ghsa

A Prototype Pollution issue in MiguelCastillo @bit/loader v.10.0.3 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the M function e argument in index.js.

A Prototype Pollution issue in Blackprint @blackprint/engine 0.8.12 through 0.9.1 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the `_utils.setDeepProperty` function of `engine.min.js`.

A vulnerability has been identified in the robrichards/xmlseclibs library, specifically related to XPath injection. The issue arises from inadequate filtering of user input before it is incorporated into XPath expressions.

The service offered by Pusher provides "private" channels with an authentication mechanism that restricts subscription access. The decision on allowing subscriptions to private channels is delegated to customers, who implement an authentication endpoint. End-users request a token from this endpoint to join a specific channel. The token is an HMAC signature of the end-user's connection ID (socket_id) and the desired channel. The issue arises from a lack of validation in the libraries provided to customers. This vulnerability allows a malicious end-user to submit a malformed socket_id field, leading the customer to unknowingly sign a string. This signed string grants access to a different private channel than the one the end-user is ostensibly requesting. Consequently, a malicious end-user, with permission to subscribe to one private channel, can forge permission for any private channel owned by the same customer. Additionally, the HTTP API is secured by requiring a signature with each...

The limit() query method is susceptible to catastrophic SQL injection with MySQL. For example, given a model User for a table users: ``` UserQuery::create()->limit('1;DROP TABLE users')->find(); ``` This will drop the users table! The cause appears to be a lack of integer casting of the limit input in either Criteria::setLimit() or in DBMySQL::applyLimit(). The code comments there seem to imply that casting was avoided due to overflow issues with 32-bit integers. This is surprising behavior since one of the primary purposes of an ORM is to prevent basic SQL injection. This affects all versions of Propel: 1.x, 2.x, and 3.

The limit() query method is susceptible to catastrophic SQL injection with MySQL. For example, given a model User for a table users: ``` UserQuery::create()->limit('1;DROP TABLE users')->find(); ``` This will drop the users table! The cause appears to be a lack of integer casting of the limit input in either Propel\Runtime\ActiveQuery\Criteria::setLimit() or in Propel\Runtime\Adapter\Pdo\MysqlAdapter::applyLimit(). The code comments there seem to imply that casting was avoided due to overflow issues with 32-bit integers. This is surprising behavior since one of the primary purposes of an ORM is to prevent basic SQL injection. This affects all versions of Propel: 1.x, 2.x, and 3.

Versions preceding 0.6.1 of the phpxmlrpc/extras project are susceptible to a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. This vulnerability exists within the class documenting_xmlrpc_server when processing the GET methodName parameter.

### Description A user could create and share a resource with a malicious URI. When the victim opens with menu “Open URI in a new tab” function, the malicious page has access to the window.opener object. ### Impact of issue The newly opened malicious page can for example change the window.opener.location to redirect the user to a phishing page, or call a JavaScript function served by the AppJS on the user behalf for example to try to affect the integrity of the data. ### Fix The code that opens a new window via window.open(); now open the tab with the noopener attribute.

### Description An administrator can craft a user with a malicious first name and last name, using a payload such as ``` <svg onload="confirm(document.domain)">'); ?></svg> ``` The user will then receive the invitation email and click on the setup link. The setup start page served by the server will fire the XSS. ### Impact of issue An administrator could use this exploit to edit the setup start page for a given user, for example, trick the user into installing another extension. Even though the severity of this issue in itself is high, the likelihood is low because the exploit will be visible in clear by the user in the email notification, and also requires an action from a malicious administrator. ### Fix Sanitize the firstname and lastname in the page that is used to trigger the extension setup process. Additionally since v2.11 some default CSP are inserted in the server response headers to prevent inline-scripts or 3rd party domain scripts on pages served by the passbolt API. Th...

Passbolt provides a way for system administrators to generate a PGP key for the server during installation. The wizard requests a username, an e-mail address and an optional comment. No escaping or verification is done by Passbolt, effectively allowing a user to inject bash code. The impact is very high, but the probability is very low given that this vulnerability can only be exploited during Passbolt’s installation stage.