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### Impact A [cross-site scripting (XSS)](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/) vulnerability was discovered in TinyMCE’s Notification Manager API. The vulnerability exploits TinyMCE's unfiltered notification system, which is used in error handling. The conditions for this exploit requires carefully crafted malicious content to have been inserted into the editor and a notification to have been triggered. When a notification was opened, the HTML within the text argument was displayed unfiltered in the notification. The vulnerability allowed arbitrary JavaScript execution when an notification presented in the TinyMCE UI for the current user. This issue could also be exploited by any integration which uses a TinyMCE notification to display unfiltered HTML content. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in TinyMCE 5.10.8 and TinyMCE 6.7.1 by ensuring that the HTML displayed in the notification is sanitized, preventing the exploit. ### Fix To avoid this vulnerability...

### Impact A [mutation cross-site scripting](https://researchgate.net/publication/266654651_mXSS_attacks_Attacking_well-secured_web-applications_by_using_innerHTML_mutations) (mXSS) vulnerability was discovered in TinyMCE’s core undo and redo functionality. When a carefully-crafted HTML snippet passes the XSS sanitisation layer, it is manipulated as a string by internal trimming functions before being stored in the undo stack. If the HTML snippet is restored from the undo stack, the combination of the string manipulation and reparative parsing by either the browser's native [DOMParser API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/DOMParser) (TinyMCE 6) or the [SaxParser API](https://www.tiny.cloud/docs/api/tinymce.html/tinymce.html.saxparser/) (TinyMCE 5) mutates the HTML maliciously, allowing an XSS payload to be executed. ​This vulnerability also impacts these related TinyMCE APIs and plugins:​ * [`tinymce.Editor.getContent({ format: 'raw' })`](https://tiny.cloud/docs/tinymce...

Terminal character injection in Mintty before 3.6.3 allows code execution via unescaped output to the terminal.

### Impact Any users who are using the `wget` extractor and view the content it outputs. The impact is potentially severe if you are logged in to the ArchiveBox admin site in the same browser session and view an archived malicious page designed to target your ArchiveBox instance. Malicious JS could potentially act using your logged-in admin credentials and add/remove/modify snapshots, add/remove/modify ArchiveBox users, and generally do anything an admin user could do. The impact is less severe for non-logged-in users, as malicious JS cannot *modify* any archives, but it can still *read* all the other archived content by fetching the snapshot index and iterating through it. Because all of ArchiveBox's archived content is served from the same host and port as the admin panel, when archived pages are viewed the JS executes in the same context as all the other archived pages (and the admin panel), defeating most of the browser's usual CORS/CSRF security protections and leading to th...

(This advisory is canonically <https://advisories.nats.io/CVE/secnote-2023-01.txt>) ## Background NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing. NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable. ## Problem Description Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication. Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block. If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. Wh...

### Impact The Apollo Router is a configurable, high-performance graph router written in Rust to run a federated supergraph that uses Apollo Federation. Affected versions are subject to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) type vulnerability which causes the Router to panic and terminate when a multi-part response is sent. When users send queries to the router that uses the `@defer` or Subscriptions, the Router will panic. To be vulnerable, users of Router must have a coprocessor with `coprocessor.supergraph.response` configured in their `router.yaml` and also to support either `@defer` or Subscriptions. ### Patches Router version 1.33.0 has a fix for this vulnerability. https://github.com/apollographql/router/pull/4014 fixes the issue. ### Workarounds For affected versions, avoid using the coprocessor supergraph response: ```yml # do not use this stage in your coprocessor configuration coprocessor: supergraph: response: ``` Or you can disable defer and subscriptions support: ```y...

### Impact A user with a limited-permission editor account for the Wagtail admin can make a direct URL request to the admin view that handles bulk actions on user accounts. While authentication rules prevent the user from making any changes, the error message discloses the display names of user accounts, and by modifying URL parameters, the user can retrieve the display name for any user. The vulnerability is not exploitable by an ordinary site visitor without access to the Wagtail admin. ### Patches Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 4.1.9 (LTS), 5.0.5 and 5.1.3. The fix is also included in Release Candidate 1 of the forthcoming Wagtail 5.2 release. ### Workarounds None. ### Acknowledgements Many thanks to @quyenheu for reporting this issue. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Visit Wagtail's [support channels](https://docs.wagtail.io/en/stable/support.html) * Email us at [[email protected]](mailto:security@wagtail...

The React Developer Tools extension registers a message listener with window.addEventListener('message', <listener>) in a content script that is accessible to any webpage that is active in the browser. Within the listener is code that requests a URL derived from the received message via fetch(). The URL is not validated or sanitised before it is fetched, thus allowing a malicious web page to arbitrarily fetch URL’s via the victim's browser.

An issue in GetSimpleCMS v.3.4.0a allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the phpinfo().

The React Developer Tools extension registers a message listener with window.addEventListener('message', <listener>) in a content script that is accessible to any webpage that is active in the browser. Within the listener is code that requests a URL derived from the received message via fetch(). The URL is not validated or sanitised before it is fetched, thus allowing a malicious web page to arbitrarily fetch URL’s via the victim's browser.