Cybersecurity researchers have shed light on a new Golang-based backdoor that uses Telegram as a mechanism for command-and-control (C2) communications.
Netskope Threat Labs, which detailed the functions of the malware, described it as possibly of Russian origin.
"The malware is compiled in Golang and once executed it acts like a backdoor," security researcher Leandro Fróes said in an analysis

New Golang-Based Backdoor Uses Telegram Bot API for Evasive C2 Operations

A list of topics we covered in the week of February 10 to February 16 of 2025

February 14, 2025 - A cybercriminal stole a reported 12 million data records on Zacks’ customers and clients.

February 13, 2025 - Scammers are once again using AI to take over Gmail accounts.

February 12, 2025 - Etsy sellers are being targeted by scammers that use a legitimate Etsy domain to host their dodgy PDFs.

February 11, 2025 - Apple has released an out-of-band security update for a vulnerability which it says may have been exploited in an "extremely sophisticated attack against specific targeted individuals.”

February 11, 2025 - Android phishing apps are the latest, critical threat for Android users, putting their passwords in danger of new, sneaky tricks of theft.

 A week in security (February 10 &#8211; February 16) 

Plus: Researchers find RedNote lacks basic security measures, surveillance ramps up around the US-Mexico border, and the UK ordering Apple to create an encryption backdoor comes under fire.

As the United States reels from the upheaval caused by Elon Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), hackers from countries the US considers hostile continue to wreak havoc from afar.

New research shows that China’s Salt Typhoon hacking group has expanded its targets list to include universities around the world and at least two more telecoms operating in the US. That brings the total number of US telecommunications networks breached by Salt Typhoon to at least 11.

Russia’s notorious Sandworm hacking unit may be best known for its attacks on Ukraine, including multiple blackouts caused by its cyberattacks and its release of the destructive NotPetya malware. However, a hacking group within Sandworm is now taking aim at targets in Western nations, including Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US, according to research released this week by Microsoft. The group, which Microsoft calls BadPilot, is known as an “initial access operation,” breaching targets for the purpose of handing over access to those systems to other Sandworm hackers.

Meanwhile, we dug into the slimy world of romance scammers who are making ill-gotten fortunes by capitalizing on the loneliness epidemic, and we dipped into the opaqueness of online advertising data that could pose a threat to US national security. Finally, we found that US funding cuts under the new Trump administration are hurting the organizations protecting children from exploitation, abuse, and human trafficking.

And there's more. Each week, we round up the security and privacy news we didn’t cover in depth ourselves. Click the headlines to read the full stories. And stay safe out there.

**The Official DOGE Website Launch Was a Security Mess**

Elon Musk’s DOGE finally started publishing some information about its activities on its threadbare website this week. But it wasn’t the only entity publishing on the site.

Two web developers, working independently, found that it is possible to push updates to the DOGE.gov domain, which claims to be an official US government website. The website uses a database that can be edited by anyone online, the experts told 404Media. To demonstrate the insecurity, they left a couple of messages on the DOGE site: “This is a joke of a .gov site,” one read, while the other says: “THESE ‘EXPERTS’ LEFT THEIR DATABASE OPEN.”

The messages stayed on the website for at least 12 hours and remained visible for some time on Friday. The DOGE website was launched in January and until this week was a single landing page containing very little information. The web experts who discovered the vulnerabilities told 404Media that the website appeared to have been “slapped together.”

The website only started being populated this week—with some figures purporting to show the size of the US government—after Musk promised his organization would be “maximally transparent.” That transparency may have gone a step too far, however, with HuffPost reporting on Friday that the site included classified material.

As well as being insecure, the DOGE website heavily leans on X, the social media platform owned by Musk. DOGE’s homepage is a feed of its own X posts, but it also uses code that directs search engines to X.com instead of DOGE.gov, a WIRED review of the site found. “This isn't usually how things are handled, and it indicates that the X account is taking priority over the actual website itself,” one developer told WIRED.

**RedNote Security Flaws Come Into Focus**

Chinese TikTok alternative RedNote gained around 700,000 US users and courted American influencers when the ban on TikTok loomed in January. While many of those people may have only used RedNote for a few days, a new analysis from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab has highlighted how a lack of encryption could have opened up US users to “surveillance by any government or ISP \[Internet Service Provider\], and not just the Chinese government.”

The analysis of RedNote found a host of network security issues in both its Android and iOS apps. RedNote fetched images and videos using HTTP connections, not the industry standard and encrypted HTTPS; some versions of the app contained a vulnerability that allows an attacker to have “read” permissions on a phone; and it “transmitted insufficiently encrypted device metadata.” The flaws were contained in RedNote’s app and several third-party software libraries that it uses. Citizen Lab reported the issues to the companies starting in November 2024 but has not heard back from any of them.

The security researchers say that the vulnerabilities could risk surveillance for all users, including those in China. “As the Chinese government might already have mechanisms to lawfully obtain detailed data from RedNote about their users, the issues that we found also make Chinese users especially vulnerable to surveillance by non-Chinese governments,” the research says.

It underscores that within China even widely used apps may not meet the same security standards as those developed outside the country. “Applications that are popular in China often use no encryption, proprietary encryption protocols, or use TLS without certificate validation to encrypt sensitive data,” the analysis says.

**Military Spy Planes Increase Surveillance Flights at US-Mexico Border**

Over the last two weeks, US spy planes have flown at least 18 missions around the Mexico border, analysis from CNN has shown. The flights mark a “dramatic escalation in activity,” the publication reports, and come as the Trump administration has designated drug cartels as terrorist organizations and has turned the nation’s security apparatus toward deporting millions of migrants. According to CNN, various military planes, including Navy P-8s and a U-2 spy plane, were used in the operations and are capable of collecting both imagery and signals intelligence. Also this week, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement has advertised new contracts that would allow it to monitor “negative” social media posts that people make about it.

**Backlash Mounts Against UK’s Secret Apple Encryption Order**

Last month, the UK government hit Apple with a secret order demanding the company create a way to access data stored in encrypted iCloud backups. The order, called a Technical Capability Notice and issued under the UK’s controversial 2016 surveillance law, was first reported by The Washington Post last week. Since then, there’s been a growing backlash against the demands from the UK government, with many highlighting how a change would impact the security of millions around the world.

US senator Ron Wyden and representative Andy Biggs have sent a letter to Tulsi Gabbard, the new director of national intelligence, saying the order undermines trust between the US and UK. “If the UK does not immediately reverse this dangerous effort, we urge you to reevaluate US-UK cybersecurity arrangements and programs as well as US intelligence sharing with the UK,” the pair said, drawing comparisons to the Chinese-linked Salt Typhoon hacks of US telecom firms that utilized a surveillance “backdoor.” Since details of the order emerged, Human Rights Watch has called it an “alarming overreach,” while 109 civil society organizations, companies, and other groups signed an open letter saying the “demand jeopardizes the security and privacy of millions.”

The Official DOGE Website Launch Was a Security Mess

Google is working on a new security feature for Android that blocks device owners from changing sensitive settings when a phone call is in progress.
Specifically, the in-call anti-scammer protections include preventing users from turning on settings to install apps from unknown sources and granting accessibility access. The development was first reported by Android Authority.
Users who attempt

Android's New Feature Blocks Fraudsters from Sideloading Apps During Calls

Versions of the package jsonpath-plus before 10.3.0 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can execute aribitrary code on the system by exploiting the unsafe default usage of eval='safe' mode.

**Note:**

This is caused by an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-21534.

**Exploitability Metrics**

Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.

Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.

Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.

Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.

User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.

**Vulnerable System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

**Subsequent System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

GHSA-hw8r-x6gr-5gjp: JSONPath Plus allows Remote Code Execution

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has frozen efforts to aid states in securing elections, according to an internal memo viewed by WIRED.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has frozen all of its election security work and is reviewing everything it has done to help state and local officials secure their elections for the past eight years, WIRED has learned. The move represents the first major example of the country’s cyberdefense agency accommodating President Donald Trump’s false claims of election fraud and online censorship.

In a memo sent Friday to all CISA employees and obtained by WIRED, CISA’s acting director, Bridget Bean, said she was ordering “a review and assessment” of every position at the agency related to election security and countering mis- and disinformation, “as well as every election security and \[mis-, dis-, and malinformation\] product, activity, service, and program that has been carried out” since the federal government designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017.

“CISA will pause all elections security activities until the completion of this review,” Bean added. The agency is also cutting off funding for these activities at the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing & Analysis Center, a group funded by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has served as a coordinating body for the elections community.

In her memo, Bean confirmed that CISA had, as first reported by Politico, placed employees “initially identified to be associated with the elections security activities and the MDM program” on administrative leave on February 7.

“It is necessary to rescope the agency's election security activities to ensure CISA is focused exclusively on executing its cyber and physical security mission,” she told employees in the memo.

While Bean is temporarily leading CISA, she is officially the agency’s executive director, its top career position. CISA’s first director created the executive-director role to provide continuity during political transitions. Previously, Bean was a Trump appointee at the Federal Emergency Management Agency during his first term.

In justifying CISA’s internal review, which will conclude on March 6, Bean pointed to Trump’s January 20 executive order on “ending federal censorship.” Conservatives have argued that CISA censored their speech by coordinating with tech companies to identify online misinformation in 2020, during the final year of Trump’s first term. CISA has denied conducting any censorship, and the US Supreme Court dismissed a lawsuit over the government’s work. But in the wake of the backlash, CISA halted most conversations with tech platforms about online mis- and disinformation.

CISA and DHS did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Since 2017, state and local election officials have relied on CISA’s expertise and resources—as well as its partnerships with other agencies—to improve their physical and digital security. Through on-site consultations and online guidance, CISA has helped election administrators secure voting infrastructure against hackers, harden polling places against active shooters, and create polling-place backup plans to deal with ballot shortages or power outages.

Election supervisors have always struggled to overcome serious funding challenges, but in recent years, their jobs have become even more stressful as intense voter scrutiny has given way to harassment and even death threats. Election officials of both parties have repeatedly praised CISA for its apolitical support of their work, saying the agency’s recommendations and free security services have been critical in boosting their own efforts.

But that bipartisan accord began fraying after the 2020 election, as some conservative election officials started criticizing the agency for its focus on mis- and disinformation. Congressional Republicans joined the fray as well, calling CISA “the nerve center of the federal government’s domestic surveillance and censorship operations on social media.” Their rhetoric echoed Trump’s own history of election denialism, which involved false claims of rigged voting machines and mass voter fraud and culminated in Trump supporters’ January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol.

With conservatives pushing to axe CISA’s election security mission, Trump’s election last November virtually guaranteed an end to that program, and employees have been bracing for retaliation against the people who participated in that work.

Bean’s memo indicates that CISA’s internal review will cover every agency position related to election security, as well as performance plans for employees involved in that work; all support services provided to the election community; and all election security guidance and publications. Bean wrote that CISA will describe any steps necessary to “correct any activities identified as past misconduct by the Federal Government related to censorship of protected speech,” including eliminating programs or roles.

After CISA completes its review, the agency will submit a report to the White House addressing how it plans to “deliver a more focused provision of services for elections security activities,” Bean told employees. The report will focus on three goals: streamlining the election security services that CISA offers to state and local governments, ensuring that its activities align with its new “mandate to refocus” on its core mission, and removing “all personnel, contracts, grants, programs, products, services, and activities” that conflict with Trump’s anti-censorship directive or exceed CISA’s authorities.

It is unclear if White House officials or DHS secretary Kristi Noem directly ordered Bean to launch the election security investigation or if she independently determined that Trump’s executive order necessitated it. The January 20 directive does instruct the attorney general to work with other agency leaders to investigate Biden-administration activities that are “inconsistent” with Trump’s vow to end online censorship, but it makes no mention of activities prior to Biden’s term, including CISA’s 2020 election work.

Top US Election Security Watchdog Forced to Stop Election Security Work

RansomHub emerges as a major ransomware threat in 2024, targeting 600 organizations after ALPHV and LockBit disruptions. Group-IB…

RansomHub emerges as a major ransomware threat in 2024, targeting 600 organizations after ALPHV and LockBit disruptions. Group-IB reveals its rapid rise in cybercrime.

Group-IB’s latest research, shared exclusively with Hackread.com, highlights the sudden rise of ransomware-as-a-service operations, with one group being very active in this domain, identified as RansomHub. Emerging in early 2024, RansomHub quickly established itself as a major player, capitalizing on the disruption of other prominent groups like ALPHV and LockBit.

Group-IB’s investigation reveals that RansomHub strategically advertises its partnership program on underground forums like the RAMP forum, actively recruiting affiliates from disbanded ransomware operations, which helps them rapidly expand their reach and impact.

Further investigation suggests that RansomHub likely acquired its ransomware and web application source code from the Knight group (aka Cyclops), demonstrating the interconnected nature of the world of cybercrime. By leveraging existing resources, RansomHub accelerated its development and deployment, quickly becoming a significant threat. Their ransomware is designed for cross-platform compatibility, targeting various operating systems and architectures, including Windows, ESXi, Linux, and FreeBSD. This versatility allows them to maximize their potential targets.

RansomHub’s operations reflect a high degree of sophistication. They utilize advanced techniques, such as exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities and employing tools like PCHunter to bypass endpoint security solutions. Their adaptability is evident in their rapid weaponization of newly discovered vulnerabilities, often outpacing defenders’ ability to patch systems. They also demonstrate proficiency in traditional attack methods, such as brute-force attacks against VPN services when necessary.

Following initial reconnaissance and exploitation of vulnerabilities, they establish persistence within the compromised network and proceed with internal reconnaissance, identifying and targeting critical assets like network-attached storage (NAS) and backup systems. Data exfiltration is a key objective, with tools like Filezilla used to transfer sensitive information to external command and control servers.  

The final stage of a RansomHub attack typically involves data encryption and extortion. They disable backup services and deploy ransomware to render data inaccessible, effectively crippling the victim organization. The ransomware itself boasts advanced features, including the ability to terminate virtual machines, delete shadow copies, and clear system event logs. This comprehensive approach aims to maximize the impact of the attack and increase the likelihood of a ransom payment.

RansomHub ransomware gang’s ransom note (Via Group-IB)

According to Group-IB’s report, different variants of the ransomware are tailored for specific platforms, each with its own set of command-line options. The Windows variant, in particular, offers extensive control over execution, including safe mode execution and network spreading capabilities.

> _“RansomHub has targeted over 600 organizations globally, spanning sectors such as healthcare, finance, government, and critical infrastructure, firmly establishing it as the most active ransomware group in 2024.”_
> 
> Group-IB

A specific RansomHub attack, lasting under 14 hours, was investigated by Group-IB. The attackers initially exploited a vulnerability in a Palo Alto firewall (CVE-2024-3400) and then brute-forced VPN credentials to gain access. They then compromised the domain controller using vulnerabilities CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccount Spoofing) and CVE-2020-1472 (ZeroLogon) to gain control, moved laterally within the network accessing NAS servers and shared folders, and exfiltrated data using Filezilla.

The attack culminated in disabling backups, deploying ransomware, and ultimately encrypting critical data. The attackers then left, leaving behind traces of their activity, which Group-IB’s DFIR team investigated further. This attack sequence, from initial compromise to final data encryption, is visually represented in this image by Group-IB.

This highlights the importance of patching known vulnerabilities, as emphasized by Martin Jartelius, CISO at Outpost24: “It’s difficult to victim-blame when it comes to zero-day exploits or supply chain breaches, but when an organization is hit by a vulnerability that has been patched for over four years, it’s clear that someone within the team has knowingly taken on a significant risk,” explained Martin.

“The kill chain doesn’t begin with this exploit; it starts with initial access. Organizations must focus on hardening their external attack surface and training staff to reduce the likelihood of breaches. Leaving systems unpatched or intentionally vulnerable is a serious security misstep.”

RansomHub: The New King of Ransomware? Targeted 600 Firms in 2024

A phishing attack dubbed DEEP#DRIVE is targeting South Korean entities, with thousands already affected. North Korean hackers from…

A phishing attack dubbed DEEP#DRIVE is targeting South Korean entities, with thousands already affected. North Korean hackers from the Kimsuky group are the prime suspects behind this cyber espionage campaign.

Securonix has shared its investigation into the DEEP#DRIVE attack campaign, a multi-stage operation targeting South Korean businesses, government entities, and cryptocurrency users since September 2024. The attack’s primary objective is most likely espionage to gather sensitive information from South Korean entities and has already claimed thousands of victims.

The investigation shared with Hackread.com ahead of its publishing, reveals that attackers employed _tailored phishing lures_ written in Korean and disguised as legitimate documents, such as work logs, insurance documents, and crypto-related files, to successfully infiltrate targeted environments. 

Securonix has shared an image of a phishing lure disguised as the Telegram.exe application, labelled 대차 및 파레트 (Korean term for bogie and pallet) revealing logistics-related details like product name (제품명), P9 basement factory (P9 지하공장), total weight (총중량), etc., indicating a likely attempt to trick victims in the logistics sector.

These lures, crafted to appeal to their intended audience, were often distributed in trusted file formats like .hwp, .xlsx, and .pptx and hosted on widely used platforms like Dropbox, allowing attackers to evade traditional security defences and “blend into normal user behaviour.”

“It is evident that phishing was the primary method of malware distribution in this campaign as the collected samples and their filenames strongly align with common themes and wording typically used in phishing lures” Secrounix’s researchers explained in their report.

****Campaign Analysis****

The campaign heavily leveraged PowerShell scripts for payload delivery, reconnaissance (gathering system info like IP address, OS details, antivirus software, and running processes), and establishing persistence (using scheduled tasks like “ChromeUpdateTaskMachine”). Dropbox was also used for data exfiltration.  

The attack chain typically begins with a .lnk file disguised as a legitimate document, which initiates the execution of malicious PowerShell scripts. These scripts download further payloads, including a .NET assembly, disguised as a legitimate application (such as “Telegram.exe”), and establish persistence. A key reconnaissance script, “system\_first.ps1,” collects and exfiltrates system information.  

The final payload, often delivered via a script like “temp.ps1,” is suspected to be a backdoor, though researchers could not capture it during analysis. The attackers’ Dropbox account analysis showed a large number of compromised system configuration files and various malicious payloads.

Stealth and obfuscation are key elements, with attackers using techniques like meaningless variable names, repeated irrelevant assignments, and string concatenation to evade detection, and the removal of associated Dropbox links suggests the attack infrastructure was temporary. 

Although the attacker’s infrastructure, particularly Dropbox links, appeared short-lived, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) strongly resemble those used by Kimsuky, a North Korean Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group “known for targeting South Korea and using similar Dropbox-based methods in previous campaigns,” researchers observed.

Securonix recommends user education on phishing, monitoring of malware staging directories, and reliable endpoint logging (e.g. PowerShell logging) to defend against similar attacks.

N. Korean Hackers Suspected in DEEP#DRIVE Attacks Against S. Korea

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a new type of name confusion attack called whoAMI that allows anyone who publishes an Amazon Machine Image (AMI) with a specific name to gain code execution within the Amazon Web Services (AWS) account.
"If executed at scale, this attack could be used to gain access to thousands of accounts," Datadog Security Labs researcher Seth Art said in a report

New “whoAMI” Attack Exploits AWS AMI Name Confusion for Remote Code Execution

Credible Security's founders bring their varied experiences to help growing companies turn trust into a strategic advantage.

Source: Ronstik via Alamy Stock Photo

Teaching students or learning the classics may not be the typical career path for cybersecurity professionals, but the founders of independent security consultancy Credible Security believe a diversity of backgrounds can be a superpower.

"Working together has taught us that the thing that makes the difference between an acceptable and a great approach to security within any organization is not technical knowledge or skill sets or backgrounds," says co-founder Josh Yavor. Qualifications are a given, but more importantly, a security team needs leadership "empowered in the right ways with empathy and effective communication and a bias toward building relationships that are based on trust."

Yavor, along with Kim Burton and Jessica Walters, launched Credible Security at the start of 2025. The company works with business-to-business companies that offer cloud services and software-as-a-service, with a specific focus on underserved teams within organizations. That includes go-to-market teams that have public-facing functions and early-stage companies that are finding their security footing while still forming a growth strategy.

**Diversity Leads to Stronger Security Mindset**

The founding partners — "We haven't really fought over those titles yet," Yavor jokes — had worked together before at Tessian, Cisco, and Duo Security. When Proofpoint acquired Tessian in 2023, Yavor was CISO, Burton was head of trust and compliance, and Waters was senior security manager. They each had extensive security experience but had taken different paths to get there.

Prior to holding security leadership roles at Cisco Secure, Duo Security, and Facebook, Yavor was a school teacher and owned an IT consulting business. Burton studied literature and classical languages in graduate school. Walters was chief of staff of Cisco's Security Business Group team. All three say their experiences at Duo Security demonstrated the value of bringing together practitioners from different backgrounds. They stayed at Duo through its Cisco acquisition in 2018 and landed in the same team at Cisco. When Yavor joined Tessian in 2021, Burton and Walters "came over to continue the journey."

The team members' varied backgrounds "make it so that when you encounter something that you haven't seen before, everyone is able to actually relate to something that they have, in fact, experienced," Burton says. "When you have a team of people who've come from the same programs, the same location, the same ideas all the time, you actually end up with groupthink. We do not have that problem."

**Developing Strategy With a Trusted Partner**

Having different perspectives is particularly important when helping customers develop and execute their cloud strategies, according to the trio. Cloud services touch every aspect of people's lives, so B2B enterprises need to prioritize building trust with end users as part of their strategy. In the past 10 to 15 years, enterprises have made strides in thinking about risk and how to manage it, but they haven't mastered the strategy in all areas, Yavor says.

The missing part that Credible Security targets "is having consistent strategy and outcomes in evaluating and delivering trust on both sides of the equation \[end users and service providers\]," Yavor says. Trust is critical at every juncture of that pipeline; with some proactive security thinking and investment, businesses can boost results.

"We are helping our clients simplify their strategies and align them to their actual business objectives so that they have a much easier and more efficient approach to developing not just minimum viable security for whatever their product is, but actually using it as a competitive advantage as they try to earn their customers' trust and then maintain it through a long-term relationship," Yavor says.

When managing risk, many companies still conflate trust with compliance, "where you're doing checkbox exercises because you have to show up to an auditor and tell them about it. But that's a backward way of thinking about it," Burton says. Compliance is only a way to verify trustworthiness, and trust develops as consultants show that they are working with the same values and goals in mind.

"It's saying: 'Hey, how can you actually design your product and your process so that the customers that you are finding actually understand this deep-felt sense that they know you will do the best by them?'"

**'Layered Experiences'**

Another advantage Credible Security offers is the ability to tap the team's experience as both buyers of security products and on the developer side of the process.

"All three of us have these layered experiences of both things we've done or built, but then also seeing teams and brands that really showed up in a way that we would want family members to experience," Walters says. The variety of positions they have held — CISO, head of compliance, chief of staff — also give them internal perspective, Yavor adds.

"That's actually one of the most exciting differentiators about our company, that all three of us, we haven't just been in the industry, we have been in the roles that we are seeking to help," he says. "We've actually done the work."

**About the Author**

Contributing Writer, Dark Reading

Mercedes Cardona is a New York-based business journalist. She is the former editor of The Economist Group’s “Marketing Unbound” blog and WP Engine’s “Velocitize.” She also has served as the Assistant Business Editor for features at the Associated Press and Financial Editor at Advertising Age. She has contributed to books including The Advertising Age Encyclopedia of Advertising and Single Women and Money.

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