CVE

A cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Jenkins Build Failure Analyzer Plugin 2.4.1 and earlier allows attackers to delete Failure Causes.

Jenkins 2.423 and earlier, LTS 2.414.1 and earlier does not escape the value of the 'caption' constructor parameter of 'ExpandableDetailsNote', resulting in a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exploitable by attackers able to control this parameter.

The `PaperCutNG Mobility Print` version 1.0.3512 application allows an unauthenticated attacker to perform a CSRF attack on an instance administrator to configure the clients host (in the "configure printer discovery" section). This is possible because the application has no protections against CSRF attacks, like Anti-CSRF tokens, header origin validation, samesite cookies, etc.

Use of a static key to protect a JWT token used in user authentication can allow an for an authentication bypass in D-Link D-View 8 v2.0.1.28

A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Rockwell Automation select 1756-EN* communication devices. If exploited, a threat actor could potentially leverage this vulnerability to perform a remote code execution. To exploit this vulnerability, a threat actor would have to send a maliciously crafted CIP request to device.

A Type Confusion vulnerability was found in the Spotlight RPC functions in afpd in Netatalk 3.1.x before 3.1.17. When parsing Spotlight RPC packets, one encoded data structure is a key-value style dictionary where the keys are character strings, and the values can be any of the supported types in the underlying protocol. Due to a lack of type checking in callers of the dalloc_value_for_key() function, which returns the object associated with a key, a malicious actor may be able to fully control the value of the pointer and theoretically achieve Remote Code Execution on the host. This issue is similar to CVE-2023-34967.

In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault. As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their respective parts are changed. This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline, initrd, and more. However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the filesystem and gain control over the system. As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4, which is easily changeable. This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes in it and replace the partition altogether. This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the “mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs). An attacker can gain full contro...

In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault. As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their respective parts are changed. This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline, initrd, and more. However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the filesystem and gain control over the system. As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4, which is easily changeable. This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes in it and replace the partition altogether. This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the “mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs). An attacker can gain full contro...

Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism. Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique value for each PCR entry. These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory. This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should be protected. This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism, designed to protect said “vault”. The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being checked. The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs. This leads to several issues: • Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well as not sealing th...

Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism. Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique value for each PCR entry. These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory. This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should be protected. This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism, designed to protect said “vault”. The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being checked. The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs. This leads to several issues: • Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well as not sealing th...