Bogus job offers and unrevoked permissions are to blame for a massive crypto-heist which took place earlier this year.
The post Fake job offer leads to $600 million theft appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Back in March, popular NFT battler Axie Infinity lay at the heart of a huge cryptocurrency theft inflicted on the Ronin network. From the Ronin newsletter:

> There has been a security breach on the Ronin Network. Earlier today, we discovered that on March 23rd, Sky Mavis’s Ronin validator nodes and Axie DAO validator nodes were compromised resulting in 173,600 Ethereum and 25.5M USDC drained from the Ronin bridge in two transactions. The attacker used hacked private keys in order to forge fake withdrawals. We discovered the attack this morning after a report from a user being unable to withdraw 5k ETH from the bridge.

These validator nodes act as a means to prevent criminals making off with lots of money. In order to put together a bogus transaction, they’d need to gain access to 5 out of 9 validator nodes. The successful attack happened over 2 stages.

An unwary employee provided one foot in the door. An unrevoked permission elsewhere kicked it wide open.

**The trap is set**

According to The Block, everything fell into place thanks to a senior engineer at the game developer. Two inside sources claim the engineer was fooled by a fake job offer. In fact, it seems multiple employees were approached and encouraged to put in applications. Scams originating from LinkedIn accounts are popular at the moment. As it happens, this is where scammers tried to persuade various people on the development team.

One individual is all it took to empty out a big slice of cryptocurrency funds. A job offer made after several interviews was enough to convince the victim to get on board. Perhaps the “extremely generous” compensation package offered should have set off some alarm bells. Having said that, anything digital finance related likely has huge amounts of cash available.

**We rate this job offer a 4 out of 5**

Unbeknownst to the engineer, everything came crashing down once they received the job offer. A booby-trapped PDF granted the attackers access to Ronin systems, and they were able to compromise 4 out of the required 5 nodes.

Just one node remained to be compromised. How did they do it?

Step up to the plate, non-revoked access. When employees leave an organisation, it’s a good idea to remove access to networks and devices. Unknown entities will happily make use of unattended credentials or permissions. Sure enough, that’s what happened here.

**Nudging a node**

A Decentralised Autonomous Organization (DAO) is a way for people in a community to make decisions on a project. The developers approached an Axie DAO for assistance with transactions in November 2021. Ultimately, this is where the fifth node compromise starts to take shape. The issue isn’t that the DAO exists. The issue is the permissions granted to the DAO.

From the Substack post detailing the attack:

> At the time, Sky Mavis controlled 4/9 validators, which would not be enough to forge withdrawals. The validator key scheme is set up to be decentralized so that it limits an attack vector, similar to this one, but the attacker found a backdoor through our gas-free RPC node, which they abused to get the signature for the Axie DAO validator.  
> 
> This traces back to November 2021 when Sky Mavis requested help from the Axie DAO to distribute free transactions due to an immense user load. The Axie DAO allowlisted Sky Mavis to sign various transactions on its behalf. This was discontinued in December 2021, but the allowlist access was not revoked.

**Who takes the blame?**

In April, the US Department of Treasury pinned this one on North Korean hacking group Lazarus. Research elsewhere details Lazarus attacks on both the aerospace and defence sector involving bogus job posts. There’s no mention of those attacks having any connection to what happened above. However, the research does highlight further recruitment scams using LinkedIn as the starting point.

Whether you’re operating in a cryptocurrency / web3 realm or not, forgotten permissions could cost you dearly. There’s also the fake job offer approach to consider, too. In recent months we’ve seen other game developers targeted. Deepfakes are now worming their way into the bogus job scene. Malware is rife in this sort of operation, so please be cautious around any promising new offer.

Fake job offer leads to $600 million theft

CHICAGO, July 8, 2022 /PRNewswire/ -- According to a research report "Security Orchestration, Automation and Response (SOAR) Market **by Offering (Platform & Solutions, Services), Application (Threat Intelligence, Network Forensics, Compliance), Deployment Mode, Organization Size, Vertical and Region - Global Forecast to 2027**," published by MarketsandMarkets™, the global SOAR Market size is expected to grow from an estimated value of USD 1.1 billion in 2022 to USD 2.3 billion by 2027, at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 15.8% from 2022 to 2027. As SOAR helps security team to fight against alert fatigue, growing incidents of phishing emails and ransomware is driving the market growth.

_Browse in-depth TOC on_ **"Security Orchestration, Automation and Response Market"****398 – Tables  
39 – Figures  
282 – Pages**

**Download PDF Brochure:** https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/pdfdownloadNew.asp?id=176584778

**By offerings, services segment to grow at higher CAGR during forecast period**

Services involve support offered by security vendors to assist their customers to use and maintain security products efficiently. With the increasing sophistication in cyberattacks, organizations are adopting security services to address risks related to cyber threats as well as prevent them. The security services market is segmented across two major types: professional services and managed services. These services enhance the security portfolio of enterprises and safeguard their systems from unauthorized access, exploitation, and data loss. With the increasing digitalization and changing regulatory norms, customers need continuous guidance from SOAR implementation experts. This expertise gathered from managed services helps consumers design customized solutions for their business processes. MSPs also ensure customers are aware of the Return on Investment (RoI) on their security platform.

**By deployment mode, cloud segment to grow at higher CAGR during forecast period**

With the rapid digital transformation, organizations are changing their operating models and embracing cloud-based solutions. Cloud-based deployment offers several benefits to organizations, such as scalability and agility, reduce physical infrastructure, less maintenance cost, and 24/7 data accessibility from anytime, anywhere. Thus, organizations are adopting cost-effective SOAR solutions to prevent and protect volumes of data from cyberattacks. Cloud platforms automate all the process in an organization that falls short of staff to monitor security operations. These platforms also offer additional support and consulting services.

**Speak to Analyst:** https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/speaktoanalystNew.asp?id=176584778

**By Region, Asia Pacific to grow at a higher CAGR during the forecast period.**

Asia Pacific comprises some of the world's largest economies, such as China, India, Japan, and Australia. The cyber threat landscape in these countries is changing every day, with threats experienced by organizations increasing at an alarming rate. In 2021, the most targeted region for cyberattacks was Asia Pacific, it accounted for one in four cybersecurity attacks launched worldwide. The most incidents in the region were experienced by Japan, Australia, and India, where server access and ransomware were amongst the most popular forms of attacks. The type of threats faced by Asia Pacific countries is also changing and growing more complex each day. Asia Pacific is also proactively leading the charge in the development and adoption of many new technologies, including smart cities. As more and more technologies or complex projects are being taken up, the region also becomes increasingly vulnerable to more sophisticated threats. To address these increasing vulnerabilities, many companies are expanding into Asia Pacific. For example, Swimlane, a major vendor of SOAR has extended its cloud-based security automation into Asia Pacific Japan (APJ) amid momentous growth in region.

**Key Players**

Major vendors in the global **Security Orchestration, Automation and Response (SOAR) Market** include IBM (US), Cisco (US), Rapid7 (US), Palo Alto Networks (US), Splunk (US), Swimlane (US), Tufin (US), Fortinet (US), ThreatConnect (US), Trellix (US), Sumo Logic (US), Siemplify (US), LogRhythm (US), Resolve (US), Exabeam (US), manageEngine (US), KnowBe4 (US), D3 Security (Canada), Qvine (US), Cyware (US), LogicHub (US), Cyberbit (US), Logsign (Netherland), SIRP (UK), Tines (Ireland).

**Browse Adjacent Markets:** Information Security Market Research Reports & Consulting

**Related Reports**

Cybersecurity Market by Component (Software, Hardware, and Services), Software (IAM, Encryption, APT, Firewall), Security Type, Deployment Mode, Organization Size, Vertical, and Region (2022 - 2026)

Security Information and Event Management Market by Component, Application, Deployment Mode, Organization Size, Vertical (Information, Finance and Insurance, Healthcare and Social Assistance, Utilities), and Region - Global Forecast to 2025

**About MarketsandMarkets™**

MarketsandMarkets™ provides quantified B2B research on 30,000 high growth niche opportunities/threats which will impact 70% to 80% of worldwide companies' revenues. Currently servicing 7500 customers worldwide including 80% of global Fortune 1000 companies as clients. Almost 75,000 top officers across eight industries worldwide approach MarketsandMarkets™ for their painpoints around revenues decisions.

Our 850 fulltime analyst and SMEs at MarketsandMarkets™ are tracking global high growth markets following the "Growth Engagement Model – GEM". The GEM aims at proactive collaboration with the clients to identify new opportunities, identify most important customers, write "Attack, avoid and defend" strategies, identify sources of incremental revenues for both the company and its competitors. MarketsandMarkets™ now coming up with 1,500 MicroQuadrants (Positioning top players across leaders, emerging companies, innovators, strategic players) annually in high growth emerging segments. MarketsandMarkets™ is determined to benefit more than 10,000 companies this year for their revenue planning and help them take their innovations/disruptions early to the market by providing them research ahead of the curve.

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SOAR Market Worth $2.3 Billion by 2027, According to Exclusive Report by MarketsandMarkets

Threat actor released decryption keys after abandoning malware to focus on cryptojacking

Adam Bannister 08 July 2022 at 15:40 UTC

Threat actor released decryption keys after abandoning malware to focus on cryptojacking

Malware protection specialist Emsisoft has released free decryption tools for the AstraLocker and Yashma ransomware variants.

The decryptors were recently uploaded to the VirusTotal malware analysis platform by the ransomware’s developer after they reportedly shut down their operation in order to pivot to cryptojacking.

The AstraLocker decryptor and Yashma decryptor join a host of other decryptors made available for free by Emsisoft, a New Zealand-based outfit.

**Using the decryptor**

“Be sure to quarantine the malware from your system first, or it may repeatedly lock

your system or encrypt files,” reads a guide (PDF) on how to use the AstraLocker tool.

For systems compromised via Windows Remote Desktop, users are advised to change passwords for all users permitted to login remotely and check local user accounts for additional accounts the attacker might have added.

Catch up with the latest ransomware news and attacks

By default, the AstraLocker decryptor pre-populates locations selected for decryption from network and connected drives, but users can add other locations before initiating the decryption process.

The decryptor also defaults to leaving encrypted files in place, although users can enable automatic deletion if disk space is an issue.

“Since the ransomware does not save any information about the unencrypted files, the decryptor can’t guarantee that the decrypted data is identical to the one that was previously encrypted,” the guide warns.

**BabyK offspring**

AstraLocker, which emerged in 2021, is seemingly built on Babuk (or BabyK), a variant deployed via a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, according to a ReversingLabs analysis of the latter’s leaked source code.

Files are encrypted using a modified HC-128 encryption algorithm and Curve25519 cryptographic function, and or extensions are appended to encrypted files.

Yashma – or ‘AstraLocker 2.0’ – harnesses AES-128 and RSA-2048 to encrypt files and appends encrypted files with the extension or a random four-character alphanumeric combination.

According to ReversingLabs, AstraLocker 2.0 is smuggled into networks via malicious Microsoft Office files.

This ‘smash and grab’ attack methodology is suggestive of a low-skill threat actor, argued Joseph Edwards, senior malware researcher at ReversingLabs.

“This underscores the risk posed to organizations following code leaks like that affecting Babuk, as a large population of low-skill, high-motivation actors leverage the leaked code for use in their own attacks.”

RELATED Ransomware market evolution results in fewer variants, but rise in off-the-shelf cybercrime kits continues

AstraLocker ransomware decryptors released by Emsisoft

File upload vulnerability in GFI Mail Archiver versions up to and including 15.1 via insecure implementation of Telerik Web UI plugin which is affected by CVE-2014-2217, and CVE-2017-11317.

CVE-2021-29281: Unrestricted File Upload | OWASP Foundation

A radio control system for drones is vulnerable to remote takeover, thanks to a weakness in the mechanism that binds transmitter and receiver.

A radio control system for drones is vulnerable to remote takeover, thanks to a weakness in the mechanism that binds transmitter and receiver.

The popular protocol for radio controlled (RC) aircraft called ExpressLRS can be hacked in only a few steps, according to a bulletin published last week.

ExpressLRS is an open-source long range radio link for RC applications, such as first-person view (FPV) drones. “Designed to be the best FPV Racing link,” wrote its authors on Github. According to the report the hack utilizes “a highly optimized over-the-air packet structure, giving simultaneous range and latency advantages.”

The vulnerability in the protocol is tied to the fact some of the information sent over via over-the-air packets is link data that a third-party can use to hijack the connection between drone operator and drone.

Anyone with the ability to monitor traffic between an ExpressLRS transmitter and receiver can hijack the communication, which “could result in full control over the target craft. An aircraft already in the air would likely experience control issues causing a crash.”

****Weakness in Drone Protocol** **

The ExpressLRS protocol utilizes what is called a “binding phrase,” a kind of identifier that ensures the correct transmitter is talking to the correct receiver. The phrase is encrypted using MD5 – a hashing algorithm that’s been considered broken (PDF) for nearly a decade. As noted in the bulletin, “the binding phrase is not for security, it is anti-collision,” and security weaknesses associated with the phrase could allow an attacker to “extract part of the identifier shared between the receiver and transmitter.”

The core of the problem is tied to the “sync packets” – data communicated between transmitter and receiver at regular intervals to ensure they are synced up. These packets leak much of the binding phrase’s unique identifier (UID) – specifically, “75% of the bytes required to take over the link.”

That leaves only 25% – only one byte of data – left open. At this point, the report author explained, the remaining bit of the UID can be brute forced, or gathered “by observing packets over the air without brute forcing the sequences, but that this can be more time consuming and error prone.”

If an attacker has the UID in hand, they can connect with the receiver – the target aircraft – and take at least partial control over it.

The author of the bulletin recommended the following actions be taken, to patch over the vulnerabilities in ExpressLRS. Do not send the UID over the control link. The data used to generate the FHSS sequence should not be sent over the air. Improve the random number generator. This could involve using a more secure algorithm, or adjusting the existing algorithm to work around repeated sequences.

Hack Allows Drone Takeover Via ‘ExpressLRS’ Protocol

Tenda AC23 v16.03.07.44 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the AdvSetMacMtuWan function.

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CVE-2022-32383: Vuln/Tenda AC23.pdf at main · LuGakki/Vuln

Use of hard-coded credentials vulnerability exists in Machine automation controller NJ series all models V 1.48 and earlier, Machine automation controller NX7 series all models V1.28 and earlier, Machine automation controller NX1 series all models V1.48 and earlier, Automation software 'Sysmac Studio' all models V1.49 and earlier, and Programable terminal (PT) NA series NA5-15W/NA5-12W/NA5-9W/NA5-7W models Runtime V1.15 and earlier, which may allow a remote attacker who successfully obtained the user credentials by analyzing the affected product to access the controller.

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CVE-2022-34151

Authentication bypass by capture-replay vulnerability exists in Machine automation controller NX7 series all models V1.28 and earlier, Machine automation controller NX1 series all models V1.48 and earlier, and Machine automation controller NJ series all models V 1.48 and earlier, which may allow an adjacent attacker who can analyze the communication between the controller and the specific software used by OMRON internally to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition or execute a malicious program.

%PDF-1.7 %���� 396 0 obj <> endobj 413 0 obj <>/Encrypt 397 0 R/Filter/FlateDecode/ID\[<1B0A0832795B6645A2C6347810CA7DD5><1DE4824CD3E08B4A92A0C07E4F62D576>\]/Index\[396 40\]/Info 395 0 R/Length 91/Prev 232253/Root 398 0 R/Size 436/Type/XRef/W\[1 3 1\]>>stream h�bbd\`\`\`b\`\`�"��H�� �i �d1��"��\`�,�Ln�@��\`�L��3�8 bo����Y�e��00����� @��3V endstream endobj startxref 0 %%EOF 435 0 obj <>stream �"�B��ـ�%�75��3y�%�S\[r���jw���Z�|/�t����w���mRQѦ���~9q�ەx74ه}�'Z&�� �s!��i�d��z�N���cs6=Z�1W,Ҳq; ���6)�:�����a������\_t�==����@8$+8� �\[:D'w�����r endstream endobj 397 0 obj <>>>/Filter/Standard/Length 128/O(��������Q�Ro,�\\)�C��19+���J)/P -1324/R 4/StmF/StdCF/StrF/StdCF/U(����h�����<�hRC)/V 4>> endobj 398 0 obj <>/Metadata 13 0 R/PageLayout/SinglePage/Pages 394 0 R/StructTreeRoot 22 0 R/Type/Catalog/ViewerPreferences 414 0 R>> endobj 399 0 obj <>/MediaBox\[0 0 595.32 841.92\]/Parent 394 0 R/Resources<>/Font<>/ProcSet\[/PDF/Text/ImageB/ImageC/ImageI\]>>/Rotate 0/StructParents 0/Tabs/S/Type/Page>> endobj 400 0 obj <>stream {;�n#�r�I�6M�� ��7�0w�EJIۓ�"��@HO0\*O�5���痪�M������k�R����C�����m��;�� �Zf����5�vN��D�\_�r��ƀ�N?4������3GL�N����͡�^�9F�~�߸���#p�����V�#�Z��bd��n�F����J���b yڼ��Y��� �Iuy>웹��=�7=-Q<�)RB��\\TS<���\*�m���,<�曺��q\`�����1����u%�+�V�ܷ\]e�{߀�ً�J2��������F$~�����Ѳ�jl�m�T�pE:���.o�U����3��̊�(�l��T�Z{3<3 \\�y��+^���^�ɑyF�� �Ӝ�P�X�ikR- �Pz<2g�� Md؈,I����oj\\^��;�X�c�&�

CVE-2022-33971

PDFAlto v0.4 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via the component /pdfalto/src/pdfalto.cc.

sample here:  
heap-bufferoverflow-pos-)%at pdfalto.zip

**Describe info：  
$ ./pdfalto heap-bufferoverflow-pos->at\\ pdfalto.cc:190:5**

\==43072==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6040000000f1 at pc 0x00000043f92b bp 0x7fff65e8f0f0 sp 0x7fff65e8e8a0  
WRITE of size 33 at 0x6040000000f1 thread T0  
#0 0x43f92a in strncat /home/bupt/Desktop/tools/llvm-12.0.1/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan\_interceptors.cpp:397  
#1 0x503603 in main /home/bupt/Desktop/pdfalto/src/pdfalto.cc:190:5  
#2 0x7f8cfec7dc86 in \_\_libc\_start\_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310  
#3 0x422ca9 in \_start (/home/bupt/Desktop/pdfalto/build/pdfalto+0x422ca9)

0x6040000000f1 is located 0 bytes to the right of 33-byte region \[0x6040000000d0,0x6040000000f1)  
allocated by thread T0 here:  
#0 0x4b5270 in malloc /home/bupt//tools/llvm-12.0.1/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan\_malloc\_linux.cpp:145  
#1 0x5035f1 in main /home/bupt/Desktop/pdfalto/src/pdfalto.cc:189:22  
#2 0x7f8cfec7dc86 in \_\_libc\_start\_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/bupt//tools/llvm-12.0.1/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan\_interceptors.cpp:397 in strncat  
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:  
0x0c087fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0x0c087fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0x0c087fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0x0c087fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0x0c087fff8000: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 04  
\=>0x0c087fff8010: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00\[01\]fa  
0x0c087fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c087fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c087fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c087fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c087fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):  
Addressable: 00  
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07  
Heap left redzone: fa  
Freed heap region: fd  
Stack left redzone: f1  
Stack mid redzone: f2  
Stack right redzone: f3  
Stack after return: f5  
Stack use after scope: f8  
Global redzone: f9  
Global init order: f6  
Poisoned by user: f7  
Container overflow: fc  
Array cookie: ac  
Intra object redzone: bb  
ASan internal: fe  
Left alloca redzone: ca  
Right alloca redzone: cb  
Shadow gap: cc  
\==43072==ABORTING

CVE-2022-32324: heap-buffer-overflow found? · Issue #144 · kermitt2/pdfalto

The Call For Papers has been announced for the Workshop on CPS and IoT Security and Privacy (CPSIoTSec 2022). It will be held in Los Angeles, CA, USA on November 7th through the 11th, 2022.

    [Apologies for cross-posting]--------------------------------------------------------------------------C a l l     F o r     P a p e r sThe Workshop on CPS&IoT Security and Privacy (CPSIoTSec 2022), in conjunction with the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS)November 7-11, 2022, Los Angeles, U.S.A.https://cpsiotsec2022.github.io/cpsiotsec/--------------------------------------------------------------------------CPSIoTSec 2022 invites academia, industry, and governmental entities to submit:Original research papers on the security and privacy of CPS&IoTSystematization of Knowledge (SoK) papers on the security and privacy of CPS&IoTDemos (hands-on or videos) of testbeds/experiences of CPS&IoT security and privacy research--------------------------------------------------------------------------We seek submissions from multiple interdisciplinary backgrounds tackling security and privacy issues in CPS&IoT, including but not limited to:- Mathematical foundations for secure CPS/IoT- Control-theoretic approaches- High assurance security architectures- Security and resilience metrics- Metrics and risk assessment approaches- Identity and access management- Privacy and trust- Network security- Game theory applied to CPS/IoT security- Human factors, humans in the loop, and usable security- Understanding dependencies among security, reliability and safety in CPS/IoT- Economics of security and privacy- Intrusion and anomaly detection- Model-based security systems engineering- Sensor and actuator attacks- CPS/IoT malware analysis- CPS/IoT firmware analysis- Hardware-assisted CPS/IoT securityAlso of interest will be papers that can point the research community to new research directions, and those that can set research agendas and priorities in CPS/IoT security and privacy. There will be a best paper and best presentation award.New Process for Selecting the Best Paper Award: Following the success of the 2021 process and in the interest of increasing transparency, the PC will select upto 3 top-rated papers based on reviews and place them in a single session. Then the audience will vote on what they think should be the best paper after viewing the presentations.------------------------------SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS:Submissions include long papers (12 pages), short papers (6 pages), or 1-page abstracts:Long papers include a) Original research on a CPS/IoT security and privacy topic, b) Systematization of Knowledge of CPS/IoT security and privacy;Short papers include original work-in-progress research on a CPS/IoT security and privacy topic;1-page abstracts include demos/interesting findings/insights on CPS/IoT security and privacy, which will be accompanied by a hands-on demo during the workshop.Submitted papers can be up to 12 or 6 pages excluding appendices and references. Submissions must use the ACM SIG Proceedings Templates, with a simpler version here: https://github.com/acmccs/format. Only PDF files will be accepted. Accepted papers will be published by the ACM Press and/or the ACM Digital Library. Submissions must not substantially overlap with papers that have been published or that are simultaneously submitted to a journal or a conference with proceedings. Each accepted paper must be presented by a registered author. Submissions not meeting these guidelines risk immediate rejection. For questions about these policies, please contact the chairs.Paper Submission Site: https://cpsiotsec22.hotcrp.com------------------------------IMPORTANT DATES:• Submission Deadline: *** July 25, 2022 *** Firm deadline (23:59 Anywhere on Earth time)• Notification of Acceptance/Rejection: 18 August, 2022• Camera Ready Papers Due: (hard deadline): September 5, 2022------------------------------ORGANIZING COMMITTEE:Program Committee Chairs:- Cristina Alcaraz, University of Malaga, Spain- Earlence Fernandes, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USAProgram Committee:- Mauro Conti, University of Padua- Amir Rahmati, Stony Brook University- Z. Berkay Celik, Oregon State University- Nils Ole Tippenhauer, CISPA- Alvaro Cardenas, UCSC- Luis Garcia, USC- Sara Rampazzi, University of Florida- Alfred Chen, UCI- Peng Liu, Penn State University- Gang Tan, Penn State University- Saman Zonouz, GaTech- Danny Huang, NYU- Awais Rashid, University of Bristol- Gerhard Hancke, City University of Hong Kong- Charalambos Konstantinou, KAUST- Sokratis Katsikas, Norwegian University of Science and Technology- Emil Lupu, Imperial College- Yuqing Zhang, NIPC- Le Guan, University of Georgia- Vasileios Gkioulos, Norwegian University of Science and Technology- George Stergiopoulos, University of the Aegean- Weizhi Meng, Technical Universtiy of Denmark- Monowar Hasan, Wichita State University- Magnus Almgren, Chalmers- Yongkai Fan, China University of Petroleum- Ebelechukwu Nwafor, Villanova- Alessandro Brighente, University of Padua- Stefano Longari, Politecnico di Milano- Sridhar Adepu, University of BristolSteering Committee:- Rakesh Bobba, Oregon State University- Alvaro Cardenas, University of California, Santa Cruz- Peng Liu, Penn State University- Sibin Mohan, Oregon State University- Awais Rashid, University of Bristol- Gang Tan, Penn State University- Nils Ole Tippenhauer, CISPA- Roshan Thomas, MITRE- Yuqing Zhang, University of CASPublicity Chair:- Li Wenjuan, City University of Hong KongWeb Chair and Voting Manager:- Amrita Ghosal, University of Limerick, Ireland

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