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Failing to properly validate incoming data, the suggest wizard is susceptible to insecure unserialize. To exploit this vulnerability a valid backend user account is needed.

### Impact `kyber512`, `kyber768`, and `kyber1024` on Mac OS \(or when compiled with clang\) only: An attacker able to submit many decapsulation requests against a single private key, and to gain timing information about the decapsulation, could recover the private key. Proof-of-concept exploit exists for a local attacker. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N/E:P/RL:U/RC:C ### Patches No patch is currently available / pending upstream [PQClean#556](https://github.com/PQClean/PQClean/issues/556). ### Workarounds No workarounds have been reported. The 0.0.7 -> 0.0.7.1 upgrade, when available, should be a drop-in replacement<!--; it has no known breaking changes-->. ### References https://pqshield.com/pqshield-plugs-timing-leaks-in-kyber-ml-kem-to-improve-pqc-implementation-maturity/ https://github.com/antoonpurnal/clangover https://www.github.com/PQClean/PQClean/issues/556 https://www.github.com/pq-crystals/kyber/commit/9b8d30698a3e7449aeb34e62339d4176f11e3c6c

### Summary An unsafe decompression vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to crash the collector via excessive memory consumption. ### Details The OpenTelemetry Collector handles compressed HTTP requests by recognizing the Content-Encoding header, rewriting the HTTP request body, and allowing subsequent handlers to process decompressed data. It supports the gzip, zstd, zlib, snappy, and deflate compression algorithms. A "zip bomb" or "decompression bomb" is a malicious archive designed to crash or disable the system reading it. Decompression of HTTP requests is typically not enabled by default in popular server solutions due to associated security risks. A malicious attacker could leverage this weakness to crash the collector by sending a small request that, when uncompressed by the server, results in excessive memory consumption. During proof-of-concept (PoC) testing, all supported compression algorithms could be abused, with zstd causing the most significant impact. Compre...

Links with a valid cHash argument lead to newly generated page cache entries. Because the cHash is not bound to a specific page, attackers could use valid cHash arguments for multiple pages, leading to additional useless page cache entries. Depending on the number of pages in the system and the number of available valid links with a cHash, attackers could add a considerable amount of additional cache entries, which in the end exceed storage limits and thus could lead to the system not responding any more. This means the Cache Flooding attack potentially could lead to a successful Denial of Service (DoS) attack.

Due to late TCA initialization the authentication service fails to restrict frontend user according to the validation rules. Therefore it is possible to authenticate restricted (e.g. disabled) frontend users.

### Summary BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat. ### Details 1. There is no overflow detection or enforcement of the maximum sequence value. (This is a missed requirement from the draft Chunked Oblivious OHTTP RFC and so should be inherited from the HPKE RFC 9180, Section 5.2). 2. The sequence number (seq) is stored as 32-bit int which is relatively easy to overflow. https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/blob/1ddadb6473cd3be5491d114431ed4c1a9f316001/codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAEADContext.java#L112-L114 ### Impact If the BoringSSLAEADContext is used to encrypt more than 2^32 messages then the AES-GCM nonce will repeat...

It has been discovered that TYPO3’s Salted Password system extension (which is a mandatory system component) is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass when using hashing methods which are related by PHP class inheritance. In standard TYPO3 core distributions stored passwords using the blowfish hashing algorithm can be overridden when using MD5 as the default hashing algorithm by just knowing a valid username. Per default the Portable PHP hashing algorithm (PHPass) is used which is not vulnerable.

Failing to properly check user permission on file storages, editors could gain knowledge of protected storages and its folders as well as using them in a file collection being rendered in the frontend. A valid backend user account is needed to exploit this vulnerability.

Phar files (formerly known as "PHP archives") can act als self extracting archives which leads to the fact that source code is executed when Phar files are invoked. The Phar file format is not limited to be stored with a dedicated file extension - "bundle.phar" would be valid as well as "bundle.txt" would be. This way, Phar files can be obfuscated as image or text file which would not be denied from being uploaded and persisted to a TYPO3 installation. Due to a missing sanitization of user input, those Phar files can be invoked by manipulated URLs in TYPO3 backend forms. A valid backend user account is needed to exploit this vulnerability. In theory the attack vector would be possible in the TYPO3 frontend as well, however no functional exploit has been identified so far.

Versions of the package pymongo before 4.6.3 are vulnerable to Out-of-bounds Read in the bson module. Using the crafted payload the attacker could force the parser to deserialize unmanaged memory. The parser tries to interpret bytes next to buffer and throws an exception with string. If the following bytes are not printable UTF-8 the parser throws an exception with a single byte.