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GHSA-32gq-x56h-299c: age vulnerable to malicious plugin names, recipients, or identities causing arbitrary binary execution

A plugin name containing a path separator may allow an attacker to execute an arbitrary binary. Such a plugin name can be provided to the age CLI through an attacker-controlled recipient or identity string, or to the [`plugin.NewIdentity`](https://pkg.go.dev/filippo.io/age/plugin#NewIdentity), [`plugin.NewIdentityWithoutData`](https://pkg.go.dev/filippo.io/age/plugin#NewIdentityWithoutData), or [`plugin.NewRecipient`](https://pkg.go.dev/filippo.io/age/plugin#NewRecipient) APIs. On UNIX systems, a directory matching `${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/age-plugin-*` needs to exist for the attack to succeed. The binary is executed with a single flag, either `--age-plugin=recipient-v1` or `--age-plugin=identity-v1`. The standard input includes the recipient or identity string, and the random file key (if encrypting) or the header of the file (if decrypting). The format is constrained by the [age-plugin](https://c2sp.org/age-plugin) protocol. An equivalent issue was fixed by the [rage](https://github.com/...

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#git
GHSA-4fg7-vxc8-qx5w: rage vulnerable to malicious plugin names, recipients, or identities causing arbitrary binary execution

A plugin name containing a path separator may allow an attacker to execute an arbitrary binary. Such a plugin name can be provided to the `rage` CLI through an attacker-controlled recipient or identity string, or to the following `age` APIs when the `plugin` feature flag is enabled: - [`age::plugin::Identity::from_str`](https://docs.rs/age/0.11.0/age/plugin/struct.Identity.html#impl-FromStr-for-Identity) (or equivalently [`str::parse::<age::plugin::Identity>()`](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/core/primitive.str.html#method.parse)) - [`age::plugin::Identity::default_for_plugin`](https://docs.rs/age/0.11.0/age/plugin/struct.Identity.html#method.default_for_plugin) - [`age::plugin::IdentityPluginV1::new`](https://docs.rs/age/0.11.0/age/plugin/struct.IdentityPluginV1.html#method.new) - [`age::plugin::Recipient::from_str`](https://docs.rs/age/0.11.0/age/plugin/struct.Recipient.html#impl-FromStr-for-Recipient) (or equivalently [`str::parse::<age::plugin::Recipient>()`](https://doc.rust-la...

Phishers Spoof Google Calendar Invites in Fast-Spreading, Global Campaign

Attackers are using links to the popular Google scheduling app to lead users to pages that steal credentials, with the ultimate goal of committing financial fraud.

Pallet liquidation scams and how to recognize them

Pallet liquidation is an attractive playing field for online scammers. Will you receive goods or get your credit card details stolen?

GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r: `Slip10Like` derivation method instantiated with certain curves may allow attacker to find derivation path which results into very long derivation (possible DoS)

### Impact <!-- _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ --> **Impacted are the only ones who use [`hd_wallet::Slip10Like`](https://docs.rs/hd-wallet/0.5.1/hd_wallet/struct.Slip10Like.html) or [`slip_10`](https://docs.rs/slip-10/latest/slip_10/) derivation method instantiated with curves other than secp256k1 and secp256r1.** `hd_wallet` crate used to provide `Slip10Like` derivation method, which is also provided in `slip-10` crate as a default derivation method. It's based on [slip10](https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0010.md) method that searches for a valid child key in an infinite loop until it's found. Theoretically, this could be exploited by an attacker by finding a derivation path that would force someone to execute a lot of iterations of this loop to find a valid child key. This attack, however, requires the probability of getting an invalid scalar from random 32 bytes to be high. Slip10 is protected from this attack as it's only defined on se...

GHSA-m56h-5xx3-2jc2: Prototype pollution in jsii.configureCategories

## Summary `jsii` is a TypeScript to JavaScript compiler that also extracts an interface definition manifest to generate RPC stubs in various programming languages. jsii is typically used as a command-line tool, but it can also be loaded as a library. When loaded as a library into a larger application, prototype pollution may happen if untrusted user input is passed to the library. When used as a command line-tool, this pollution cannot occur. ## Impact You may be impacted if you have written an application that loads jsii as a library, and passes untrusted user input into the `jsii.configureCategories()` function. In that case, a user can craft input in such a way that, following the invocation, a field named "category" with a user-controlled value is added to the JavaScript Object prototype. This will cause every object in the program (both new and existing) to have a field named "category", even if it shouldn't. **This will not affect jsii itself, but it might affect the applic...

Hackers Exploiting Linux eBPF to Spread Malware in Ongoing Campaign

KEY SUMMARY POINTS Cybersecurity researchers Dr. Web have uncovered a new and active Linux malware campaign aimed at…

GHSA-c4pw-33h3-35xw: Atro CSRF Middleware Bypass (security.checkOrigin)

### Summary A bug in Astro’s CSRF-protection middleware allows requests to bypass CSRF checks. ### Details When the `security.checkOrigin` configuration option is set to `true`, Astro middleware will perform a CSRF check. (Source code: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/6031962ab5f56457de986eb82bd24807e926ba1b/packages/astro/src/core/app/middlewares.ts) For example, with the following Astro configuration: ```js // astro.config.mjs import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config'; import node from '@astrojs/node'; export default defineConfig({ output: 'server', security: { checkOrigin: true }, adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }), }); ``` A request like the following would be blocked if made from a different origin: ```js // fetch API or <form action="https://test.example.com/" method="POST"> fetch('https://test.example.com/', { method: 'POST', credentials: 'include', body: 'a=b', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' }, }); // => Cross-site POST...

Midnight Blizzard Taps Phishing Emails, Rogue RDP Nets

The Russian-based attack group uses legitimate red-team tools, 200 domain names, and 34 back-end RDP servers, making it harder to identify and block malicious activity.