#git

CometVisu's file system endpoints don't require authentication and additionally the endpoint to update an existing file is susceptible to path traversal. This makes it possible for an attacker to overwrite existing files on the openHAB instance. If the overwritten file is a shell script that is executed at a later time this vulnerability can allow remote code execution by an attacker. This vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL's [Uncontrolled data used in path expression](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-path-injection/) query. ## Impact This issue may lead up to Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Several endpoints in the CometVisu add-on of openHAB don't require authentication. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to modify or to steal sensitive data. ## Impact This issue may lead to sensitive Information Disclosure.

The [proxy endpoint](https://github.com/openhab/openhab-webui/blob/1c03c60f84388b9d7da0231df2d4ebb1e17d3fcf/bundles/org.openhab.ui.cometvisu/src/main/java/org/openhab/ui/cometvisu/internal/backend/rest/ProxyResource.java#L83) of openHAB's CometVisu add-on can be accessed without authentication. This proxy-feature can be exploited as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to induce GET HTTP requests to internal-only servers, in case openHAB is exposed in a non-private network. Furthermore, this proxy-feature can also be exploited as a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, as an attacker is able to re-route a request to their server and return a page with malicious JavaScript code. Since the browser receives this data directly from the openHAB CometVisu UI, this JavaScript code will be executed with the origin of the CometVisu UI. This allows an attacker to exploit call endpoints on an openHAB server even if the openHAB server is located in a private network. (e.g. by sending an openHAB...

### Summary Static routes which contain files with compressed variants (`.gz` or `.br` extension) were vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links. ### Details The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when `follow_symlinks=False` (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the `FileResponse` class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing `Path.stat()` and `Path.open()` to send the file. ### Impact Servers with static routes that contain compressed variants as symbolic links, pointing outside the root directory, or that permit users to upload or create such links, are impacted. ---- Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8653/files

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