lenovo warranty check/lookup | check warranty status | lenovo support us

Torrance, United States / California, 12th September 2024, CyberNewsWire

### Impact `next-auth` applications prior to version **4.24.5** that rely on the default [Middleware authorization](https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/nextjs#middleware) are affected. A bad actor could create an empty/mock user, by getting hold of a NextAuth.js-issued JWT from an interrupted OAuth sign-in flow (state, PKCE or nonce). Manually overriding the `next-auth.session-token` cookie value with this non-related JWT would let the user simulate a logged in user, albeit having no user information associated with it. (The only property on this user is an opaque randomly generated string). This vulnerability does **not** give access to other users' data, neither to resources that require proper authorization via scopes or other means. The created mock user has no information associated with it (ie. no name, email, access_token, etc.) This vulnerability can be exploited by bad actors to peek at logged in user states (e.g. dashboard layout). _Note: Regardless of the vulnerabil...

Coinbase researchers reported 2 security issues in our implementation of the oblivious transfer (OT) based protocol [DKLS](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/499.pdf): ### 1. Secret share recovery attack If the base OT setup of the protocol is reused for another execution of the OT extension, then a malicious participant can extract a bit of the secret of another participant. By repeating the execution they can eventually recover the whole secret. Therefore, unlike our comments suggested, you **must not reuse an OT setup** for multiple protocol executions. We're adding a warning in the code: https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/blob/9e4400fccee89be6195d0a12dd0ed052288d5040/internal/ot/extended.go#L114 ### 2. Invalid security proof due to incorrect operator The original 2018 version of the DKLS had a typo in the OT extension protocol when computing the check value in the OT extension: the paper noted a XOR whereas it should be a field multiplication. This erroneous behavior ...

### Summary Private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is [`buffer` package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/buffer) ### Details This affects only environments where `require('buffer')` is <https://npmjs.com/buffer> E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc. `Buffer.isBuffer` check can be bypassed, resulting in `k` reuse for different messages, leading to private key extraction over a single invalid message (and a second one for which any message/signature could be taken, e.g. previously known valid one) v2.x is unaffected as it verifies input to be an actual `Uint8Array` instance Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair, meaning that the attack needs only a single malicious message being signed for a full key extraction While signing unverified attacker-controlled messages would be problematic itself (and exploitation of this needs such a scenario), signing a single message still shou...

Zabbix Server 2.2.x and 3.0.x before 3.0.31, and 3.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.

Plus: An Iranian hacking tool steals inboxes, LastPass gets hacked, and a deepfake scammer targets the crypto world.

In wolfSSL before 5.2.0, certificate validation may be bypassed during attempted authentication by a TLS 1.3 client to a TLS 1.3 server. This occurs when the sig_algo field differs between the certificate_verify message and the certificate message.

Stored XSS viva .webma file upload in GitHub repository star7th/showdoc prior to 2.10.4.

Stored XSS via File Upload in star7th/showdoc in star7th/showdoc in GitHub repository star7th/showdoc prior to 2.10.4.

webmagic-extension v0.9.0 and below was discovered to contain a code injection vulnerability via the component us.codecraft.webmagic.downloader.PhantomJSDownloader.