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authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Prior to versions 2023.4.3 and 2023.5.5, authentik does not verify the source of the X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers, both in the Python code and the go code. Only authentik setups that are directly accessible by users without a reverse proxy are susceptible to this. Possible spoofing of IP addresses in logs, downstream applications proxied by (built in) outpost, IP bypassing in custom flows if used. This poses a possible security risk when someone has flows or policies that check the user's IP address, e.g. when they want to ignore the user's 2 factor authentication when the user is connected to the company network. A second security risk is that the IP addresses in the logfiles and user sessions are not reliable anymore. Anybody can spoof this address and one cannot verify that the user has logged in from the IP address that is in their account's log. A third risk is that this header is passed on to the proxied application behind ...

### Impact A malicious homeserver can craft a room or room structure such that the predecessors form a cycle. The matrix-js-sdk's `getRoomUpgradeHistory` function will infinitely recurse in this case, causing the code to hang. This method is public but also called by the 'leaveRoomChain()' method, so leaving a room will also trigger the bug. Even if the CVSS score would be 4.1 ([AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L&version=3.1)) we classify this as High severity issue. ### Patches This was patched in matrix-js-sdk 34.3.1. ### Workarounds Sanity check rooms before passing them to the matrix-js-sdk or avoid calling either `getRoomUpgradeHistory` or `leaveRoomChain`. ### References N/A.

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 301, 302, or 303 after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like `POST`) to `GET` as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although this behavior is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers. Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable. Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability: 1. Using urllib3 and...

Home assistant is an open source home automation. The Home Assistant login page allows users to use their local Home Assistant credentials and log in to another website that specifies the `redirect_uri` and `client_id` parameters. Although the `redirect_uri` validation typically ensures that it matches the `client_id` and the scheme represents either `http` or `https`, Home Assistant will fetch the `client_id` and check for `<link rel="redirect_uri" href="...">` HTML tags on the page. These URLs are not subjected to the same scheme validation and thus allow for arbitrary JavaScript execution on the Home Assistant administration page via usage of `javascript:` scheme URIs. This Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability can be executed on the Home Assistant frontend domain, which may be used for a full takeover of the Home Assistant account and installation. This issue has been addressed in version 2023.9.0 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vuln...

### Impact **What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?** This vulnerability relates to the **bypass of directory traversal checks** within the `is_in_or_equal` function. This function, intended to check if a file resides within a given directory, can be bypassed with certain payloads that manipulate file paths using `..` (parent directory) sequences. Attackers could potentially access restricted files if they are able to exploit this flaw, although the difficulty is high. This primarily impacts users relying on Gradio’s blocklist or directory access validation, particularly when handling file uploads. ### Patches Yes, please upgrade to `gradio>=5.0` to address this issue. ### Workarounds **Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?** As a workaround, users can manually sanitize and normalize file paths in their Gradio deployment before passing them to the `is_in_or_equal` function. Ensuring that all file paths are properly resolved an...

### Impact Due to lack of limits by default in the [`explode()`](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.explode.php) function, malicious clients were able to abuse some packets to waste server CPU and memory. This is similar to a previous security issue published in https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/security/advisories/GHSA-gj94-v4p9-w672, but with a wider impact, including but not limited to: - Sign editing - LoginPacket JWT parsing - Command parsing However, the estimated impact of these issues is low, due to other limits such as the packet decompression limit. ### Patches The issue was fixed in 5.25.2 via d0d84d4c5195fb0a68ea7725424fda63b85cd831. A custom PHPStan rule has also been introduced to the project, which will henceforth require that all calls to `explode()` within the codebase must specify the `limit` parameter. ### Workarounds No simple way to fix this. Given that sign editing is the easiest way this could be exploited, workarounds could include plugins pre-proc...

### Summary Due to the insufficient patch for the CVE-2024-39931, it's still possible to delete files under the `.git` directory and achieve remote command execution. ### Details In the patch for CVE-2024-39931, the following check is added: https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/77a4a945ae9a87f77e392e9066b560edb71b5de9 ```diff + // 🚨 SECURITY: Prevent uploading files into the ".git" directory + if isRepositoryGitPath(opts.TreePath) { + return errors.Errorf("bad tree path %q", opts.TreePath) + } ``` While the above code snippet checks if the specified path is a `.git` directory, there are no checks for symbolic links in the later steps. So, by creating a symbolic link that points to the `.git` directory, an attacker can still delete arbitrary files in the `.git` directory and achieve remote command execution. ### Impact Unprivileged user accounts can execute arbitrary commands on the Gogs instance with the privileges of the account specified by `RUN_USER` in the configuration. It a...

The Bricks theme for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass due to a missing capability check on the bricks_save_post AJAX action in versions 1.0 to 1.5.3. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with minimal permissions, such as a subscriber, to edit any page, post, or template on the vulnerable WordPress website.

Debian Linux Security Advisory 5271-1 - Several vulnerabilities were discovered in libxml2, a library providing support to read, modify and write XML and HTML files.

The extension fails to check access permissions for the edit user component. An authenticated frontend user can use the vulnerability to either edit data of various frontend users or to delete various frontend user accounts. Another missing access check in the backend module of the extensions allows an authenticated backend user to perform various actions (userLogout, confirmUser, refuseUser and resendUserConfirmation) for any frontend user in the system.