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ABB Cylon Aspect 3.08.02 (webServerUpdate.php) Input Validation Config Poisoning

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from improper input validation on the port POST parameter in the webServerUpdate.php script. This input is not validated on the server side and relies on bypassable client-side checks using the inString.js script to verify that the port parameter contains only characters from the set (0123456789). Attackers can bypass these checks and supply arbitrary integer values. Exploitation of this issue can result in configuration poisoning, Denial of Service (DoS) through malformed configurations, or manipulation of server settings via Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) combined with authentication bypass.

Zero Science Lab
#csrf#vulnerability#web#linux#dos#apache#js#java#intel#php#auth
India Readies Overhauled National Data Privacy Rules

The country awaits implementation guidelines for a framework that gives Indians greater autonomy and security over their personal data — and recognizes a right to personal privacy.

Green Bay Packers' Online Pro Shop Sacked by Payment Skimmer

Cyberattackers injected the NFL Wild Card team's online Pro Shop with malicious code to steal credit card data from 8,500 fans.

ABB Cylon Aspect 3.08.03 (MapServicesHandler) Authenticated Reflected XSS

The ABB BMS/BAS controller suffers from an authenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability. Input passed to the GET parameters 'name' and 'id' is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site.

GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6: fetch: Authorization headers not dropped when redirecting cross-origin

### Summary When you send a request with the `Authorization` header to one domain, and the response asks to redirect to a different domain, Deno's`fetch()` redirect handling creates a follow-up redirect request that keeps the original `Authorization` header, leaking its content to that second domain. ### Details The [right behavior](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#ref-for-cors-non-wildcard-request-header-name) would be to drop the `Authorization` header instead, in this scenario. The same is generally applied to `Cookie` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers, and is done for not only host changes, but also protocol/port changes. Generally referred to as "origin". The [documentation](https://docs.deno.com/runtime/reference/web_platform_apis/#:~:text=Deno%20does%20not%20follow%20the,leaking%20authenticated%20data%20cross%20origin.) states: > Deno does not follow the same-origin policy, because the Deno user agent currently does not have the concept of origins, and it does not have a cook...

GHSA-7m27-7ghc-44w9: Next.js Allows a Denial of Service (DoS) with Server Actions

### Impact A Denial of Service (DoS) attack allows attackers to construct requests that leaves requests to Server Actions hanging until the hosting provider cancels the function execution. _Note: Next.js server is idle during that time and only keeps the connection open. CPU and memory footprint are low during that time._ Deployments without any protection against long running Server Action invocations are especially vulnerable. Hosting providers like Vercel or Netlify set a default maximum duration on function execution to reduce the risk of excessive billing. This is the same issue as if the incoming HTTP request has an invalid `Content-Length` header or never closes. If the host has no other mitigations to those then this vulnerability is novel. This vulnerability affects only Next.js deployments using Server Actions. ### Patches This vulnerability was resolved in Next.js 14.2.21, 15.1.2, and 13.5.8. We recommend that users upgrade to a safe version. ### Workarounds There ar...

GHSA-8fx8-pffw-w498: SiYuan has an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability

### Summary A **arbitrary file deletion vulnerability** has been identified in the latest version of Siyuan Note. The vulnerability exists in the `POST /api/history/getDocHistoryContent` endpoint.An attacker can craft a payload to exploit this vulnerability, resulting in the deletion of arbitrary files on the server. ### Details The vulnerability can be reproduced by sending a crafted request to the `/api/history/getDocHistoryContent` endpoint. Sending a request to the `/api/history/getDocHistoryContent` like: ``` curl "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/history/getDocHistoryContent" -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"historyPath":"<abs_filepath_of_a_file>"}' ``` Replace `<abs_filepath_of_a_file>` with the absolute file path of the target file you wish to delete. The `historyPath` parameter in the payload is processed by the `func getDocHistoryContent` in `api/history.go:133`. In turn, `historyPath` is passed to the `func GetDocHistoryContent` located in `model/history....

ABB Cylon Aspect 4.00.00 (factorySaved.php) Unauthenticated XSS

The ABB Cylon Aspect BMS/BAS controller suffers from an unauthenticated reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in the 'title' GET parameter. Input is not properly sanitized before being returned to the user, allowing the execution of arbitrary HTML/JS code in a user's browser session in the context of the affected site. While the factory test scripts included in the upgrade bundle are typically deleted, a short window for exploitation exists when the device is in the manufacturing phase.

GHSA-94p5-r7cc-3rpr: path-sanitizer allows bypassing the existing filters to achieve path-traversal vulnerability

### Summary This is a POC for a path-sanitizer [npm package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/path-sanitizer). The filters can be bypassed and can result in path traversal. Payload: `..=%5c` can be used to bypass this on CLI (along with other candidates). Something similar would likely work on web apps as well. ### PoC Here's the code to test for the filter bypass: ```js const sanitize = require("path-sanitizer") const path = require("path") const fs = require("fs") // Real scenario: function routeHandler(myPath) { // Lets just assume that the path was extracted from the request // We want to read a file in the C:\Users\user\Desktop\myApp\ directory // But the user should be able to access C:\Users\user\Desktop\ // So we need to sanitize the path const APP_DIR = "/var/hacker" const sanitized = path.join(APP_DIR, sanitize(myPath)) // Now we would usally read the file // But in this case we just gonna print the path // console.log(sanitized) return sanitized } fu...