#web

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global).  View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 6.1 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Siemens Equipment: RUGGEDCOM APE1808 Vulnerabilities: Network Amplification, Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere, External Control of File Name or Path, Cross-site Scripting, Insufficiently Protected Credentials, Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow a network-based attacker to conduct reflected and amplified TCP denial-of-service (RDoS) attacks. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following versions of Siemens RUGGEDCO...

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A critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability was identified in the aimhubio/aim project, specifically within the `/api/runs/search/run/` endpoint, affecting versions >= 3.0.0. The vulnerability resides in the `run_search_api` function of the `aim/web/api/runs/views.py` file, where improper restriction of user access to the `RunView` object allows for the execution of arbitrary code via the `query` parameter. This issue enables attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the server, potentially leading to full system compromise.

### Impact Parameters of UI extensions are always interpreted as Velocity code and executed with programming rights. Any user with edit right on any document like the user's own profile can create UI extensions. This allows remote code execution and thereby impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce, edit your user profile with the object editor and add a UIExtension object with the following values: ``` Extension Point ID: org.xwiki.platform.panels.Applications Extension ID: platform.panels.myFakeApplication Extension parameters:  label=I got programming right: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming') target=Main.WebHome targetQueryString= icon=icon:bomb Extension Scope: "Current User". ``` Save the document and open any document. If an application entry with the text "I got programming right: true" is displayed, the attack succeeded, if the code in "label" is displayed literally, the XWiki installation isn'...

### Impact At the end of the request handling, it will encrypt all data in the session with a secret key and attach the ciphertext as a cookie value with the defined cookie name. After that, the session on the server side is destroyed. When an encrypted cookie with matching session name is provided with subsequent requests, it will decrypt the ciphertext to get the data. The plugin then creates a new session with the data in the ciphertext. Thus theoretically the web instance is still accessing the data from a server-side session, but technically that session is generated solely from a user provided cookie (which is assumed to be non-craftable because it is encrypted with a secret key not known to the user). The issue exists in the session removal process. In the delete function of the code, when the session is deleted, it is marked for deletion. However, if an attacker could gain access to the cookie, they could keep using it forever. ### Patches Fixed in 56d66642ecc633cff06069276...

### Impact When the realtime editor is installed in XWiki, it allows arbitrary remote code execution with the interaction of an admin user with programming right. More precisely, by getting an admin user to either visit a crafted URL or to view an image with this URL that could be in a comment, the attacker can get the admin to execute arbitrary XWiki syntax including scripting macros with Groovy or Python code. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce on an XWiki installation, as an admin, click on `<xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/get/RTFrontend/ConvertHTML?wiki=xwiki&space=Main&page=WebHome&text=%7B%7Bvelocity%7D%7D%24logtool.error%28%22Hello%20from%20Velocity%20%21%22%29%7B%7B%2Fvelocity%7D%7D`. If the error "Hello from Velocity!" gets logged then the installation is vulnerable. ### Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.4 and 15.9. ### Workarounds Update `RTFrontend.ConvertHTML` following t...

### Impact By creating a document with a special crafted documented reference and an `XWiki.SchedulerJobClass` XObject, it is possible to execute arbitrary code on the server whenever an admin visits the scheduler page or the scheduler page is referenced, e.g., via an image in a comment on a page in the wiki. To reproduce on an XWiki installation, click on this link to create a new document : `<xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/%22%3E%5D%5D%7B%7B%2Fhtml%7D%7D%7B%7Basync%20context%3D%22request/parameters%22%7D%7D%7B%7Bvelocity%7D%7D%23evaluate%28%24request/eval%29/`. Then, add to this document an object of type `XWiki.SchedulerJobClass`. Finally, as an admin, go to `<xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Scheduler/?eval=$services.logging.getLogger(%22attacker%22).error(%22Hello%20from%20URL%20Parameter!%20I%20got%20programming:%20$services.security.authorization.hasAccess(%27programming%27)%22)`. If the logs contain `ERROR attacker - Hello from URL Parameter! I got programming: true`, the installation ...