#java

A flaw was found in Keycloak. An active keycloak session can be hijacked by initiating a new authentication (having the query parameter prompt=login) and forcing the user to enter his credentials once again. If the user cancels this re-authentication by clicking Restart login, the account takeover could take place as the new session, with a different SUB, will have the same SID as the previous session.

A flaw was found in Keycloak, where it does not properly validate URLs included in a redirect. An attacker can use this flaw to construct a malicious request to bypass validation and access other URLs and potentially sensitive information within the domain or possibly conduct further attacks. This flaw affects any client that utilizes a wildcard in the Valid Redirect URIs field. #### Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Axel Flamcourt for reporting this issue and helping us improve our project.

A potential security flaw in the "checkLoginIframe" which allows unvalidated cross-origin messages, enabling potential DDoS attacks. By exploiting this vulnerability, attackers could coordinate to send millions of requests in seconds using simple code, significantly impacting the application's availability without proper origin validation for incoming messages. #### Acknowledgements Special thanks to Adriano Márcio Monteiro from BRZTEC for reporting this issue and helping us improve our project.

A flaw was found in keycloak 22.0.5. Errors in browser client during setup/auth with "Security Key login" (WebAuthn) are written into the form, send to Keycloak and logged without escaping allowing log injection. Acknowledgements: Special thanks toTheresa Henze for reporting this issue and helping us improve our security.

Due to a permissive regular expression hardcoded for filtering allowed hosts to register a dynamic client, a malicious user with enough information about the environment could benefit and jeopardize an environment with this specific Dynamic Client Registration with TrustedDomain configuration previously unauthorized. #### Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Bastian Kanbach for reporting this issue and helping us improve our security.

Keycloak allows arbitrary URLs as SAML Assertion Consumer Service POST Binding URL (ACS), including JavaScript URIs (javascript:). Allowing JavaScript URIs in combination with HTML forms leads to JavaScript evaluation in the context of the embedding origin on form submission. #### Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Lauritz Holtmann for reporting this issue and helping us improve our project.

Keycloak does not correctly validate its client step-up authentication. A password-authed attacker could use this flaw to register a false second auth factor, alongside the existing one, to a targeted account. The second factor then permits step-up authentication.

An issue was found in the redirect_uri validation logic that allows for a bypass of otherwise explicitly allowed hosts.

Versions of the BlazeMeter Jenkins plugin prior to 4.22 contain a flaw which results in credential enumeration.

### Summary There is a potential cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability that can be exploited via maliciously crafted user data. Our filter to detect and prevent the use of the `javascript:` URL scheme in the `href` attribute of an `<a>` tag could be bypassed with tab `\t` or newline `\n` characters between the characters of the protocol, e.g. `java\tscript:`. ### Impact If you render an `<a>` tag with an `href` attribute set to a user-provided link, that link could potentially execute JavaScript when clicked by another user. ```ruby a(href: user_profile) { "Profile" } ``` ### Mitigation The best way to mitigate this vulnerability is to update to one of the following versions: - [1.10.1](https://rubygems.org/gems/phlex/versions/1.10.1) - [1.9.2](https://rubygems.org/gems/phlex/versions/1.9.2) - [1.8.3](https://rubygems.org/gems/phlex/versions/1.8.3) - [1.7.2](https://rubygems.org/gems/phlex/versions/1.7.2) - [1.6.3](https://rubygems.org/gems/phlex/versions/1.6.3) - [1.5.3](htt...