangle.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE223 IOb_seek(&io_buffer, _new_offset, SEEK_SET);
LINE224 _rgb_dest = rgb_dest;
LINE225 OS_memset(rgb_dest, 0, __raster_size);
LINE226 if ( pixel_size != 24 )
LINE227 _raster_size_1 = _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[index_raster_data / 0x440].next_offset;
LINE228 raster_size = _raster_size_1;
LINE229 packet_type = (unsigned __int16)_pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[index_raster_data / 0x440].packet_type;
LINE230 v25 = 0;
LINE231 io_buffer.size_buffer = packet_type;
LINE232 _pict_header_8 = 0;
LINE233 if ( !_err_count )
LINE234 {
LINE235 while ( v25 < v50 )
LINE236 {
LINE237 if ( _raster_size_1 < 8 || packet_type == 1 || packet_type == 2 && pixel_size >= 24 )
LINE238 {
LINE239 v32 = (void *)read_block(&io_buffer, _raster_size_1);
LINE240 v33 = v32;
LINE241 if ( !v32 )
LINE242 {
LINE243 v38 = AF_err_record_set((LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 855, -2100, 0, 0, 0, 0);
LINE244 goto LABEL_55;
LINE245 }
LINE246 switch ( pixel_size )
LINE247 {
LINE248 case 1:
LINE249 case 4:
LINE250 case 8:
LINE251 OS_memcpy(rgb_dest, v32, _raster_size_1);
LINE252 break;
LINE253 case 16:
LINE254 sub_10148800(rgb_dest, (int)v32, y_diff);
LINE255 break;
LINE256 case 24:
LINE257 case 32:
LINE258 v34 = y_diff;
LINE259 copy_rgb_data(rgb_dest, (char *)v32, y_diff, some_length, buffer2_28);
LINE260 if ( buffer2_28 )
LINE261 OS_memcpy(__destination_buffer, v33, v34);
LINE262 break;
LINE263 default:
LINE264 break;
LINE265 }
LINE266 }
LINE267 else
LINE268 {
LINE269 if ( _raster_size_1 <= 250 )
LINE270 {
LINE271 if ( !IOb_byte_read(&io_buffer, &_length) )
LINE272 {
LINE273 v38 = AF_err_record_set((LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 893, -2100, 0, 0, 0, 0);
LINE274 goto LABEL_55;
LINE275 }
LINE276 _len_to_read = _length;
LINE277 }
LINE278 else
LINE279 {
LINE280 if ( !IOb_short_read(&io_buffer, &tbd) )
LINE281 {
LINE282 v38 = AF_err_record_set((LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 884, -2100, 0, 0, 0, 0);
LINE283 LABEL_55:
LINE284 _err_count = v38;
LINE285 break;
LINE286 }
LINE287 _len_to_read = (unsigned __int16)tbd;
LINE288 }
LINE289 __source_buffer = (void *)read_block(&io_buffer, _len_to_read);
LINE290 _source_data = (int)__source_buffer;
LINE291 if ( !__source_buffer )
LINE292 {
LINE293 v38 = AF_err_record_set((LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 901, -2100, 0, 0, 0, 0);
LINE294 goto LABEL_55;
LINE295 }
LINE296 // biBitCount = 0x1f
LINE297 switch ( pixel_size )
LINE298 {
LINE299 case 1:
LINE300 case 8:
LINE301 write_into_dest_buffer(_rgb_dest, __source_buffer, _len_to_read, dest_size);
LINE302 break;
LINE303 case 4:
LINE304 v28 = __raster_size / 2;
LINE305 v29 = &rgb_dest[__raster_size / 2];
LINE306 write_into_dest_buffer(v29, (void *)_source_data, _len_to_read, dest_size);
LINE307 v42 = v29;
LINE308 pixel_size = _pixel_size;
LINE309 iIG_IP_raster_unpack(1, _pixel_size, size__destination_buffer, v42, rgb_dest, v28);
LINE310 break;
LINE311 case 16:
LINE312 v44 = _len_to_read;
LINE313 v30 = (int)__destination_buffer;
LINE314 sub_10149A10(__destination_buffer, (int)__source_buffer, v44, raster_size);
LINE315 sub_10148800(_rgb_dest, v30, y_diff);
LINE316 break;
LINE317 case 24:
LINE318 case 32:
LINE319 size_source = _len_to_read;
LINE320 rgb_source = (char *)__destination_buffer;
LINE321 write_into_dest_buffer(__destination_buffer, __source_buffer, size_source, raster_size);
LINE322 copy_rgb_data(_rgb_dest, rgb_source, y_diff, some_length, buffer2_28);
LINE323 break;
LINE324 default:
LINE325 break;
LINE326 }
LINE327 }
LINE328 v35 = _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE329 top_left_corner_Y = v35[index_raster_data / 0x440].field_2A.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE330 v37 = &buffer3[__raster_size * (_pict_header_8 + v35[index_raster_data / 0x440].field_2A.top_left_corner_x)];
LINE331 if ( pixel_size < 8 )
LINE332 {
LINE333 OS_memcpy(&v37[top_left_corner_Y / (8 / pixel_size)], rgb_dest, dest_size);
LINE334 }
LINE335 else if ( pixel_size == 8 )
LINE336 {
LINE337 OS_memcpy(&v37[top_left_corner_Y], rgb_dest, dest_size);
LINE338 }
LINE339 else
LINE340 {
LINE341 OS_memcpy(&v37[top_left_corner_Y * ((pixel_size > 16) + 2)], rgb_dest, dest_size);
LINE342 }
LINE343 _raster_size_1 = raster_size;
LINE344 _rgb_dest = rgb_dest;
LINE345 packet_type = io_buffer.size_buffer;
LINE346 v25 = ++_pict_header_8;
LINE347 }
LINE348 }
LINE349 _pict_header_1 = _pict_header;
LINE350 v14 = v52 + 1;
LINE351 offset_mem = index_raster_data + 0x440;
LINE352 ++v52;
LINE353 index_raster_data += 0x440;
LINE354 }
LINE355 while ( !_err_count );
LINE356 v39 = 0;
LINE357 if ( height > 0 )
LINE358 {
LINE359 v40 = buffer3;
LINE360 v41 = __raster_size;
LINE361 do
LINE362 {
LINE363 IO_raster_set(mys_table_func, (int)v40, v39++, v41);
LINE364 v40 += v41;
LINE365 }
LINE366 while ( v39 < height );
LINE367 }
LINE368 _kind_of_heap_1 = _kind_of_heap;
LINE369 _buffer3 = buffer3;
LINE370 }
LINE371 IOb_done(&io_buffer);
LINE372 if ( __destination_buffer )
LINE373 AF_memm_free(_kind_of_heap_1, __destination_buffer, (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 980);
LINE374 if ( rgb_dest )
LINE375 AF_memm_free(_kind_of_heap_1, rgb_dest, (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 983);
LINE376 if ( _buffer3 )
LINE377 AF_memm_free(_kind_of_heap_1, _buffer3, (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 986);
LINE378 if ( buffer2_28 && buffer4 )
LINE379 AF_memm_free(_kind_of_heap_1, buffer4, (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 989);
LINE380 return AF_error_check();
LINE381 }
The allocation of the destination buffer __destination_buffer is performed at LINE159, and the size of the allocation buffer size__destination_buffer is computed earlier at LINE148.
At LINE159 there is a potential integer overflow as the size allocated is the result of the multiplication by 5 * size__destination_buffer.
The size of this allocation however is different from the size used by the write_into_dest_buffer function that eventually writes to the buffer. This is where the crux of the matter lies: the function writing to the buffer is not respecting the bounds of the allocation.
In fact, the size_dest argument passed to write_into_dest_buffer corresponds to raster_size at LINE321. The raster_size is derived from _raster_size_1 at LINE228.
The value for _raster_size_1 can be computed from a different place at LINE227 or LINE212 depending on the values contained in pixel_size.
When _raster_size_1 is computed in LINE227, it’s computed from an offset structure field named next_offset in an earlier process that parses the opcode from the PICT file in the function get_data_from_opcode:
LINE383 AT_ERRCOUNT __stdcall get_data_from_opcode(
LINE384 lp_iobuffer lp_iobuffer,
LINE385 unsigned __int16 opcode,
LINE386 pic_raster_data *pic_raster_data)
LINE387 {
[...]
LINE400
LINE401 current_pos = IOb_tell(lp_iobuffer);
LINE402 OS_memset(pic_raster_data, 0, 0x440u);
LINE403 pic_raster_data->opcode = opcode;
LINE404 pic_raster_data->offset_in_file = current_pos;
LINE405 if ( opcode > 0x9Bu )
LINE406 {
LINE407 if ( (unsigned int)opcode - 0x8200 <= 1 )
LINE408 {
LINE409 v4 = lp_iobuffer;
LINE410 pic_raster_data->field_0x0 = 4 * (opcode != 0x8200) + 4;
LINE411 if ( !fill_in_pict2_buffer(lp_iobuffer, opcode, &_pict_2_buffer) )
LINE412 {
LINE413 pic_raster_data->next_offset = v11;
LINE414 pic_raster_data->packet_type = v12;
LINE415 v7 = _pict_2_buffer.field_0x9e;
LINE416 pic_raster_data->pixel_size = _pict_2_buffer.field_0x9e;
LINE417 pic_raster_data->component_size = v7;
LINE418 pic_raster_data->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch = _pict_2_buffer.field_0x70;
LINE419 pic_raster_data->original_vertical_pixel_per_inch = _pict_2_buffer.field_0x74;
LINE420 *(_DWORD *)&pic_raster_data->bounding_rectangle.top_left_corner_x = 0;
LINE421 pic_raster_data->bounding_rectangle.lower_right_corner_x = _pict_2_buffer.field_0x6e;
LINE422 pic_raster_data->bounding_rectangle.lower_right_corner_y = _pict_2_buffer.field_0x6c;
LINE423 pic_raster_data->num_planes = 1;
LINE424 if ( opcode == 0x8200 )
LINE425 {
LINE426 *(_DWORD *)&pic_raster_data->four_short.top_left_corner_x = *(_DWORD *)&_pict_2_buffer.four_short;
LINE427 v8 = *(dword *)((char *)&_pict_2_buffer.current_offset + 2);
LINE428 }
LINE429 else
LINE430 {
LINE431 *(_DWORD *)&pic_raster_data->four_short.top_left_corner_x = v13;
LINE432 v8 = v14;
LINE433 }
LINE434 *(_DWORD *)&pic_raster_data->four_short.lower_right_corner_x = v8;
LINE435 pic_raster_data->some_shift_offset = _pict_2_buffer.opcode_8200_or_8201;
LINE436 goto LABEL_12;
LINE437 }
LINE438 }
LINE439 }
LINE440 else if ( opcode >= 0x98u || (unsigned int)opcode - 0x90 <= 1 )
LINE441 {
LINE442 v4 = lp_iobuffer;
LINE443 if ( !possible_parse_pixmap(lp_iobuffer, opcode, &pict_1_buffer, (int)&pic_raster_data->dib_palette) )
LINE444 {
LINE445 rowbytes = pict_1_buffer.rowbytes;
LINE446 pic_raster_data->field_0x0 = ((pict_1_buffer.rowbytes & 0x8000) != 0) + 1;
LINE447 pic_raster_data->packet_type = pict_1_buffer.packet_type;
LINE448 pic_raster_data->pixel_size = pict_1_buffer.pixel_size;
LINE449 pic_raster_data->num_planes = pict_1_buffer.num_planes;
LINE450 pic_raster_data->component_size = pict_1_buffer.component_size;
LINE451 pic_raster_data->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch = pict_1_buffer.original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch;
LINE452 pic_raster_data->original_vertical_pixel_per_inch = pict_1_buffer.original_vertical_pixel_per_inch;
LINE453 pic_raster_data->bounding_rectangle = pict_1_buffer.bounding_rectangle;
LINE454 pic_raster_data->four_short = pict_1_buffer.four_short;
LINE455 *(_DWORD *)&pic_raster_data->four_short_1.top_left_corner_x = *(_DWORD *)&pict_1_buffer.four_short_1.top_left_corner_x;
LINE456 v6 = *(_DWORD *)&pict_1_buffer.four_short_1.lower_right_corner_x;
LINE457 pic_raster_data->next_offset = rowbytes & 0x7FFF;
LINE458 *(_DWORD *)&pic_raster_data->four_short_1.lower_right_corner_x = v6;
LINE459 LABEL_12:
LINE460 pic_raster_data->some_distance_to_move_into = IOb_tell(v4);
LINE461 }
LINE462 }
LINE463 return AF_error_check();
LINE464 }
At LINE457 we can see the variable next_offset corresponding to our _raster_size_1 seen previously, obtained from rowbytes, which is coming from pict_1_buffer.rowbytes (LINE445).
As the function possible_parse_pixmap is quite large, you can see part of it below and observe the rowbytes corresponds to the short (LINE500) after the PICT opcode inside the file:
LINE465 BOOL __stdcall possible_parse_pixmap(
LINE466 lp_iobuffer lp_iobuffer,
LINE467 __int16 opcode,
LINE468 pict_1_buffer *pict_1_buffer,
LINE469 int four_short)
LINE470 {
[...]
LINE493
LINE494 _pict1_buffer = pict_1_buffer;
LINE495 OS_memset(pict_1_buffer, 0, 0x44u);
LINE496 _lp_iobuffer = lp_iobuffer;
LINE497 if ( opcode == 0x9A || opcode == 0x9B )
LINE498 IOb_seek(lp_iobuffer, 4, SEEK_CUR);
LINE499 _current_pos = IOb_tell(lp_iobuffer);
LINE500 IOb_short_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->rowbytes);
LINE501 pict_read_4_short(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->bounding_rectangle.top_left_corner_x);
LINE502 if ( (unsigned int)IOb_tell(lp_iobuffer) - _current_pos == 10 )
LINE503 {
LINE504 if ( pict_1_buffer->rowbytes >= 0 )
LINE505 {
LINE506 if ( (opcode == 0x91 || opcode == 0x99) && seek_toward_from_reading_short(lp_iobuffer) )// if (opcode == 145 or opcode == 143)
LINE507 // read_short_value
LINE508 // if value is positive then seek from current -minus2
LINE509 // otherwise error
LINE510 return 1;
LINE511 pict_1_buffer->component_size = 1;
LINE512 pict_1_buffer->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch = 0x48;
LINE513 pict_1_buffer->original_vertical_pixel_per_inch = 0x48;
LINE514 *(_DWORD *)&pict_1_buffer->pixel_size = 65537;
LINE515 if ( four_short )
LINE516 {
LINE517 *(_DWORD *)four_short = 0xFFFFFF;
LINE518 *(_DWORD *)(four_short + 4) = 0;
LINE519 }
LINE520 }
LINE521 else
LINE522 {
LINE523 _current_pos_1 = IOb_tell(lp_iobuffer);
LINE524 IOb_short_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->version);
LINE525 IOb_short_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->packet_type);
LINE526 IOb_dword_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->packed_size);
LINE527 IOb_dword_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch);
LINE528 IOb_dword_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->original_vertical_pixel_per_inch);
LINE529 IOb_short_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->pixel_type);
LINE530 IOb_short_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->pixel_size);
LINE531 IOb_short_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->num_planes);
LINE532 IOb_short_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->component_size);
LINE533 IOb_dword_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->offset_to_next_color_plane);
LINE534 IOb_dword_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->reserved);
LINE535 IOb_dword_read(lp_iobuffer, &pict_1_buffer->id_color_table);
[...]
LINE626 _4_short = pict_read_4_short(_lp_iobuffer, &_pict1_buffer->four_short.top_left_corner_x);
LINE627 v23 = pict_read_4_short(_lp_iobuffer, &_pict1_buffer->four_short_1.top_left_corner_x) + _4_short;
LINE628 IOb_seek(_lp_iobuffer, 2, SEEK_CUR);
LINE629 if ( opcode == 0x91 || opcode == 0x99 || opcode == 0x9B )
LINE630 v23 += seek_toward_from_reading_short(_lp_iobuffer);
LINE631 return v23 != 0;
LINE632 }
So in the case of pixel_size equal to 32 (condition at LINE257), the raster_size derived from _raster_size_1 is computed from rowbytes where the value is bound to 0x7FFF, as you can see at LINE457.
When pixel_size is equal to 16 (condition at LINE311), the logic stays the same. pixel_size is stored at LINE448.
In the other case, we can observe _raster_size_1 is computed at LINE212 with the call to DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_calc, below the pseudo code.
unsigned int __stdcall DIB1bit_packed_raster_size_calc(int a1)
{
return ((a1 + 31) >> 3) & 0xFFFFFFFC;
}
Now the argument of this function, represented by the variable _ydiff, is derived from the subtraction of frame fields v16->field_2A.lower_right_corner_y and v16->field_2A.top_left_corner_Y at LINE207.
These fields are also read from the file through the possible_parse_pixmap first at LINE627, then potentially modified after in the process of the entire function pctwread:
LINE633 AT_ERRCOUNT __stdcall pctwread(
LINE634 mys_table_function *mys_table_function_obj,
LINE635 uint kind_of_heap,
LINE636 pict_header *pict_header,
LINE637 void *dest_bytes,
LINE638 int a5)
LINE639 {
[...]
LINE730 _pict_header = pict_header;
LINE731 pict_header->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch.nUnits = 0;
LINE732 io_buffer.buffer_size = 0;
LINE733 IO_byte_order_set(mys_table_function_obj, 1);
LINE734 // prepare some io_buffer
LINE735 error_iobinit = (__int16 *)IOb_init(mys_table_function_obj, kind_of_heap, &io_buffer, 0x5000u, 1);
LINE736 _error_status = error_iobinit;
LINE737 if ( error_iobinit )
LINE738 return AF_error_check();
LINE739 // get current offset in file
LINE740 start_header = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE741 // move from file to 512 offset
LINE742 IOb_seek(&io_buffer, 512, SEEK_CUR);
LINE743 // init pict_header struct
LINE744 OS_memset(pict_header, 0, 0x48u);
LINE745 // read first short
LINE746 IOb_short_read(&io_buffer, &pict_header->size_of_file);
LINE747 // read frame data
LINE748 pict_read_4_short(&io_buffer, &pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_x);
LINE749 first_non_null_byte = 0;
LINE750 *(_DWORD *)pict_version = 0;
LINE751 do
LINE752 {
LINE753 if ( first_non_null_byte >= 20 )
LINE754 break;
LINE755 IOb_short_read(&io_buffer, pict_version);
LINE756 ++first_non_null_byte;
LINE757 }
LINE758 while ( !pict_version[0] );
LINE759 // Not Processed
LINE760 // ------------------------------
LINE761 if ( IO_tag_set_exists(mys_table_function_obj) )
LINE762 IO_tag_word_set(mys_table_function_obj, 0x1036, (int)pict_version);
LINE763 // --------------------------------
LINE764 // Validating we don't have extra bytes
LINE765 current_pos_1 = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE766 if ( current_pos_1 - start_header == 2 * first_non_null_byte + 0x20A )
LINE767 {
LINE768 if ( pict_version[0] == 0x1101 || pict_version[0] == 0x11 )
LINE769 {
LINE770 pict_header->pict_version = pict_version[0];
LINE771 goto pict_valid_header;
LINE772 }
LINE773 // ---------------------------------------------------------
LINE774 // Invalid pict header
LINE775 error_current_offset_in_file = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE776 error_iobinit = (__int16 *)AF_err_record_set(
LINE777 (LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE778 481,
LINE779 -2060,
LINE780 0,
LINE781 error_current_offset_in_file,
LINE782 0,
LINE783 0);
LINE784 _error_status = error_iobinit;
LINE785 // -------------------------------------------
LINE786 }
LINE787 else
LINE788 {
LINE789 // ---------------------------------------------------------
LINE790 // Invalid pict header
LINE791 v9 = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE792 error_iobinit = (__int16 *)AF_err_record_set(
LINE793 (LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE794 479,
LINE795 -2100,
LINE796 0,
LINE797 v9,
LINE798 0,
LINE799 0);
LINE800 _error_status = error_iobinit;
LINE801 // --------------------------------------
LINE802 }
LINE803 if ( error_iobinit )
LINE804 goto pict_v1;
LINE805 pict_valid_header:
LINE806 if ( pict_header->pict_version != 0x11 )
LINE807 goto pict_v1;
LINE808 current_pos_2 = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE809 IOb_short_read(&io_buffer, pict_version);
LINE810 IOb_short_read(&io_buffer, (__int16 *)&io_buffer.size_buffer);
LINE811 IOb_dword_read(&io_buffer, &dword_value);
LINE812 if ( (unsigned int)IOb_tell(&io_buffer) - current_pos_2 == 8 )
LINE813 {
LINE814 if ( pict_version[0] == 0x2FF && LOWORD(io_buffer.size_buffer) == 0xC00 )
LINE815 {
LINE816 v13 = dword_value & 0xFFFF0000;
LINE817 pict_header->header_value_FFFF = dword_value & 0xFFFF0000;
LINE818 if ( v13 != 0xFFFE0000 )
LINE819 {
LINE820 IOb_seek(&io_buffer, 20, SEEK_CUR);
LINE821 goto pict_v1;
LINE822 }
LINE823 current_pos_3 = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE824 pict_header->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch.nUnits = 3;
LINE825 HIDWORD(pict_header->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch.xResNumerator) = 1;
LINE826 HIDWORD(pict_header->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch.yResNumerator) = 1;
LINE827 IOb_dword_read(&io_buffer, &dword_value);
LINE828 LODWORD(pict_header->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch.xResNumerator) = HIWORD(dword_value);
LINE829 IOb_dword_read(&io_buffer, &dword_value);
LINE830 LODWORD(pict_header->original_horizontal_pixel_per_inch.yResNumerator) = HIWORD(dword_value);
LINE831 pict_read_4_short(&io_buffer, &pict_header->pict_frame_original.top_left_corner_x);
LINE832 IOb_seek(&io_buffer, 4, SEEK_CUR);
LINE833 if ( (unsigned int)IOb_tell(&io_buffer) - current_pos_3 == 20 )
LINE834 goto pict_v1;
LINE835 current_pos_4 = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE836 v12 = (__int16 *)AF_err_record_set(
LINE837 (LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE838 512,
LINE839 -2453,
LINE840 0,
LINE841 current_pos_4,
LINE842 0,
LINE843 0);
LINE844 }
LINE845 else
LINE846 {
LINE847 _err_current_pos = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE848 v12 = (__int16 *)AF_err_record_set(
LINE849 (LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE850 495,
LINE851 -2060,
LINE852 0,
LINE853 _err_current_pos,
LINE854 0,
LINE855 0);
LINE856 }
LINE857 }
LINE858 else
LINE859 {
LINE860 _current_pos = IOb_tell(&io_buffer);
LINE861 v12 = (__int16 *)AF_err_record_set(
LINE862 (LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE863 493,
LINE864 -2100,
LINE865 0,
LINE866 _current_pos,
LINE867 0,
LINE868 0);
LINE869 }
LINE870 error_iobinit = v12;
LINE871 _error_status = v12;
LINE872 pict_v1:
LINE873 // /-------------------------------
LINE874 // PICT V1
LINE875 _src = 0;
LINE876 v16 = 0;
LINE877 Src = 0;
LINE878 index_1 = 0;
LINE879 if ( !error_iobinit )
LINE880 {
LINE881 _offset_in_bloc = 0;
LINE882 offset_in_bloc = 0;
LINE883 while ( parse_opcode_and_seek(&io_buffer, pict_header) )
LINE884 {
LINE885 v18 = Src;
LINE886 // ----------------------------------
LINE887 // Allocate some Memory
LINE888 // If null is passed as size then some default bloc size is used
LINE889 mem_bloc = (char *)AF_memm_realloc(
LINE890 kind_of_heap,
LINE891 Src,
LINE892 (size_t)&_offset_in_bloc[2].buffer4,
LINE893 (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE894 523);
LINE895 if ( mem_bloc )
LINE896 {
LINE897 pic_raster_data = (pic_raster_data *)((char *)_offset_in_bloc + (_DWORD)mem_bloc);
LINE898 Src = mem_bloc;
LINE899 error_boolean = get_data_from_opcode(&io_buffer, pict_header->opcode, pic_raster_data);
LINE900 error_boolean_1 = move_in_the_file(&io_buffer, pic_raster_data);
LINE901 _offset_in_bloc = offset_in_bloc;
LINE902 error_iobinit = (__int16 *)(error_boolean_1 + error_boolean);
LINE903 }
LINE904 else
LINE905 {
LINE906 AF_memm_free((void *)kind_of_heap, v18, (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 526);
LINE907 error_iobinit = (__int16 *)AF_err_record_set(
LINE908 (LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE909 527,
LINE910 0xFFFFF65F,
LINE911 0,
LINE912 0,
LINE913 0,
LINE914 0);
LINE915 }
LINE916 v16 = (char *)index_1 + 1;
LINE917 _offset_in_bloc = (mys_table_function *)((char *)_offset_in_bloc + 0x440);
LINE918 index_1 = (char *)index_1 + 1;
LINE919 offset_in_bloc = _offset_in_bloc;
LINE920 if ( error_iobinit )
LINE921 goto LABEL_35;
LINE922 }
LINE923 v16 = (char *)index_1;
LINE924 LABEL_35:
LINE925 _src = (int *)Src;
LINE926 _error_status = error_iobinit;
LINE927 }
LINE928 if ( v16 == (char *)1 )
LINE929 {
LINE930 *(int *)((char *)_src + 42) = *(int *)((char *)_src + 34);
LINE931 *(int *)((char *)_src + 46) = *(int *)((char *)_src + 38);
LINE932 }
LINE933 v23 = 0;
LINE934 mys_table_function_objb = 0;
LINE935 if ( !error_iobinit )
LINE936 {
LINE937 num_planes = 0;
LINE938 start_header = 0;
LINE939 if ( (int)v16 > 0 )
LINE940 {
LINE941 v24 = v16;
LINE942 v25 = 0;
LINE943 do
LINE944 {
LINE945 v26 = *_src;
LINE946 v27 = *_src == 1;
LINE947 _src += 0x110;
LINE948 start_header += v27;
LINE949 num_planes = (__int16 *)((char *)num_planes + (v26 == 2));
LINE950 v23 += v26 == 4;
LINE951 v25 = (__int16 *)((char *)v25 + (v26 == 8));
LINE952 --v24;
LINE953 }
LINE954 while ( v24 );
LINE955 error_iobinit = _error_status;
LINE956 v82 = v25;
LINE957 _pict_header = pict_header;
LINE958 if ( v23 )
LINE959 {
LINE960 v23 = 4;
LINE961 mys_table_function_objb = 4;
LINE962 LABEL_51:
LINE963 v16 = (char *)index_1;
LINE964 goto LABEL_52;
LINE965 }
LINE966 if ( v82 )
LINE967 {
LINE968 v23 = 8;
LINE969 mys_table_function_objb = 8;
LINE970 goto LABEL_51;
LINE971 }
LINE972 if ( num_planes )
LINE973 {
LINE974 v23 = 2;
LINE975 mys_table_function_objb = 2;
LINE976 goto LABEL_51;
LINE977 }
LINE978 if ( start_header )
LINE979 {
LINE980 v23 = 1;
LINE981 mys_table_function_objb = 1;
LINE982 goto LABEL_51;
LINE983 }
LINE984 }
LINE985 error_iobinit = (__int16 *)AF_err_record_set(
LINE986 (LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE987 565,
LINE988 -2394,
LINE989 0,
LINE990 0,
LINE991 0,
LINE992 0);
LINE993 v23 = 0;
LINE994 goto LABEL_51;
LINE995 }
LINE996 LABEL_52:
LINE997 _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data = 0;
LINE998 _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data = 0;
LINE999 if ( !error_iobinit )
LINE1000 {
LINE1001 _bytes = (char *)Src;
LINE1002 loop_index = (int)(v16 - 1);
LINE1003 v30 = loop_index;
LINE1004 _temp_loop_index = loop_index;
LINE1005 if ( loop_index >= 0 )
LINE1006 {
LINE1007 v31 = (char *)Src + 0x440 * loop_index;
LINE1008 do
LINE1009 {
LINE1010 if ( v23 == *v31 )
LINE1011 break;
LINE1012 v31 -= 272;
LINE1013 --v30;
LINE1014 }
LINE1015 while ( v30 >= 0 );
LINE1016 }
LINE1017 v32 = 0x440 * v30;
LINE1018 v33 = *(unsigned __int16 *)((char *)Src + v32 + 0x1C);
LINE1019 v34 = (pic_raster_data *)((char *)Src + v32);
LINE1020 start_header = v33;
LINE1021 num_planes = (__int16 *)v34->num_planes;
LINE1022 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_x = v34->four_short_1.top_left_corner_x;
LINE1023 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_x = v34->four_short_1.lower_right_corner_x;
LINE1024 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_Y = v34->four_short_1.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE1025 v35 = loop_index;
LINE1026 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_y = v34->four_short_1.lower_right_corner_y;
LINE1027 if ( loop_index >= 0 )
LINE1028 {
LINE1029 v36 = start_header;
LINE1030 v37 = mys_table_function_objb;
LINE1031 v38 = (__int16 *)&_bytes[1088 * v35 + 42];
LINE1032 do
LINE1033 {
LINE1034 if ( *(_DWORD *)(v38 - 21) == v37 && *(v38 - 7) == v36 )
LINE1035 {
LINE1036 if ( *(v38 - 6) == (_WORD)num_planes )
LINE1037 {
LINE1038 ++_pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE1039 top_left_corner_x = *v38;
LINE1040 if ( _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_x < *v38 )
LINE1041 top_left_corner_x = _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_x;
LINE1042 top_left_corner_Y = _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE1043 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_x = top_left_corner_x;
LINE1044 v41 = v38[1];
LINE1045 if ( top_left_corner_Y < v41 )
LINE1046 v41 = top_left_corner_Y;
LINE1047 lower_right_corner_x = _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_x;
LINE1048 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_Y = v41;
LINE1049 v43 = v38[2];
LINE1050 if ( lower_right_corner_x > v43 )
LINE1051 v43 = lower_right_corner_x;
LINE1052 lower_right_corner_y = _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_y;
LINE1053 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_x = v43;
LINE1054 v45 = v38[3];
LINE1055 if ( lower_right_corner_y > v45 )
LINE1056 v45 = lower_right_corner_y;
LINE1057 _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_y = v45;
LINE1058 }
LINE1059 v37 = mys_table_function_objb;
LINE1060 }
LINE1061 v38 -= 544;
LINE1062 --v35;
LINE1063 }
LINE1064 while ( v35 >= 0 );
LINE1065 loop_index = _temp_loop_index;
LINE1066 }
LINE1067 table_pic_data = (pic_raster_data *)AF_memm_alloc(
LINE1068 kind_of_heap,
LINE1069 0x440 * _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data,
LINE1070 (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c",
LINE1071 619);
LINE1072 _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data = table_pic_data;
LINE1073 if ( table_pic_data )
LINE1074 {
LINE1075 v47 = _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data - 1;
LINE1076 if ( loop_index >= 0 )
LINE1077 {
LINE1078 index = 0x440 * v47;
LINE1079 src_buffer = (pic_raster_data *)((char *)Src + 0x440 * loop_index);
LINE1080 index_1 = (void *)(0x440 * v47);
LINE1081 do
LINE1082 {
LINE1083 if ( v47 < 0 )
LINE1084 break;
LINE1085 if ( src_buffer->field_0x0 == mys_table_function_objb
LINE1086 && src_buffer->pixel_size == (_WORD)start_header
LINE1087 && src_buffer->num_planes == (_WORD)num_planes )
LINE1088 {
LINE1089 qmemcpy((char *)_pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data + index, src_buffer, sizeof(pic_raster_data));
LINE1090 loop_index = _temp_loop_index;
LINE1091 --v47;
LINE1092 index = (int)index_1 - 0x440;
LINE1093 index_1 = (char *)index_1 - 0x440;
LINE1094 }
LINE1095 --loop_index;
LINE1096 --src_buffer;
LINE1097 _temp_loop_index = loop_index;
LINE1098 }
LINE1099 while ( loop_index >= 0 );
LINE1100 }
LINE1101 if ( mys_table_function_objb == 1 || mys_table_function_objb == 2 )
LINE1102 {
LINE1103 if ( _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data > 0 )
LINE1104 {
LINE1105 v61 = 0;
LINE1106 v62 = 1;
LINE1107 pict_headerc = 0;
LINE1108 start_header = 1;
LINE1109 do
LINE1110 {
LINE1111 v63 = v62;
LINE1112 if ( v62 < _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data )
LINE1113 {
LINE1114 p_lower_right_corner_y = (int)&v61[15].pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_y;
LINE1115 num_planes = &v61[15].pict_frame_72_dpi.lower_right_corner_y;
LINE1116 do
LINE1117 {
LINE1118 table_of_pic_raster_data = _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE1119 v66 = (__int16 *)((char *)&v61->size_of_file + (_DWORD)table_of_pic_raster_data);
LINE1120 v67 = (char *)table_of_pic_raster_data + p_lower_right_corner_y;
LINE1121 v82 = (__int16 *)((char *)table_of_pic_raster_data + p_lower_right_corner_y);
LINE1122 LOWORD(table_of_pic_raster_data) = *(__int16 *)((char *)&table_of_pic_raster_data->four_short_1.lower_right_corner_x
LINE1123 + p_lower_right_corner_y);
LINE1124 v81 = v66;
LINE1125 if ( (__int16)table_of_pic_raster_data <= v66[21] )
LINE1126 {
LINE1127 qmemcpy(v79, v67, sizeof(v79));
LINE1128 qmemcpy(v82, v81, 0x440u);
LINE1129 qmemcpy((char *)pict_headerc + (unsigned int)_pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data, v79, 0x440u);
LINE1130 p_lower_right_corner_y = (int)num_planes;
LINE1131 }
LINE1132 v61 = pict_headerc;
LINE1133 ++v63;
LINE1134 p_lower_right_corner_y += 0x440;
LINE1135 num_planes = (__int16 *)p_lower_right_corner_y;
LINE1136 }
LINE1137 while ( v63 < _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data );
LINE1138 v62 = start_header;
LINE1139 }
LINE1140 start_header = v62 + 1;
LINE1141 v61 = (pict_header *)((char *)v61 + 0x440);
LINE1142 v68 = v62++ < _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE1143 pict_headerc = v61;
LINE1144 }
LINE1145 while ( v68 );
LINE1146 }
LINE1147 }
LINE1148 else
LINE1149 {
LINE1150 v50 = (char *)Src;
LINE1151 v51 = 1;
LINE1152 *(_DWORD *)((char *)Src + 42) = *(_DWORD *)((char *)Src + 34);
LINE1153 *(_DWORD *)(v50 + 46) = *(_DWORD *)(v50 + 38);
LINE1154 num_planes = (__int16 *)1;
LINE1155 if ( _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data > 1 )
LINE1156 {
LINE1157 v52 = v50 + 1130;
LINE1158 v53 = -42 - (_DWORD)v50;
LINE1159 index_1 = v50 + 1130;
LINE1160 v81 = (__int16 *)(-42 - (_DWORD)v50);
LINE1161 do
LINE1162 {
LINE1163 *v52 = *(v52 - 272);
LINE1164 v52[1] = *(v52 - 271);
LINE1165 v54 = *((_WORD *)v52 - 2);
LINE1166 *(_WORD *)v52 += v54;
LINE1167 *((_WORD *)v52 + 2) += v54;
LINE1168 v55 = v51;
LINE1169 if ( v51 < _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data )
LINE1170 {
LINE1171 v56 = (int)v52 + v53;
LINE1172 start_header = v56;
LINE1173 v57 = (pict_header *)v56;
LINE1174 pict_headerb = (pict_header *)v56;
LINE1175 do
LINE1176 {
LINE1177 v58 = _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE1178 v59 = (__int16 *)((char *)v58 + v56);
LINE1179 v60 = (char *)v58 + (_DWORD)v57;
LINE1180 _error_status = (__int16 *)((char *)v58 + (_DWORD)v57);
LINE1181 LOWORD(v58) = *(__int16 *)((char *)&v58->four_short_1.top_left_corner_x + (_DWORD)v57);
LINE1182 v82 = v59;
LINE1183 if ( (__int16)v58 < v59[21] )
LINE1184 {
LINE1185 qmemcpy(v79, v60, sizeof(v79));
LINE1186 qmemcpy(_error_status, v82, 0x440u);
LINE1187 qmemcpy((char *)_pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data + start_header, v79, sizeof(pic_raster_data));
LINE1188 v57 = pict_headerb;
LINE1189 }
LINE1190 v56 = start_header;
LINE1191 ++v55;
LINE1192 v57 = (pict_header *)((char *)v57 + 1088);
LINE1193 pict_headerb = v57;
LINE1194 }
LINE1195 while ( v55 < _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data );
LINE1196 v52 = index_1;
LINE1197 v51 = (int)num_planes;
LINE1198 v53 = (int)v81;
LINE1199 }
LINE1200 ++v51;
LINE1201 v52 += 272;
LINE1202 num_planes = (__int16 *)v51;
LINE1203 index_1 = v52;
LINE1204 }
LINE1205 while ( v51 < _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data );
LINE1206 }
LINE1207 }
LINE1208 num_of_pic_raster_data = 0;
LINE1209 if ( _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data > 0 )
LINE1210 {
LINE1211 v70 = 0;
LINE1212 do
LINE1213 {
LINE1214 ++num_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE1215 _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[v70++].four_short_1.top_left_corner_x -= _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_x;
LINE1216 _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[v70 - 1].four_short_1.lower_right_corner_x -= _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_x;
LINE1217 _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[v70 - 1].four_short_1.top_left_corner_Y -= _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE1218 _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data[v70 - 1].four_short_1.lower_right_corner_y -= _pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi.top_left_corner_Y;
LINE1219 }
LINE1220 while ( num_of_pic_raster_data < _pict_header->num_of_pic_raster_data );
LINE1221 }
LINE1222 goto LABEL_109;
LINE1223 }
LINE1224 if ( !AF_err_record_set((LPCHAR)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 621, -3020, 0, 0, 0, 0) )
LINE1225 {
LINE1226 LABEL_109:
LINE1227 v71 = _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE1228 pixel_size = v71->pixel_size;
LINE1229 if ( pixel_size == 1 || pixel_size == 4 || pixel_size == 8 )
LINE1230 OS_memcpy(dest_bytes, &v71->dib_palette, 4 * (1 << pixel_size));
LINE1231 if ( mys_table_function_objb == 4 )
LINE1232 {
LINE1233 *(_DWORD *)a5 = 6;
LINE1234 }
LINE1235 else
LINE1236 {
LINE1237 v73 = _pict_header->table_of_pic_raster_data;
LINE1238 if ( v73->next_offset < 8u
LINE1239 || (packet_type = (unsigned __int16)v73->packet_type, packet_type == 1)
LINE1240 || packet_type == 2 && v73->pixel_size >= 0x18u )
LINE1241 {
LINE1242 *(_DWORD *)a5 = 0;
LINE1243 }
LINE1244 else
LINE1245 {
LINE1246 *(_DWORD *)a5 = 7;
LINE1247 }
LINE1248 }
LINE1249 }
LINE1250 }
LINE1251 if ( Src )
LINE1252 AF_memm_free((void *)kind_of_heap, Src, (int)"..\\..\\..\\..\\Common\\Formats\\pctwread.c", 703);
LINE1253 IOb_done(&io_buffer);
LINE1254 return AF_error_check();
LINE1255 }
Effectively, values can be subtracted from the original frame in 72 dpi contained in the header of the PICT file at LINE1218. And this is all controlled by the number num_of_pic_raster_data in the do-while loop from LINE1212 to LINE1220.
The original frame 72 dpi values are read at LINE748 into pict_header->pict_frame_72_dpi through the call to the pict_read_4_short function.
So we see that we can have control over the size of the destination buffer that we want to overwrite in multiple ways. The main issue is that the size of the allocated buffer is not considered inside the write_into_dest_buffer function, which eventually writes out-of-bounds.
This makes the code run under wrong size assumptions, and the do-while loop will run past the end of the buffer, triggering the out-of-bounds write condition in the heap, which can lead to arbitrary code execution.
Crash Information
0:000> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Exception Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
Key : AV.Fault
Value: Write
Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
Value: 3765
Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisManager
Value: Create
Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 11741
Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
Value: 8937
Key : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 64720149
Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
Value: 162
Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
Value: 451097
Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
Value: 64719
Key : WER.OS.Branch
Value: vb_release
Key : WER.OS.Timestamp
Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z
Key : WER.OS.Version
Value: 10.0.19041.1
Key : WER.Process.Version
Value: 1.0.1.1
NTGLOBALFLAG: 2000000
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_LOADED: 1
EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 6731dd22 (MSVCR110!memcpy+0x0000002a)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
Parameter[0]: 00000001
Parameter[1]: 0cd21000
Attempt to write to address 0cd21000
FAULTING_THREAD: 00001394
PROCESS_NAME: Fuzzme.exe
WRITE_ADDRESS: 0cd21000
ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - The instruction at 0x%p referenced memory at 0x%p. The memory could not be %s.
EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: c0000005
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 00000001
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 0cd21000
STACK_TEXT:
0019f638 6748f9a6 0cd21000 0c4fb012 00000001 MSVCR110!memcpy+0x2a
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0019f64c 675c9b43 0cd21000 0c4fb012 00000001 igCore19d+0xf9a6
0019f66c 675c856f 0cd20ff8 0cd228f8 0c4fb103 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xddb13
0019f734 675c7751 0019fc3c 1000001e 0e44eff8 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdc53f
0019fbb4 674c13d9 0019fc3c 0e44eff8 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0xdb721
0019fbec 675008d7 00000000 0e44eff8 0019fc3c igCore19d!IG_image_savelist_get+0xb29
0019fe68 67500239 00000000 0524dfd0 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x148a7
0019fe88 67495757 00000000 0524dfd0 00000001 igCore19d!IG_mpi_page_set+0x14209
0019fea8 00402219 0524dfd0 0019febc 00000001 igCore19d!IG_load_file+0x47
0019fec0 00402524 0524dfd0 0019fef8 051aff48 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x19
0019ff28 0040668d 00000005 051a8f68 051aff48 Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x324
0019ff70 760ffa29 003fe000 760ffa10 0019ffdc Fuzzme!fuzzme+0x448d
0019ff80 774b7a9e 003fe000 721cdcd8 00000000 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x19
0019ffdc 774b7a6e ffffffff 774d8a44 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
0019ffec 00000000 00406715 003fe000 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b
STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb
SYMBOL_NAME: MSVCR110!memcpy+2a
MODULE_NAME: MSVCR110
IMAGE_NAME: MSVCR110.dll
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_WRITE_STRING_DEREFERENCE_AVRF_c0000005_MSVCR110.dll!memcpy
OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1
BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x86
OSNAME: Windows 10
IMAGE_VERSION: 11.0.50727.1
FAILURE_ID_HASH: {77975e19-9d4d-daf1-6c0e-6a3a4c334a80}
Followup: MachineOwner
---------
Timeline
2021-11-16 - Vendor disclosure
2021-11-17 - Vendor acknowledged and created case number
2021-12-01 - Vendor advised Q1 2022 plans for fix
2021-12-07 - 30 day disclosure extension granted
2022-01-06 - Follow up w/ vendor re: disclosure release
2022-03-31 - Public Release
Discovered by Emmanuel Tacheau of Cisco Talos.
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