CVE-2022-48424

commit 4adc0fbe03a69d3189607bf74e82a79c29c08b4a Author: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed Jan 4 11:29:02 2023 +0100 Linux 6.1.3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Tested-by: Ronald Warsow Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso Tested-by: Rudi Heitbaum Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Tested-by: Fenil Jain Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Tested-by: Bagas Sanjaya Tested-by: Allen Pais Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Justin M. Forbes Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 6a0ef7326e1e7dcb37d797dd77335cc145cad149 Author: Marco Elver Date: Mon Sep 12 11:45:40 2022 +0200 kcsan: Instrument memcpy/memset/memmove with newer Clang commit 7c201739beef1a586d806463f1465429cdce34c5 upstream. With Clang version 16+, -fsanitize=thread will turn memcpy/memset/memmove calls in instrumented functions into __tsan_memcpy/__tsan_memset/__tsan_memmove calls respectively. Add these functions to the core KCSAN runtime, so that we (a) catch data races with mem* functions, and (b) won’t run into linker errors with such newer compilers. Cc: [email protected] # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit c9ded831e2552b9c3cab7e2591a190e94f9d29c0 Author: Chuck Lever Date: Sat Nov 26 15:55:18 2022 -0500 SUNRPC: Don’t leak netobj memory when gss_read_proxy_verf() fails commit da522b5fe1a5f8b7c20a0023e87b52a150e53bf5 upstream. Fixes: 030d794bf498 (“SUNRPC: Use gssproxy upcall for server RPCGSS authentication.”) Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Cc: Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit e60fa800a32a693d672b1a091424d780278c4587 Author: Hanjun Guo Date: Thu Nov 17 19:23:42 2022 +0800 tpm: tpm_tis: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak commit db9622f762104459ff87ecdf885cc42c18053fd9 upstream. In check_acpi_tpm2(), we get the TPM2 table just to make sure the table is there, not used after the init, so the acpi_put_table() should be added to release the ACPI memory. Fixes: 4cb586a188d4 (“tpm_tis: Consolidate the platform and acpi probe flow”) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit b0785edaf649e5f04dc7f75533e810f4c00e4106 Author: Hanjun Guo Date: Thu Nov 17 19:23:41 2022 +0800 tpm: tpm_crb: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak commit 37e90c374dd11cf4919c51e847c6d6ced0abc555 upstream. In crb_acpi_add(), we get the TPM2 table to retrieve information like start method, and then assign them to the priv data, so the TPM2 table is not used after the init, should be freed, call acpi_put_table() to fix the memory leak. Fixes: 30fc8d138e91 (“tpm: TPM 2.0 CRB Interface”) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit bf31e3f8077af539feaf4e9bbf82e8eb51e7e5a8 Author: Hanjun Guo Date: Thu Nov 17 19:23:40 2022 +0800 tpm: acpi: Call acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak commit 8740a12ca2e2959531ad253bac99ada338b33d80 upstream. The start and length of the event log area are obtained from TPM2 or TCPA table, so we call acpi_get_table() to get the ACPI information, but the acpi_get_table() should be coupled with acpi_put_table() to release the ACPI memory, add the acpi_put_table() properly to fix the memory leak. While we are at it, remove the redundant empty line at the end of the tpm_read_log_acpi(). Fixes: 0bfb23746052 (“tpm: Move eventlog files to a subdirectory”) Fixes: 85467f63a05c (“tpm: Add support for event log pointer found in TPM2 ACPI table”) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Hanjun Guo Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit ba2e7d07dd06e646a72ba906a89fdc1cca7ea560 Author: Deren Wu Date: Sun Dec 4 16:24:16 2022 +0800 mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING commit 4a44cd249604e29e7b90ae796d7692f5773dd348 upstream. vub300_enable_sdio_irq() works with mutex and need TASK_RUNNING here. Ensure that we mark current as TASK_RUNNING for sleepable context. [ 77.554641] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [] sdio_irq_thread+0x17d/0x5b0 [ 77.554652] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1983 at kernel/sched/core.c:9813 __might_sleep+0x116/0x160 [ 77.554905] CPU: 2 PID: 1983 Comm: ksdioirqd/mmc1 Tainted: G OE 6.1.0-rc5 #1 [ 77.554910] Hardware name: Intel® Client Systems NUC8i7BEH/NUC8BEB, BIOS BECFL357.86A.0081.2020.0504.1834 05/04/2020 [ 77.554912] RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x116/0x160 [ 77.554920] RSP: 0018:ffff888107b7fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 77.554923] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888118c1b740 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 77.554926] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffed1020f6ffa9 [ 77.554928] RBP: ffff888107b7fde0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1043ea60ba [ 77.554930] R10: ffff88821f5305cb R11: ffffed1043ea60b9 R12: ffffffff93aa3a60 [ 77.554932] R13: 000000000000011b R14: 7fffffffffffffff R15: ffffffffc0558660 [ 77.554934] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88821f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 77.554937] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 77.554939] CR2: 00007f8a44010d68 CR3: 000000024421a003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 77.554942] Call Trace: [ 77.554944] [ 77.554952] mutex_lock+0x78/0xf0 [ 77.554973] vub300_enable_sdio_irq+0x103/0x3c0 [vub300] [ 77.554981] sdio_irq_thread+0x25c/0x5b0 [ 77.555006] kthread+0x2b8/0x370 [ 77.555017] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 77.555023] [ 77.555025] —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— Fixes: 88095e7b473a (“mmc: Add new VUB300 USB-to-SD/SDIO/MMC driver”) Signed-off-by: Deren Wu Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87dc45b122d26d63c80532976813c9365d7160b3.1670140888.git.deren.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit a35b4bcb43895c6e57e09bdad1cf3191cb67c63c Author: Jan Kara Date: Wed Nov 30 18:56:53 2022 +0100 block: Do not reread partition table on exclusively open device commit 36369f46e91785688a5f39d7a5590e3f07981316 upstream. Since commit 10c70d95c0f2 (“block: remove the bd_openers checks in blk_drop_partitions”) we allow rereading of partition table although there are users of the block device. This has an undesirable consequence that e.g. if sda and sdb are assembled to a RAID1 device md0 with partitions, BLKRRPART ioctl on sda will rescan partition table and create sda1 device. This partition device under a raid device confuses some programs (such as libstorage-ng used for initial partitioning for distribution installation) leading to failures. Fix the problem refusing to rescan partitions if there is another user that has the block device exclusively open. Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221130135344.2ul4cyfstfs3znxg@quack3 Fixes: 10c70d95c0f2 (“block: remove the bd_openers checks in blk_drop_partitions”) Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [axboe: fold in followup fix] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 01bb485730691ccb6e938be22cdf67fc2cd05406 Author: Jaegeuk Kim Date: Tue Nov 8 17:59:34 2022 -0800 f2fs: allow to read node block after shutdown commit e6ecb142429183cef4835f31d4134050ae660032 upstream. If block address is still alive, we should give a valid node block even after shutdown. Otherwise, we can see zero data when reading out a file. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 83a3bfdb5a8a (“f2fs: indicate shutdown f2fs to allow unmount successfully”) Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 6028ec01c4f79af91aa035c970869e630a39fafa Author: Pavel Machek Date: Mon Oct 24 19:30:12 2022 +0200 f2fs: should put a page when checking the summary info commit c3db3c2fd9992c08f49aa93752d3c103c3a4f6aa upstream. The commit introduces another bug. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: c6ad7fd16657e (“f2fs: fix to do sanity check on summary info”) Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit b3b3212725ed6876085e235d609e3801f23ea12d Author: NARIBAYASHI Akira Date: Wed Oct 26 20:24:38 2022 +0900 mm, compaction: fix fast_isolate_around() to stay within boundaries commit be21b32afe470c5ae98e27e49201158a47032942 upstream. Depending on the memory configuration, isolate_freepages_block() may scan pages out of the target range and causes panic. Panic can occur on systems with multiple zones in a single pageblock. The reason it is rare is that it only happens in special configurations. Depending on how many similar systems there are, it may be a good idea to fix this problem for older kernels as well. The problem is that pfn as argument of fast_isolate_around() could be out of the target range. Therefore we should consider the case where pfn < start_pfn, and also the case where end_pfn < pfn. This problem should have been addressd by the commit 6e2b7044c199 (“mm, compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone”) but there was an oversight. Case1: pfn < start_pfn | node X’s zone | node Y’s zone ±----------------±-----------------------------… pageblock ^ ^ ^ ±----------±----------±----------±----------+… ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ end_pfn ^ start_pfn = cc->zone->zone_start_pfn pfn <---------> scanned range by “Scan After” Case2: end_pfn < pfn | node X’s zone | node Y’s zone ±----------------±-----------------------------… pageblock ^ ^ ^ ±----------±----------±----------±----------+… ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ pfn ^ end_pfn start_pfn <---------> scanned range by “Scan Before” It seems that there is no good reason to skip nr_isolated pages just after given pfn. So let perform simple scan from start to end instead of dividing the scan into “Before” and "After". Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 6e2b7044c199 (“mm, compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone”). Signed-off-by: NARIBAYASHI Akira Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 97ce99984be12b9acb49ddce0f5d8ebb037adbb6 Author: Mikulas Patocka Date: Fri Nov 4 09:53:38 2022 -0400 md: fix a crash in mempool_free commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream. There’s a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh. The reason for the crash is this: * super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio). * so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio). * if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed. * bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free. We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test. We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown. The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay] RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 Call Trace: clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] __submit_bio+0x76/0x120 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0 flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300 worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0 ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 kthread+0xc2/0x100 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd] CR2: 0000000000000000 —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit e9d055b8dfcac3c7c9e90328582ffda7179581f1 Author: ChiYuan Huang Date: Thu Sep 29 10:00:17 2022 +0800 mfd: mt6360: Add bounds checking in Regmap read/write call-backs commit 5f4f94e9f26cca6514474b307b59348b8485e711 upstream. Fix the potential risk of OOB read if bank index is over the maximum. Refer to the discussion list for the experiment result on mt6370. https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ If not to check the bound, there is the same issue on mt6360. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 3b0850440a06c (mfd: mt6360: Merge different sub-devices I2C read/write) Signed-off-by: ChiYuan Huang Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 784a4f995ee24460aa72e00b085612fad57ebce5 Author: Christian Brauner Date: Sat Dec 17 22:28:40 2022 +0100 pnode: terminate at peers of source commit 11933cf1d91d57da9e5c53822a540bbdc2656c16 upstream. The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by @dest_mnt. Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of @source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference. Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it’s easy to trigger. Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged users. While fixing this bug we’ve gotten confused multiple times due to unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let’s start this with some clarifications: * The terms “master” or “peer” denote a shared mount. A shared mount belongs to a peer group. * A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other. They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id. Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id. The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share. * The terms “slave mount” or “dependent mount” denote a mount that receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list. * The term “master mount” denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term “master mount” - or “master” for short - is mostly used when talking in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point to different masters in the same peer group. * Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists. Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don’t intersect. Consequently, to ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the ->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked. * Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave mount receives propagation from. * A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive propagation from another peer group. If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via ->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups. * A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group but is not a peer in another peer group. * A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id. The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a single propagation level in a propagation tree. For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and all slaves of @dest_mnt’s peer group form a propagation group propg1. So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2 together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in their ->mnt_master. * A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation starting from a specific shared mount. For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that receive propagation from @dest_mnt’s peer group down to the leafs. With that out of the way let’s get to the actual algorithm. We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt’s peer group: for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) { ret = propagate_one(n); if (ret) goto out; } Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn’t propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination propagation tree. The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt() and doesn’t concern us a lot here. It’s just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called @source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus, @source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its former parent. For each peer @m in @dest_mnt’s peer group propagate_one() will create a new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns. propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in @last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in @last_source. Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest. Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy of the source mount tree. This will become important later. The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a peer @m in @dest_mnt’s peer group. After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt’s peer group propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the propagation tree that @dest_mnt’s peer group propagates to: for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m; m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) { /* everything in that slave group */ n = m; do { ret = propagate_one(n); if (ret) goto out; n = next_peer(n); } while (n != m); } The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the propagation tree. The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW, it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become slaves to these masters. It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m. Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree headed by @dest_mnt’s peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters before their slaves. The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we’ve done that in a previous call to propagate_one(). The hard case is when we’re dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and mount a copy of the source mount tree on. For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies @child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful but as far as we can tell that’s the core of it all. But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree @m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the destination propagation tree @m. Let’s walk through the base case as that’s still fairly easy to grasp. If we’re dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that @dest_mnt is in then we don’t yet have marked any masters in the destination propagation tree. We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt’s peer group is simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at the first slave @m: for (n = m; ; n = p) { p = n->mnt_master; if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED§) break; } For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way up to a peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master. Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important. Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too. So the first iteration sets: n = m; p = n->mnt_master; such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one more level since we don’t have any marked mounts. So we end up with: n = dest_mnt; p = dest_mnt->mnt_master; If @dest_mnt’s peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is now NULL. If @dest_mnt’s peer group is a slave to another peer group then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master outside the propagation tree we’re dealing with. Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount tree we’re about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt’s peer group: do { struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent; if (last_source == first_source) break; done = parent->mnt_master == p; if (done && peers(n, parent)) break; last_source = last_source->mnt_master; } while (!done); We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and @last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group we propagated to in the peer loop in propagate_mnt(). Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that last peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group. So @last_source is the master we want to pick. We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to @last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation tree and so does @p. Hence: done = parent->mnt_master == p; is trivially true in the base condition. We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt’s peer group that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was initialized to: last_dest = dest_mnt; at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of @dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for peers here as that’s important.): if (done && peers(n, parent)) break; So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt’s peer group. The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, …). We’ll skip over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost. At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from @dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master. By marking @dest_mnt or one of it’s peers we are able to easily find it again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to @dest_mnt’s peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in the destination propagation tree again. The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest. What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m does. If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that @last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m. IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead us to an earlier propagation node @m via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy. So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous copy of @last_source and the fact it’s mounted on the previous propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be. The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a suitable master in the propagation group. As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation tree we can find @m’s closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to that master in @n We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous destination propagation node @m. We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree we’re about to create and mount at the current destination propagation node @m. If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know that the closest master they receive propagation from is @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be one level higher up. This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the closest peer group that they receive propagation from. However, terminating the walk has corner cases. If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again. This isn’t an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy of the source mount tree we’re about to create has a copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group as its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from. We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master either points outside the propagation hierarchy we’re dealing with or it is NULL because @source_mnt isn’t a shared-slave. So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again. One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of slaves of @dest_mnt’s peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer group that is a slave to @dest_mnt’s peer group. We handle them and then we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to @dest_mnt’s peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount tree will need to have @source_mnt as it’s master. So we walk the propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on @last_source->mnt_master. So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses something that the rest of the algorithm already handles. If @dest_mnt has peers in it’s peer group the peer loop in propagate_mnt(): for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) { ret = propagate_one(n); if (ret) goto out; } will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group. Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore. Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn’t even handled in this loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can’t even accidently come last in that peer loop. So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt’s peer group the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt’s peer group__. But this means that the termination condition that checks for @source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt’s peer group again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself. IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt’s peer group isn’t slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL causing the splat below. For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers in its peer group: =================================================================================== mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id =================================================================================== (@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216 \ (@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]: 609 609 shared:218 (1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216 \ (P1) mnt_master[218]: 624 607 shared:218 (2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216 \ (P2) mnt_master[218]: 625 576 shared:218 (3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216 \ (P3) mnt_master[218]: 626 545 shared:218 After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3), the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt’s peer group we handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt’s peer group: =================================================================================== mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id =================================================================================== mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216 / / (S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216 \ \ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218 \ / \/ (P4) mnt_slave 627 483 master:218 will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0). When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source’s master hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt. We can fix this in multiple ways: (1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers in @dest_mnt’s peer group right after the peer loop in propagate_mnt(). (2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly @source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt. (3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer group or some clever variant thereof. The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix. The third option is more intrusive but something we’d like to explore in the near future. This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of this issues. Final words. First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm. There isn’t a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(), propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what’s happening. Let’s not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into fixing this. Second, all the cool kids with access to unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users while namespace_lock() lock is held. [ 115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 115.850012] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #3 [ 115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0 [ 115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37 02 4d [ 115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00 [ 115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780 [ 115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0 [ 115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8 [ 115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 115.856859] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 115.857531] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0 [ 115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 115.860099] Call Trace: [ 115.860358] [ 115.860535] propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190 [ 115.860848] attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0 [ 115.861212] path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60 [ 115.861503] __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140 [ 115.861819] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80 [ 115.862117] ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250 [ 115.862435] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40 [ 115.862826] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.863133] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40 [ 115.863527] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.863835] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.864144] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.864452] ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170 [ 115.864775] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe [ 115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe [ 115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620 [ 115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620 [ 115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076 [ 115.870581] [ 115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0 sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath [ 115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010 [ 115.875641] —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— [ 115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0 [ 115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37 02 4d [ 115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00 [ 115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780 [ 115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0 [ 115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8 [ 115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 115.881548] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 115.882234] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0 [ 115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: f2ebb3a921c1 ("smarter propagate_mnt()") Fixes: 5ec0811d3037 (“propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave”) Cc: Reported-by: Ditang Chen Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (Digital Ocean) Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit f9aafff5448b1d8d457052271cd9a11b24e4d0bd Author: Takashi Iwai Date: Wed Dec 28 13:57:14 2022 +0100 ALSA: hda/hdmi: Static PCM mapping again with AMD HDMI codecs commit 090ddad4c7a9fefd647c762093a555870a19c8b2 upstream. The recent code refactoring for HD-audio HDMI codec driver caused a regression on AMD/ATI HDMI codecs; namely, PulseAudioand pipewire don’t recognize HDMI outputs any longer while the direct output via ALSA raw access still works. The problem turned out that, after the code refactoring, the driver assumes only the dynamic PCM assignment, and when a PCM stream that still isn’t assigned to any pin gets opened, the driver tries to assign any free converter to the PCM stream. This behavior is OK for Intel and other codecs, as they have arbitrary connections between pins and converters. OTOH, on AMD chips that have a 1:1 mapping between pins and converters, this may end up with blocking the open of the next PCM stream for the pin that is tied with the formerly taken converter. Also, with the code refactoring, more PCM streams are exposed than necessary as we assume all converters can be used, while this isn’t true for AMD case. This may change the PCM stream assignment and confuse users as well. This patch fixes those problems by: - Introducing a flag spec->static_pcm_mapping, and if it’s set, the driver applies the static mapping between pins and converters at the probe time - Limiting the number of PCM streams per pins, too; this avoids the superfluous PCM streams Fixes: ef6f5494faf6 (“ALSA: hda/hdmi: Use only dynamic PCM device allocation”) Cc: Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216836 Co-developed-by: Jaroslav Kysela Signed-off-by: Jaroslav Kysela Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 389d34c2a8b52acc351fd932ed4bea41fee5a39b Author: Artem Egorkine Date: Sun Dec 25 12:57:28 2022 +0200 ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit commit b8800d324abb50160560c636bfafe2c81001b66c upstream. Correctly calculate available space including the size of the chunk buffer. This fixes a buffer overflow when multiple MIDI sysex messages are sent to a PODxt device. Signed-off-by: Artem Egorkine Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit e58d1d2eb31bcdcd65981d220a23965d29bb53e6 Author: Artem Egorkine Date: Sun Dec 25 12:57:27 2022 +0200 ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt commit 8508fa2e7472f673edbeedf1b1d2b7a6bb898ecc upstream. A PODxt device sends 0xb2, 0xc2 or 0xf2 as a status byte for MIDI messages over USB that should otherwise have a 0xb0, 0xc0 or 0xf0 status byte. This is usually corrected by the driver on other OSes. This fixes MIDI sysex messages sent by PODxt. [ tiwai: fixed white spaces ] Signed-off-by: Artem Egorkine Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit bc2e0c5bb97c4b9dab471980cf8359d249e8f908 Author: Al Viro Date: Thu Nov 24 17:03:11 2022 +0000 ovl: update ->f_iocb_flags when ovl_change_flags() modifies ->f_flags commit 456b59e757b0c558df550764a4fd5ae6877e93f8 upstream. ovl_change_flags() is an open-coded variant of fs/fcntl.c:setfl() and it got missed by commit 164f4064ca81 (“keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file”); the same change applies there. Reported-by: Pierre Labastie Fixes: 164f4064ca81 (“keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file”) Cc: # v6.0 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216738 Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit d84a696c86ac10fa32550a141fc3e6f66e03cf1d Author: Zhang Tianci Date: Thu Sep 1 16:29:29 2022 +0800 ovl: Use ovl mounter’s fsuid and fsgid in ovl_link() commit 5b0db51215e895a361bc63132caa7cca36a53d6a upstream. There is a wrong case of link() on overlay: $ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge $ mount -t fuse /fuse $ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work $ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,\ workdir=work $ touch /merge/file $ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file’s caller becomes “bin” $ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile Then we will get an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s caller is “bin", it denied this request. In the changing history of ovl_link(), there are two key commits: The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 (“ovl: fix sgid on directory”) which overrides the cred’s fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode’s owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The current caller may should have this permission. This is acceptable to use the caller’s fsuid. The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 (“ovl: share inode for hard link”) which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid becomes the old inode’s fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay’s mounter! So this is incorrect. Fix this bug by using ovl mounter’s fsuid/fsgid to do underlying fs’s link(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220817102952.xnvesg3a7rbv576x@wittgenstein/T Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/t Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianci Signed-off-by: Jiachen Zhang Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) Fixes: 51f7e52dc943 (“ovl: share inode for hard link”) Cc: # v4.8 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 703fd753a0ba6bec6dfa6702dbc6a8f123e4a3cd Author: Wang Yufen Date: Fri Dec 2 09:41:01 2022 +0800 binfmt: Fix error return code in load_elf_fdpic_binary() commit e7f703ff2507f4e9f496da96cd4b78fd3026120c upstream. Fix to return a negative error code from create_elf_fdpic_tables() instead of 0. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 (“Linux-2.6.12-rc2”) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit e6d180a35bc0efd614b0df45f92a08550143555d Author: Mario Limonciello Date: Thu Dec 15 13:16:16 2022 -0600 ACPI: x86: s2idle: Stop using AMD specific codepath for Rembrandt+ commit e555c85792bd5f9828a2fd2ca9761f70efb1c77b upstream. After we introduced a module parameter and quirk infrastructure for picking the Microsoft GUID over the SOC vendor GUID we discovered that lots and lots of systems are getting this wrong. The table continues to grow, and is becoming unwieldy. We don’t really have any benefit to forcing vendors to populate the AMD GUID. This is just extra work, and more and more vendors seem to mess it up. As the Microsoft GUID is used by Windows as well, it’s very likely that it won’t be messed up like this. So drop all the quirks forcing it and the Rembrandt behavior. This means that Cezanne or later effectively only run the Microsoft GUID codepath with the exception of HP Elitebook 8*5 G9. Fixes: fd894f05cf30 (“ACPI: x86: s2idle: If a new AMD _HID is missing assume Rembrandt”) Cc: [email protected] # 6.1 Reported-by: Benjamin Cheng Reported-by: [email protected] Reported-by: Paul Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2292 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216768 Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel Tested-by: Philipp Zabel Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 577821f756cf3dfd308906d38610db178268841a Author: Mario Limonciello Date: Thu Dec 15 13:16:15 2022 -0600 ACPI: x86: s2idle: Force AMD GUID/_REV 2 on HP Elitebook 865 commit 3ea45390e9c0d35805ef8357ace55594fd4233d0 upstream. HP Elitebook 865 supports both the AMD GUID w/ _REV 2 and Microsoft GUID with _REV 0. Both have very similar code but the AMD GUID has a special workaround that is specific to a problem with spurious wakeups on systems with Qualcomm WLAN. This is believed to be a bug in the Qualcomm WLAN F/W (it doesn’t affect any other WLAN H/W). If this WLAN firmware is fixed this quirk can be dropped. Cc: [email protected] # 6.1 Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 0478b94c6f9170102e14a4815acbcd2ab50cb70c Author: Aditya Garg Date: Wed Dec 7 03:05:40 2022 +0000 hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount commit 9f2b5debc07073e6dfdd774e3594d0224b991927 upstream. Despite specifying UID and GID in mount command, the specified UID and GID were not being assigned. This patch fixes this issue. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 23ac2a31c54f5bb39d6e11c47680e588b3a0ca81 Author: Qiujun Huang Date: Sun Sep 4 23:17:13 2022 +0800 pstore/zone: Use GFP_ATOMIC to allocate zone buffer commit 99b3b837855b987563bcfb397cf9ddd88262814b upstream. There is a case found when triggering a panic_on_oom, pstore fails to dump kmsg. Because psz_kmsg_write_record can’t get the new buffer. Handle this by using GFP_ATOMIC to allocate a buffer at lower watermark. Signed-off-by: Qiujun Huang Fixes: 335426c6dcdd (“pstore/zone: Provide way to skip “broken” zone for MTD devices”) Cc: WeiXiong Liao Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAJRQjofRCF7wjrYmw3D7zd5QZnwHQq+F8U-mJDJ6NZ4bddYdLA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 5c3a4cdc53639f08929f3400b26e01e28f175bd2 Author: Luca Stefani Date: Thu Dec 22 14:10:49 2022 +0100 pstore: Properly assign mem_type property commit beca3e311a49cd3c55a056096531737d7afa4361 upstream. If mem-type is specified in the device tree it would end up overriding the record_size field instead of populating mem_type. As record_size is currently parsed after the improper assignment with default size 0 it continued to work as expected regardless of the value found in the device tree. Simply changing the target field of the struct is enough to get mem-type working as expected. Fixes: 9d843e8fafc7 (“pstore: Add mem_type property DT parsing support”) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Luca Stefani Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 2cec280c491547e5d15a741aa66128650b97242f Author: Arnd Bergmann Date: Thu Dec 15 17:30:17 2022 +0100 kmsan: include linux/vmalloc.h commit aaa746ad8b30f38ef89a301faf339ef1c19cf33a upstream. This is needed for the vmap/vunmap declarations: mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:316:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘vmap’ is invalid in C99 [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration] vbuf = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL); ^ mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:316:29: error: use of undeclared identifier ‘VM_MAP’ vbuf = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL); ^ mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c:322:3: error: implicit declaration of function ‘vunmap’ is invalid in C99 [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration] vunmap(vbuf); ^ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 8ed691b02ade (“kmsan: add tests for KMSAN”) Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Marco Elver Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit dace33a1896e33cadcd7922cf5942dec12dd2b64 Author: Arnd Bergmann Date: Thu Dec 15 17:26:57 2022 +0100 kmsan: export kmsan_handle_urb commit 7ba594d700998bafa96a75360d2e060aa39156d2 upstream. USB support can be in a loadable module, and this causes a link failure with KMSAN: ERROR: modpost: “kmsan_handle_urb” [drivers/usb/core/usbcore.ko] undefined! Export the symbol so it can be used by this module. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 553a80188a5d (“kmsan: handle memory sent to/from USB”) Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Marco Elver Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 0ce4cc6d269ddc448a825955b495f662f5d9e153 Author: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Thu Dec 15 14:46:21 2022 -0500 mm/mempolicy: fix memory leak in set_mempolicy_home_node system call commit 38ce7c9bdfc228c14d7621ba36d3eebedd9d4f76 upstream. When encountering any vma in the range with policy other than MPOL_BIND or MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, an error is returned without issuing a mpol_put on the policy just allocated with mpol_dup(). This allows arbitrary users to leak kernel memory. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: c6018b4b2549 (“mm/mempolicy: add set_mempolicy_home_node syscall”) Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap Reviewed-by: “Huang, Ying” Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V Acked-by: Michal Hocko Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Feng Tang Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dan Williams Cc: Huang Ying Cc: [5.17+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 4d528dab403ba45db24769f5e5a9514ab0890351 Author: Vlastimil Babka Date: Fri Dec 16 17:32:27 2022 +0100 mm, mremap: fix mremap() expanding vma with addr inside vma commit 6f12be792fde994ed934168f93c2a0d2a0cf0bc5 upstream. Since 6.1 we have noticed random rpm install failures that were tracked to mremap() returning -ENOMEM and to commit ca3d76b0aa80 (“mm: add merging after mremap resize”). The problem occurs when mremap() expands a VMA in place, but using an starting address that’s not vma->vm_start, but somewhere in the middle. The extension_pgoff calculation introduced by the commit is wrong in that case, so vma_merge() fails due to pgoffs not being compatible. Fix the calculation. By the way it seems that the situations, where rpm now expands a vma from the middle, were made possible also due to that commit, thanks to the improved vma merging. Yet it should work just fine, except for the buggy calculation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Jiri Slaby Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1206359 Fixes: ca3d76b0aa80 (“mm: add merging after mremap resize”) Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Jakub Matěna Cc: “Kirill A . Shutemov” Cc: Liam Howlett Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 97e14ae082040b2a65c7cbf7f2a53c240cc805db Author: Mel Gorman Date: Fri Dec 2 10:02:23 2022 +0000 rtmutex: Add acquire semantics for rtmutex lock acquisition slow path commit 1c0908d8e441631f5b8ba433523cf39339ee2ba0 upstream. Jan Kara reported the following bug triggering on 6.0.5-rt14 running dbench on XFS on arm64. kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:625! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP CPU: 11 PID: 6611 Comm: dbench Tainted: G E 6.0.0-rt14-rt+ #1 pc : clear_inode+0xa0/0xc0 lr : clear_inode+0x38/0xc0 Call trace: clear_inode+0xa0/0xc0 evict+0x160/0x180 iput+0x154/0x240 do_unlinkat+0x184/0x300 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x48/0xc0 el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0xe4/0x2c0 do_el0_svc+0xac/0x100 el0_svc+0x78/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x9c/0xc0 el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 It also affects 6.1-rc7-rt5 and affects a preempt-rt fork of 5.14 so this is likely a bug that existed forever and only became visible when ARM support was added to preempt-rt. The same problem does not occur on x86-64 and he also reported that converting sb->s_inode_wblist_lock to raw_spinlock_t makes the problem disappear indicating that the RT spinlock variant is the problem. Which in turn means that RT mutexes on ARM64 and any other weakly ordered architecture are affected by this independent of RT. Will Deacon observed: “I’d be more inclined to be suspicious of the slowpath tbh, as we need to make sure that we have acquire semantics on all paths where the lock can be taken. Looking at the rtmutex code, this really isn’t obvious to me – for example, try_to_take_rt_mutex() appears to be able to return via the ‘takeit’ label without acquire semantics and it looks like we might be relying on the caller’s subsequent _unlock_ of the wait_lock for ordering, but that will give us release semantics which aren’t correct.” Sebastian Andrzej Siewior prototyped a fix that does work based on that comment but it was a little bit overkill and added some fences that should not be necessary. The lock owner is updated with an IRQ-safe raw spinlock held, but the spin_unlock does not provide acquire semantics which are needed when acquiring a mutex. Adds the necessary acquire semantics for lock owner updates in the slow path acquisition and the waiter bit logic. It successfully completed 10 iterations of the dbench workload while the vanilla kernel fails on the first iteration. [ [email protected]: Initial prototype fix ] Fixes: 700318d1d7b38 (“locking/rtmutex: Use acquire/release semantics”) Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core”) Reported-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 09727bc32f6784e09e81921f821c38fc3ea2a1cc Author: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Wed Dec 14 17:20:08 2022 -0500 futex: Fix futex_waitv() hrtimer debug object leak on kcalloc error commit 94cd8fa09f5f1ebdd4e90964b08b7f2cc4b36c43 upstream. In a scenario where kcalloc() fails to allocate memory, the futex_waitv system call immediately returns -ENOMEM without invoking destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(). When CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS=y, this results in leaking a timer debug object. Fixes: bf69bad38cf6 ("futex: Implement sys_futex_waitv()") Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # v5.16+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit c86c5cf67f3821acc9fdcc27917f6f98153e9de0 Author: Terry Junge Date: Thu Dec 8 15:05:06 2022 -0800 HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk [ Upstream commit 3d57f36c89d8ba32b2c312f397a37fd1a2dc7cfc ] I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim, the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220 would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk. Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055) Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057) Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058) Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled. The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn’t affect other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too. Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once in 5 ms. End quote Signed-off-by: Terry Junge Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 79f9b467b8b5d603fd0fcfd57e8125977c38a8ba Author: José Expósito Date: Mon Nov 28 17:57:05 2022 +0100 HID: multitouch: fix Asus ExpertBook P2 P2451FA trackpoint [ Upstream commit 4eab1c2fe06c98a4dff258dd64800b6986c101e9 ] The HID descriptor of this device contains two mouse collections, one for mouse emulation and the other for the trackpoint. Both collections get merged and, because the first one defines X and Y, the movemenent events reported by the trackpoint collection are ignored. Set the MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT class for this device to be able to receive its reports. This fix is similar to/based on commit 40d5bb87377a (“HID: multitouch: enable multi-input as a quirk for some devices”). Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libinput/libinput/-/issues/825 Reported-by: Akito Tested-by: Akito Signed-off-by: José Expósito Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit d465fa2a9addd4b4e625e5902905b17bd7f2879f Author: wuqiang Date: Thu Nov 10 16:15:02 2022 +0800 kprobes: kretprobe events missing on 2-core KVM guest [ Upstream commit 3b7ddab8a19aefc768f345fd3782af35b4a68d9b ] Default value of maxactive is set as num_possible_cpus() for nonpreemptable systems. For a 2-core system, only 2 kretprobe instances would be allocated in default, then these 2 instances for execve kretprobe are very likely to be used up with a pipelined command. Here’s the testcase: a shell script was added to crontab, and the content of the script is: #!/bin/sh do_something_magic `tr -dc a-z < /dev/urandom | head -c 10` cron will trigger a series of program executions (4 times every hour). Then events loss would be noticed normally after 3-4 hours of testings. The issue is caused by a burst of series of execve requests. The best number of kretprobe instances could be different case by case, and should be user’s duty to determine, but num_possible_cpus() as the default value is inadequate especially for systems with small number of cpus. This patch enables the logic for preemption as default, thus increases the minimum of maxactive to 10 for nonpreemptable systems. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: wuqiang Reviewed-by: Solar Designer Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 650b69b17cfd79f51476d93c2c63bfb73280a77a Author: Dai Ngo Date: Mon Dec 12 14:50:11 2022 -0800 NFSD: fix use-after-free in __nfs42_ssc_open() [ Upstream commit 75333d48f92256a0dec91dbf07835e804fc411c0 ] Problem caused by source’s vfsmount being unmounted but remains on the delayed unmount list. This happens when nfs42_ssc_open() return errors. Fixed by removing nfsd4_interssc_connect(), leave the vfsmount for the laundromat to unmount when idle time expires. We don’t need to call nfs_do_sb_deactive when nfs42_ssc_open return errors since the file was not opened so nfs_server->active was not incremented. Same as in nfsd4_copy, if we fail to launch nfsd4_do_async_copy thread then there’s no need to call nfs_do_sb_deactive Reported-by: Xingyuan Mo Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo Tested-by: Xingyuan Mo Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit ba50fee6b41bcbafaeed3c51f90d37d1480ff9a0 Author: Kees Cook Date: Fri Dec 2 10:45:30 2022 -0800 rtc: msc313: Fix function prototype mismatch in msc313_rtc_probe() [ Upstream commit 21b8a1dd56a163825e5749b303858fb902ebf198 ] With clang’s kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. msc313_rtc_probe() was passing clk_disable_unprepare() directly, which did not have matching prototypes for devm_add_action_or_reset()'s callback argument. Refactor to use devm_clk_get_enabled() instead. This was found as a result of Clang’s new -Wcast-function-type-strict flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type, which only checks for type width mismatches. Reported-by: kernel test robot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected] Suggested-by: Christophe JAILLET Cc: Daniel Palmer Cc: Romain Perier Cc: Alessandro Zummo Cc: Alexandre Belloni Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Daniel Palmer Tested-by: Daniel Palmer Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 482d990a5dd1027ee0b70a8a570d56749cac8103 Author: Nathan Lynch Date: Fri Nov 18 09:07:42 2022 -0600 powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term() [ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ] It’s unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term(): Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9 Call Trace: [c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable) [c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0 [c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0 [c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4 [c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68 [c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50 [c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0 [c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420 [c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200 Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 464d10e8d797454e16a173ef1292a446b2adf21c Author: Nathan Lynch Date: Fri Nov 18 09:07:41 2022 -0600 powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term() [ Upstream commit ed2213bfb192ab51f09f12e9b49b5d482c6493f3 ] rtas_os_term() is called during panic. Its behavior depends on a couple of conditions in the /rtas node of the device tree, the traversal of which entails locking and local IRQ state changes. If the kernel panics while devtree_lock is held, rtas_os_term() as currently written could hang. Instead of discovering the relevant characteristics at panic time, cache them in file-static variables at boot. Note the lookup for “ibm,extended-os-term” is converted to of_property_read_bool() since it is a boolean property, not an RTAS function token. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan [mpe: Incorporate suggested change from Nick] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 85cc8a187f2de7a91e2cea522e9406fa12999269 Author: Ricardo Ribalda Date: Mon Nov 28 23:16:48 2022 +0100 iommu/mediatek: Fix crash on isr after kexec() [ Upstream commit 00ef8885a945c37551547d8ac8361cacd20c4e42 ] If the system is rebooted via isr(), the IRQ handler might be triggered before the domain is initialized. Resulting on an invalid memory access error. Fix: [ 0.500930] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000070 [ 0.501166] Call trace: [ 0.501174] report_iommu_fault+0x28/0xfc [ 0.501180] mtk_iommu_isr+0x10c/0x1c0 Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [ joro: Fixed spelling in commit message ] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit fcee8a2d4db404a93e690d79e7273b6ef9d33575 Author: Christophe Leroy Date: Mon Nov 14 23:27:46 2022 +0530 objtool: Fix SEGFAULT [ Upstream commit efb11fdb3e1a9f694fa12b70b21e69e55ec59c36 ] find_insn() will return NULL in case of failure. Check insn in order to avoid a kernel Oops for NULL pointer dereference. Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao Reviewed-by: Naveen N. Rao Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 6d076293e5bffdf897ea5f975669206e09beed6a Author: Yin Xiujiang Date: Mon Dec 6 10:40:45 2021 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in r_page [ Upstream commit ecfbd57cf9c5ca225184ae266ce44ae473792132 ] When PAGE_SIZE is 64K, if read_log_page is called by log_read_rst for the first time, the size of *buffer would be equal to DefaultLogPageSize(4K).But for *buffer operations like memcpy, if the memory area size(n) which being assigned to buffer is larger than 4K (log->page_size(64K) or bytes(64K-page_off)), it will cause an out of boundary error. Call trace: […] kasan_report+0x44/0x130 check_memory_region+0xf8/0x1a0 memcpy+0xc8/0x100 ntfs_read_run_nb+0x20c/0x460 read_log_page+0xd0/0x1f4 log_read_rst+0x110/0x75c log_replay+0x1e8/0x4aa0 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x290/0x2d0 ntfs_fill_super+0x508/0xec0 get_tree_bdev+0x1fc/0x34c […] Fix this by setting variable r_page to NULL in log_read_rst. Signed-off-by: Yin Xiujiang Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 4d744cee4ca1fbd843c50e77d52f3398bc5ff166 Author: Dan Carpenter Date: Sat Oct 15 11:28:55 2022 +0300 fs/ntfs3: Delete duplicate condition in ntfs_read_mft() [ Upstream commit 658015167a8432b88f5d032e9d85d8fd50e5bf2c ] There were two patches which addressed the same bug and added the same condition: commit 6db620863f85 (“fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset”) commit 887bfc546097 (“fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack”) Delete one condition. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit fd8aa71b65710ddbe3698892850d7e576fc23acb Author: Tetsuo Handa Date: Sun Oct 2 23:54:11 2022 +0900 fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at ntfs_fill_super() [ Upstream commit 59bfd7a483da36bd202532a3d9ea1f14f3bf3aaf ] syzbot is reporting too large allocation at ntfs_fill_super() [1], for a crafted filesystem can contain bogus inode->i_size. Add __GFP_NOWARN in order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by using kvmalloc(). Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33f3faaa0c08744f7d40 [1] Reported-by: syzot Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 590a6943a1d12776f13dd96d0d02f86955da2343 Author: Tetsuo Handa Date: Sun Oct 2 23:39:15 2022 +0900 fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at wnd_init() [ Upstream commit 0d0f659bf713662fabed973f9996b8f23c59ca51 ] syzbot is reporting too large allocation at wnd_init() [1], for a crafted filesystem can become wnd->nwnd close to UINT_MAX. Add __GFP_NOWARN in order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by using kvcalloc(). Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa4648a5446460b7b963 [1] Reported-by: syzot Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit d6379ce242960a8e9ecd6ff76f476d9336c21f16 Author: Edward Lo Date: Fri Sep 30 09:58:40 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Validate index root when initialize NTFS security [ Upstream commit bfcdbae0523bd95eb75a739ffb6221a37109881e ] This enhances the sanity check for $SDH and $SII while initializing NTFS security, guarantees these index root are legit. [ 162.459513] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.460176] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880037bca99 by task mount/243 [ 162.460851] [ 162.461252] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7 #42 [ 162.461744] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 162.462609] Call Trace: [ 162.462954] [ 162.463276] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 162.463822] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 162.464608] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60 [ 162.465766] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.466975] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130 [ 162.467506] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0xc0/0xf0 [ 162.467998] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.468536] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90 [ 162.468923] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.469282] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0 [ 162.469557] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90 [ 162.469864] ? ni_find_attr+0x214/0x300 [ 162.470217] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80 [ 162.470479] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 162.470931] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190 [ 162.471307] ? indx_get_root+0xe4/0x190 [ 162.471556] ? indx_get_root+0x140/0x190 [ 162.471833] ? indx_init+0x1e0/0x1e0 [ 162.472069] ? fnd_clear+0x115/0x140 [ 162.472363] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100 [ 162.472731] indx_find+0x184/0x470 [ 162.473461] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 162.474429] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 162.474704] ? do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 162.474962] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0 [ 162.475381] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450 [ 162.475661] ? ntfs_security_init+0x3d6/0x440 [ 162.475906] ? is_sd_valid+0x180/0x180 [ 162.476191] ntfs_extend_init+0x13f/0x2c0 [ 162.476496] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0x130/0x130 [ 162.476861] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 162.477325] ntfs_fill_super+0x11e0/0x1b50 [ 162.477709] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 162.477970] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 162.478258] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 162.478538] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 162.478789] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 162.479038] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 162.479374] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 162.479729] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 162.480124] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 162.480484] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 162.480894] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 162.481467] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 162.482280] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 162.482714] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 162.483264] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 162.484782] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 162.485593] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 162.486024] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 162.486543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 162.487141] RIP: 0033:0x7f9d374e948a [ 162.488324] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 162.489728] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30e73d18 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 162.490971] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdb43a060 RCX: 00007f9d374e948a [ 162.491669] RDX: 0000561cdb43a260 RSI: 0000561cdb43a2e0 RDI: 0000561cdb442af0 [ 162.492050] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdb43a280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 162.492459] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561cdb442af0 [ 162.493183] R13: 0000561cdb43a260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 162.493644] [ 162.493908] [ 162.494214] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 162.494761] page:000000003e38a3d5 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x37bc [ 162.496064] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 162.497278] raw: 000fffffc0000000 ffffea00000df1c8 ffffea00000df008 0000000000000000 [ 162.498928] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 162.500542] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 162.501057] [ 162.501242] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 162.502230] ffff8880037bc980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.502977] ffff8880037bca00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.503522] >ffff8880037bca80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.503963] ^ [ 162.504370] ffff8880037bcb00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.504766] ffff8880037bcb80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff Signed-off-by: Edward Lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit fe5c3915c3737c758ebbc95e9db4fe447428ee75 Author: Andre Przywara Date: Mon Oct 31 11:13:55 2022 +0000 phy: sun4i-usb: Add support for the H616 USB PHY [ Upstream commit 0f607406525d25019dd9c498bcc0b42734fc59d5 ] The USB PHY used in the Allwinner H616 SoC inherits some traits from its various predecessors: it has four full PHYs like the H3, needs some extra bits to be set like the H6, and puts SIDDQ on a different bit like the A100. Plus it needs this weird PHY2 quirk. Name all those properties in a new config struct and assign a new compatible name to it. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 1eacd1fd41b7ae85786170c43ce5859f1d887f32 Author: Andre Przywara Date: Mon Oct 31 11:13:54 2022 +0000 phy: sun4i-usb: Introduce port2 SIDDQ quirk [ Upstream commit b45c6d80325bec2b78c716629a518b6442d8bdc6 ] At least the Allwinner H616 SoC requires a weird quirk to make most USB PHYs work: Only port2 works out of the box, but all other ports need some help from this port2 to work correctly: The CLK_BUS_PHY2 and RST_USB_PHY2 clock and reset need to be enabled, and the SIDDQ bit in the PMU PHY control register needs to be cleared. For this register to be accessible, CLK_BUS_ECHI2 needs to be ungated. Don’t ask … Instead of disguising this as some generic feature, treat it more like a quirk (what it really is): If the quirk bit is set, and we initialise a PHY other than PHY2, ungate this one special clock, and clear the SIDDQ bit. We also pick the clock and reset from PHY2 and enable them as well. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 0da27d8efcdb0fd22223d8ffea48bd688b02d97a Author: Pierre-Louis Bossart Date: Tue Oct 18 09:25:00 2022 +0800 soundwire: dmi-quirks: add quirk variant for LAPBC710 NUC15 [ Upstream commit f74495761df10c25a98256d16ea7465191b6e2cd ] Some NUC15 LAPBC710 devices don’t expose the same DMI information as the Intel reference, add additional entry in the match table. BugLink: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/issues/3885 Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan Signed-off-by: Bard Liao Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit d34485d40b6a263d65bc476554299c42b2ec0187 Author: Hawkins Jiawei Date: Fri Sep 23 19:09:04 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack [ Upstream commit 887bfc546097fbe8071dac13b2fef73b77920899 ] Syzkaller reports slab-out-of-bounds bug as follows: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801bbdff02 by task syz-executor131/3611 […] Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944 run_unpack_ex+0xb0/0x7c0 fs/ntfs3/run.c:1057 ntfs_read_mft fs/ntfs3/inode.c:368 [inline] ntfs_iget5+0xc20/0x3280 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:501 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x124/0x5d0 fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:272 ntfs_fill_super+0x1eff/0x37f0 fs/ntfs3/super.c:1018 get_tree_bdev+0x440/0x760 fs/super.c:1323 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x1326/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd […] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00006ef600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1bbd8 head:ffffea00006ef600 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88801bbdfe00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88801bbdfe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88801bbdff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88801bbdff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88801bbe0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Kernel will tries to read record and parse MFT from disk in ntfs_read_mft(). Yet the problem is that during enumerating attributes in record, kernel doesn’t check whether run_off field loading from the disk is a valid value. To be more specific, if attr->nres.run_off is larger than attr->size, kernel will passes an invalid argument run_buf_size in run_unpack_ex(), which having an integer overflow. Then this invalid argument will triggers the slab-out-of-bounds Read bug as above. This patch solves it by adding the sanity check between the offset to packed runs and attribute size. link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/#t Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 2f041a19f4eb72bcc851f9e3a15f3cfd1ae1addf Author: Edward Lo Date: Fri Sep 23 00:50:23 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Validate resident attribute name [ Upstream commit 54e45702b648b7c0000e90b3e9b890e367e16ea8 ] Though we already have some sanity checks while enumerating attributes, resident attribute names aren’t included. This patch checks the resident attribute names are in the valid ranges. [ 259.209031] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.210770] Write of size 426 at addr ffff88800632f2b2 by task exp/255 [ 259.211551] [ 259.212035] CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37 [ 259.212955] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 259.214387] Call Trace: [ 259.214640] [ 259.214895] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 259.215284] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 259.215565] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50 [ 259.215778] ? kasan_unpoison+0x28/0x60 [ 259.215991] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.216270] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130 [ 259.216481] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.216719] kasan_check_range+0x15a/0x1d0 [ 259.216939] memcpy+0x3c/0x70 [ 259.217136] ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.217945] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 [ 259.218384] ? ni_remove_attr+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 259.218712] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0 [ 259.219064] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40 [ 259.219434] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 259.219668] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [ 259.219904] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 259.220140] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 [ 259.220561] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0 [ 259.220984] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x850/0x850 [ 259.221532] ? run_deallocate+0x120/0x120 [ 259.221972] ? vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.222688] ? setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.222921] ? path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.223431] ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.223828] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.224417] ? mi_find_attr+0x3c/0xf0 [ 259.224772] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420 [ 259.225216] ? ni_ins_attr_ext+0x5c0/0x5c0 [ 259.225504] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x119/0x450 [ 259.225775] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0 [ 259.226316] ? ni_insert_nonresident+0x400/0x400 [ 259.227001] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 259.227468] ? __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 259.227773] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30 [ 259.228216] ? ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x2a/0xb0 [ 259.228494] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.228838] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x450/0x450 [ 259.229098] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x24/0x40 [ 259.229418] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0 [ 259.229681] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40 [ 259.229948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60 [ 259.230271] ? write_profile+0x270/0x270 [ 259.230537] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 259.230836] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0 [ 259.231099] ? ntfs_set_acl_ex+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 259.231529] ? evm_protected_xattr_common+0x6d/0x100 [ 259.231817] ? posix_xattr_acl+0x13/0x80 [ 259.232073] ? evm_protect_xattr+0x1f7/0x440 [ 259.232351] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120 [ 259.232635] ? xattr_resolve_name+0x180/0x180 [ 259.232912] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300 [ 259.233219] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160 [ 259.233492] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50 [ 259.233744] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.234002] ? __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x160/0x160 [ 259.234837] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170 [ 259.235567] ? vmemdup_user+0x53/0x90 [ 259.236212] setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.236491] ? do_setxattr+0x170/0x170 [ 259.236791] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 259.237232] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x57/0x180 [ 259.237605] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 259.237870] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 259.238234] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 259.238500] ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0 [ 259.238775] ? __mnt_want_write+0xaa/0x100 [ 259.238990] ? mnt_want_write+0x8b/0x150 [ 259.239290] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.239605] ? setxattr+0x140/0x140 [ 259.239849] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 259.240174] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x67/0x80 [ 259.240411] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.240715] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 259.240934] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.241697] RIP: 0033:0x7fc6b26e4469 [ 259.242647] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088 [ 259.244512] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c7841f8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc [ 259.245086] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc6b26e4469 [ 259.246025] RDX: 00007ffc3c784380 RSI: 00007ffc3c7842e0 RDI: 00007ffc3c784238 [ 259.246961] RBP: 00007ffc3c788410 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffc3c7884f8 [ 259.247775] R10: 000000000000007f R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00000000004004e0 [ 259.248534] R13: 00007ffc3c7884f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 259.249368] [ 259.249644] [ 259.249888] Allocated by task 255: [ 259.250283] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 259.250957] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 259.251826] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 259.252745] ni_create_attr_list+0x11e/0x850 [ 259.253298] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0 [ 259.253685] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420 [ 259.253974] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0 [ 259.254311] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30 [ 259.254629] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0 [ 259.254859] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120 [ 259.255155] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300 [ 259.255445] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160 [ 259.255862] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.256251] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170 [ 259.256522] setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.256911] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.257308] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.257637] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 259.257970] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.258550] [ 259.258772] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800632f000 [ 259.258772] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 259.260190] The buggy address is located 690 bytes inside of [ 259.260190] 1024-byte region [ffff88800632f000, ffff88800632f400) [ 259.261412] [ 259.261743] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 259.262354] page:0000000081e8cac9 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x632c [ 259.263722] head:0000000081e8cac9 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 259.264284] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 259.265312] raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffffea0000060d00 dead000000000004 ffff888001041dc0 [ 259.265772] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 259.266305] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 259.266588] [ 259.266728] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 259.267225] ffff88800632f300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 259.267841] ffff88800632f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 259.269111] >ffff88800632f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 259.269626] ^ [ 259.270162] ffff88800632f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 259.270810] ffff88800632f500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Signed-off-by: Edward Lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 3f6f75e8863f41c8b3dbfd9d99e3963aaca42601 Author: Edward Lo Date: Thu Sep 22 15:30:44 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Validate buffer length while parsing index [ Upstream commit 4d42ecda239cc13738d6fd84d098a32e67b368b9 ] indx_read is called when we have some NTFS directory operations that need more information from the index buffers. This adds a sanity check to make sure the returned index buffer length is legit, or we may have some out-of-bound memory accesses. [ 560.897595] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.898321] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888009497238 by task exp/245 [ 560.898760] [ 560.899129] CPU: 0 PID: 245 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37 [ 560.899505] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 560.900170] Call Trace: [ 560.900407] [ 560.900732] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 560.901108] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 560.901395] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.901716] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130 [ 560.901950] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.902208] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90 [ 560.902427] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.902846] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0 [ 560.903363] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90 [ 560.903883] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190 [ 560.904196] ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x750/0x750 [ 560.904969] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0xe0/0x130 [ 560.905259] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 560.905599] ? up_read+0x1a/0x90 [ 560.905853] ? indx_read+0x22c/0x380 [ 560.906096] indx_find+0x2ef/0x470 [ 560.906352] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 560.906692] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 560.906977] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0 [ 560.907220] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450 [ 560.907464] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 560.907747] ? mutex_lock+0x8f/0xe0 [ 560.907970] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20 [ 560.908214] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0 [ 560.908459] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100 [ 560.908788] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220 [ 560.909050] ? lookup_fast+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 560.909309] ? lookup_fast+0x13f/0x1b0 [ 560.909601] walk_component+0x187/0x230 [ 560.909944] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660 [ 560.910285] ? handle_lookup_down+0x90/0x90 [ 560.910618] ? path_init+0x642/0x6e0 [ 560.911084] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x6e/0xf0 [ 560.912559] ? __alloc_file+0x114/0x170 [ 560.913008] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10 [ 560.913419] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0 [ 560.913815] ? kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x50 [ 560.914125] ? kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 560.914542] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6d/0x90 [ 560.914924] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0 [ 560.915339] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0 [ 560.915647] ? getname+0x12/0x20 [ 560.916114] ? __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 560.916460] ? path_lookupat.isra.0+0x230/0x230 [ 560.916867] ? __isolate_free_page+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 560.917194] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0 [ 560.917448] ? may_open_dev+0x60/0x60 [ 560.917696] ? expand_files+0xa4/0x3a0 [ 560.917923] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 560.918185] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x88/0xdb [ 560.918409] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100 [ 560.918783] ? _find_next_bit+0x4a/0x130 [ 560.919026] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x19/0x40 [ 560.919276] ? alloc_fd+0x14b/0x2d0 [ 560.919635] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0 [ 560.920035] ? file_open_root+0x230/0x230 [ 560.920336] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 [ 560.920813] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0 [ 560.921208] ? filp_open+0x60/0x60 [ 560.921482] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x49/0x180 [ 560.921867] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 560.922128] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 560.922369] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 560.923030] RIP: 0033:0x7f7dff2e4469 [ 560.923681] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088 [ 560.924451] RSP: 002b:00007ffd41a210b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 [ 560.925168] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7dff2e4469 [ 560.925655] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007ffd41a211f0 [ 560.926085] RBP: 00007ffd41a252a0 R08: 00007f7dff60fba0 R09: 00007ffd41a25388 [ 560.926405] R10: 0000000000400b80 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000004004e0 [ 560.926867] R13: 00007ffd41a25380 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 560.927241] [ 560.927491] [ 560.927755] Allocated by task 245: [ 560.928409] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 560.929271] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 560.929778] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 560.930023] indx_read+0x249/0x380 [ 560.930224] indx_find+0x2a2/0x470 [ 560.930695] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0 [ 560.930892] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100 [ 560.931115] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220 [ 560.931323] walk_component+0x187/0x230 [ 560.931570] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660 [ 560.931791] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10 [ 560.932008] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0 [ 560.932226] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0 [ 560.932413] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0 [ 560.932709] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 560.933417] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 560.933776] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 560.934235] [ 560.934486] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009497000 [ 560.934486] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 560.935239] The buggy address is located 56 bytes to the right of [ 560.935239] 512-byte region [ffff888009497000, ffff888009497200) [ 560.936153] [ 560.937326] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 560.938228] page:0000000062a3dfae refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9496 [ 560.939616] head:0000000062a3dfae order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 560.940219] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 560.942702] raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffffea0000164f80 dead000000000005 ffff888001041c80 [ 560.943932] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 560.944568] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 560.945735] [ 560.946112] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 560.946870] ffff888009497100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 560.947242] ffff888009497180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 560.947611] >ffff888009497200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 560.947915] ^ [ 560.948249] ffff888009497280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 560.948687] ffff888009497300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Signed-off-by: Edward Lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit b343c40bb7ff9095430c3f31468a59f8a760dabd Author: Edward Lo Date: Fri Sep 9 09:04:00 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Validate attribute name offset [ Upstream commit 4f1dc7d9756e66f3f876839ea174df2e656b7f79 ] Although the attribute name length is checked before comparing it to some common names (e.g., $I30), the offset isn’t. This adds a sanity check for the attribute name offset, guarantee the validity and prevent possible out-of-bound memory accesses. [ 191.720056] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000008 [ 191.721060] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 191.721586] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 191.722079] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 191.722571] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 191.723179] CPU: 0 PID: 244 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #28 [ 191.723749] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 191.724832] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0 [ 191.725870] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069 [ 191.727375] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 191.727897] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9 [ 191.728531] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040 [ 191.729183] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 191.729628] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040 [ 191.730158] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0 [ 191.730645] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 191.731328] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 191.731667] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 191.732568] Call Trace: [ 191.733231] [ 191.733860] kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 191.734632] ni_clear+0x180/0x290 [ 191.735085] ntfs_evict_inode+0x45/0x70 [ 191.735495] evict+0x199/0x280 [ 191.735996] iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 191.736438] iput+0x32/0x50 [ 191.736811] iget_failed+0x23/0x30 [ 191.737270] ntfs_iget5+0x337/0x1890 [ 191.737629] ? ntfs_clear_mft_tail+0x20/0x260 [ 191.738201] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 191.738482] ? ntfs_objid_init+0xf6/0x140 [ 191.738779] ? ntfs_reparse_init+0x140/0x140 [ 191.739266] ntfs_fill_super+0x121b/0x1b50 [ 191.739623] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.739984] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 [ 191.740466] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.740787] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x6a/0x80 [ 191.741272] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 191.741829] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.742669] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 191.743132] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 191.743457] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 191.743938] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.744271] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 191.744582] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.745053] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 191.745403] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.745616] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 191.745887] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 191.746287] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 191.746582] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 191.746850] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 191.747122] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 191.747517] RIP: 0033:0x7f351fee948a [ 191.748332] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 191.749341] RSP: 002b:00007ffd51cf3af8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 191.749960] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b903733060 RCX: 00007f351fee948a [ 191.750589] RDX: 000055b903733260 RSI: 000055b9037332e0 RDI: 000055b90373bce0 [ 191.751115] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055b903733280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 191.751537] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055b90373bce0 [ 191.751946] R13: 000055b903733260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 191.752519] [ 191.752782] Modules linked in: [ 191.753785] CR2: ffffebde00000008 [ 191.754937] —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— [ 191.755429] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0 [ 191.755725] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069 [ 191.756744] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 191.757218] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9 [ 191.757580] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040 [ 191.758016] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 191.758570] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040 [ 191.758957] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0 [ 191.759317] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 191.759711] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 191.760118] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Signed-off-by: Edward Lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit a7b23037b38b577d9a4372e0c6b7c9fe808070c1 Author: Edward Lo Date: Fri Sep 9 09:03:10 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check for inode operations [ Upstream commit c1ca8ef0262b25493631ecbd9cb8c9893e1481a1 ] This adds a sanity check for the i_op pointer of the inode which is returned after reading Root directory MFT record. We should check the i_op is valid before trying to create the root dentry, otherwise we may encounter a NPD while mounting a image with a funny Root directory MFT record. [ 114.484325] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 114.484811] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 114.485084] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 114.485606] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 114.485975] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 114.486570] CPU: 0 PID: 237 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 6.0.0-rc4 #28 [ 114.486977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 114.488169] RIP: 0010:d_flags_for_inode+0xe0/0x110 [ 114.488816] Code: 24 f7 ff 49 83 3e 00 74 41 41 83 cd 02 66 44 89 6b 02 eb 92 48 8d 7b 20 e8 6d 24 f7 ff 4c 8b 73 20 49 8d 7e 08 e8 60 241 [ 114.490326] RSP: 0018:ffff8880065e7aa8 EFLAGS: 00000296 [ 114.490695] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888008ccd750 RCX: ffffffff84af2aea [ 114.490986] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff87abd020 [ 114.491364] RBP: ffff8880065e7ac8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0f57a05 [ 114.491675] R10: ffffffff87abd027 R11: fffffbfff0f57a04 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 114.491954] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888008ccd750 [ 114.492397] FS: 00007fdc8a627e40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.492797] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.493150] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000000013ba000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 114.493671] Call Trace: [ 114.493890] [ 114.494075] __d_instantiate+0x24/0x1c0 [ 114.494505] d_instantiate.part.0+0x35/0x50 [ 114.494754] d_make_root+0x53/0x80 [ 114.494998] ntfs_fill_super+0x1232/0x1b50 [ 114.495260] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 114.495499] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 114.495723] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 114.495964] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 114.496272] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 114.496502] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 114.496859] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 114.497099] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 114.497507] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 114.497933] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 114.498362] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 114.498571] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 114.498819] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 114.499069] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 114.499343] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 114.499683] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 114.500133] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 114.500592] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 114.500930] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 114.501294] RIP: 0033:0x7fdc898e948a [ 114.501542] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 114.502716] RSP: 002b:00007ffd793e58f8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 114.503175] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564b2228f060 RCX: 00007fdc898e948a [ 114.503588] RDX: 0000564b2228f260 RSI: 0000564b2228f2e0 RDI: 0000564b22297ce0 [ 114.504925] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564b2228f280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 114.505484] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564b22297ce0 [ 114.505823] R13: 0000564b2228f260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 114.506562] [ 114.506887] Modules linked in: [ 114.507648] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 114.508884] —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— [ 114.509675] RIP: 0010:d_flags_for_inode+0xe0/0x110 [ 114.510140] Code: 24 f7 ff 49 83 3e 00 74 41 41 83 cd 02 66 44 89 6b 02 eb 92 48 8d 7b 20 e8 6d 24 f7 ff 4c 8b 73 20 49 8d 7e 08 e8 60 241 [ 114.511762] RSP: 0018:ffff8880065e7aa8 EFLAGS: 00000296 [ 114.512401] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888008ccd750 RCX: ffffffff84af2aea [ 114.513103] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff87abd020 [ 114.513512] RBP: ffff8880065e7ac8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0f57a05 [ 114.513831] R10: ffffffff87abd027 R11: fffffbfff0f57a04 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 114.514757] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888008ccd750 [ 114.515411] FS: 00007fdc8a627e40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.515794] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.516208] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000000013ba000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Signed-off-by: Edward Lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 2600c80ea7b39f987c3fa89287e73d62e322bbbd Author: Shigeru Yoshida Date: Tue Aug 23 19:32:05 2022 +0900 fs/ntfs3: Fix memory leak on ntfs_fill_super() error path [ Upstream commit 51e76a232f8c037f1d9e9922edc25b003d5f3414 ] syzbot reported kmemleak as below: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff8880122f1540 (size 32): comm "a.out", pid 6664, jiffies 4294939771 (age 25.500s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 … 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ed ff ed ff 00 00 00 00 … backtrace: [] ntfs_init_fs_context+0x22/0x1c0 [] alloc_fs_context+0x217/0x430 [] path_mount+0x704/0x1080 [] __x64_sys_mount+0x18c/0x1d0 [] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd This patch fixes this issue by freeing mount options on error path of ntfs_fill_super(). Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 1621734cd3047f7979da1d7d5c5444d583d8b0ed Author: Edward Lo Date: Sun Aug 7 01:05:18 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check to attr_load_runs_vcn [ Upstream commit 2681631c29739509eec59cc0b34e977bb04c6cf1 ] Some metadata files are handled before MFT. This adds a null pointer check for some corner cases that could lead to NPD while reading these metadata files for a malformed NTFS image. [ 240.190827] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 240.191583] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 240.191956] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 240.192391] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 240.192897] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 240.193805] CPU: 0 PID: 242 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 5.19.0+ #17 [ 240.194477] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 240.195152] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.195679] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.196642] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.197019] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.197523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.197877] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.198292] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.198647] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.199410] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.199895] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.200314] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 240.200839] Call Trace: [ 240.201104] [ 240.201502] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80 [ 240.202297] ? ___slab_alloc+0x465/0x830 [ 240.202614] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 240.202886] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x32/0x90 [ 240.203157] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250 [ 240.203543] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0 [ 240.203785] mi_get+0x70/0x140 [ 240.204012] ni_load_mi_ex+0xfa/0x190 [ 240.204346] ? ni_std5+0x90/0x90 [ 240.204588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.204859] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 240.205107] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 240.205600] ? ntfs_load_attr_list+0xbe/0x300 [ 240.205864] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 240.206157] ntfs_iget5+0x56c/0x1870 [ 240.206510] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 240.206776] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.207030] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.207545] ntfs_fill_super+0xb8f/0x1e20 [ 240.207839] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.208069] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 240.208467] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 240.208846] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.209221] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 240.209804] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.210519] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 240.210991] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 240.211455] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 240.211806] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.212112] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 240.212559] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 240.212906] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.213329] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 240.213829] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 240.214246] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 240.214774] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 240.215080] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 240.215442] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 240.215811] RIP: 0033:0x7f233b4e948a [ 240.216104] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 240.217615] RSP: 002b:00007fff02211ec8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 240.218718] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdc35b060 RCX: 00007f233b4e948a [ 240.219556] RDX: 0000561cdc35b260 RSI: 0000561cdc35b2e0 RDI: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.219975] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdc35b280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 240.220403] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.220803] R13: 0000561cdc35b260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 240.221256] [ 240.221567] Modules linked in: [ 240.222028] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 240.223291] —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— [ 240.223669] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.224058] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.225033] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.225968] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.226624] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.227307] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.227816] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228330] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228729] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.229281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.230298] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Signed-off-by: Edward Lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 9173b89c16a603d73c434b695fe2a7a13491300f Author: Edward Lo Date: Sat Aug 6 00:47:27 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset [ Upstream commit 6db620863f8528ed9a9aa5ad323b26554a17881d ] This adds sanity checks for data run offset. We should make sure data run offset is legit before trying to unpack them, otherwise we may encounter use-after-free or some unexpected memory access behaviors. [ 82.940342] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.941180] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888008a8487f by task mount/240 [ 82.941670] [ 82.942069] CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #15 [ 82.942482] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 82.943720] Call Trace: [ 82.944204] [ 82.944471] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 82.944908] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x67b [ 82.945141] ? __wait_on_bit+0x106/0x120 [ 82.945750] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.946626] kasan_report+0xa7/0x120 [ 82.947046] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.947280] __asan_load1+0x51/0x60 [ 82.947483] run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.947709] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x70 [ 82.947927] ? run_pack+0x7a0/0x7a0 [ 82.948158] run_unpack_ex+0xad/0x3f0 [ 82.948399] ? mi_enum_attr+0x14a/0x200 [ 82.948717] ? run_unpack+0x570/0x570 [ 82.949072] ? ni_enum_attr_ex+0x1b2/0x1c0 [ 82.949332] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 82.949611] ? mi_read+0x262/0x2c0 [ 82.949970] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 82.950249] ntfs_iget5+0x632/0x1870 [ 82.950621] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 82.951192] ? evict+0x223/0x280 [ 82.951525] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 82.951969] ntfs_fill_super+0x1321/0x1e20 [ 82.952436] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 82.952822] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 82.953188] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 82.953379] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 82.954001] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 82.954438] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 82.954700] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 82.955049] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 82.955292] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 82.955615] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 82.955955] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 82.956310] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 82.956723] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 82.957023] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 82.957411] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 82.957638] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 82.957948] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 82.958310] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 82.958719] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 82.959341] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0d1ce948a [ 82.960193] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 82.961532] RSP: 002b:00007ffe59ff69a8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 82.962527] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564dcc107060 RCX: 00007fd0d1ce948a [ 82.963266] RDX: 0000564dcc107260 RSI: 0000564dcc1072e0 RDI: 0000564dcc10fce0 [ 82.963686] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564dcc107280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 82.964272] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564dcc10fce0 [ 82.964785] R13: 0000564dcc107260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff Signed-off-by: Edward Lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 0bb9f93ba63acfdb7c363d9f9fc2199fc6fa913d Author: edward lo Date: Mon Aug 1 18:20:51 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Add overflow check for attribute size [ Upstream commit e19c6277652efba203af4ecd8eed4bd30a0054c9 ] The offset addition could overflow and pass the used size check given an attribute with very large size (e.g., 0xffffff7f) while parsing MFT attributes. This could lead to out-of-bound memory R/W if we try to access the next attribute derived by Add2Ptr(attr, asize) [ 32.963847] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff956a83c76067 [ 32.964301] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 32.964526] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 32.964893] PGD 4dc01067 P4D 4dc01067 PUD 0 [ 32.965316] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 32.965727] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #6 [ 32.966050] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 32.966628] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110 [ 32.967239] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a [ 32.968101] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283 [ 32.968364] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f [ 32.968651] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8 [ 32.968963] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f [ 32.969249] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000 [ 32.969870] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170 [ 32.970655] FS: 00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 32.971098] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 32.971378] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 32.972098] Call Trace: [ 32.972842] [ 32.973341] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xda/0xf0 [ 32.974087] ntfs_iget5+0x1db/0xde0 [ 32.974386] ? slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x270 [ 32.974778] ? ntfs_fill_super+0x4c7/0x12a0 [ 32.975115] ntfs_fill_super+0x5d6/0x12a0 [ 32.975336] get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x270 [ 32.975709] ? put_ntfs+0x150/0x150 [ 32.975956] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 32.976191] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xc0 [ 32.976374] ? capable+0x19/0x20 [ 32.976572] path_mount+0x484/0xaa0 [ 32.977025] ? putname+0x57/0x70 [ 32.977380] do_mount+0x80/0xa0 [ 32.977555] __x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0 [ 32.978105] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 32.978830] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 32.979311] RIP: 0033:0x7fdab72e948a [ 32.980015] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 32.981251] RSP: 002b:00007ffd15b87588 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 32.981832] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557de0aaf060 RCX: 00007fdab72e948a [ 32.982234] RDX: 0000557de0aaf260 RSI: 0000557de0aaf2e0 RDI: 0000557de0ab7ce0 [ 32.982714] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557de0aaf280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 32.983046] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000557de0ab7ce0 [ 32.983494] R13: 0000557de0aaf260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 32.984094] [ 32.984352] Modules linked in: [ 32.984753] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 [ 32.985911] —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— [ 32.986555] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110 [ 32.987217] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a [ 32.988232] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283 [ 32.988532] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f [ 32.988916] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8 [ 32.989356] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f [ 32.989994] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000 [ 32.990415] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170 [ 32.991011] FS: 00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 32.991524] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 32.991936] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 This patch adds an overflow check Signed-off-by: edward lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit db91a9c59162a9c56792ded88160442c0a2dabd5 Author: edward lo Date: Mon Aug 1 15:37:31 2022 +0800 fs/ntfs3: Validate BOOT record_size [ Upstream commit 0b66046266690454dc04e6307bcff4a5605b42a1 ] When the NTFS BOOT record_size field < 0, it represents a shift value. However, there is no sanity check on the shift result and the sbi->record_bits calculation through blksize_bits() assumes the size always > 256, which could lead to NPD while mounting a malformed NTFS image. [ 318.675159] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 318.675682] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 318.675869] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 318.676246] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 318.676502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 318.676934] CPU: 0 PID: 259 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0 #5 [ 318.677289] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 318.678136] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0x2d/0x1c0 [ 318.678656] Code: 89 ca 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 cc 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 d3 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 180 [ 318.679848] RSP: 0018:ffffa6c8c0297bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 318.680104] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000080 [ 318.680790] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 318.681679] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 318.682577] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000080 [ 318.683015] R13: ffff8d5582e68400 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 318.683618] FS: 00007fd9e1c81e40(0000) GS:ffff8d55fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 318.684280] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 318.684651] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000002e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 318.685623] Call Trace: [ 318.686607] [ 318.686872] ? ntfs_alloc_inode+0x1a/0x60 [ 318.687235] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x2b/0xa0 [ 318.687468] mi_read+0xbb/0x250 [ 318.687576] ntfs_iget5+0x114/0xd90 [ 318.687750] ntfs_fill_super+0x588/0x11b0 [ 318.687953] ? put_ntfs+0x130/0x130 [ 318.688065] ? snprintf+0x49/0x70 [ 318.688164] ? put_ntfs+0x130/0x130 [ 318.688256] get_tree_bdev+0x16a/0x260 [ 318.688407] vfs_get_tree+0x20/0xb0 [ 318.688519] path_mount+0x2dc/0x9b0 [ 318.688877] do_mount+0x74/0x90 [ 318.689142] __x64_sys_mount+0x89/0xd0 [ 318.689636] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 318.689998] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 318.690318] RIP: 0033:0x7fd9e133c48a [ 318.690687] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 318.691357] RSP: 002b:00007ffd374406c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 318.691632] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564d0b051080 RCX: 00007fd9e133c48a [ 318.691920] RDX: 0000564d0b051280 RSI: 0000564d0b051300 RDI: 0000564d0b0596a0 [ 318.692123] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564d0b0512a0 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 318.692349] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564d0b0596a0 [ 318.692673] R13: 0000564d0b051280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 318.693007] [ 318.693271] Modules linked in: [ 318.693614] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 318.694446] —[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]— [ 318.694779] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0x2d/0x1c0 [ 318.694952] Code: 89 ca 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 cc 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 d3 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 180 [ 318.696042] RSP: 0018:ffffa6c8c0297bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 318.696531] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000080 [ 318.698114] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 318.699286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 318.699795] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000080 [ 318.700236] R13: ffff8d5582e68400 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 318.700973] FS: 00007fd9e1c81e40(0000) GS:ffff8d55fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 318.701688] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 318.702190] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000002e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 318.726510] mount (259) used greatest stack depth: 13320 bytes left This patch adds a sanity check. Signed-off-by: edward lo Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 2df487537c77885e116aaa5b00cd1233c0949598 Author: Christoph Hellwig Date: Wed Dec 21 09:51:19 2022 +0100 nvmet: don’t defer passthrough commands with trivial effects to the workqueue [ Upstream commit 2a459f6933e1c459bffb7cc73fd6c900edc714bd ] Mask out the “Command Supported” and “Logical Block Content Change” bits and only defer execution of commands that have non-trivial effects to the workqueue for synchronous execution. This allows to execute admin commands asynchronously on controllers that provide a Command Supported and Effects log page, and will keep allowing to execute Write commands asynchronously once command effects on I/O commands are taken into account. Fixes: c1fef73f793b (“nvmet: add passthru code to process commands”) Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Keith Busch Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit a574e81b37c0add6c143d90b074ea508970a9ca7 Author: Christoph Hellwig Date: Wed Dec 21 10:30:45 2022 +0100 nvme: fix the NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK definition [ Upstream commit 685e6311637e46f3212439ce2789f8a300e5050f ] 3 << 16 does not generate the correct mask for bits 16, 17 and 18. Use the GENMASK macro to generate the correct mask instead. Fixes: 84fef62d135b (“nvme: check admin passthru command effects”) Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Keith Busch Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit aa9732dae4bc4fe98a0efb43c4796aae62b6105e Author: Adam Vodopjan Date: Fri Dec 9 09:26:34 2022 +0000 ata: ahci: Fix PCS quirk application for suspend [ Upstream commit 37e14e4f3715428b809e4df9a9958baa64c77d51 ] Since kernel 5.3.4 my laptop (ICH8M controller) does not see Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD disk connected into a SATA connector on wake from suspend. The problem was introduced in c312ef176399 (“libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond”): the quirk is not applied on wake from suspend as it originally was. It is worth to mention the commit contained another bug: the quirk is not applied at all to controllers which require it. The fix commit 09d6ac8dc51a (“libata/ahci: Fix PCS quirk application”) landed in 5.3.8. So testing my patch anywhere between commits c312ef176399 and 09d6ac8dc51a is pointless. Not all disks trigger the problem. For example nothing bad happens with Western Digital WD5000LPCX HDD. Test hardware: - Acer 5920G with ICH8M SATA controller - sda: some SATA HDD connnected into the DVD drive IDE port with a SATA-IDE caddy. It is a boot disk - sdb: Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD connected into the only SATA port Sample “dmesg --notime | grep -E '^(sd |ata)'” output on wake: sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Starting disk sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Starting disk ata4: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300) ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300) ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:0c:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:42:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out ata1: FORCE: cable set to 80c ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300) ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300) ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300) ata3.00: disabled sd 2:0:0:0: rejecting I/O to offline device ata3.00: detaching (SCSI 2:0:0:0) sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_NO_CONNECT driverbyte=DRIVER_OK sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronize Cache(10) failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET driverbyte=DRIVER_OK sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Stopping disk sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET driverbyte=DRIVER_OK Commit c312ef176399 dropped ahci_pci_reset_controller() which internally calls ahci_reset_controller() and applies the PCS quirk if needed after that. It was called each time a reset was required instead of just ahci_reset_controller(). This patch puts the function back in place. Fixes: c312ef176399 (“libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond”) Signed-off-by: Adam Vodopjan Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 1ed959fef5b1c6f1a7a3fbea543698c30ebd6678 Author: Yu Kuai Date: Mon Dec 26 11:06:05 2022 +0800 block, bfq: fix uaf for bfqq in bfq_exit_icq_bfqq [ Upstream commit 246cf66e300b76099b5dbd3fdd39e9a5dbc53f02 ] Commit 64dc8c732f5c (“block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic’”) will access ‘bic->bfqq’ in bic_set_bfqq(), however, bfq_exit_icq_bfqq() can free bfqq first, and then call bic_set_bfqq(), which will cause uaf. Fix the problem by moving bfq_exit_bfqq() behind bic_set_bfqq(). Fixes: 64dc8c732f5c (“block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic’”) Reported-by: Yi Zhang Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 5fe70f9683f872e63793edf098a89fe95e5fca95 Author: Hans de Goede Date: Thu Dec 15 10:41:38 2022 +0100 ACPI: video: Fix Apple GMUX backlight detection [ Upstream commit 3cf3b7f012f3ea8bdc56196e367cf07c10424855 ] The apple-gmux driver only binds to old GMUX devices which have an IORESOURCE_IO resource (using inb()/outb()) rather then memory-mapped IO (IORESOURCE_MEM). T2 MacBooks use the new style GMUX devices (with IORESOURCE_MEM access), so these are not supported by the apple-gmux driver. This is not a problem since they have working ACPI video backlight support. But the apple_gmux_present() helper only checks if an ACPI device with the “APP000B” HID is present, causing acpi_video_get_backlight_type() to return acpi_backlight_apple_gmux disabling the acpi_video backlight device. Add a new apple_gmux_backlight_present() helper which checks that the “APP000B” device actually is an old GMUX device with an IORESOURCE_IO resource. This fixes the acpi_video0 backlight no longer registering on T2 MacBooks. Note people are working to add support for the new style GMUX to Linux: https://github.com/kekrby/linux-t2/commits/wip/hybrid-graphics Once this lands this patch should be reverted so that acpi_video_get_backlight_type() also prefers the gmux on new style GMUX MacBooks, but for now this is necessary to avoid regressing backlight control on T2 Macs. Fixes: 21245df307cb (“ACPI: video: Add Apple GMUX brightness control detection”) Reported-and-tested-by: Aditya Garg Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit ba074330a4872a1466bf6a5e7df32b5f18ee1729 Author: Hans de Goede Date: Thu Dec 15 10:44:43 2022 +0100 ACPI: resource: Add Asus ExpertBook B2502 to Asus quirks [ Upstream commit 7203481fd12b1257938519efb2460ea02b9236ee ] The Asus ExpertBook B2502 has the same keyboard issue as Asus Vivobook K3402ZA/K3502ZA. The kernel overrides IRQ 1 to Edge_High when it should be Active_Low. This patch adds the ExpertBook B2502 model to the existing quirk list of Asus laptops with this issue. Fixes: b5f9223a105d (“ACPI: resource: Skip IRQ override on Asus Vivobook S5602ZA”) Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2142574 Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 33b7f0ef4aaf7af44d5b7f98da3a58e2a9225efd Author: Adrian Freund Date: Tue Dec 13 21:13:11 2022 +0100 ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on Lenovo 14ALC7 [ Upstream commit f3cb9b740869712d448edf3b9ef5952b847caf8b ] Commit bfcdf58380b1 (“ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on LENOVO IdeaPad”) added an override for Lenovo IdeaPad 5 16ALC7. The 14ALC7 variant also suffers from a broken touchscreen and trackpad. Fixes: 9946e39fe8d0 (“ACPI: resource: skip IRQ override on AMD Zen platforms”) Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216804 Signed-off-by: Adrian Freund Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit ee8ec50b9269e153831d7d61a770a7a2ecf6bcac Author: Erik Schumacher Date: Sun Dec 11 14:33:22 2022 +0100 ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on XMG Core 15 [ Upstream commit 7592b79ba4a91350b38469e05238308bcfe1019b ] The Schenker XMG CORE 15 (M22) is Ryzen-6 based and needs IRQ overriding for the keyboard to work. Adding an entry for this laptop to the override_table makes the internal keyboard functional again. Signed-off-by: Erik Schumacher Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Stable-dep-of: f3cb9b740869 (“ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on Lenovo 14ALC7”) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit d1136b10944e0fe2d32ceca9d298ffc9d578c78d Author: Keith Busch Date: Mon Dec 19 13:54:55 2022 -0800 nvme-pci: fix page size checks [ Upstream commit 841734234a28fd5cd0889b84bd4d93a0988fa11e ] The size allocated out of the dma pool is at most NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE, which may be smaller than the PAGE_SIZE. Fixes: c61b82c7b7134 (“nvme-pci: fix PRP pool size”) Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit b1814724e0d7162bdf4799f2d565381bc2251c63 Author: Keith Busch Date: Mon Dec 19 10:59:06 2022 -0800 nvme-pci: fix mempool alloc size [ Upstream commit c89a529e823d51dd23c7ec0c047c7a454a428541 ] Convert the max size to bytes to match the units of the divisor that calculates the worst-case number of PRP entries. The result is used to determine how many PRP Lists are required. The code was previously rounding this to 1 list, but we can require 2 in the worst case. In that scenario, the driver would corrupt memory beyond the size provided by the mempool. While unlikely to occur (you’d need a 4MB in exactly 127 phys segments on a queue that doesn’t support SGLs), this memory corruption has been observed by kfence. Cc: Jens Axboe Fixes: 943e942e6266f (“nvme-pci: limit max IO size and segments to avoid high order allocations”) Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit a72f318c704e22e29e0323129af38a8b11358082 Author: Klaus Jensen Date: Tue Dec 13 09:58:07 2022 +0100 nvme-pci: fix doorbell buffer value endianness [ Upstream commit b5f96cb719d8ba220b565ddd3ba4ac0d8bcfb130 ] When using shadow doorbells, the event index and the doorbell values are written to host memory. Prior to this patch, the values written would erroneously be written in host endianness. This causes trouble on big-endian platforms. Fix this by adding missing endian conversions. This issue was noticed by Guenter while testing various big-endian platforms under QEMU[1]. A similar fix required for hw/nvme in QEMU is up for review as well[2]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/ Fixes: f9f38e33389c (“nvme: improve performance for virtual NVMe devices”) Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit ff46a46b7a30dd59513d7f33dfdd06553843b11d Author: Jens Axboe Date: Sun Nov 20 10:18:45 2022 -0700 io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups [ Upstream commit 4464853277d0ccdb9914608dd1332f0fa2f9846f ] Pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE when signaling eventfd or doing poll related wakups, so that we can check for a circular event dependency between eventfd and epoll. If this flag is set when our wakeup handlers are called, then we know we have a dependency that needs to terminate multishot requests. eventfd and epoll are the only such possible dependencies. Cc: [email protected] # 6.0 Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 3b2728881dcd4ec3549d479c4b3aa38cf15fc73d Author: Jens Axboe Date: Sun Nov 20 10:13:44 2022 -0700 eventfd: provide a eventfd_signal_mask() helper [ Upstream commit 03e02acda8e267a8183e1e0ed289ff1ef9cd7ed8 ] This is identical to eventfd_signal(), but it allows the caller to pass in a mask to be used for the poll wakeup key. The use case is avoiding repeated multishot triggers if we have a dependency between eventfd and io_uring. If we setup an eventfd context and register that as the io_uring eventfd, and at the same time queue a multishot poll request for the eventfd context, then any CQE posted will repeatedly trigger the multishot request until it terminates when the CQ ring overflows. In preparation for io_uring detecting this circular dependency, add the mentioned helper so that io_uring can pass in EPOLL_URING as part of the poll wakeup key. Cc: [email protected] # 6.0 [axboe: fold in !CONFIG_EVENTFD fix from Zhang Qilong] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Stable-dep-of: 4464853277d0 (“io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups”) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin commit 717ed90a661494b895609fc536382dec40f71de6 Author: Jens Axboe Date: Sun Nov 20 10:10:53 2022 -0700 eventpoll: add EPOLL_URING_WAKE poll wakeup flag [ Upstream commit caf1aeaffc3b09649a56769e559333ae2c4f1802 ] We can have dependencies between epoll and io_uring. Consider an epoll context, identified by the epfd file descriptor, and an io_uring file descriptor identified by iofd. If we add iofd to the epfd context, and arm a multishot poll request for epfd with iofd, then the multishot poll request will repeatedly trigger and generate events until terminated by CQ ring overflow. This isn’t a desired behavior. Add EPOLL_URING so that io_uring can pass it in as part of the poll wakeup key, and io_uring can check for that to detect a potential recursive invocation. Cc: [email protected] # 6.0 Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Stable-dep-of: 4464853277d0 (“io_uring: pass in EPOLL_URING_WAKE for eventfd signaling and wakeups”) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin