#web

Jenkins GitLab Branch Source Plugin 684.vea_fa_7c1e2fe3 and earlier uses a non-constant time comparison function when checking whether the provided and expected webhook token are equal, potentially allowing attackers to use statistical methods to obtain a valid webhook token.

Jenkins has a built-in command line interface (CLI) to access Jenkins from a script or shell environment. Since Jenkins 2.217 and LTS 2.222.1, one of the ways to communicate with the CLI is through a WebSocket endpoint. This endpoint relies on the default Jenkins web request authentication functionality, like HTTP Basic authentication with API tokens, or session cookies. This endpoint is enabled when running on a version of Jetty for which Jenkins supports WebSockets. This is the case when using the provided native installers, packages, or the Docker containers, as well as when running Jenkins with the command java -jar jenkins.war. Jenkins 2.217 through 2.441 (both inclusive), LTS 2.222.1 through 2.426.2 (both inclusive) does not perform origin validation of requests made through the CLI WebSocket endpoint, resulting in a cross-site WebSocket hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability.

Gentoo Linux Security Advisory 202401-29 - A vulnerability has been discovered in sudo which can lead to execution manipulation through rowhammer-style memory manipulation. Versions less than 1.9.15_p2 are affected.

Gentoo Linux Security Advisory 202401-28 - Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in GOCR, the worst of which could lead to arbitrary code execution. Versions below or equal to 0.52-r1 are affected.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-0293-03 - Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform release 4.14.10 is now available with updates to packages and images that fix several bugs and add enhancements.

Red Hat Security Advisory 2024-0290-03 - Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform release 4.14.10 is now available with updates to packages and images that fix several bugs and add enhancements.

Gentoo Linux Security Advisory 202401-27 - Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in Ruby, the worst of which could lead to execution of arbitrary code. Multiple versions are affected.

Employee Management System version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

# Introduction This write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.10.1` and was tested on version `1.9.2.post0`. # Overview [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio) had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. This feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. # Description The following [code snippet in Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146) showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. ```python def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, u...

# Introduction This write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.9.2` and was tested on version `1.8.2`. # Overview [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio) has a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability that could be exploited when an authenticated user uploads a crafted image file for their avatar that gets rendered as a HTML file on the website. # Description The following [code snippet in Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/users/functions.py#L18-L49) shows that the only verification check is that the file is an image by extracting the dimensions from the file. ```python def hash_upload(instance, filename): filename = str(uuid.uuid4())[0:8] + '-' + filename return settings.AVATAR_PATH + '/' + filename <3> def check_avatar(files): i...