#git

One of the key components of a container-based architecture is security.There are many facets to it (just have a look at the list of topics in the official OpenShift documentation here), but some of the most basic requirements are authentication and authorization. In this article, I explain how authentication and authorization work in Kubernetes and Red Hat OpenShift. I cover interactions between the different layers of a Kubernetes ecosystem, including the infrastructure layer, Kubernetes layer, and the containerized applications layer.What is authentication and authorization?In simple terms,

### Impact A user without script/programming right can trick a user with elevated rights to edit a content with a malicious payload using a WYSIWYG editor. The user with elevated rights is not warned beforehand that they are going to edit possibly dangerous content. The payload is executed at edit time. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 15.10RC1. ### Workarounds No workaround. It is advised to upgrade to XWiki 15.10+. ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20331 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21311 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21481 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21482 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21483 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21484 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21485 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21486 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21487 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21488 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21489 * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21490 ### ...

### Impact Is it possible for a user without Script or Programming rights to craft a URL pointing to a page with arbitrary JavaScript. This requires social engineer to trick a user to follow the URL. #### Reproduction steps 1. As a user without script or programming right, create a (non-terminal) document named `" + alert(1) + "` (the quotes need to be part of the name). 1. Edit the class. 1. Add a string property named `"test"`. 1. Edit using the object editor and add an object of the created class 1. Get an admin to open `<xwiki-server>/xwiki/bin/view/%22%20%2B%20alert(1)%20%2B%20%22/?viewer=display&type=object&property=%22%20%2B%20alert(1)%20%2B%20%22.WebHome.test&mode=edit` where `<xwiki-server>` is the URL of your XWiki installation. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.21, 15.5.5, 15.10.6 and 16.0.0. ### Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading. ### References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21810 - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-plat...

### Summary Upon reviewing the MobSF source code, I identified a flaw in the Static Libraries analysis section. Specifically, during the extraction of .a extension files, the measure intended to prevent Zip Slip attacks is improperly implemented. Since the implemented measure can be bypassed, the vulnerability allows an attacker to extract files to any desired location within the server running MobSF. ### Details Upon examining lines 183-192 of the `mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/common/shared_func.py` file, it is observed that there is a mitigation against Zip Slip attacks implemented as `a.decode('utf-8', 'ignore').replace('../', '').replace('..\\', '')`. However, this measure can be bypassed using sequences like `....//....//....//`. Since the replace operation is not recursive, this sequence is transformed into `../../../` after the replace operation, allowing files to be written to upper directories. <img width="448" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fadf...

### Impact The fugit "natural" parser, that turns "every wednesday at 5pm" into "0 17 * * 3", accepted any length of input and went on attempting to parse it, not returning promptly, as expected. The parse call could hold the thread with no end in sight. Fugit dependents that do not check (user) input length for plausability are impacted. ### Patches Problem was reported in #104 and the fix was released in [fugit 1.11.1](https://rubygems.org/gems/fugit/versions/1.11.1) ### Workarounds By making sure that `Fugit.parse(s)`, `Fugit.do_parse(s)`, `Fugit.parse_nat(s)`, `Fugit.do_parse_nat(s)`, `Fugit::Nat.parse(s)`, and `Fugit::Nat.do_parse(s)` are not fed strings too long. 1000 chars feels ok, while 10_000 chars makes it stall. In fewer words, making sure those fugit methods are not fed unvetted input strings. ### References gh-104

Dovecot IMAP server versions 2.2 and 2.3 suffer from denial of service and resource exhaustion vulnerabilities.

Dovecot IMAP server versions 2.2 and 2.3 have an issue where a large number of address headers (From, To, Cc, Bcc, etc.) becomes excessively CPU intensive. With 100k header lines CPU usage is already 12 seconds, and in a production environment we observed 500k header lines taking 18 minutes to parse. Since this can be triggered by external actors sending emails to a victim, this is a security issue.

The following presentation at this year's DEF CON was brought to our attention on the SQLx Discord: > SQL Injection isn't Dead: Smuggling Queries at the Protocol Level > <http://web.archive.org/web/20240812130923/https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Paul%20Gerste%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20Isn't%20Dead%20Smuggling%20Queries%20at%20the%20Protocol%20Level.pdf> > (Archive link for posterity.) Essentially, encoding a value larger than 4GiB can cause the length prefix in the protocol to overflow, causing the server to interpret the rest of the string as binary protocol commands or other data. It appears SQLx _does_ perform truncating casts in a way that could be problematic, for example: <https://github.com/launchbadge/sqlx/blob/6f2905695b9606b5f51b40ce10af63ac9e696bb8/sqlx-postgres/src/arguments.rs#L163> This code has existed essentially since the beginning, so it is reasonable to assume that all published versions `<= 0.8.0` a...

A stalkerware researcher has found that Trackimo and its Tracki GPS tracker have some underlying major security flaws exposing location data.

A new type of malware called UULoader is being used by threat actors to deliver next-stage payloads like Gh0st RAT and Mimikatz. The Cyberint Research Team, which discovered the malware, said it's distributed in the form of malicious installers for legitimate applications targeting Korean and Chinese speakers. There is evidence pointing to UULoader being the work of a Chinese speaker due to the