ghsa

### Summary Currently session tokens function like the other JWT tokens where they are not actually invalidated when logging out. The `directus_session` gets destroyed and the cookie gets deleted but if you captured the cookie value it will still work for the entire expiry time which is set to 1 day by default. Making it effectively a long lived unrevokable stateless token instead of the stateful session token it was meant to be. When authenticating a session token JWT, Directus should also check whether the associated `directus_session` both still exists and has not expired (although the token should expire at the same time or before the session) to ensure leaked tokens are not valid indefinitely. ## Steps to reproduce - Copy the current session token from the cookie - Refresh and or log out - Use the saved session token to check if it is still valid ### Impact The lack of proper session expiration may improve the likely success of certain attacks. For example, a user might access a...

### Impact A Nautobot user with admin privileges can modify the `BANNER_TOP`, `BANNER_BOTTOM`, and `BANNER_LOGIN` configuration settings via the `/admin/constance/config/` endpoint. Normally these settings are used to provide custom banner text at the top and bottom of all Nautobot web pages (or specifically on the login page in the case of `BANNER_LOGIN`) but it was reported that an admin user can make use of these settings to inject arbitrary HTML, potentially exposing Nautobot users to security issues such as cross-site scripting (stored XSS). ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Patches will be released as part of Nautobot 1.6.22 and 2.2.4. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ As [described in the Nautobot documentation](https://docs.nautobot.com/projects/core/en/stable/user-guide/administration/configuration/optional-settings/#administratively-configurable-settings), t...

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability exists within the Formula virtual cell comments functionality. ### Details The nc-gui/components/virtual-cell/Formula.vue displays a v-html tag with the value of "urls" whose contents are processed by the function replaceUrlsWithLink(). This function recognizes the pattern URI::(XXX) and creates a hyperlink tag <a> with href=XXX. However, it leaves all the other contents outside of the pattern URI::(XXX) unchanged, which makes the evil users can create a malicious table with a formula field whose payload is <img src=1 onerror="malicious javascripts"URI::(XXX). The evil users then can share this table with others by enabling public viewing and the victims who open the shared link can be attacked. ### PoC Step 1: Attacker login the nocodb and creates a table with two fields, "T" and "F". The type of field "T" is "SingleLineText", and the type of the "F" is "Fomula" with the formula content {T} Step 2: The attacker sets the content...

## Summary A user with permission to view any collection using redacted hashed fields can get access the raw stored version using the `alias` functionality on the API. Normally, these redacted fields will return `**********` however if we change the request to `?alias[workaround]=redacted` we can instead retrieve the plain text value for the field. ## Steps to reproduce - Set up a simple role with read-access to users. - Create a new user with the role from the previous step - Assign a password to the user The easiest way to confirm this vulnerability is by first visiting `/users/me`. You should be presented with a redacted JSON-object. Next, visit `/users/me?alias[hash]=password`. This time, the returned JSON object will included the raw password hash instead of the redacted value. ## Workaround This can be avoided by removing permission to view the sensitive fields entirely from users or roles that should not be able to see them.

### Summary --- An authenticated attacker with create access could conduct a SQL Injection attack on MySQL DB using unescaped table_name. ### Details --- ### SQL Injection vulnerability occurs in **VitessClient.ts**. ```javascript async columnList(args: any = {}) { const func = this.columnList.name; const result = new Result(); log.api(`${func}:args:`, args); try { args.databaseName = this.connectionConfig.connection.database; const response = await this.sqlClient.raw( `select *, table_name as tn from information_schema.columns where table_name = '${args.tn}' ORDER by ordinal_position`, ); ``` The variable **${args.tn}** refers to the table name entered by the user. A malicious attacker can escape the existing query by including a special character (') in the table name and insert and execute a new arbitrary SQL query. ### Impact --- This vulnerability may result in leakage of sensitive data in the database.

### Summary --- Attacker can upload a html file with malicious content. If user tries to open that file in browser malicious scripts can be executed leading Stored XSS(Cross-Site Script) attack. ### PoC --- NocoDB was configured using the Release Binary `Noco-macos-arm64`, and nocodb version 0.202.9 (currently the latest version) was used. binary hash infos: md5(164b727f287af56168bc16fba622d0b4) / sha256(43e8e97f4c5f5330613abe071a359f84e4514b7186f92954b678087c37b7832e) <img width="665" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/86613161/287472673-aeb60a02-2080-429f-8583-9f130ab62779.png"> ### 1. Run the binary to start the server and access the arbitrary table dashboard. <img width="830" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/86613161/287472852-98b2286e-ad66-45bf-b503-63780619d775.png"> Here, used the default `Features` table. ### 2. Click `+` in the table `field header` to add an `attachment` field. <img width="1173" alt="image" src="https://us...

## Summary Nokogiri v1.16.5 upgrades its dependency libxml2 to [2.12.7](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/releases/v2.12.7) from 2.12.6. libxml2 v2.12.7 addresses CVE-2024-34459: - described at https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/issues/720 - patched by https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/2876ac53 ## Impact There is no impact to Nokogiri users because the issue is present only in libxml2's `xmllint` tool which Nokogiri does not provide or expose. ## Timeline - 2024-05-13 05:57 EDT, libxml2 2.12.7 release is announced - 2024-05-13 08:30 EDT, nokogiri maintainers begin triage - 2024-05-13 10:05 EDT, nokogiri [v1.16.5 is released](https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/releases/tag/v1.16.5) and this GHSA made public

### Impact When opening a form in Valtimo, the access token (JWT) of the user is exposed to `api.form.io` via the the `x-jwt-token` header. An attacker can retrieve personal information from this token, or use it to execute requests to the Valtimo REST API on behalf of the logged-in user. This issue is caused by a misconfiguration of the Form.io component. ### Attack requirements ### The following conditions have to be met in order to perform this attack: - An attacker needs to have access to the network traffic on the `api.form.io` domain. - The content of the `x-jwt-token` header is logged or otherwise available to the attacker. - An attacker needs to have network access to the Valtimo API. - An attacker needs to act within the time-to-live of the access token. The default TTL in Keycloak is 5 minutes. ### Patches Versions 10.8.4, 11.1.6 and 11.2.2 have been patched

### Introduction In Matrix, the server-side *key backup* stores encrypted copies of Matrix message keys. This facilitates key sharing between a user's devices and provides a redundant copy in case all devices are lost. The key backup uses asymmetric cryptography, with each server-side key backup assigned a unique public-private key pair. ### Impact Due to a logic bug introduced in https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/pull/2961/commits/71136e44c03c79f80d6d1a2446673bc4d53a2067, the matrix-sdk-crypto crate version 0.7.0 will sometimes log the private part of the backup key pair to Rust debug logs (using the `tracing` crate). ### Patches This issue has been resolved in matrix-sdk-crypto [version 0.7.1](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-rust-sdk/releases/tag/matrix-sdk-crypto-0.7.1). ### Workarounds None. ### References - [crates.io release](https://crates.io/crates/matrix-sdk-crypto/0.7.1) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this adviso...

Improper escaping of a custom field's name allows an attacker to inject HTML and, if CSP settings permit, achieve execution of arbitrary JavaScript when: - resolving or closing issues (bug_change_status_page.php) belonging to a project linking said custom field - viewing issues (view_all_bug_page.php) when the custom field is displayed as a column - printing issues (print_all_bug_page.php) when the custom field is displayed as a column ### Impact Cross-site scripting (XSS). ### Patches https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/447a521aae0f82f791b8116a14a20e276df739be ### Workarounds Ensure Custom Field Names do not contain HTML tags. ### References - https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=34432 - This is related to CVE-2020-25830 (same root cause, different affected pages)