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### Impact Due to missing overflow check for loop variables, by assigning the iterator of a loop to a variable, it is possible to overflow the type of the latter. In the following example, calling `test` returns `354`, meaning that the variable `a` did store `354` a value out of bound for the type `uint8`. ```Vyper @external def test() -> uint16: x:uint8 = 255 a:uint8 = 0 for i in range(x, x+100): a = i return convert(a,uint16) ``` The issue seems to happen only in loops of type `for i in range(a, a + N)` as in loops of type `for i in range(start, stop)` and `for i in range(stop)`, the compiler is able to raise a `TypeMismatch` when trying to overflow the variable. thanks to @trocher for reporting ### Patches The problem is patched at https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/3de1415ee77a9244eb04bdb695e249d3ec9ed868 ### Workarounds

### Impact A "mismatch" type `InventoryTransactionPacket` is sent by the client to request a resync of all currently open inventories. Since PocketMine-MP does not rate-limit these "mismatch" transactions, and the syncing of inventories is not deferred until, e.g. the end of the current tick, they can be used as a very cheap bandwidth multiplier by making the server send out many MB of data (network serialized inventory items can be very large, especially when dealing with large amounts of NBT). This is not currently known to have been exploited in the wild. ### Patches This problem was fixed in 4.18.0-ALPHA2 by ca6d51498f12427a947467da8fcad7811418e6cc alongside the introduction of the `ItemStackRequest` system implementation. ### Workarounds Plugins can handle `DataPacketReceiveEvent` for `InventoryTransactionPacket` and check if the type is `MismatchTransactionData`. If it is, apply some kind of rate limit (e.g. max 1 per tick).

SpiceDB is an open source, Google Zanzibar-inspired, database system for creating and managing security-critical application permissions. Any user making a negative authorization decision based on the results of a `LookupResources` request with 1.22.0 is affected. For example, using `LookupResources` to find a list of resources to allow access to be okay: some subjects that should have access to a resource may not. But if using `LookupResources` to find a list of banned resources instead, then some users that shouldn't have access may. Generally, `LookupResources` is not and should not be to gate access in this way - that's what the `Check` API is for. Additionally, version 1.22.0 has included a warning about this bug since its initial release. Users are advised to upgrade to version 1.22.2. Users unable to upgrade should avoid using `LookupResources` for negative authorization decisions.

### Impact An authenticated user can exploit a vulnerability in MongoDB sessions to execute arbitrary commands, leading to remote code execution. This vulnerability may further be leveraged to gain root privileges on the host system. ### Details Through the WEB CLI interface provided by koko, a user logs into the authorized mongoDB database and exploits the MongoDB session to execute arbitrary commands. ``` admin> const { execSync } = require("child_process") admin> console.log(execSync("id; hostname;").toString()) uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) jms_koko admin> ``` ### Patches Safe versions: - v2.28.20 - v3.7.1 ### Workarounds It is recommended to upgrade the safe versions. After upgrade, you can use the same method to check whether the vulnerability is fixed. ``` admin> console.log(execSync("id; hostname;").toString()) /bin/sh: line 1: /bin/hostname: Permission denied ``` ### References Thanks for **Oskar Zeino-Mahmalat** of [Sonar](https://sonarsource.com/) found an...

### Impact Malicious users may try to get access to resources they are not allowed to see, by creating resources with integers as names. One example where this is a risk, is when users define which users are allowed to run algorithms on their node. This may be defined by username or user id. Now, for example, if user id 13 is allowed to run tasks, and an attacker creates a username with username '13', they would be wrongly allowed to run an algorithm. There may also be other places in the code where such a mixup of resource ID or name leads to issues. The best solution we see is therefore to check when resources are created or modified, that the resource name always starts with a character. ### Patches To be done, probably in v3.9 ### Workarounds None

Business Logic Errors in GitHub repository answerdev/answer prior to 1.0.6.

Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource vulnerability in PHOENIX CONTACT MULTIPROG, PHOENIX CONTACT ProConOS eCLR (SDK) allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to upload arbitrary malicious code and gain full access on the affected device.

A SQL injection in the flutter_downloader component through 1.11.1 for iOS allows remote attackers to steal session tokens and overwrite arbitrary files inside the app's container. The internal database of the framework is exposed to the local user if an app uses UIFileSharingEnabled and LSSupportsOpeningDocumentsInPlace properties. As a result, local users can obtain the same attack primitives as remote attackers by tampering with the internal database of the framework on the device.

Foxit PDF Editor v11.3.1 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability.

Foxit PDF Reader and PDF Editor before 11.2.2 have a Type Confusion issue that causes a crash because of Unsigned32 mishandling during JavaScript execution.