ghsa

Due to a lack of parameter sanitisation a carefully crafted URL could be used to inject arbitrary HTML into the CMS Edit page. An attacker could create a URL and share it with a site administrator to perform an attack.

In it's default configuration, SilverStripe trusts all originating IPs to include HTTP headers for Hostname, IP and Protocol. This enables reverse proxies to forward requests while still retaining the original request information. Trusted IPs can be limited via the SS_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS constant. Even with this restriction in place, SilverStripe trusts a variety of HTTP headers due to different proxy notations (e.g. X-Forwarded-For vs. Client-IP). Unless a proxy explicitly unsets invalid HTTP headers from connecting clients, this can lead to spoofing requests being passed through trusted proxies. The impact of spoofed headers can include Director::forceSSL() not being enforced, SS_HTTPRequest->getIP() returning a wrong IP (disabling any IP restrictions), and spoofed hostnames circumventing any hostname-specific restrictions enforced in SilverStripe Controllers. Regardless on running a reverse proxy in your hosting infrastructure, please follow the instructions on Secure Coding: Reques...

GridField does not have sufficient CSRF protection, meaning that in some cases users with CMS access can be tricked into posting unspecified data into the CMS from external websites. Amongst other default CMS interfaces, GridField is used for management of groups, users and permissions in the CMS. The resolution for this issue is to ensure that all gridFieldAlterAction submissions are checked for the SecurityID token during submission.

The buildDefaults method on DevelopmentAdmin is missing a permission check. In live mode, if you access /dev/build, you are requested to login first. However, if you access /dev/build/defaults, then the action is performed without any login check. This should be protected in the same way that /dev/build is. The buildDefaults view is requireDefaultRecords() on each DataObject class, and hence has the potential to modify database state. It also lists all modified tables, allowing attackers more insight into which modules are used, and how the database tables are structured.

"Add from URL" doesn't clearly sanitise URL server side HtmlEditorField_Toolbar has an action HtmlEditorField_Toolbar#viewfile, which gets called by the CMS when adding a media "from a URL" (i.e. via oembed). This action gets the URL to add in the GET parameter FileURL. However it doesn't do any URL sanitising server side. The current logic will pass this through to Oembed, which will probably reject most dangerous URLs, but it's possible future changes would break this.

A high level XSS risk has been identified in the encoding of validation messages in certain FormField classes. Certain fields such as the NumericField and DropdownField have been identified, but any form field which presents any invalid content as a part of its validation response will be at risk.

During installation, certain parameters (admin_username and admin_password) are not escaped in the setup form. This issue is resolved in 3.1.14 stable, although existing users are advised to remove this file prior to deploying to a production server.

When a secure token parameter is provided to a SilverStripe site (such as isDev or flush) an empty token parameter can be provided in order to bypass normal authentication parameters. For instance, http://www.mysite.com/?isDev=1&isDevtoken will force a site to dev mode. Alternatively, "flush" could also be used in succession to cause excessive load on a victim site and risk denial of service. The fix in this case is to ensure that empty tokens fail the validation check.

A XSS risk exists in the returnURL parameter passed to dev/build. An unvalidated url could cause the user to redirect to an unverified third party url outside of the site. This issue is resolved in framework 3.1.14 stable release.

A vulnerability has been found in the SilverStripe framework where a login url can be potentially redirected to an external site. For example, the url http://www.my-silverstripe-site.com/Security/login?BackURL=/\attacker-site.com will redirect successful logins to the page http://attacker-site.com. If that website were set up to look identical to the first with "login failed" then the user will likely just enter their user/pass again.