Search
lenovo warranty check/lookup | check warranty status | lenovo support us
Found 10000 results in 51 ms.
GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. When resolving a program, Python/Windows look for the current working directory, and after that the PATH environment. GitPython defaults to use the `git` command, if a user runs GitPython from a repo has a `git.exe` or `git` executable, that program will be run instead of the one in the user's `PATH`. This is more of a problem on how Python interacts with Windows systems, Linux and any other OS aren't affected by this. But probably people using GitPython usually run it from the CWD of a repo. An attacker can trick a user to download a repository with a malicious `git` executable, if the user runs/imports GitPython from that directory, it allows the attacker to run any arbitrary commands. There is no fix currently available for windows users, however there are a few mitigations. 1: Default to an absolute path for the git program on Windows, like `C:\\Program Files\\Git\\cmd\\git.EXE` (default git path installation). ...
SUMMARY: Do Hyeong Kwon (Do Kwon), the 33-year-old co-founder and former CEO of Terraform Labs, has been extradited…
Pagefind initializes its dynamic JavaScript and WebAssembly files relative to the location of the first script you load. This information is gathered by looking up the value of `document.currentScript.src`. It is possible to "clobber" this lookup with otherwise benign HTML on the page, for example: ```html <img name="currentScript" src="blob:https://xxx.xxx.xxx/ui.js"></img> ``` This will cause `document.currentScript.src` to resolve as an external domain, which will then be used by Pagefind to load dependencies. This exploit would only work in the case that an attacker could inject HTML to your live, hosted, website. In these cases, this would act as a way to escalate the privilege available to an attacker. This assumes they have the ability to add some elements to the page (for example, `img` tags with a `name` attribute), but not others, as adding a `script` to the page would itself be the XSS vector. Pagefind has tightened this resolution by ensuring the source is loaded from a...
A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Symantec Layer7 API Management OAuth Toolkit (OTK) allows a remote attacker to craft a malicious URL for the OTK web UI and target OTK users with phishing attacks or other social engineering techniques. A successful attack allows injecting malicious code into the OTK web UI client application.
A WordPress plugin and several WordPress themes developed by AccessPress Themes are vulnerable to malicious file uploads via the plugin_offline_installer AJAX action due to a missing capability check in the plugin_offline_installer_callback function found in the /demo-functions.php file or /welcome.php file of the affected products. The complete list of affected products and their versions are below: WordPress Plugin: AccessPress Demo Importer <=1.0.6 WordPress Themes: accesspress-basic <= 3.2.1 accesspress-lite <= 2.92 accesspress-mag <= 2.6.5 accesspress-parallax <= 4.5 accesspress-root <= 2.5 accesspress-store <= 2.4.9 agency-lite <= 1.1.6 arrival <= 1.4.2 bingle <= 1.0.4 bloger <= 1.2.6 brovy <= 1.3 construction-lite <= 1.2.5 doko <= 1.0.27 edict-lite <= 1.1.4 eightlaw-lite <= 2.1.5 eightmedi-lite <= 2.1.8 eight-sec <= 1.1.4 eightstore-lite <= 1.2.5 enlighten <= 1.3.5 fotography <= 2.4.0 opstore <= 1.4.3 parallaxsome <= 1.3.6 punte <= 1.1.2 revolve <= 1.3.1 ripple <= 1.2.0 sakala <...
A collaboration with the FBI and law-enforcement agencies in Europe, the UK, and Australia, Operation Magnus has seized servers and source code related to the two malware families, which have stolen data from millions of victims worldwide.
Operation CuckooBees uncovered the state-sponsored group's sophisticated new tactics in a years-long campaign that hit more than 30 tech and manufacturing companies.
### Impact For some Post/Put Concourse endpoint containing `:team_name` in the URL, a Concourse user can send a request with body including `:team_name=team2` to bypass team scope check to gain access to certain resources belong to any other team. The user only needs a valid user session and belongs to team2. Exploitable endpoints: ``` {Path: "/api/v1/teams/:team_name/pipelines/:pipeline_name/jobs/:job_name/builds/:build_name", Method: "POST", Name: RerunJobBuild}, {Path: "/api/v1/teams/:team_name/pipelines/:pipeline_name/jobs/:job_name/pause", Method: "PUT", Name: PauseJob}, {Path: "/api/v1/teams/:team_name/pipelines/:pipeline_name/jobs/:job_name/unpause", Method: "PUT", Name: UnpauseJob}, {Path: "/api/v1/teams/:team_name/pipelines/:pipeline_name/jobs/:job_name/schedule", Method: "PUT", Name: ScheduleJob}, {Path: "/api/v1/teams/:team_name/pipelines/:pipeline_name/pause", Method: "PUT", Name: PausePipeline}, {Path: "/api/v1/teams/:team_name/pipelines/:pipeline_name/unpause", Method: ...
### Summary GeoNode is vulnerable to an XML External Entity (XXE) injection in the style upload functionality of GeoServer leading to Arbitrary File Read. ### Details GeoNode's GeoServer has the ability to upload new styles for datasets through the [`dataset_style_upload` view](https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/urls.py#L70-L72). ```py # https://github.dev/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/views.py#L158-L159 @login_required def dataset_style_upload(request, layername): def respond(*args, **kw): kw['content_type'] = 'text/html' return json_response(*args, **kw) ... sld = request.FILES['sld'].read() # 1 sld_name = None try: # Check SLD is valid ... sld_name = extract_name_from_sld(gs_catalog, sld, sld_file=request.FILES['sld']) # 2 except Exception as e: respond(errors=f"The uploaded SLD file is not valid X...
authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Prior to versions 2023.4.3 and 2023.5.5, authentik does not verify the source of the X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers, both in the Python code and the go code. Only authentik setups that are directly accessible by users without a reverse proxy are susceptible to this. Possible spoofing of IP addresses in logs, downstream applications proxied by (built in) outpost, IP bypassing in custom flows if used. This poses a possible security risk when someone has flows or policies that check the user's IP address, e.g. when they want to ignore the user's 2 factor authentication when the user is connected to the company network. A second security risk is that the IP addresses in the logfiles and user sessions are not reliable anymore. Anybody can spoof this address and one cannot verify that the user has logged in from the IP address that is in their account's log. A third risk is that this header is passed on to the proxied application behind ...