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Xiaofeng Wang, a longtime computer science professor at Indiana University, has disappeared along with his wife, and their profiles on the school's website were wiped ahead of recent FBI raids.

### Summary The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser. ### Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected. ### Details - base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using `?inline&import` (originally reported as `?import&?inline=1.wasm?init`) - content of non-allowed files is exposed using `?raw?import` `/@fs/` isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root. ### PoC Original report (check details above for simplified cases): The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice ``` $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev ``` Example full URL `http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init`

### Summary The latest deployed fix for the SSRF vulnerability is through the use of the call `valid_host()`. The code available at lines [/ae34f7c055aa64fca58e995b70bc7f19da6ca33a/mobsf/MobSF/utils.py#L907-L957](https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/blob/ae34f7c055aa64fca58e995b70bc7f19da6ca33a/mobsf/MobSF/utils.py#L907-L957) is vulnerable to SSRF abuse using DNS rebinding technique. ### PoC The following proof of concept: ```python def valid_host(host): """Check if host is valid.""" try: prefixs = ('http://', 'https://') if not host.startswith(prefixs): host = f'http://{host}' parsed = urlparse(host) domain = parsed.netloc path = parsed.path if len(domain) == 0: # No valid domain return False, None if len(path) > 0: # Only host is allowed return False, None if ':' in domain: # IPv6 return False, None ...

### Summary A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Beego's `RenderForm()` function due to improper HTML escaping of user-controlled data. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious JavaScript code that executes in victims' browsers, potentially leading to session hijacking, credential theft, or account takeover. The vulnerability affects any application using Beego's `RenderForm()` function with user-provided data. Since it is a high-level function generating an entire form markup, many developers would assume it automatically escapes attributes (the way most frameworks do). ### Details The vulnerability is located in the `renderFormField()` function in Beego's `templatefunc.go` file (around lines 316-356). This function directly injects user-provided values into HTML without proper escaping: ```go return fmt.Sprintf(`%v<input%v%v name="%v" type="%v" value="%v"%v>`, label, id, class, name, fType, value, requiredString) ``` None of the values (label,...

The threat actors behind the zero-day exploitation of a recently-patched security vulnerability in Microsoft Windows have been found to deliver two new backdoors called SilentPrism and DarkWisp. The activity has been attributed to a suspected Russian hacking group called Water Gamayun, which is also known as EncryptHub and LARVA-208. "The threat actor deploys payloads primarily by means of

The `Drop` implementation will get run twice when using the cursor. This issue does not affect you, if you are using only using the crate with types that are `Copy` such as `u8`. This issue also does not affect you, if you are only depending on it through the crate `planus`.

### Summary There is a `ReDoS vulnerability risk` in the system, specifically when administrators create `notification` through the web service(`pushdeer` and `whapi`). If a string is provided that triggers catastrophic backtracking in the regular expression, it may lead to a ReDoS attack. ### Details The regular expression` \/*$\` is used to match zero or more slashes `/` at the end of a URL. When a malicious attack string appends a large number of slashes `/` and a non-slash character at the end of the URL, the regular expression enters a backtracking matching process. During this process, the regular expression engine starts checking each slash from the first one, continuing until it encounters the last non-slash character. Due to the greedy matching nature of the regular expression, this process repeats itself, with each backtrack checking the next slash until the last slash is checked. This backtracking process consumes significant CPU resources. ```js .replace(/\/*$/, "") ``` Fo...

Threat actors are using the "mu-plugins" directory in WordPress sites to conceal malicious code with the goal of maintaining persistent remote access and redirecting site visitors to bogus sites. mu-plugins, short for must-use plugins, refers to plugins in a special directory ("wp-content/mu-plugins") that are automatically executed by WordPress without the need to enable them explicitly via the

The device provides access to an unprotected endpoint, enabling the upload of MPFS File System binary images. Authenticated attackers can exploit this vulnerability to overwrite the flash program memory containing the web server's main interfaces, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.

The Ksenia home automation and burglar alarm system has a security flaw where the PIN required to disable the alarm is exposed in the 'basisInfo' XML file after initial authentication, allowing attackers who gain access to this file to bypass security measures. This design flaw enables unauthorized individuals to both disable the alarm system and manipulate smart home devices by simply retrieving the PIN from the server response, effectively rendering the security system useless since the supposedly secret PIN is easily obtainable once an attacker reaches the authenticated state. The system should never expose sensitive codes in API responses and should implement proper multi-factor authentication for critical functions like alarm deactivation.