Ichitaro uses the ATOK input method (IME) and uses the proprietary .jtd file extension. It’s the second most-popular word processing system in Japan behind only Microsoft word.

Wednesday, April 5, 2023 11:04

_A Cisco Talos researcher discovered these vulnerabilities._

Cisco Talos recently discovered four vulnerabilities in Ichitaro, a popular word processing software in Japan produced by JustSystems that could lead to arbitrary code execution.

Ichitaro uses the ATOK input method (IME) and uses the proprietary .jtd file extension. It’s the second most-popular word processing system in Japan behind only Microsoft word.

Talos discovered four vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to gain the ability to execute arbitrary code on the targeted machine. TALOS-2022-1673 (CVE-2022-43664) can trigger the reuse of freed memory by the attacker, which can lead to further memory corruption and potentially result in arbitrary code execution after the target opens an attacker-created malicious file. TALOS-2023-1722 (CVE-2023-22660) has a similar effect, though in this case, it’s caused by a buffer overflow condition.

There are two other memory corruption vulnerabilities that can also be triggered if the target opens a specially crafted, malicious document — TALOS-2022-1687 (CVE-2023-22291) and TALOS-2022-1684 (CVE-2022-45115) — which could also lead to code execution.

Cisco Talos worked with JustSystems to ensure these vulnerabilities are resolved and an update is available for affected customers, all in adherence to Cisco’s vulnerability disclosure policy.

Users are encouraged to update these affected products as soon as possible: Ichitaro 2022, version 1.0.1.57600. Talos tested and confirmed this version of the word processor could be exploited by these vulnerabilities.

The following Snort rules will detect exploitation attempts against this vulnerability:  
61011, 61012, 61091, 61092, 61163, 61164, 61393 and 61394. Additional rules may be released in the future and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center or Snort.org.

Vulnerability Spotlight: Vulnerabilities in popular Japanese word processing software could lead to arbitrary code execution, other issues

The stealer is for sale on dark web forums for $59 a month, or $540 for a lifetime subscription, which is relatively inexpensive compared to other infostealers.

*   The developer of the Typhon Reborn information stealer released version 2 (V2) in January, which included significant updates to its codebase and improved capabilities.
*   Most notably, the new version features additional anti-analysis and anti-virtual machine (VM) capabilities to evade detection and make analysis more difficult.
*   We assess Typhon Reborn 2 will likely appear in future attacks, as we have already observed samples in the wild and multiple purchases of the malware.
*   The stealer is currently offered on underground forums for $59 per month but also offers a lifetime subscription for $540, which is inexpensive compared to competing infostealers.
*   The stealer can harvest and exfiltrate sensitive information and uses the Telegram API to send stolen data to attackers.

**Typhon Reborn V2 release  
**

Typhon is an information stealer first publicly reported in mid-2022. It steals sensitive information, such as cryptocurrency wallet data, from a variety of applications and uses a “file grabber” to collect a predefined list of file types, then exfiltrates them via Telegram. Since its initial arrival, it has undergone continuous development, with Typhon Reborn being released just several months later in late 2022. The malware’s developer announced the release of Typhon Reborn V2 on Jan. 31, 2023 on the popular Russian language dark web forum XSS. Samples uploaded to public repositories indicate that the new version of Typhon Reborn has been in the wild since December 2022.

_Post announcing Typhon Reborn V2 release._

In the latest version, the malware developer claimed to have refactored the codebase and significantly improved existing capabilities present within the malware, which Cisco Talos independently confirmed. It is available for $59 per month or a lifetime subscription for $540, which is inexpensive compared to competing infostealers. Analysis of the cryptocurrency wallet from which the attacker collects payments suggests that multiple adversaries have purchased access to the stealer, making it likely that it will be used in attacks moving forward.

**Notable changes in Typhon Reborn V2**

The code in Version 2 of Typhon Reborn was heavily modified compared to Version 1, based on our analysis.

_Code changes between Typhon Reborn V1 and V2._

For example, Version 2 has significantly more anti-analysis and anti-virtualization capabilities, as evidenced by comparing the anti-analysis routines present in each version. For example, the developer made several changes to the logic that prevents the malware from infecting systems that match predefined criteria. That includes heavily expanding this list of criteria to include present usernames, CPUIDs, applications and processes present on the system, debugger/emulation checks, and geolocation data for countries that attackers may wish to avoid.

_Anti-analysis routine comparison between Typhon Reborn versions._

Finally, in Typhon Reborn V2 samples that we analyzed, the developer appeared to have removed the functionality that establishes persistence across reboots. Instead, V2 simply terminates itself after data exfiltration.

**Dissecting Typhon Reborn V2**

In Typhon Reborn V2, the malware complicates analysis via string obfuscation by using Base64 encoding and applying the XOR function to various strings. During execution, the malware decodes the Base64, generating a UTF-8 character-encoded string that is then deobfuscated using an XOR key stored in the malware’s configuration or hard-coded into DecryptString(). The XOR key used is based on the mode passed when the function is called each time. The resulting string is then decoded from Base64 again, creating a plain text string to continue the operation.

_String deobfuscation functionality._

The malware’s operations are determined by a series of parameters stored in the malware’s configuration that dictate what information should be collected, keys used for string deobfuscation and geolocations where the malware should not execute.

_Typhon Reborn V2 configuration parameters._

**Anti-analysis and sandbox evasion**

When Typhon Reborn V2’s main() method is executed, it checks the malware configuration to determine if anti-analysis has been enabled. If it is enabled, the malware will attempt to conduct a series of anti-analysis checks to determine if it is being executed in an analysis or sandbox environment.

_Anti-analysis checks._

If any of the checks fail, the malware will call a SelfRemove() class to self delete, by creating a batch file in the temp directory with the following contents.

    chcp 65001
    TaskKill /F /IM [MALWARE_PID]
    Timeout /T 2 /Nobreak
    

This batch file is then executed via the Windows command processor, thus terminating the malware’s execution.

_Self-removal functionality._

The overall execution flow of the various anti-analysis checks is shown below.

_Anti-analysis process flow._

The malware uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to retrieve information about the Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) on the system.

SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController

It then checks the returned value to determine if it contains the string vmware svga.

Then, it makes an HTTP request to the following URL to determine if the system is located in a network associated with a hosting provider, colocation facility, or data center environment. The API returns either a “True” or “False” response based on the location of the system which is used to determine the type of environment in which the system is located.

hxxp://ip-api[.]com/line/?fields=hosting

Then, it checks for the presence of the following DLLs associated with common security products that may be installed.

*   SbieDLL.dll (Sandboxie)
*   SxIn.dll (360 Total Security)
*   Sf2.dll (Avast)
*   Snxhk.dll (Avast)
*   cmdvrt32.dll (Comodo Internet Security)

It also retrieves the system manufacturer and model via WMI using the following query:

Select * from Win32_ComputerSystem

The retrieved information is checked to determine if it contains the following hypervisor-related strings.

*   VIRTUAL
*   vmware
*   VirtualBox

The malware also uses WMI to collect information about the system’s video controller.

SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController

This information is then checked to determine if it contains the strings VMware or VBox.

Next, the malware uses CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent to determine if the process is being debugged.

The malware then obtains the current system time, initiates a short (10ms) sleep, then obtains the system time again. It compares the delta between the two times to what is expected during normal operations to determine if the process is being run in a debugging session.

The command line argument used to initially launch the malware is then obtained to determine if the sample was executed using the file name detonate.exe or if the argument -–detonate was passed when initiating execution.

The malware also checks the Windows Registry (SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall) to determine if any subkeys reference the following common analysis tools:

*   dnSpy
    

*   PDFStreamDumper
    

*   Ghidra
    

*   Wireshark
    

*   Autoruns
    

*   x64dbg
    

*   HashCalc
    

*   Process Hacker
    

  

*   FileInsight
    

*   Process Monitor
    

  

Next, WMI is queried to obtain the ProcessorId (CPUID) for the system using the following query.

Select ProcessorId From Win32_Processor

The CPUID is then checked against the following list of CPUIDs under which the malware will not execute:

*   4AB2DFCCF4
*   BFEBFBFF000906E9
*   078BFBFF000506E3
*   078BFBFF00000F61
*   178BFBFF00830F10
*   0F8BFBFF000306C1

The malware also determines the user account context under which the malware is executing and will terminate if the username matches the following values:

*   IT-ADMIN
    

*   sand box
    

*   Abby
    

*   Paul Jones
    

*   maltest
    

*   WDAGUtilityAccount
    

*   WALKER
    

*   malware
    

*   Frank
    

*   Sandbox
    

*   virus
    

*   fred
    

*   timmy
    

*   John Doe
    

*   JOHN-PC
    

*   tim
    

*   Emily
    

*   Lisa
    

*   vboxuser
    

*   CurrentUser
    

*   John
    

*   sandbox
    

*   test
    

  

*   Peter Wilson
    

*   TVM
    

  

The malware then obtains the list of currently running processes on the system and checks the executable path associated with them against the following list of executable file names associated with common analysis tools.

*   ollydbg.exe
    

*   idaq64.exe
    

*   processhacker.exe
    

*   immunitydebugger.exe
    

*   tcpview.exe
    

*   wireshark.exe
    

*   autoruns.exe
    

*   dumpcap.exe
    

*   de4dot.exe
    

*   hookexplorer.exe
    

*   ilspy.exe
    

*   lordpe.exe
    

*   dnspy.exe
    

*   petools.exe
    

*   autorunsc.exe
    

*   resourcehacker.exe
    

*   filemon.exe
    

*   x32dbg.exe
    

*   procmon.exe
    

*   x64dbg.exe
    

*   regmon.exe
    

*   fiddler.exe
    

*   idaq.exe
    

  

It then attempts to test internet connectivity by making an HTTP request to http://www.google.com.

The malware again obtains the execution environment to determine if its filename matches the following list:

*   detonate
*   virus
*   test
*   malware
*   maltest

Next, the malware checks the Programs subdirectory under the Windows Start Menu for the presence of the following analysis tools:

*   dnspy
    

*   x86dbg
    

*   detect it easy
    

*   ghidra
    

*   die
    

*   ida
    

*   procmon
    

*   fiddler
    

*   process monitor
    

*   scylla
    

*   process hacker
    

*   winhex
    

*   ilspy
    

*   hxd
    

*   x64dbg
    

*   de4dot
    

It then attempts to locate wine_get_unix_file_name to determine if Wine is being used in an analysis environment.

Next, it checks the SYSTEM_CODEINTEGRITY_INFORMATION structure to determine if unsigned or test-signed drivers are allowed on the system (CODEINTEGRITY_OPTION_ENABLED, CODEINTEGRITY_OPTION_TESTSIGN).

The malware also checks the SYSTEM_KERNEL_DEBUGGER_INFORMATION structure to determine if kernel mode debugging is enabled (KernelDebuggerEnabled).

Then, the malware checks various system DLLs for the presence of instructions that may indicate that the environment is instrumented for analysis.

The malware also features two geolocation avoidance mechanisms. The first one allows for the specification of a list of countries in the malware’s config that the attacker does not want to infect systems in. The malware uses the IP-API service to determine where the system is located and compares it against the user-supplied list.

_IP geolocation check._

If the system is located in one of these countries, the malware calls the SelfRemove() functionality previously described.

The malware also contains a RunAntiCIS() feature that specifically avoids infecting systems located in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.

_CIS country avoidance._

**System and network data collection**

If the victim’s environment passes all the malware’s anti-analysis checks, Typhon Reborn V2 begins collecting and exfiltrating sensitive information. First, the malware creates a randomly named subdirectory under %LOCALAPPDATA%, then the malware begins generating stealer logs that will ultimately be staged in that subdirectory for exfiltration.

To generate the logs, the malware retrieves survey information about the infected system and writes it to the stealer log. It collects a variety of system information including user data, system data and network information, using various mechanisms such as WMI queries, environment variables, and registry keys. The malware uses api[.]ipify[.]org to obtain the public IP of the infected system. This information is saved in the malware’s working directory (UserData.txt) along with a text file (BuildID.txt) containing the Telegram channel for the malware’s developer. A list of installed software is also generated using WMI and saved (InstalledSoftwares.txt). A list of hard drives present within the system is also saved (Drive Info.txt).

The malware also captures screenshots from infected systems saved in the same directory as the stealer logs.

_Screenshot capture._

The stealer also collects saved Wi-Fi network information and stores it (Wifi Passwords.txt) using the following system commands:

cmd.exe /C  chcp 65001 && netsh wlan show profile | findstr All

cmd.exe /C timeout /t 5 /nobreak > nul && netsh wlan show profile name=<PROFILE_NAME> key=clear | findstr Key

It also attempts to scan for available wireless networks and stores information about them (Available Networks.txt).

cmd.exe /C timeout /t 5 /nobreak > nul && netsh wlan show networks mode=bssid

A list of currently running processes and process executable paths is collected and saved as well (Running Processes.txt).

**Application data collection**

Once basic system information has been collected and saved, the stealer begins iterating through specific applications and collecting data based on the malware’s configuration. The stealer currently supports collecting passwords, tokens, and other sensitive information from the applications shown below.

_Typhon Reborn V2 Application Support._

**Gaming clients**

Typhon Reborn V2 can steal data from additional applications, including various gaming clients. However, this functionality was never actually called from the main() method of the malware in the latest version analyzed.

The malware also contains a FileGrabber() feature that is used to collect and exfiltrate files of interest from victim environments. It iterates through all drives detected on the system and attempts to determine whether any are removable storage devices, network storage locations or optical drives.

_Drive enumeration._

Each drive that meets this criterion has its root directory added to a list of target directories. The malware then iterates through all of the target directories, copying contents that match the parameters in the malware’s configuration to the malware’s working directory.

The two parameters Config.GrabberSize and Config.GrabberFileExtensions defined in the malware’s configuration determine the operation of the file collection capability.

_File grabber configuration parameters._

**Data exfiltration**

Once the stealer has finished collecting information from infected systems, the data is stored in a compressed archive and exfiltrated via HTTPS using the Telegram API. First, the malware sends an overview log containing survey information and basic statistics related to the data collected.

_Stealer log transmission._

Then, the malware sends another Telegram message containing the data being exfiltrated from the infected system.

_Data exfiltration._

Once the data has been successfully transmitted to the attacker, the archive is then deleted from the infected system. The malware then calls SelfRemove.Remove() to terminate execution.

**Coverage**

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

The following Snort SIDs are applicable to this threat: 61532-61533, 300476.

**Orbital Queries**

Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this threat, click here.

**Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)**

IOCs for this research can also be found at our Github repository here

Typhon Reborn V2: Updated stealer features enhanced anti-analysis and evasion capabilities

A specially crafted STL file can lead to a heap buffer overflow.

Monday, April 3, 2023 11:04

_Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos discovered this vulnerability._

Cisco Talos recently discovered an improper array index validation vulnerability in a functionality of the ADMesh library.

ADMesh is a C library used to process 3-D triangular meshes.

Talos found an improper array index validation vulnerability in TALOS-2022-1594 (CVE-2022-38072). A specially crafted STL file can lead to a heap buffer overflow. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

Cisco Talos worked with ADMesh to ensure that this issue was resolved and an update is available for affected customers, all in adherence to Cisco’s vulnerability disclosure policy.

Users are encouraged to update these affected products as soon as possible: ADMesh Master Commit 767a105, Slic3r libslic3r Master Commit b1a5500 and ADMesh v0.98.4. Talos tested and confirmed these versions could be exploited by these vulnerabilities.

The following Snort rules will detect exploitation attempts against these vulnerabilities: 60544 and 60545. Additional rules may be released in the future and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Vulnerability Spotlight: Buffer overflow vulnerability in ADMesh library

Today, Talos is publishing a glimpse into the most prevalent threats we've observed between March 24 and March 31. As with previous roundups, this post isn't meant to be an in-depth analysis. Instead, this post will summarize the threats we've observed by highlighting key

Threat Roundup for March 24 to March 31

Cisco Talos is tracking and actively responding to a supply chain attack involving the 3CX Desktop Softphone application.
This is a multi-stage attack that involves sideloading DLLs, seven-day sleep routines, and additional payloads dependent on a now-removed GitHub repository for Windows based systems.
MacOS systems used a different infection chain

Thursday, March 30, 2023 18:03

*   Cisco Talos is tracking and actively responding to a supply chain attack involving the 3CX Desktop Softphone application.
*   This is a multi-stage attack that involves sideloading DLLs, seven-day sleep routines, and additional payloads dependent on a now-removed GitHub repository for Windows based systems.
*   MacOS systems used a different infection chain leveraging a hardcoded C2 domain, as opposed to the GitHub repo.
*   This is just the latest supply chain attack threatening users, after the SolarWinds incident in 2020 and the REvil ransomware group exploiting Kaseya VSA in 2021.

**Summary**

Cisco Talos recently became aware of a supply chain attack affecting Windows and MacOS users of the 3CX software-based phone application. This attack leveraged the legitimate update functionality of the 3CX application to deliver a set of malicious payloads to 3CX users.

The infection chain consists of several stages and involves sideloading DLLs along with a seven-day sleep cycle before the malware attempts to retrieve additional malicious artifacts from a now-removed GitHub repository for the Windows based infection. The GitHub repository hosted a series of icon files with encrypted data appended to the end of the files. These encrypted strings, once decrypted, contained the C2 domains for additional malicious artifacts.

The MacOS version used a hard coded C2 domain. These second-stage payloads are information stealers that attempt to obtain system information and the latest browsing history records, indicating this information may be used as a filtering mechanism to identify and discard some victims while maintaining unauthorized access to others.

During our investigation we were able to see file activity dating back to February 3, 2023. However, the GitHub repository has been active since December 2022. The full scope of the attack is uncertain at this point. The 3CX website claims to have over 600,000 customers and 12 million daily users. It's unclear how many are users of the 3CX Desktop App versus the web app option that was not affected. 3CX is currently asking users to use the web app while they work to release an update.

**Preparing since February 2022**

Based on Cisco Talos investigation, it appears the infrastructure that supported this attack was being prepared as early as February 2022 when the domains were first registered. A second cluster of activity happened toward the end of 2022 when the GitHub repository was created, along with a few other domains. The sbmsa\[.\]wiki domain was also created on Feb. 9, 2023, which was found to be used by the second stage of the MacOS version.  

The timeline below illustrates these clusters of activity.

Timeline of domain registration activity.

**Coverage**

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

Talos created the following coverage for this:

Snort SIDs:

Snort 3: 300480,300481

Snort 2: 61550-61553

**Orbital Queries**

Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this threat, Cisco Secure Endpoint customers need to make sure that "%3CX%" is entered into the program field under the "Installed Program Search" for Windows and ".\*3CX.\*" under "Installed Applications Monitoring" for MacOS in Orbital.

Additionally, the users can access the OSQueries directly on GitHub for both Windows and MacOS.

**Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)**

Indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with ongoing activity can be found here.

Threat Advisory: 3CX Softphone Supply Chain Compromise

XXE attacks allow an adversary to interact with other backend or external systems that OpManager accesses.

Thursday, March 30, 2023 15:03

_Marcin “Icewall” Noga of Cisco Talos discovered this vulnerability._

Cisco Talos recently discovered a vulnerability in ManageEngine OpManager that could lead to an XML external entity (XXE) attack.

OpManager is network monitoring software that allows users to track and manage the performance of connected routers, switches, firewalls, servers, VMs and more. A vulnerability (TALOS-2022-1685/CVE-2022-43473) exists when the user attempts to add a unified computing system (UCS) to the software.

An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing a specially crafted, malicious XML file at an exact point during that connection process to allow them to carry out an XXE attack. XXE attacks allow an adversary to interact with other backend or external systems that OpManager accesses.

Cisco Talos worked with the managers of ManageEngine to ensure that this issue is resolved and an update is available for affected users, all in adherence to Cisco’s vulnerability disclosure policy.

Users are encouraged to update ManageEngine OpManager, version 12.6.168 as soon as possible. Talos tested and confirmed this version of the software could be exploited by this vulnerability.

The following Snort rule will detect exploitation attempts against this vulnerability:  
49864\. Additional rules may be released in the future and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center or Snort.org.

Vulnerability Spotlight: Vulnerability in ManageEngine OpManager could lead to XXE attack

Very few of us looking to buy these pieces of equipment are qualified to say if these products are even secure, and those among us who are are probably smart enough to know not to buy these products in the first place.

Thursday, March 30, 2023 14:03

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.

Everyone loves a good video of someone slipping on their icy steps in the winter, captured thanks to their home security camera or smart doorbell. But what about when that camera is just kind of chilling out and not catching the moment your dog takes off after that squirrel?

The world of security cameras and recording devices attached to one’s home is becoming increasingly murky by the day. Law enforcement officials are finding ways to compel the companies that manufacture and manage these devices to turn over homeowners’ footage, even if the homeowner doesn’t consent to it.

And Amazon Ring, the biggest player in this space now, may or may not be the target of a ransomware attack.

So, while consumers might be purchasing these devices to ensure their physical security, the question about if these products are good for online security is a major question mark.

As Talos’ own Joe Marshall wrote in a guest column at Dark Reading this week, “IoT vendors continue to fail us on implementing solid cybersecurity controls.” This even goes for some of the largest tech companies in the world who would conceivably have the most money to invest in securing and testing these devices before they hit the market.

There are tons of budget options on the market that, unless you are an expert vulnerability researcher, are impossible to fully vet. I just went to Amazon’s website this week and searched for “smart doorbell.” Three of the best-selling items on the first page of results use nearly the exact same thumbnail art to advertise the product. Yet when you go to their product pages, each one is listed as being manufactured or sold by a different company.

If you’re merely reading the reviews of these products to figure out what’s right for you, or searching the internet for someone else’s review, they may mention if the resolution quality is up to snuff or if the app works well, but I doubt the reviewer has the time to physically tear apart the device looking for vulnerabilities or combing through the API for security holes. And if we can’t even trust the companies making these devices to differentiate their products based on appearance, there is no way to know how they may be prepared to respond to a data breach or what their stance is on sharing footage with law enforcement.

The same goes for security cameras. On Amazon’s search page for “home security camera,” the top five non-sponsored results are all made by different companies (Ring being one of them) and based on the features they offer, it’s nearly impossible to differentiate them outside of a difference in form factor. Very few of us looking to buy these pieces of equipment are qualified to say if these products are even secure, and those among us who are are probably smart enough to know not to buy these products in the first place.

I certainly wouldn’t stop anyone from buying a home security camera if they truly feel it improves their families’ safety. But I think that, no matter what brand we buy, everyone just needs to assume now that they’re taking a risk with their privacy and online security as a trade-off for catching possible package burglars.

**The one big thing**

Emotet is back from the dead once again. Since returning, Emotet has leveraged several distinct infection chains, indicating that they are modifying their approach based on their perceived success in infecting new systems. The initial emails delivered to victims are consistent with what has been observed from Emotet over the past several years.

Why do I care?

Emotet is arguably the most infamous botnet on the threat landscape, so it’s notable any time it spins back up. This network is known to go through quiet periods and then pop back up, so this isn’t particularly surprising, but it is noteworthy because Emotet’s creators are switching up their tactics by switching to new types of lure documents to evade detection and recent changes Microsoft made to macros to try and stop attackers from using malicious Office attachments.

**So now what?**

Because Emotet has been around for so long now, Cisco Secure and Talos have an exhaustive list of ways to stay protected from Emotet spam. But as a good general reminder, always make sure you triple-check the “From” field in an email to make sure it’s actually from who you think its from. And never open an attachment or click on a link in an email unless you’re sure it’s the correct destination.

**Top security headlines of the week**

**Defenders and detractors of TikTok both seem unmoved** after the popular social media app’s CEO testified in front of a U.S. Congressional panel last week. Lawmakers who are in favor of a blanket ban on the app in the U.S. over data and privacy concerns were unimpressed with the answers the company’s lead provided, while others mocked lawmakers for the types of questions they asked and instead advocated for broader data privacy laws. Republicans in Congress still plan to take up legislation to ban TikTok, with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy tweeting that, “It’s very concerning that the CEO of TikTok can’t be honest and admit what we already know to be true — China has access to TikTok user data.” (Buzzfeed, The Hill, The New Yorker)

**A bug in the popular ChatGPT AI tool exposed other users’ message history** and may have also leaked sensitive information like the payment information and emails of premium users. OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, took the tool offline last Tuesday for emergency maintenance after they became aware of the issue. The company confirmed the information was exposed during a nine-hour window on March 20, but it could have been exposed prior to that. The data leak exposes concerns that many users have around using tools like ChatGPT to share sensitive or potentially confidential information. (SecurityWeek, Engadget)

**A data breach at Latitude Financial affects millions of people in New Zealand and Australia,** potentially dating back to 2005. The personal lending company said attackers stole around 7.9 million driver’s license numbers and 53,000 passport numbers. Names, addresses, phone numbers and dates of birth are also among the data stolen. When Latitude first announced the attack on March 16, it estimated that 300,000 customers had been affected, but the number has grown as the investigation continued, though the company stopped the breach prior to the disclosure. The breach has called into question why financial companies retain records for so long after a customer has applied for financing and how that data is stored. (The Guardian, Yahoo Finance)

**Can’t get enough Talos?**

*   Talos Takes Ep. #132: Reflecting on one year of Talos' work in Ukraine
*   Graphic novel: Life inside the Talos Ukraine Task Unit
*   How an incident response retainer can drive proactive security
*   Threat Roundup for March 17 - 24
*   If your Netgear Orbi router isn’t patched, you’ll want to change that pronto

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos**

**RSA** **(April 24 - 27)**

San Francisco, CA

**Cisco Live U.S.** **(June 4 - 8)**

Las Vegas, NV

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week**

  
**SHA 256:** e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934  
**MD5:** 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c  
**Typical Filename:** Wextract  
**Claimed Product:** Internet Explorer  
**Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Trojan.Generic::85.lp.ret.sbx.tg

**SHA 256:** 00ab15b194cc1fc8e48e849ca9717c0700ef7ce2265511276f7015d7037d8725  
**MD5:** d47fa115154927113b05bd3c8a308201  
**Typical Filename:** mssqlsrv.exe  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.65065311

**SHA 256:** de3908adc431d1e66656199063acbb83f2b2bfc4d21f02076fe381bb97afc423  
**MD5:** 954a5fc664c23a7a97e09850accdfe8e  
**Typical Filename:** teams15.exe  
**Claimed Product:** teams15  
**Detection Name:** Gen:Variant.MSILHeracles.59885

**SHA 256:** c74e7421f2021b46ee256e5f02d94c1bce15da107c8c997c611055412de1ac1  
**MD5:** 2d16d0af6183803a79d9ef5c744286c4  
**Typical Filename:** nano\_download.php  
**Claimed Product:** Web Companion Installer  
**Detection Name:** W32.1C74E7421F-100.SBX.VIOC

**SHA 256:** 5616b94f1a40b49096e2f8f78d646891b45c649473a5b67b8beddac46ad398e1  
**MD5:** 3e10a74a7613d1cae4b9749d7ec93515  
**Typical Filename:** IMG001.exe  
**Claimed Product:** N/A  
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Coinminer::1201

Threat Source newsletter (March 30, 2023) — It’s impossible to tell if your home security camera or doorbell is truly safe

OpenImageIO is a library that converts, compares and processes various image files. Blender and AliceVision, two often used computer imaging services, utilize the library, among other software offerings.

Thursday, March 30, 2023 12:03

_Lilith >\_> of Cisco Talos discovered these vulnerabilities._

Cisco Talos recently discovered three vulnerabilities in the OpenImageIO image-parsing library that many popular pieces of 3-D rendering software use.

OpenImageIO is a library that converts, compares and processes various image files. Blender and AliceVision, two often used computer imaging services, utilize the library, among other software offerings.

Two of the vulnerabilities — TALOS-2023-1707 (CVE-2023-24473) and TALOS-2023-1708 (CVE-2023-22845) — could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. An adversary could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending the target a specially crafted, malicious Targa (.tga) file.

TALOS-2023-1709 (CVE-2023-24472) is a denial-of-service vulnerability that is a continuation of TALOS-2022-1653 (CVE-2022-43594 and CVE-2022-43595). Talos first discovered CVE-2022-43595 in December, though it was not fixed in the most recent version of OpenImageIO.

Cisco Talos worked with OpenImageIO to ensure that these issues are resolved and an update is available for affected users, all in adherence to Cisco’s vulnerability disclosure policy.

Users are encouraged to update these affected products as soon as possible: OpenImageIO Project, version 2.4.7.1. Talos tested and confirmed this version of the library could be exploited by this vulnerability.

The following Snort rule will detect exploitation attempts against this vulnerability: 61271, 61272, 61384 and 61385. Additional rules may be released in the future and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center or Snort.org.

Vulnerability Spotlight: Specially crafted files could lead to denial of service, information disclosure in OpenImageIO parser

An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted HTTP, TLS or DTLS packet to the target machine, potentially causing a denial of service or gaining the ability to execute remote code.

Thursday, March 30, 2023 10:03

_Keane O’Kelley of Cisco ASIG discovered this vulnerability._

Cisco ASIG recently discovered a remote code execution vulnerability in the SNIProxy open-source tool that occurs when the user utilizes wildcard backend hosts.

SNIProxy proxies incoming HTTP and TLS connections based on the hostname contained in the initial request of the TCP session. This open-source tool allows for users to carry out name-based proxying of HTTPS without decrypting traffic or needing a key or certificate.

Talos discovered a remote code execution vulnerability (TALOS-2023-1731/CVE-2023-25076) that exists if the user is utilizing wildcard backend hosts when configuring SNIProxy. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted HTTP, TLS or DTLS packet to the target machine, potentially causing a denial of service or gaining the ability to execute remote code.

Cisco Talos worked with the managers of SNIProxy to ensure that these issues are resolved and an update is available for affected users, all in adherence to Cisco’s vulnerability disclosure policy.

Users are encouraged to update these affected products as soon as possible: SNIProxy version 0.6.0-2 and SNIProxy Master, version 822bb80df9b7b345cc9eba55df74a07b498819ba. Talos tested and confirmed these versions of the open-source tool could be exploited by this vulnerability.

The following Snort rule will detect exploitation attempts against this vulnerability:  
61474\. Additional rules may be released in the future and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center or Snort.org.

Vulnerability Spotlight: SNIProxy contains remote code execution vulnerability

Whether it be threat hunting, an active defense posture or just improving security instrumentation alerts and logs an organization keeps, it’s best for every user — no matter the size — to be prepared for when a cybersecurity incident or breach occurs.

Wednesday, March 29, 2023 08:03

We’ve written before about the importance of taking a proactive approach to cybersecurity.

Whether it be threat hunting, an active defense posture or just improving security instrumentation alerts and logs an organization keeps, it’s best for every user — no matter the size — to be prepared for when a cybersecurity incident or breach occurs.

We saw this recently with a customer in the education industry vertical. The customer leveraged their Cisco Talos Incident Response retainer after conducting some proactive threat hunting to notify us that they identified some suspicious activity on their network. Talos IR responders quickly noticed that just a single box on the customer’s network alerted, and we isolated the intrusion to a single endpoint within the network. Talos IR concluded with high confidence that the adversary had compromised just a single endpoint with a single, compromised credential. This strong collaborative approach from the customer and Talos allowed us to quickly contain and eradicate the adversary from the environment.

Our Talos IR 2022 Q3 Quarterly Trends reflect pre-ransomware and ransomware activity being the top threat and this continues a trend that we’ve seen across the threat landscape where adversaries are increasingly carrying out pre-ransomware activities to establish a foothold on a network rather than diving in head-first with a full-blown ransomware attack. Regulation and small-medium business targets may be factors for adversaries evolving extortion tactics versus deploying ransomware within a compromised environment. Potential attack targets may just see smaller, potentially innocuous activities from an adversary that doesn’t have to include the encryption of files on a network and request for a ransom payment.

As outlined in Talos’ 2022 Year in Review, education is a particularly vulnerable sector and we expect adversaries to increase the targeting of schools and universities over the summer when students start to return to classes after break.

If you want to detect, quickly respond and eradicate an adversary like this customer, you need to have incident response expertise in place. Cisco Secure’s Security Outcomes Report recently found that there was 11 percent difference in average resilience scores between organizations that have an external incident response retainer versus those that don’t.

A foundational component of this proactive plan is a Cisco Talos Incident Response Retainer. If a Talos IR retainer customer sees something suspicious, we’re there immediately to respond and determine what containment actions are appropriate and if a further forensic investigation is required. Just because you are not experiencing file encryption in your environment does not mean that an adversary doesn’t have the capability to deploy ransomware leading to a business-impacting cybersecurity incident. It is common for an adversary to gain initial access to a target organization and maintain access.

With an incident response retainer, an organization doesn’t have to conglomerate a plan or response together. Instead, it’s a one-size-fits-all package that includes tabletop exercises, cyber range training, purple teaming, intelligence on-demand, and much more. Then, if (more likely when) your worst career day occurs and your organization is the target of a cyber-attack, Talos IR stands at the ready to help the team respond immediately to detect and eradicate an advanced or determined adversary.

We’ll be covering more about Incident Response retainers in our upcoming Talos IR On Air live stream on April 27 at noon Eastern, which you can watch on our LinkedIn and Twitter pages live.

With a retainer from Talos IR, organizations and users will have peace of mind that they have a trusted digital forensic and incident response team ready at any time. There’s no need to purchase emergency incident response services from one vendor, training exercises from another and a third vendor to assist in the creation of an incident response plan to prepare for the next time there’s an incident. Talos IR offers all these services in one package with a retainer.

If a customer doesn’t have a breach or an incident, there are many ways to leverage Talos IR proactively by enlisting us to lead your team through a hypothetical tabletop exercise or conducting a compromise assessment to identify potential gaps in your network before the adversaries can.

Even if your organization doesn’t already have Cisco products in place, Talos IR can work with you — we’re completely vendor-agnostic. Whatever tools and software you have, we’re here to help.

No matter what tools you must detect or scan for the next threat, our responders can start their work immediately to remediate the threat. If you require new hardware or software solutions, our team can always help with that, too.

If you are already a Cisco customer, a Talos IR retainer is the perfect way to continue your security journey with us and become more resilient. We’ll find the full capabilities of your security team and then develop a prescriptive plan for how your security team can best work with us over the lifetime of the retainer. The team that starts working with you from the first day you sign onto a retainer will be there with you.

If you’d like to learn more about a Talos IR retainer, please reach out to us through our website, and tune into the next Talos IR On Air to hear more about this service.