ghsa

### Impact The Fides webserver API allows custom integrations to be uploaded as a ZIP file. This ZIP file must contain YAML files, but Fides can be configured to also accept the inclusion of custom Python code in it. The custom code is executed in a restricted, sandboxed environment, but the sandbox can be bypassed to execute any arbitrary code. The vulnerability allows the execution of arbitrary code on the target system within the context of the webserver python process owner on the webserver container, which by default is `root`, and leverage that access to attack underlying infrastructure and integrated systems. This vulnerability affects Fides versions `2.11.0` through `2.18.0`. Exploitation is limited to API clients with the `CONNECTOR_TEMPLATE_REGISTER` authorization scope. In the Fides Admin UI this scope is restricted to highly privileged users, specifically root users and users with the owner role. Exploitation is only possible if the security configuration parameter `al...

### Impact For Windows users of `github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin`, until v0.2.4 it was possible for certain rootfs and path combinations (in particular, where a malicious Unix-style `/`-separated unsafe path was used with a Windows-style rootfs path) to result in generated paths that were outside of the provided rootfs. It is unclear to what extent this has a practical impact on real users, but given the possible severity of the issue we have released an emergency patch release that resolves this issue. Thanks to @pjbgf for discovering, debugging, and fixing this issue (as well as writing some tests for it). ### Patches c121231e1276e11049547bee5ce68d5a2cfe2d9b is the patch fixing this issue. v0.2.4 contains the fix. ### Workarounds Users could use `filepath.FromSlash()` on all unsafe paths before passing them to `filepath-securejoin`. ### References See #9.

### Impact This is a Denial-of-Service (DoS) type vulnerability which causes the Router to panic and terminate when GraphQL Subscriptions are enabled. It can be triggered when **all of the following conditions are met**: 1. Running Apollo Router v1.28.0, v1.28.1 or v1.29.0 ("impacted versions"); **and** 2. The Supergraph schema provided to the Router (either via Apollo Uplink or explicitly via other configuration) **has a `subscription` type** with root-fields defined; **and** 3. The YAML configuration provided to the Router **has subscriptions enabled** (they are _disabled_ by default), either by setting `enabled: true` _or_ by setting a valid `mode` within the `subscriptions` object (as seen in [subscriptions' documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/router/executing-operations/subscription-support/#router-setup)); **and** 4. An [anonymous](https://spec.graphql.org/draft/#sec-Anonymous-Operation-Definitions) (i.e., un-named) `subscription` operation (e.g., `subscription {...

### Impact Python's "format" functionality allows someone controlling the format string to "read" objects accessible (recursively) via attribute access and subscription from accessible objects. Those attribute accesses and subscriptions use Python's full blown `getattr` and `getitem`, not the policy restricted `AccessControl` variants `_getattr_` and `_getitem_`. This can lead to critical information disclosure. `AccessControl` already provides a safe variant for `str.format` and denies access to `string.Formatter`. However, `str.format_map` is still unsafe. Affected are all users who allow untrusted users to create `AccessControl` controlled Python code and execute it. ### Patches A fix will be introduced in the versions 4.4, 5.8 and 6.2. ### Workarounds There are no workarounds. ### References https://github.com/zopefoundation/RestrictedPython/security/advisories/GHSA-xjw2-6jm9-rf67 describes the corresponding problem for `RestrictedPython`.

Missing Authentication for Critical Function in GitHub repository answerdev/answer prior to v1.1.3.

### Impact WireMock can be configured to only permit proxying (and therefore recording) to certain addresses. This is achieved via a list of allowed address rules and a list of denied address rules, where the allowed list is evaluated first. [Documentation](https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses). Until WireMock Webhooks Extension [3.0.0-beta-15](https://github.com/wiremock/wiremock/releases/tag/3.0.0-beta-15), the filtering of target addresses from the proxy mode DID NOT work for Webhooks, so the users were potentially vulnerable regardless of the `limitProxyTargets` settings. Via the WireMock webhooks configuration, POST requests from a webhook might be forwarded to an arbitrary service reachable from WireMock’s instance. For example, If someone is running the WireMock docker Container inside a private cluster, they can trigger internal POST requests against unsecured APIs or even against secure ones by passin...

**Component**: Cosmovisor **Criticality**: Medium **Affected Versions**: Cosmovisor < v1.0.0 (distributed with Cosmos-SDK < 0.46) **Affected Users**: Validators and Node operators utilizing unsupported versions of Cosmovisor **Impact**: DOS, potential RCE on node depending on configuration An issue has been identified on unsupported versions of Cosmovisor which may result in a Denial of Service or Remote Code Execution path depending on configuration for a node or validator using the vulnerable version to manage their node. If a validator is utilizing an affected version of Cosmovisor with `DAEMON_ALLOW_DOWNLOAD_BINARIES` set to true, a non-default configuration, it may be possible for an attacker to trigger a Remote Code Execution path as well on the host. In this configuration it is recommended to immediately stop use of the `DAEMON_ALLOW_DOWNLOAD_BINARIES` feature, and then proceed with an upgrade of Cosmovisor. It is recommended that all validators utilizing unsupported versio...

### Impact Apps that are launched as command line executables are impacted. E.g. if your app exposes itself in the path as `myapp --help` Specifically this issue can only be exploited if the following conditions are met: * Your app is launched with an attacker-controlled working directory * The attacker has the ability to write files to that working directory This makes the risk quite low, in fact normally issues of this kind are considered outside of our threat model as similar to Chromium we exclude [Physically Local Attacks](https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-7x97-j373-85x5#:~:text=Physically%20Local%20Attacks) but given the ability for this issue to bypass certain protections like ASAR Integrity it is being treated with higher importance. Please bear this in mind when reporting similar issues in the future. ### Workarounds There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron. ### Fixed Versions * `26.0.0-beta.13` * `25...

### Impact Apps using `contextIsolation` and `contextBridge` are affected. This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions. ### Workarounds This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions: * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`. * If an API exposed to the main world via `contextBridge` has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed. The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge ...

### Impact A vulnerable node, can be made to consume unbounded amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node. Details about this bug will be released within 4-8 weeks, as per our official [vulnerability disclosure policy](https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/developers/geth-developer/disclosures). ### Patches The fix is included in geth version `1.12.1-stable`, i.e, `1.12.2-unstable` and onwards. ### Workarounds No known workarounds. ### Credits This bug was reported by Patrick McHardy and reported via [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]). ### References