#git

### Summary The 'gitImportSite' functionality obtains a URL string from a POST request and insufficiently validates user input. The ’set_remote’ function later passes this input into ’proc_open’, yielding OS command injection. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the logic of the ’gitImportSite’ function, located in ’Operations.php’. The current implementation only relies on the ’filter_var’ and 'strpos' functions to validate the URL, which is not sufficient to ensure absence of all Bash special characters used for command injection.  #### Affected Resources • Operations.php:2103 gitImportSite() • \<domain\>/\<user\>/system/api/gitImportSite ### PoC To replicate this vulnerability, authenticate and send a POST request to the 'gitImportSite' endpoint with a crafted URL in the JSON data. Note, a valid token needs to be obtained by capturing a request to another API endpoint (such as '...

### Impact Pion Interceptor versions v0.1.36 through v0.1.38 contain a bug in a RTP packet factory that can be exploited to trigger a panic with Pion based SFU via crafted RTP packets, This only affect users that use pion/interceptor. ### Patches Upgrade to v0.1.39 or later, which includes PR [#338](https://github.com/pion/interceptor/pull/338) which validates that: `padLen > 0 && padLen <= payloadLength` and return error on overflow, avoiding panic. If upgrading is not possible, apply the patch from the pull request manually or drop packets whose P-bit is set but whose padLen is zero or larger than the remaining payload. ### Workarounds At the application layer, reject any RTP packet where: ``` hasPadding (P-bit field) == true && (padLen == 0 || padLen > packetLen – headerLen) ``` before passing it to Pion’s packet factories. ### References Commit fixing the bug: https://github.com/pion/interceptor/commit/fa5b35ea867389cec33a9c82fffbd459ca8958e5 Pull request: https://github.c...

Have you been scammed online? Here are some tips to limit the damage and follow up steps you may find useful

### Summary In the HAX site editor, users can create a website block to load another site in an iframe. The application allows users to supply a target URL in the website block. When the HAX site is visited, the client's browser will query the supplied URL. ### Affected Resources - [Operations.php:868](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/master/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L868) - `https://<site>/<user>/system/api/saveNode` ### PoC 1. Set the URL in an iframe pointing to an attacker-controlled server running Responder  2. Once another user visits the site, they are prompted to sign in.  3. If a user inputs credentials, the username and password hash are outputted in Responder.  ### Impact An au...

### Impact Due to a URL parsing issue, Requests releases prior to 2.32.4 may leak .netrc credentials to third parties for specific maliciously-crafted URLs. ### Workarounds For older versions of Requests, use of the .netrc file can be disabled with `trust_env=False` on your Requests Session ([docs](https://requests.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api/#requests.Session.trust_env)). ### References https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6965 https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jun/2

### Summary An authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the HAXCMS saveOutline endpoint allows a low-privileged user to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating the location field written into site.json. This enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive system files such as /etc/passwd, application secrets, or configuration files accessible to the web server (www-data). ### Details The vulnerability stems from the way the HAXCMS backend handles the location field in the site's outline. When a user sends a POST request to /system/api/saveOutline, the backend stores the provided location value directly into the site.json file associated with the site, without validating or sanitizing the input. Later the location parameter is interpreted by the CMS like in[ HAXCMSSite.php line 1248](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/HAXCMSSite.php#L1248) to resolve and load the content for a given node. I...

### Summary The application does not sufficiently sanitize user input, allowing for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code. The 'saveNode' and 'saveManifest' endpoints take user input and store it in the JSON schema for the site. This content is then rendered in the generated HAX site. Although the application does not allow users to supply a 'script' tag, it does allow the use of other HTML tags to run JavaScript. ### Affected Resources - [Operations.php:258](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/master/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L258) `saveManifest()` - [Operations.php:868](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/master/system/backend/php/lib/Operations.php#L868) `saveNode()` - `https://<site>/<user>/system/api/saveNode` - `https://<site>/<user>/system/api/saveManifest` ### Impact An authenticated attacker can use the site editor and settings editor to store malicious payloads in a HAX site which execute arbitrary JavaScript when a user visits the sit...

Phone numbers are a goldmine for SIM swappers. A researcher found how to get this precious piece of information through a clever brute-force attack.

### Impact The application is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks due to incorrect input validation and sanitization of user-input data. An attacker can inject arbitrary HTML code, including JavaScript scripts, into the page processed by the user's browser, allowing them to steal sensitive data, hijack user sessions, or conduct other malicious activities. ### Patches The issue is fixed in https://github.com/barryvdh/laravel-translation-manager/pull/475 which is released in version 0.6.8 ### Workarounds Only authenticated users with access to the translation manager are impacted. ### References [[PT-2025-04] laravel translation manager.pdf](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/20639250/PT-2025-04.laravel.translation.manager.pdf) ### Reported by Positive Technologies (Artem Deikov, Ilya Tsaturov, Daniil Satyaev, Roman Cheremnykh, Artem Danilov, Stanislav Gleym)

### Summary The `env` and `expandenv` template functions which is enabled by default in [Sprig](https://masterminds.github.io/sprig/) enables capturing of env variables on host. While this may not be a problem on single-user (super admin) installations, on multi-user installations, this allows non-super-admin users with campaign or template permissions to use the `{{ env }}` template expression to capture sensitive environment variables. **Upgrade to [v5.0.2](https://github.com/knadh/listmonk/releases/tag/v5.0.2)** to mitigate. --------- # Demonstration ### Description A critical template injection vulnerability exists in Listmonk's campaign preview functionality that allows authenticated users with minimal privileges (campaigns:get & campaigns:get_all) to extract sensitive system data, including database credentials, SMTP passwords, and admin credentials due to some dangerous function being allowed. ### Proof of Concept - Create a user and give him `campaigns:get` and `campaigns...